THE PUBLIC ART OF COMMEMORATING THE WARS OF RESISTANCE: A BRIEF LIMPOPO CHAPTER

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FOREWORD

This study appears almost three decades after Nelson Mandela's inauguration as president of South Africa in 1994. At the time of its publication, all readers aged around thirty and younger, will have lived in a world where this country has "always" had a Northern (since 2003, Limpopo) province and in which the "Transvaal" and "homelands" or "Bantustans" are concepts from history.

It is a book about the making of a province. It is an intricately layered story about how things, thoughts, and practices once new and contested, sometimes remain controversial, however, oftentimes, over time, also become 'taken for granted'. It is about how our ways of seeing the world, although we might think of them as stable, are constantly adjusting. It is about the ways our view of the world is comprised not only of observation, but also of participation, as much in ritualised collective behaviours as through our individual agency and our ability to influence outcomes. This is what visual culture scholar Nicholas Mirzoeff refers to as visuality and counter visuality:[1] the extent to which we either lead or follow in the way our history is being imagined and reimagined as an unfolding of a succession of images towards an idealised future. When we understand the making of these visualities the way Mahunele Thotse explains them—as an amalgamation of governmental, communal, and individual processes of knowledge-making, remembering, and forgetting—we will be able to view our identities as more fluid, and yet embrace them with more confidence, with a stronger sense of the parameters of what was, what is, and what might become possible.

Thotse presents his arguments within the context of international scholarship on the role of public monuments in the making of national identities. As such, his study contributes to public history and historical memory studies, and it will be read as a welcome new contribution by fellow researchers in these fields. The study also contributes to the historiography of the trans-Vaal area.[2] Chapter Three provides a thorough and systematic assessment of the research conducted on the conflicts between African local polities and Boer and British invaders as from the nineteenth century. Many of these studies were submitted as dissertations and theses at the University of

1 See *The right to look. A Counterhistory of Visuality.* (Duke University Press, 2011).

2 Because the area comprised a province of South Africa for the greater part of the twentieth century and before that, was administered for roughly the last half of the nineteenth century as an entity that had accumulated a rich material archive of documentary evidence, it makes sense in historical research to continue to think of the geographical area north of the Vaal River as constitutive of an area of study.

Pretoria and as such, the chapter offers a glimpse of the historical scholarship produced at this institution from the 1940s onwards. By extracting material from these (mostly Afrikaans) studies, Thotse displays the extent to which the scholarly gaze had shifted in less than a century from "seeing" the local African communities as the "problem" to viewing the colonising forces as the aggressors. From the earliest studies, analysing "campaigns against" African polities through to the more recent ones critically engaging with the presence and the policies of Boer and British settlers and administrators, the scholarship culminates in the issues still pertinent today: land and leadership.

Thotse's study is as much a cultural history of the political as a political history of the cultural, of the very particular version of a "southern modernity". Limpopo province encapsulates: The product of a modern, negotiated political settlement, with a democratically elected government, it builds its founding myth on (defeated) "traditional" warrior kings from a precolonial dispensation; incorporating thanksgiving to the ancestors and cleansing rituals into ceremonies presided over by the provincial premier. The apparent contradictions in this sentence are key to a glint of insight into our own South African condition. Modernity entails the ability to recognise the chosen path as "different" from the past and yet to identify certain realms of our continued existence as "traditional". We need myths and rituals to reconcile the two; to act our part, to play at "being both" modern citizen and anchored-to-the-past-human-being.

As such, the warrior king sculptures are rightfully at the core of Thotse's interest; they embody the complexities of the modern South African state within the Limpopo province: the dual tensions of on the one hand, white control relinquished and on the other hand, black traditional leadership harboured in provincial and national government structures. Perhaps this explains why the warrior kings have been imagined and sculpted in a paradigm so different from our modern perceptions of masculine civility—in all probability even the modern aspirations of the warrior kings themselves according to the historical record (contrary to the bare torsos and recurrent display of animal skins and traditional weapons in the statues, visual, and material sources show us that these leaders appropriated western attire and embraced new technologies). However, for the "trick" we, living in the here and now, must perform moving forward while keeping an eye on the rear view mirror of the past, we need to assert ourselves; affirm our dignity, perform our distinctness, somehow make our distance from past visible that must, somehow, have been different from the present. And this, if I am not mistaken, is what Thotse, with an overwhelming display of erudition and informed reasoning, argues: We (as individual members becoming human through our association with many different groups—family, clan, tribe, faith community,

career, province, nation) have the power to observe with a keener eye, investigate more deeply, and choose with more discernment how we wish to act our part in the drama of the present-soon-to-become history. Rather than being 'tricked' into them, we *can* investigate, and we may *know* how, the myths we live by have been constructed.

Lize Kriel
14 August 2023

PREFACE

In South Africa, commemoration of both the Wars of Resistance and the liberation struggles by both whites and blacks have inspired singular energy and purposefulness. South Africans of either the previous white government or of the current black-led government, have struggled over how to memorialise these convulsive experiences. Since then, remembrance of these struggles has produced a vast set of monuments, speeches, poems, re-enactments, photographs, memorial lectures, motion pictures, and other works of art, to mention a few. Through commemorative activities, South Africans have created a kind of public art that addresses issues of nationhood, race relations, gender roles, and cultural continuities in time of upheavals.

Both white and black South Africans have used commemoration to tell stories of the Wars of Resistance and the liberation struggles of their diverse histories. Often these stories have clashed, combined, and changed. Such stories speak of the Wars of Resistance and the liberation struggles; however, they also reveal something of the period and place in which they are told. The commemoration of the Wars of Resistance in Limpopo province provides just one example of the commemoration that calls for examination of the past in the present. Indeed, to examine the public art, for example, statues that commemorate the warrior traditional leaders who fought the "Wars of Resistance against Colonialism and Imperialism" in Limpopo province, is not only to understand a single historical event or to explore just the construction of collective memories in Limpopo province; it is also to recognise issues that continue to play a dynamic role in the South African society to this day. Understanding how the stories of the Wars of Resistance and of the liberation struggles are told and retold, often with different emphases and different goals, sheds light on the issues and ideas that have affected South African society and intergroup relations over time.

This study is centred on commemorative public art, particularly statues to illuminate the construction of collective memories in Limpopo province and its subjectivity as a cultural historical process. This is also a collection of primary texts sometimes in their author's language of origin (verbatim, to maintain authenticity), however, translated to English in the next paragraph to allow for readers of a different language including students and tour guides, to understand these texts and narratives. A brief introduction outlines the phases of commemoration in Limpopo, while describing the most influential forms of shared memory.

Following the introduction, five chapters—focused on commemorating warrior traditional

leaders through public art; "warrior" leaders and the Wars of Resistance; sculpting the warrior traditional leaders; shared memories of the Wars of Resistance in Limpopo province; and unveiling and dedicating the monuments—use rich visual and textual sources to illuminate relations among social groups and contests over values. The illustrations should be seen by students as important documents that enable them to consider works of art as historical evidence. Each image is discussed at length within the narrative, and all captions contain a thought-provoking question to assist students analyse the artwork. In a similar manner, the headnotes to the textual sources provide specific background material for each document and suggest starting points for interpretation. The last chapter shares the author's final thoughts, recommendations, and conclusions.

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I am grateful to UM, Ann Arbor, for the African Presidential Scholarship Award that made this study possible. The African Studies Centre (ASC) International Institute under the directorship of Professor Kelly Askew provided a much needed six months scholarship (February to July) to the UM, Ann Arbor, in 2009 during which I was exposed to rich material on commemoration and construction of collective memories. The ASC further arranged that I continued to receive much needed material until February 2014. Kate Christlieb of the interlibrary loan section at Hatcher Library of the UM played a crucial role in ensuring that I received the material that I needed. Thank you also to the University of Pretoria (UP) for the initial sponsorship that kick-started research on this project. In the same vein, my thanks go to Ms Alett Nell, the History Librarian in the UP Merensky Library for her consistent assistance. At the University of Leiden, my gratitude goes to Ms Mieneke van der Salm of the Social Sciences Library.

I owe special thanks to the families of sculptors Harry Johnson and the late Phil Minnaar for their support and generosity. Harry Johnson shared remembrances of his youth and mother. The Johnson family welcomed my wife and I to their farm and studio in Groblersdal in the Sekhukhune District of Limpopo where they hosted us for two days. Harry not only invited me to his studio, but he also exposed me to some of his primary operations that also informed this study. Both his wife and son shared the family story that chronicled the history of the sculptor's career with us during a braai one evening. Phil Minnaar and his wife also welcomed me to their studio in Garsfontein,

Pretoria East. The Minnaars also shared not only a family scrapbook that articulated the history of Phil's career, but their friendship as well.

I would also like to thank the officials of the Department of Sports, Arts and Culture in Limpopo province namely Mishack Mulaudzi, Donald Lithole, Gezani Mabunda, and Derik de Wet, all of whom were working in the heritage unit of the department and were involved with the Warrior Traditional Leaders' project. The study would not have been a success without their input. Their interviews have enriched this study much more than I could have initially imagined. To the former Premier of the Limpopo province Mr Sello Moloto, thank you for your selflessness and the time you made for me during your hectic schedule. *"Your complementary gift of your speeches continues to be most valuable gift I have ever received from anyone, God bless you."* I wish to also thank Daniel Koma at the Mogalakwena Municipal Offices in Mokopane, Waterberg District for making the much-needed material on Kgoši Mokopane available at a time when I was beginning to get desperate.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ANC	African National Congress
ANCYL	African National Congress Youth League
ASC	African Studies Centre
ASGISA	Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative South Africa
CRMP	Cultural Resource Management Plans
DAC	Department of Arts and Culture
DACST	Department of Arts, Culture, Science, and Technology
DSAC	Department of Sports, Arts and Culture (Limpopo)
EPWP	Extended Public Works Programme
FRELIMO	Mozambique Liberation Front (from the Portuguese Frente de Libertação de Moçambique)
GNU	Government of National Unity
IDPs	Integrated Development Plans
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
JIPSA	Joint Initiatives on Priority Skills Acquisition
LIHRA	Limpopo Heritage Resources Authority
MEC	Member of the Executive Council
NHC	National Heritage Council
NHRA	National Heritage Resources Act
NMC	National Monuments Council
PGDP	Provincial Growth and Development Plan
SAHRA	South African Heritage Resources Agency
SLA	Service Level Agreement
ToR	Terms of Reference
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UM	University of Michigan
UP	University of Pretoria
WKM	Warrior Kings Monument
ZAR	Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek

Chapter One

Situating Commemoration for Wars of Resistance in Limpopo Province

1.1 Introduction and rationale

Today, Sekhukhune, Makhado, Ngungunhane, Malebogo, Makgoba, and Mokopane are readily recalled as important figures of Limpopo province's history. They have become part of the province's collective memory. Through the Mandela government's legacy project that began in 1996, a select group of individual traditional leaders became recognised as historically significant and intrinsic to a conception of provincial, if not national identity. Their associative monumental imagery is essential to what Tony Bennett describes as 'nationing history' and 'historicizing the nation' (Bennett 1995: 1). By the end of 2006, either figurative or abstract monuments to each of these heroic pantheons were visible at various places in the Limpopo province.

In 2004, the Limpopo provincial government appropriated a sum of R6 000 000.00 to erect monuments in the province to the following traditional leaders: Sekhukhune, Makhado, Ngungunhane, Malebogo, Mokopane, and Makgoba. These were subsequently known as the Warrior Kings Monuments (WKM). The provincial Department of Sports, Arts, and Culture (DSAC) through its heritage sub-directorate, was empowered to select sites, commission sculptors to design and carry out the work, supervise the construction and installation of these monuments, and finally facilitate the formal dedication of each monument. The DSAC and its team approached sculptors Harry Johnson, Phil Minnaar, and Andre Otto based on the sculptors' previous work to design and construct the monuments (De Wet 2009).

Despite its cost, pre-eminent locations, and to some extent high artistic merits, the WKM have not been a subject of a detailed investigation until this same author studied it towards the completion of his doctoral studies in 2015. This work represents a version of that study converted into a book form. It considers an examination of the WKM by reconstructing the aesthetic, cultural, and political contexts in which the monuments were created. This study draws out

the war discourses hidden inside the monuments' material resources and written inscriptions, describing, and analysing the communicative resources used in the monument construction to reveal the discourses hidden within this public art form.

Using the monuments in Limpopo, this study explores the multiple ways by which public art was appropriated in the construction of a new public historical consciousness in the years following the first democratic elections in South Africa. The study will also raise questions about some inherent tensions that accompanied the project from its conception in the Limpopo provincial DSAC.

The location (placing) of the subsequent statues in honour of the selected traditional leaders in Limpopo province is also appreciated, as not only a place of social public action; it must be analysed also as a territory of groups. Limpopo's monuments to the traditional leaders are visible markings of such collectively stressed territory. The theory of the imagination of nationalistic ideology, holds that a territory specifically belongs to a certain ethnical group: the term "public space" relates to questions of affiliation and "othering". By all indications, these are political representations and staging in the area that belongs traditionally to the repertoire of (re) presentations of political power. Monuments, like road and place names, as well as "political" or "heroes" squares are important, since they are in principle the most durable media of identity-political markings of public areas. The main function of these markings is the manifestation and/or production of wanted forms of collective memory by material inscriptions into public space, the manufacturing of 'collective identity' and the markings of collectively claimed territory (J. Duncan and N. Duncan 1998: 118).

This study will also examine commemorations and commemorative meanings in Limpopo province. Christian Tileaga concedes that 'there is a struggle over what is the nature of the "object of commemoration" and meaning that is ascribed to it for, and in the name of the "nation" and collective memory' (Tileaga 2008: 359-382). Commemoration as such, has much to do with the field of preservation, especially the historic preservation of war "artefacts" in line with the "Wars of Resistance against Colonialism and Imperialism" theme. Diane Barthel (1996) points out that, '[I]f war is politics continued by other means, preservation is also politics continued by other means. These "means" also revolve around the act of commemoration'. Barthel perceives the act of commemoration as significantly important for a society, especially since war calls for sacrifice in the interest of the nation or its people (Barthel 1996). Therefore, the commemoration of such sacrifices is meant to encourage future sacrifices to be made when the nation's leaders call for it in the interest of national survival and patriotism.

With the above exposition in mind, speeches of the Premier of the Limpopo province and others at the time of commemorations will also be analysed. Images of the past and recollected knowledge of the past (events) are conveyed and sustained within ritual performance of commemorative speeches. Commemorative political speeches are seen as being essential in bringing collective norms and values to a wider audience. The focus is on commemorative political speeches, commemorative addresses in particular. Such addresses are usually characterised as representative and epideictic.

1.2 Relationship between liberation struggles and commemorations

Commemorative monuments have been integral to the establishment of power in historical spheres. Visual displays have been part of the social practices of memory that created and reinforced political communities. In the nineteenth century political monuments were to play an increasingly important role in the construction of national traditions and as spectacles of governmental power (Nora 1996: 2).

After 1994, historians and several politicians argued for the rethinking of the traditional leader of South African history and the need to recognise black African heroes (Coombes 2003: 41; Duara 1995: 27; Henrard 2002; Marschall 2005b). Marschall wrote that around the time of the first general election, the Presidency and the Minister of Arts, Culture, Science, and Technology were reportedly flooded with thousands of letters by individuals and organisations concerned about matters of heritage. They expressed a request for official forms of tribute to those who had made sacrifices for the fight against apartheid and encouraged the acknowledgement of significant sites and events reflecting the history and experiences of previously marginalised communities. The Government of National Unity (GNU) understood such broadly shared sentiments as a mandate to make an urgent, high-profile intervention aimed at facilitating the construction of new monuments, memorials, and museums, as well as encouraging the reinterpretation of existing commemorative markers and their associated historical narratives. In 1996 the Cabinet adopted the National Legacy Project, developed by the Department of Arts, Culture, Science, and Technology (DACST) (Marschall 2009: 169).

The Legacy Project comprised of a selection of nine high-priority heritage developments spread throughout the country, namely: 1) The commemoration of the Zulu warriors at the battlefield of Blood River/Ncome near Dundee in KZN; 2) The Monument for the Women of South Africa at the Union Buildings in Pretoria; 3) The inclusive commemoration of the Centenary of the South African Anglo-Boer War; 4) Constitution Hill (the site of the Old Fort and the new Constitutional Court in Johannesburg); 5) The commemoration of Nelson Mandela's home and sites associated with his youth through the Qunu Museum in the Eastern Cape; 6) A memorial to former Mozambican president Samora Machel on the rural site where his plane crashed near the border town of Mbuzini; 7) The Albert Luthuli project focused on the restoration of his home in Groutville, KZN; 8) A Khoe/San heritage route situated mostly in the Western Cape; and 9) The ambitious Freedom Park outside Pretoria (Marschall 2009: 169).

After the 1997 Cabinet approval of the Legacy Project, a long list of names, of whom the overwhelming majority were those of black historical figures, was drawn with the intention of commemorating them as heroes. These heroes were involved in struggles against colonialism, imperialism, dispossession, segregation, apartheid, and other systems of racial and political or class inequalities. The meanings of their struggles were appropriated into grand, national narratives, which linked the rather relatively peaceful transition into democracy to other liberation struggles and positioned its national heroes as martyrs or fearless warriors upon which the South African nation was imagined (Marschall 2009: 170).

This construction of a national memory developed in tandem with the fashioning of a new cultural imagery based on a "folklorised" South African culture—the African Renaissance. As an addition to the new and modern models of achievement, the "ancestral" heroic figures—warrior traditional leaders and their attending monuments, served to instil a sense of pride and confidence in the South African national leadership. In addition, heroes provided an elongated genealogy of nationhood; each of their "choices" or "revolts" led to the present "condition" of democracy. Moreover, the selection of heroes allowed for an ordered narrative form in which a South African national history can be periodised and thematised (Dacres 2009: 2).

Two characteristics stand out; firstly, the collection of monuments in Limpopo reveals a material preference for bronze. Secondly, all the commissions for the designs of the monuments were won by white sculptors (Harry Johnson, Phil Minnaar, and Andre Otto). Their works allow the viewer to enter the memorial space, reflecting a specific modernist twentieth century approach to the monumental forms. Single figurative statues have been prescribed by the monument guidelines and encouraged the use of a realism or figuration as a prominent stylistic technique. Given Minnaar

and Johnson's statements regarding specific instructions received from government, which are discussed in this study, it can be argued that the preoccupation with discipline, order, and control which became evident in the government's circulars and speeches about the heroes and warriors to affect the consciousness of the new democracy, is built into the design of the monument.

Initially there were to be six sculptures/statues to mirror and portray the prominent black groups of the province: Kgošikgolo Sekhukhune of the BaPedi; Khosikhulu Makhado of the Venda; Hosinkulu Ngungunhane of the Tsonga/Shangaan; Kgoši Mokopane of the Kekana-Ndebele; Kgoši Malebogo of the BaHananwa; and Kgoši Makgoba of the BaTlhalerwa. However, factional fighting among the BaTlhalerwa BaMakgoba and the unavailability of a photo of Traditional leader Mokopane limited the number of monuments to only four. The focus of this study will mostly be on the four existing monuments only. This study notes the existence of the bust of Kgoši Makgoba at the Magoebaskloof Hotel at the top end of the Magoebaskloof Mountain Pass. This bust, however, unlike the other four statues was not commissioned by the Limpopo province; therefore, limited focus will be placed on it later in the study.

The modernist commemorative designs of these statues were promoted with a clear preference for the body in public sculptural form to be represented realistically. This had to do with a late emphasis of pure abstraction and a particular investment in realism as a mode of celebrating the previously marginalised, however, heroic black African body (Dacres 2009: 2).

The Limpopo monuments were part of several new monuments unveiled in the country after 1994 and were developed with more abstract monuments to other liberation struggle heroes (in other parts of the country). The nation was simultaneously projected to embody a modern present and future.

1.3 Monuments as social representations of Limpopo history

Increasingly, in recent years, scholars have recognised that "nation", and "national identity" are social constructions; that they do not just exist as essences, but also as political and cultural inventions and local tactics (Till 1999: 254). The case of Limpopo province of South Africa exemplifies this very well. On becoming a province in 1994, Limpopo (then Northern Transvaal province and later Northern province) found itself in a position of having to rally its people in the exercise of province or more specifically, community building at least as part of the South African nation building.

In 1994, the coming together of two former homelands (Gazankulu and Lebowa), of the former Republic of Venda and the Transvaal Administration threatened the fabric of provincial unity and highlighted the need for a "provincial community identity" to be developed that cut across racial and cultural lines. The scramble for provincial government leadership positions furthermore required that the people of Limpopo pulled together and worked as one "community". In his budget speech delivered at the Provincial Legislature in Lebowakgomo on 26 February 2004, the MEC for Finance and Economic Development, Mr Thaba Mufamadi, summed up this challenge:

> Limpopo inherited four administrations. Some of the provinces that inherited no such administrations envied us. We, at the time thought we inherited working civil service while other provinces had to build theirs from scratch. Later we discovered that the civil service inherited were founded on sand– quick sand at that–and had to be demolished. It was nothing but mirage. We had to demolish it and start building fast in order to catch up with those that started by building their public service (Mufamadi 2004).

In 1996, commentators could already foresee problems such as these. Commenting in an article on the relocation of the civil service from the parliamentary offices of the former Republic of Venda, Mary Braid of *The Independent* newspaper said:

> As regional government goes, the new Northern Province—encompassing Venda and the formerly quasi-autonomous homelands of Gazankulu and the heart-breaking poor Lebowa—faces one of the hardest tasks. Yet it is the province's removal of Venda's 20 000 civil servants to the new capital of Pietersburg that is killing Thohoyandou, for its economy was built on the civil service which mushroomed after Venda became "independent" (Braid 1996).

Sharing her sentiment, Ms Nicholson, an ANC member, said there was a real crisis in the concentration of power in Pietersburg.

> The new provincial premier boasts about the growth there, but it is relocated, stolen growth. The rest of the province is suffering. They are going to turn Pietersburg into another Johannesburg, with people desperate for work setting up squatter camps around the city (Braid 1996).

Till (1999: 254) concurs that in recent times, the broader 'annihilation of space by time' has further contributed to the need felt to assert a sense of the local and to construct a shared provincial community identity. Together, these examples illustrate how, at various points in its short history, the province of Limpopo has been confronted with different crises in which it has been necessary to develop and sustain a sense of provincial community identity and belonging. In circumstances such as in Limpopo province where heterogeneous groups are involved, where a shared history was lacking and where any nascent sense of province/nation and provincial/national identity was threatened by past experiences, the bonds between members of the community, and between people and place were at best tenuous, and required nurturing. Indeed, given that identities are conjectural and socially constructed rather than of the essence and natural, it follows that at times and under certain conditions and social contexts, the sense of provincial/national identity is especially threatened. In other words, the need to foster and assert the sense of identity may be stronger at some times than others (Till 1999: 254). Again, Mufamadi's (2004) speech sums it up:

> As democratically elected guardians, entrusted with the responsibility of guiding this baby in its period of deserved mentoring, of making the right choice of friends and associates, of choosing a path from which it has to fashion its future, we sought to, in the basket of choices for transformation, for adjustments and for development and growth, orient ourselves on three pillars of our philosophy for social human development. That being; to borrow from the Minister of Finance Mr Trevor Manuel in his 2004 budget speech, a) people-centred development, b) expansion of the frontiers of human fulfillment and c) rolling back the frontiers of poverty.

The making of 'right choices..., choosing of a path' in the above excerpt also meant that the province had to consider several available key interventions or forge new ones in the absence of any. Focus here is on how the province of Limpopo hoped to develop a sense of "province" or "nation" and "provincial"/ "national identity". The specific aim is to analyse the erection of monuments in Limpopo from 2004 to 2006 as evidence of the province's efforts at inventing social representations of history, creating public landscape spectacle to build up provincial/ national identity and develop an 'imagined community' (Anderson 1983: 73). The idea of imagined community was popularised by Anderson (1983: 73), who held that the living generations of a nation feel a connection to the nation's dead, which thus secures the 'nation's imagined continuity and transcendence of time'. The symbolic value and national contribution of the dead traditional

leaders is marked by the monuments, which are an arresting emblem of the modern nation.

A broad consensus has developed across the social sciences that history is an essential ingredient in constructing the imagined community of nationhood (Anderson 1983: 73). Liu and Hilton (2005: 3) are of the view that social representations of history provide myths of origin for peoples. Malinowski is quoted stating that:

> *Myth* comes into play when rite, ceremony, or a social or moral rule demands justification, warrant of antiquity, reality and sanctity ... myth is not only looked upon as a comment of additional information, but it is a warrant, a charter, and even a practical guide to the activities with which it is connected (as cited by Liu and Hilton 2005: 3, 44).

Parts of social representations function as charters that are quasi-legal and confer legitimacy through normative and constitutive components (Hart 1961: 6). Charters are normative in that they establish rules, norms, moral codes, laws, 'dos', and 'don'ts' (Hart 1961: 6). Charters are also constitutive in that they endow groups with status and position. For example, being rulers in South Africa for over many years allowed whites to erect as many monuments in honour of their past as much as the current government allows for proliferation of monuments in honour of the previously marginalised black Africans.

Conceding that all people have a history, it is also a fact that not all peoples have a consensual social representation of their history, let alone a historical charter. Moscovici (1984: 67) notes that social representations of history may be hegemonic (consensual throughout society), emancipated (different, smoothly interacting versions in different segments of society), or polemical (conflicting representations across different groups). Liu and Hilton (2005: 6) posit that a charter, allowing people to think and act as one, through normative imperatives that provide justification for institutional practices, would seem to require a hegemonic social representation. Such depends on a resonance between historical representations, physical artefacts, and mass media, as well as the current political agenda.

In their view, the study of history places intergroup relations into diachronic perspective, where with the passage of time, the past experiences of groups join social representations that are mobilised as part and parcel of the content of a group's social identity. Historical representations can thus act as group narratives that shape responses to new challenges. Often social representations of history reflect real conflicts between groups. One concurs indeed, that

often ethnic and national identities are formed when disparate groups unify to achieve some shared goal, such as defending themselves against a shared opponent (Liu and Hilton 2005: 6). The attempt at the development or even realisation of provincial identity in the Limpopo province was accelerated by the recognition by government leaders of the years of experience of fighting against the South African Republic (ZAR) and other white governments by the different ethnic groups in the province. Against this background, the provincial government forged the rallying theme– "Wars of Resistance against Colonialism and Imperialism"–a strategy through which the people of Limpopo would become conscious of themselves as "Limpopians".

To this extent, the warrior traditional leaders' monuments in Limpopo province as social representations of history, summarise realistic group conflicts. If popular representations of history are stories about politics and war, then they should function as group-based narratives to identify friends, foes, and the mission of the group. The roles of protagonists and antagonists in intergroup conflict appear to be exceptionally well-elaborated in historical narratives. For many organisations, assuming the mantle of liberator has exceptional historical currency for politicians and governments wanting to legitimise political actions.

Monuments as social representations of history, also function as resources for managing the interplay of social identities. This study also examines the impact of monuments through their analysis as historical representations. A hegemonic representation of history, shared by all groups within the Limpopo province, was aimed at facilitating a positive correlation between at least provincial, if not national identity and subgroup identities. Hegemonic representations exhibit properties of what Cinnirella (1996: 262) has termed 'positive networking'. That is, when all the subgroups within the province share the same representation of history, it is likely because the history offers an adequate position for each of them. The representation should contain narratives that allow for conflict resolution and subgroup reconciliation, so that the activation of provincial identity may simultaneously activate ethnic identity, and vice versa (Liu and Hilton 2005: 10). Research data from Limpopo is consistent with the notion that hegemonic representations of history are associated with positive correlations between ethnic and provincial/national identity. In this case, the overall representation appears to be a narrative about the emergence of a province as part of the South African nation from the forces of colonisation. This representation appears to be capable of smoothing over ethnic and provincial differences. Social representations, therefore, appear to be relevant to defining the content of what makes the Limpopo province positively distinct compared to other provinces.

The dynamics between managing internal relations (conflict) within the province while

asserting positive distinctiveness is central to the identity positioning fostered by historical charters in the province. This seems to have been particularly effective in line with the province's need to assert itself as "good" on that dimension. Thus, the desire to appear as a balanced province with harmonious race relations in the country has provided the province with leverage for social change. This reflects a combination of coaxing (paying homage to national and provincial ideals of positive distinctiveness) and reproach (referring to the past injustices) which became a particularly effective "carrot and stick" for engineering social change, since it invokes national/provincial identity with a particular agenda in mind.

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1.4 Public art as collective memory in Limpopo province

The creation of a collective memory is very important to the cohesion of the people of Limpopo province. The population of the province consists of several ethnic groups distinguished by culture, language, and race. Based on the 2011 census statistics, Sepedi (Northern Sotho) speakers make up the largest number, being nearly 53 per cent. The Xitsonga (Shangaan) speakers comprise 17 per cent, while the Venda speakers make up 16.7 per cent. Afrikaans speakers make up 2.6 per cent, while English-speaking whites account for less than half, 1.5 per cent (Limpopo Province Census 2011). Compressed within the borders of the province are the four previous administrations which were created during or even before the apartheid era: Lebowa, Gazankulu, Venda, and Transvaal Administration (Wikipedia n.d.). Given these demographics, the political leaders of the Limpopo province seem to have taken a leaf out of Renan's advice in his essay, *What is a nation?,* in which the author defines a nation's identity as 'centred on what people remember and what they forget, and some of the most powerful memories come from times of war, when nations were fighting to construct their identities' (Renan 1939: 190-191). This lies behind the choice of the war theme "Wars of Resistance against Colonialism and Imperialism".

Arguing in support of Renan, both Halbwachs's works: *The Collective Memory* and *On Collective Memory* illuminate what is necessary for the construction of such a memory and how it is affected by the society that creates it. Every social group holds a certain sway over its members, and for all intents and purposes, a nation is just a large social group, within which there are many subdivisions. However, as a collective group, it must retain cohesion for it to be successful, and a very significant

way of keeping such cohesiveness, is to have members of the group sharing memories for them to connect with each other (Halbwachs 1980: 45).

The decision by the Limpopo provincial government to launch the "Wars of Resistance against Colonialism and Imperialism" theme was meant not only to acknowledge the contribution of the selected traditional leaders that are being honoured, but also to bring about an element of cohesion and shared past out of the people of Limpopo. It is, therefore, interesting to note that only one traditional leader was selected from each of the more prominent groups of the Limpopo province: Kgošikgolo Sekhukhune I of the BaPedi, Khosinkhulu Makhado of the VhaVenda, Hosinkulu Ngungunhane of the VaTsonga/Shangaan, Kgoši Malebogo of the BaHananwa, Kgoši Mokopane of the AmaNdebele of Kekana and Kgoši Makgoba of the BaTlhalerwa. For Limpopo to succeed as a province, given its difficult historical past as reflected by the diverse character of its citizenry, it is essential to maintain such cohesiveness among these and other minority groups.

Halbwachs (1980: 45) maintains that national memory is a type of overarching umbrella covering an entire 'nation state' and is therefore, less connected to individuals. National memory instead, is based more on the remembrances of others. It borrows from certain sub-groups to create its own conceptions and symbols (Halbwachs 1980: 45). While Limpopo is just a province and cannot be a nation on its own, the same principles apply where the shared memories of the various sub-groups as shown above, were evoked to create the province's own conceptions and symbols. These were eventually passed on to the national government as evidence of the contribution of the Limpopo province to the South African national memory. These have since been acknowledged and endorsed by the erection of the cairn (stone monument) Ubuntu Memorial Monument (see photograph in Chapter Four, p. 95) honouring the same warrior traditional leaders in collaboration with the National Heritage Council (NHC) in Musina in September 2008.

Concurring with Halbwachs, Connerton questions how group memories are conveyed and sustained; a question that leads to a consideration of social memory as a dimension of political power. Connerton (1989: 2) therefore contends that:

> Our present experiences are largely dependent on our knowledge of the past. Therefore, our experiences of the present seem to be connected to the past events in a manner that places our present into a certain context, dependent on how we remember the past.

Connerton (1989: 18) concludes that this contextualisation is not necessarily one dimensional,

since the way in which the past is remembered does influence or even distort one's views of the present and vice versa. Indeed, some images of the past have been used to legitimise the present social order. In concurring with Halbwachs, Connerton (1989: 43) noted that any participation in social order presupposes a shared memory. The two authors also concur regarding the differences between historical and social memory. While history is itself impartial, societies can construct it to present a particular view of the past and thus, how the past affects the present.

With reference again to what Renan conceded earlier, that often such kinds of powerful images are related to war, perhaps it is not surprising that the monuments in Limpopo province honour heroes of the "Wars of Resistance against Colonialism and Imperialism". In the past, major efforts in the creation of national identities have seen wars being used as defining events. It seemed simple and easy for a nation not only to define enemies and allies in war, but also to define its role within such conflicts as much as the Limpopo province seems to have successfully used the selected traditional leaders to define its role in the Wars of Resistance fought by black African chiefdoms during their subjugation in the nineteenth century South Africa. Wars elsewhere have provided enough opportunities for nations to come together as cohesive communities under the umbrella of political nationalisms (Connerton 1989: 17). Since the memory of war and a particular people's role in it can keep the thread of national unity running through the national community, the creation of a nation's memory, therefore, is as much a political process as a social one, which is exactly the case in Limpopo province. Connerton (1989: 17-18) also argues that the 'ruling group will use its knowledge of the past in a direct and active way', that is, manipulating the people/nation's memory to bring about certain events that can legitimise the way the incumbent ruling group is governing the province. How then, can the ruling group advocate certain memories and events without seeming to be too heavy handed? The goal is, without doubt, to create some sort of propaganda, but also to make it elegant and sophisticated enough so that it can be more easily accepted, but also treasured (Connerton 1989:18).

The most successful way of promoting such a memory as suggested by Connerton would be through commemorative monuments and ceremonies in honour of Limpopo's fallen traditional leaders, not only to remind the Limpopo province's people of events that took away their land and the heroics of their former leaders, but also to re-present them, to preserve a certain viewpoint of the situation (Connerton 1989: 43), through what Hobsbawn (1983: 11) calls 'invention of tradition'. The Limpopo provincial government, therefore sought to show and celebrate its provincial heroism, to stimulate certain emotive responses that promoted provincial if not nationalistic feelings. These feelings culminated in the response of the NHC, when the latter erected the

Ubuntu Memorial Monument (NHC 2010). By creating commemorative rituals and memorials, the South African government through the NHC, created 'emotionally and symbolically charged signs of club membership...' (Hobsbawm 1983: 11).

The theory of invented traditions as espoused by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger in their work *The Invention of Tradition* (1983) is a 'presentist' approach to social remembering (Hobsbawm 1983: 11). Barbara Misztal (2003: 56-61) noted that this perspective scrutinises how public notions of history are manipulated by 'dominant forces of society through public commemorations, education systems, mass media, and official records and chronologies. The 'invention of tradition perspective' or "theory of the politics of memory", as the "presentist" memory approach is also called, argues that the past is moulded to suit present dominant interests. Researchers (Confino 1997: 1386-1405; Gedi and Elam 1996: 30-50; Gerphart 1998: 127-136; Hutton 1988: 311-322) working within this paradigm have illustrated how new traditions and rituals are "invented" in the sense of being deliberately designed and produced with a view to creating new political realities, defining nations, and sustaining national communities. Defining social memories as inventions of the past, they study the institutionalisation of "remembrance" within national ritual and educational systems. Such investigations show how nationalist movements create a master commemorative narrative that highlights their members' common past and legitimises their aspiration for a shared destiny. While Hobsbawm and Ranger's work remains authoritative in this perspective, there are now several studies (Bartlett 1982; Gergen 1985: 266-275; Middleton and Edwards 1990; Shotter 1990: 120-138) concerned with the role played in modern societies by constructed versions of the past in establishing social cohesion, legitimising authority, and socialising populations in a common culture.

Three types of invented traditions espoused by Hobsbawm and Ranger exist:

> Those establishing or symbolizing social cohesion or the membership of groups, real or artificial communities, b) those establishing or legitimizing institutions, status or relations of authority, and c) those whose main purpose was socialization, the inculcation of beliefs, value systems and conventions of behaviour. While traditions of types b) and c) were certainly devised ..., it may be tentatively suggested that type a) was prevalent, the other functions being regarded as implicit in or flowing from a sense of identification with a "community" and/or the institutions representing, expressing or symbolizing it such as a "nation" (Hobsbawm 1983:9).

Hobsbawm (1983: 1) maintains that the construction of a collective memory through such "invented traditions" is crucial to the development of the provincial/national community. It is, therefore, important for leaders to create a past if there is not any for them to be able to legitimise certain views and to convince their people to follow them. To create such a cohesive community, Hobsbawm argues that a government needs to create a past or pasts for themselves, and to do that, they must invent traditions and practices that are of a ritual and symbolic nature in a way that instils certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition which automatically translates into continuity with the past. Marschall (2004: 78-95) writes that, monuments 'create an imagined, desired past, compensating for absences and shortcomings of the real past'. Whether the proliferation of commemorative monuments in the Limpopo province is a response toward the creation of such past, is tenable at this stage.

Grobler (2008: 165) noted that when the new government took over in South Africa in 1994—a mainly black government dominated by the African National Congress—the new leadership congratulated themselves, claiming victory over white supremacy and that they had brought freedom to the peoples of South Africa. Grobler observed that the new government needed a foundation myth which would give due credit to black South Africans. As the then minister of Arts and Culture, Pallo Jordan, explained to a journalist in 2004:

> If you came from Mars and you went on the evidence of what is there in these public spaces [in the line of statues, monuments, and memorials], you'd come away with the impression that whites were the original inhabitants [of South Africa] and Africans were the immigrants (Grobler 2008: 165).

In drawing conclusions on the above-mentioned opinions, it might be helpful to take note of Schwartz's (1991: 221) suggestions that two theoretical approaches are at play organising most twentieth-century studies in collective memory. Neither approach is narrow or dogmatic; however, they differ primarily in emphasis. The most widely accepted approach, Schwartz contends, sees the construction of the past shaped by the concerns and needs of the present. Classical statements include Mead's (1929) declaration that 'every conception of the past is construed from the standpoint of new problems of today', and Halbwachs's (1941: 221) assertion that 'collective memory is essentially a reconstruction of the past [that] adapts the image of ancient facts to the beliefs and spiritual needs of the present'. To this work, Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983, as cited by Schwartz 1991: 221) added an important dimension by bringing together

accounts of the deliberate fabrication of rituals, emblems, and monuments, and by showing how these new symbolic and physical markings support new mental constructions of the past. In the process, tradition is reconceived. Commonly defined as a conception or practice sustained across generations, tradition becomes an "invention" consciously designed to deal with present problems (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983, as cited by Schwartz 1991: 221). While these classic and contemporary writings pursue different research goals, the essential thrust of their arguments is the same: they see the past as precarious, its contents hostage to the conditions of the present. While empirically well-grounded, they seem to offer a one-sided perspective (Schwartz 1991: 222). As Schudson (1989, as cited by Schwartz 1991: 221) puts it: 'The present shapes our understanding of the past, yes. But this is half the truth, at best, and a particularly cynical half-truth, at that.'

The second approach notes that every society, whatever its ideological climate, requires a sense of continuity with the past, and its enduring memories maintain this continuity. If beliefs about the past failed to outlive changes in society (as in the case of black African beliefs in South Africa which have been disrupted by colonialism and apartheid), then society's unity and continuity would be undermined (Schwartz 1991: 222). Durkheim, a French sociologist commonly cited as one of the principal architects of modern science, commented on this link between unity and continuity. Conceptions of the past, Durkheim believed, are cultivated by periodic commemoration rites whose function is not to transform the past bending it to serve the present, but to produce the past, to make it live as it once did (Durkheim [1912] 1965, as cited by Schwartz 1991: 221). Shils's concept of tradition expresses this same idea. The image of an epoch or a historical figure, he observed, is not conceived and elaborated anew by each generation, but is transmitted following to a "guiding pattern" that endows subsequent generations with a common heritage. Stable memories strengthen society's "temporal integration" by creating links between the living and the dead and promoting consensus over time (Shils 1981: 31-32 as cited by Schwartz 1991: 222). This consensus is resilient since memories create the grounds for their own perpetuation. Memories are not credible unless they conform to an existing structure of assumptions about the past — an 'available past' that people accept as given and that possesses a self-sustaining inertia (Schudson 1989, as cited by Schwartz 1991: 222). Thus, a true community is a "community of memory", one whose past is retained by retelling the same "cognitive narrative" by recalling the people who have always embodied and exemplified its moral values (Bellah et al. 1991, as cited by Schwartz 1991: 222) and in this case, those are the traditional leaders of the Limpopo province.

1.5 Context

Any interest in post-apartheid reunion and reconciliation must explore the political and cultural content of commemorations. That South Africans would feel compelled to commemorate the freedom struggles was inevitable, however, the form and content of their commemorations was not known. In his State of the Province Address of 15 February 2007, the Premier of the Limpopo province announced to the fourth sitting of the third democratic legislature that the work of honouring all warrior traditional leaders who fell in the cause of the struggle against colonial dispossession has been completed (Limpopo Provincial Government 2007)..

This utilitarian act of erecting monuments in the public spaces in honour of those traditional leaders is the focal area of this study. The monuments have historical and commemorative significance. It is essential that a study be conducted on the reasons why only these traditional leaders were chosen as well as the specific historical and commemorative value of the statues in their honour.

The emergence of new South African provinces after 1994 was a historical contingency resulting from the division of the country into nine provinces following the first democratic elections in the country. The Limpopo province provides an interesting case study for socio-cultural memory, being a province currently populated by several cultural communities and ethnic groups that once lived within separated spaces. The two main communities—black and white—subsequently came to employ commemorations for the construction of competing histories of the now unified space.

The previous white government in South Africa created nationalistic narratives that celebrated the construction of racial hierarchies as symbolised in monuments and other memorials, including names of major towns and cities. The same government instituted the history of white self-determination as told by Afrikaners. The wars of independence Afrikaners fought and either won or lost against the British were memorialised extensively with statues erected in memory of those clashes. The built environment underscored the ideological message that defended white supremacy, but also complicated messages of black liberation and cultural independence. A symbolic culmination of Afrikaner nationalism in South Africa can be seen in the erection of the Voortrekker Monument in Pretoria in 1937-1951. In South Africa, black people resisted these racially exclusive narratives, positing their own histories. Today the freedom struggle is embraced through the memorialisation process in provinces such as Limpopo.

Informed by memory studies, an analysis of the contested pasts of South Africa and of Limpopo province show how these two distinct cultures followed similar paths before intersecting at the crossroads of the freedom struggle. Where once memorials defended a racist past, today commemorations in Limpopo province proclaim the liberation of the people, the individual, and celebrate human rights.

After careful consideration of the history and character of the province, it may be postulated that the ethnic groups within the province do not necessarily have a history of closer relations and cooperation. Being aware of this situation and desperate to bring about unity and transformation in their towns and cities, provincial leaders recognised the power of monuments and names to move people and have since embarked on a mission to erect statues of prominent traditional leaders and to adopt new names with which most of the population can identify. It is interesting to note that the six traditional leaders who are commemorated represent six of the major ethnic groups, apart from the whites that comprise the Limpopo province.

The Limpopo provincial government prefers to commemorate the past in the ideal language of patriotism as reflected in the speeches of provincial leaders, for example, at unveilings, that are often instrumental both for partisan political activities and for fashioning a new public sphere. Commemorative gatherings in Limpopo often provide spaces for government and other community leaders to reach mass audiences of like-minded people to reinforce partisan ideals. Commemorations of wars and of freedom as chosen for this theme by the Limpopo provincial government seem to be part of the restructuring of public space and suggest how leaders are trying to persuade their constituencies, illuminating the practical concerns for power.

Having considered the above brief background of the history of the province, it will be the contention in this study that the Limpopo provincial government's political leaders saw in commemorations, public art (statues) in particular, as devices that would foster provincial and by implication, national unity, and patriotism. The central theme of this study would, therefore, be the invention of "Limpopo province" through strategies that have attempted to integrate a people separated by history and ethnicity by constructing an identity that is self-consciously aware of the past. Nationalising states have long made use of many devices and agencies to create an emotional bonding with certain histories and pasts. Many nations have had to confront the problems of incorporating peripheral domains and assimilating diverse peoples into the body politic and establishing a degree of national homogeneity—or at least a semblance of common central purpose. They attempted to create what Osborne (2001: 7) calls an 'awareness of belonging'. Reviewing the process by which some of these monuments in Limpopo province were

erected and adopted as well as an analysis of the ambiguous posting of these traditional leaders as patriotic heroes, may help to explain why these memorials tell the histories they tell. Of further concern is to make the connections between identity and the construction of these meaningful devices, which although inanimate objects, still evoke specific kinds of meanings and serve as spatial coordinates of identity (Entrikin 1991).

Limpopo is a contested landscape. People are shooting at and vandalising the monuments. Recently, vandals attempted to blow up the Sekhukhune monument at Tjate and Makhado's at Makhado (after a court battle, now called by its previous name Louis Trichardt) and in 2005 was defaced with paint using the colours of the flag of the government of South Africa in the era of apartheid (Van Zyl 2005). In short, what the landscape says about the past can still arouse strong feelings and sentiments today. Since these symbols are also associated with specific kinds of activities linked to the provincial community through repetitive prosaic practices, often-ritualised performances and institutionalised commemoration, those activities will also be subjected to scrutiny as part of this study.

1.6 Qualifications criteria

Commemoration of past wars has been an area of increasing public interest especially since World War I (Nora 1996: 2). Commemorative Warrior Traditional Leaders' Monuments are the physical points of collective remembrance and stand in the public spaces in Limpopo province as permanent reminders of the "Wars of Resistance against Colonialism and Imperialism". These monuments seem to serve multiple purposes as symbols that carry meaning about reasons for war and the nature of the role of the individual traditional leader's participation in the nations and province's wars. What then brought about the decisions to commemorate through public art and statues in particular?

These project initiatives were informed by the House of Traditional Leaders strategic priorities, such as the promotion of nation building, of a spirit of reconciliation, of the restoration of historically disadvantaged chieftainships, of redressing imbalances of the past in the portrayal of its history, and lastly of the promotion of social cohesion. In its implementation, the project would have been in line with national, provincial, and local growth strategies, such as the Provincial Growth and Development Plan (PGDP), which was in line with the national policy framework

for socio-economic planning at provincial levels; the Integrated Development Plans (IDPs); the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative South Africa (ASGISA); the Joint Initiatives on Priority Skills Acquisition (JIPSA); and the Extended Public Works Programmes (EPWP) (South African History Online n.d[b]: 3).

Several provinces were drawn into these projects. As a background, provinces such as Limpopo, Eastern Cape, and KwaZulu Natal resolved to embark on programmes that were seeking to commemorate the wars that were fought in their areas which were spearheaded by the traditional leaders in the resistance to land dispossession by the colonialists. The House of Traditional Leadership realised the lack of promoting the historical past of the provinces in the form of their rich history of Wars of Resistance and dispossession. The House had also noted that provinces were lagging in terms of marketing the colonial war histories. Of concern was the lack of education in the present generation regarding the role played by traditional leaders in the liberation struggle. Western influence and enculturation have distorted the perceptions about traditional history and indigenous past (South African History Online n.d[b]: 3).

In a way the commemoration of Wars of Resistance and dispossessions is also perceived as a tribute to the 'fallen sons and daughters of the African soil and this sought to address the idea of promoting African Renaissance' (South African History Online n.d[b]: 3). This rich historical past was therefore portrayed by remembering the wars that were fought against colonial advancement. 'This project also comes at a time when our nation is faced with challenges of social ill-health conditions, for example, HIV/Aids, Tuberculosis, initiation challenges and other related diseases that are in need of traditional healing perspectives (indigenous knowledge systems)' (South African History Online n.d[b]: 3). Further, the project was aimed at the revival of cultural tourism, living heritage practices and role of traditional administrative structures (South African History Online n.d[b]: 3).

The criteria used to select each war was, that the war was between the colonialists and the black Africans, that it reflected unity amongst tribes, that its impact was felt across river boundaries, and that it signalled united resistance from the part of the chieftainships (South African History Online n.d[b]: 3).

The provinces viewed involvement in projects of this nature as an opportunity to contribute to the "African Renaissance" in line with former President Thabo Mbeki's vision, thereby instilling an awareness of common heritage and nationhood. Moreover, this would help promote and invest in cultural diversity through heritage and common nationhood while at the same time, build a strong sense of South African unity. More importantly, this project was significant in that it took

place at a time when traditional leadership and African heritage were being challenged by the influence of modernisation. It was also aimed at unifying the provinces internally and the nation by way of showcasing the past experiences which in turn, would be part of agencies of social change and social cohesion (South African History Online n.d[b]: introduction).

Further, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) recommended symbolic reparations to victims of apartheid. Symbolic reparations in terms of the TRC report encompassed measures that facilitated communal processes of remembering the pain and victories of the past. Such measures aimed to restore the dignity of victims and survivors. Commemorative aspects included exhumations, tombstones, memorials or monuments, and the renaming of streets and other public entities (Report of the Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee: vol 6: 95). Some provinces chose to expand the TRC recommendation beyond victims. They needed to look back to focus on Wars of Resistance and dispossession.

The DSAC in Limpopo, therefore, submitted a proposal to the provincial cabinet through its Member of the Executive Council (MEC). In its draft framework and business plan for the project, the DSAC stated that the Wars of Resistance underpinned the leadership, courage, and achievement of traditional leaders in the political history of resistance against colonialism and liberation in South Africa. The proposed business plan also stated as rationale the realisation of the lack of education of the present generation about the role played by traditional leaders in the liberation struggle (South African History Online n.d[a]).

The legacy of the Wars of Resistance hinged on several cultural values which have a direct bearing on the sites associated with the political resistance and tensions. It is because of values such as those briefly described below that this legacy remains outstanding:

Historical value:

The Wars of Resistance are historic in nature and constitute an integral aspect of South Africa's past worthy of conservation. The sites of the Wars of Resistance are a physical manifestation and proof of the intangible values which epitomise the historical context (South African History Online n.d[b]).

Political value:

The Wars of Resistance have been instrumental in shaping the political landscape of South Africa.

Throughout the colonial years and post-colonialism, the legacies of Wars of Resistance have shown tremendous influence in the subsequent political regimes to follow (South African History Online n.d[b]).

Educational value:

The teachings of Wars of Resistance still prevail and are relevant today. The sites of Wars of Resistance and dispossession represent a museum without walls or an open-air archive scattered with traces of history and meaning. The sites present the opportunity for the development of an educational resource to serve the immediate and broader surrounding communities. In particular, the sites are conducive for the establishment of an interpretive centre that could serve as an outdoor learning experience. There are also far-reaching prospects for research and development leading to knowledge production, especially since there is a need for documentation of information (South African History Online n.d[b]).

Economic value:

Although the economic value of the sites associated with Wars of Resistance can be realised in several ways, currently, tourism is the most crucial economic activity that has been identified. In this regard, tourism has the potential to contribute to economic development and provide opportunities for job creation in the surrounding areas. Sustainable tourism can thrive when it is executed responsibly by means of upholding conservation measures pertaining to the management of sites (South African History Online n.d[b]).

The Limpopo government initially appropriated a R3 000 000.00 budget towards the completion of this project, however, when it was deemed not enough then the provincial government let it roll over and, in the end R6 000 000.00 was allocated for the whole project (De Wet 2009). The concept document proposed statues in honour of the following chiefs: Sekhukhune, Makhado, Ngungunhane, Malebogo, Mokopane, and Makgoba (in no order) as the ones selected to be honoured through statues for their leadership during the Wars of Resistance (Mulaudzi 2013). Ironically, all but one of these traditional leaders lost their Wars of Resistance against their white enemies. Perhaps, like many other societies, Limpopo proved themselves capable of organising their provincial public psyche around a "lost cause". However, it was more for their bravery to stand up against white intrusion into their land possessions that they were being

honoured, which will be discussed in the later chapters. While in the case of Ngungunhane, his inclusion seems to have been motivated by the need to embrace the Tsonga / Shangaan speaking groups who at present, live in Limpopo province, the traditional leader had indeed fought similar wars against the Portuguese, which explains why he was taken into exile in Portugal, where he later died.

Statues are not necessarily an entirely new culture in Limpopo province. A statue of the late Patrick Mphephu, one-time President of the former Republic of Venda, still stands outside the former Venda parliamentary buildings. Mphephu's statue casts a stern eye over the deserted car park, once reserved for ministers. Like Mphephu's statue, former Lebowa Prime Minister, Dr C.N. Phatudi's statue still stands outside the Lebowakgomo legislative chambers. Recently, a memorial column was erected in honour of Peter Mokaba, the late president of the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL), in Mankweng Township outside of Polokwane.

The proposal to erect statues was accepted by the provincial Premier Sello Moloto, when in his state of the province address to the first session of the third legislature of Limpopo, at the beginning of his term as the Premier in May 2004, he committed the province to:

> Celebrate the lives and honour the spirits of our historical *icons*. These are represented by our warrior traditional leaders such as Sekhukhune 1, Tshilwavhusiku Makhado and Nghunghunyane (Limpopo Provincial Government 2004-8).
>
> The real work then started in earnest.

Chapter Two

Public Art for Commemorating Warrior Traditional Leaders

2.1 Introduction

This chapter traces the history of the Warrior Traditional Leader project from its conception in 2004 until the dedication of the last monument in 2006. It explores the competition/approach that resulted in the selection of the designs and appointment of sculptors, and it considers the monuments' gestation in the sculptors' studios. The chapter also investigates the inherent challenges involved in that process and how these were channelled into a high-profile project. The chapter furthermore considers how these traditional leaders were selected and what their symbolic significance was perceived to be. An attempt will be made to demonstrate that components of the wars of resistance in Limpopo did not become "part of the list" based on the culmination of critical debate, consultation, and conscious selection. However, specific circumstances, pragmatic considerations, political compromises, and other technocratic processes of decision-making played a major role. To this end it can be argued that the Wars of Resistance project did not represent a need on the part of the people of Limpopo province, rather a reflection of a decision by the political principals on a highly institutionalised form of commemoration sponsored and directed by the provincial government in pursuit of specific aims and intentions to address present challenges.

It is important to introduce this section by providing some historical background on heritage and policy as strategic unifiers in the eyes of the new rulers of the new South Africa. Arthur Danto and George Dickie, advocates of the so-called institutional theory of art, have argued that any object becomes a work of art through a process of designation by the institutions, theories, and official structures of the art world. Marschall (2005a: 31) believes that the same holds true for heritage and observes that the value of a heritage site is not intrinsic; it becomes valuable through selection, through an act of designation, or proclamation. It is through the act of proclamation—by those official structures empowered to perform it—that a heritage site acquires its status and

significance (Danto and Dickie, as cited in Marschall 2005a: 31). In South Africa, at a national level, the official structure empowered to determine what counts as heritage today, is the South African Heritage Resources Agency (SAHRA), which replaced the National Monuments Council (NMC) of the previous era. It is through policy and legislation that a site is declared as heritage of national or provincial significance (Republic of South Africa 1999).

Frescura (1991) calculated that at the beginning of the 1990s, 97 per cent of all heritage sites listed by the NMC related to the values and experiences of the white population minority. The remaining three per cent covered the heritage of all other population groups combined, much of which was taken up by San/Bushmen rock art sites (Frescura 1991).

Marschall wrote that with the advent of fundamental changes in the political arena following Nelson Mandela's release from prison in 1990, discussions about the need for a radical democratisation and multicultural adjustment of the South African heritage landscape ensued. After the first South African general elections in 1994, it was decided to completely restructure the existing body of legislation and administration, dissolving the NMC in the process. The National Heritage Resources Act (NHRA), adopted in 1999, established SAHRA as a statutory body entrusted with the protection, not only of "monuments" in the sense of previous legislation, but of "cultural heritage". The shift of terminology was a significant one and was widely interpreted as a progressive move. A new term "heritage" now opened the field to include a broad range of objects and sites—not necessarily containing any built structures—of which many were related to the history and culture of Africans and other previously marginalised population groups. In line with the foundation myth of the new South African state, particular attention was devoted to sites associated with the liberation (and resistance) struggle (Frescura 1991). Grobler (2008: 174) wrote that the new South Africa's foundation myth consisted of a struggle against injustice and for freedom.

Equally important in the new heritage legislation was its decentralisation policy, assigning control over heritage matters to the jurisdiction of the provinces. This decision was a strategic political move by the ANC-led central government, meant as a concession to opposition political forces concentrated in certain regions. Notably, supporters of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) in KwaZulu Natal and many whites in the Western Cape were keen to foster—through heritage—a unique identity different from the ANCs efforts at building a new national identity (Marschall 2009a: 33-34). The identification, conservation, and management of heritage—so central in identity construction—were thus relegated to the provinces. This move allowed for a balancing out of specific regional identities, thus preventing the failure of the project of national unity through

its perceived threat to diverging identities. It is for this reason that one can observe, for instance in Limpopo, the prioritisation of heritage sites that celebrate warrior traditional leaders.

Finally, in 2004 the Limpopo provincial government appropriated funds to the amount of R6 000 000.00 to erect statues throughout the province to a select group of warrior traditional leaders who fought the "Wars of Resistance against Colonialism and Imperialism". The provincial DSAC, which was mandated to preserve heritage issues, persuaded the government to allocate funds toward the statues. The appropriation, by far the largest Limpopo provincial government expenditure for a fine arts project up to that time, led to the establishment of a Project Team empowered to select sites, commission sculptors and /or architects to design and to carry out the work, and supervise the construction of the monuments and formal dedications. This chapter traces the history of the statues to the warrior traditional leaders from conceptualisation until the dedication of the last statue in 2006. The chapter will also explore the conception that resulted in the decision to use public art (statues/ monuments) in the Limpopo province; the process of appointing sculptors; monitoring and evaluation of the designs of the statues; and the unveiling amid (sometimes a storm of) protests from some competing sections of communities; the chapter also considers the statues gestation in the sculptor's studios.

2.2 Fields of memory: burial grounds or battlefields?

At the first meeting of the Project Team in 2004, preliminary decisions were made concerning the content of the Terms of Reference (ToR) to be given to prospective sculptors. Soon after the first meeting, the Project Team started considering the question of site, and suggested that an even better location for a traditional leader's monument would be on a battlefield site (Mulaudzi 2013).

Continued overleaf

Photograph 1: Former Lebowa Prime Minister, Dr C.N. Phatudi statue, outside Lebowakgomo Legislative chambers. Photo by Mahunele Thotse. **Question**: In what ways was this image of the former Lebowa Bantustan Leader different from the image of the Warrior Traditional Leader?

Arguments in favour of the inclusion of specific battlefields included that those battlefields must play a part in a people's sense of place, local distinctiveness, and culture as well as their understanding and enjoyment of the past. Battlefields, it was further argued, should offer a rich resource for education and research, including family histories. The selected battlefields where traditional leaders fought would have a significant place in the history of the people of the province and by implication, on South Africa's national conscience. The proposed statues on the battlefields would also have a strong resonance in the sense of provincial and national identity. Some of these battlefields might still contain physical remains associated with the battles or have the potential to yield important archaeological evidence that can enhance an understanding of events (African Heritage Consulting 2008).

Further arguments in favour of the statues being placed at the battlefields were that battlefields, particularly modern examples, are often viewed as types of memorials, however, if the memorial itself is not on the battlefield, the focus can become detached from the site of the conflict. The connection between the battlefield and memorial could later be lost, since the memorial itself becomes the symbol of the event. The above proposals, however, also present challenges as they highlight the need to physically record where the boundaries of conflict sites were located (Sutherland and Holst 2005). Unfortunately, in Limpopo the exact limits of the locations of the battlefields were often not recorded, resulting in uncertainty with boundaries unknown. The Project Team, however, made no final site selections and left the question of specific placements of the monuments open to would-be advisors.

Photograph 2: Archaeological remains found on the site on the northern foot of Mosego, Tjate. Picture taken from Assessment of the Cultural Heritage Resources on the Provincial Heritage Site of Tjate on the Farm Djate 249KT in Sekhukhune, Limpopo province compiled by African Heritage Consulting, July 2008, p. 27.

The Project Team eventually agreed that a decision regarding the siting of the monuments in the correct context at the right places to align meaning with the correct location and place was possible, however, dependent on what the future holds with such identified sites. Therefore, the

future development of the sites became a much-discussed topic in Limpopo, as members of the Project Team began their search for suitable sites for the monuments they had been empowered to erect (Mulaudzi 2013).

Finally, the siting of the monuments to the warrior traditional leaders resulted from the discussions and collaborations between the Project Team and associated institutions, such as the Limpopo Heritage Resources Authority (LIHRA) as well as delegated members of the communities and representative members of the royal houses involved. This shows that these bodies formally or informally joined forces and created mutually beneficial liaisons which ultimately resulted in the Warrior Traditional Leaders Monuments' placement in premier locations, thus providing anchors for the Limpopo government to cast the "Warrior Traditional Leaders who fought the Wars of Resistance against Colonialism and Imperialism" as the thematic focus of the commemorations intended to be the unifying structure of the province's ceremonial core (Mulaudzi 2013).

Therefore, to understand the importance of these collaborations, one must first gain an understanding of the potential of the identified sites as tourist attractions and of the provincial government ambitions for the sites as heritage sites. As the Premier of Limpopo province, Sello Moloto, indicated in September 2006:

> There are many sites of historical significance in our province that only deserve to be graded to the status of heritage sites. High amongst these include, Tjate in Sekhukhune, Soutini in Baleni (Mopani), Fundudzi Lake and Dzata in the Vhembe District. These sites are bequeathed from our ancestors and are equally deserving to be called national symbols. Our government is committed to doing everything possible to facilitate the optimum conditions in which these sites can be developed and marketed for the benefit of local communities and for tourism purposes (Speaker's Notes [Sello Moloto] 2006).

In terms of its location, Tjate valley—where Sekhukhune's monument is located—lies east of the Leolo Mountain and west of Modimolle hills on the farms Djate 249KT and Hackney 116KT. Tjate valley is south of the road from Mosego to Swale. One must also note that the events during the Sekhukhune wars cover a large portion of what is today known as 'Sekhukhuneland', but also links up with Burgersfort, Steelpoort, and eventually with Mapoch's caves at Roossenekal and Botshabelo near Middleburg (Mapungubwe News n.d.). Kgoši Sekhukhune's long and bitter struggles against the ZAR between 1876 and 1877 as well as against the British in 1879, were

determined and submitted by the Limpopo government to SAHRA as the significance of the battlefield for the consideration of its declaration as a provincial heritage site (Mapungubwe News n.d.).

Soutini-Baleni is situated twenty-five kilometres further east of Nkomo-Goxani village near Mahumani on the southern bank of Klein Letaba River. It is under Mahumani Traditional Authority in Greater Giyani Municipality, Mopani District Municipality, approximately 35 km from the eastern side of Kruger National Park. The significance of Soutini-Baleni is demonstrated in its hot mineral spring (geo-thermal spring)—a unique natural feature in the otherwise arid Mopani veld wilderness, south-east of Giyani. It has been declared as a Natural Heritage Site (1999) because of its unique ecology. A species of fish, the stunted population of Mozambique tilapia (*Oreochromis mossambicus*) lives in the fountain. The surrounding swamp is covered mostly by bulrushes and reeds (Mapungubwe News n.d.).

Other than its scientific significance, indigenous people have been harvesting salt at the Soutini-Baleni fountain for the past 2000 years. Stone tools also tell a story of Stone Age people being active at Baleni. Soutini-Baleni is, thus, the only salt production site where indigenous people harvested salt using indigenous technologies, practices, and customs in this part of Limpopo province. Traditional customs which accompany salt making processes at Baleni include interaction with the ancestral world through ritual and appeasement offerings at the sacred dry leadwood tree (the shrine). It forms part of the community's tangible or living heritage. The natural fountain is significant to a broader indigenous community because of its mythical character. It is referred to as Mukhulu (the Great One) (Mapungubwe News n.d.).

The cultural landscape at Baleni includes ancient salt mounds which date back to 250 AD and which cover an area of one-and-a-half to two kilometres in radius from the fountain eye. The modern salt production site and the shrine are also part of the cultural landscape. Oral history abounds and because of all the myths, legends, and other stories that are well known to all the people in surrounding communities and regularly told to visitors, the place and the fountain are considered sacred. Besides being sacred, it is a gendered site since salt making at Soutini-Baleni is an activity that is only practiced by women (Mapungubwe News n.d.).

In an address at the Summit of Limpopo Traditional Leaders in 2007, then Premier Sello Moloto stated that the newly declared provincial heritage sites of Tjate in Sekhukhuneland, Dzata in Vhembe, Soutini-Baleni in Mopani, and the Malebogo-Boer war battlefields in Capricorn are important tourism icons, which must be linked to other offerings to attract as many visitors to the province as possible (Speakers Notes [Sello Moloto] 2004). Premier Moloto impressed on

traditional leaders to help sustain the memory of the tales behind these sites by ensuring that they do not get lost.

The Baleni site is indeed developed for tourism. It forms part of the chain of destinations on the African ivory route and their facilities, including accommodation and tour guides, to welcome visitors (South African Heritage Resources Agency 2006).

Dzata is in the eastern section of the Soutpansberg mountain range in Vhembe district, in the north-eastern part of Limpopo province. It lies adjacent to the Nzhelele valley, some forty kilometres to the west of Thohoyandou. Dzata is regarded as the spiritual home of the Venda people since it is the ancient capital of Venda. Khosi Dambanyika settled at Dzata from Zimbabwe following the breakup of the Monomotapa Empire. He found peaceful aboriginal Venda residents at Dzata and subjugated them c.1688 (Kruger 1972: 561, 639). There is a museum of the Drum which will inform tourists to Dzata on the history and heritage of the area (Luonde Uhavenda History n.d.).

The battlefields of the Malebogo-Boer War cover a vast part of the Blouberg area. It is situated approximately sixty kilometres from the rural city of Senwabarwana (translated as place where Bushmen drink and formerly called Bochum). The battlefields site covers a vast area because of the nature of the war between the Bahananwa and the Boers in which the latter established fortifications throughout the area in preparation of their assault. The vast site covers the farms Leipzig 264, Buffelshoek 261, Beauly 280, The Grange 257, Wiltstein 256, and Veredig. Its significance lies in the fact that this area played host to the bitter war of Kgoši Malebogo against the ZAR over white encroachment on his land towards the end of the nineteenth century (Setumu 2005a: 15).

It was, however, the LIHRA that launched information gathering projects as part of their requirements for the protection, conservation, preservation, and declaration of the sites. The emphasis was on gathering information to set forth ideas for the planned growth and embellishment of the sites. Various proposals, advanced during meetings sought to ennoble the potential of heritage sites. Embodied in all the plans, was a desire to bring the future heritage sites into ceremonial step with other similar sites in accordance with the province's growing political and economic importance to South Africa.

To achieve the above aims, LIHRA invited applications for the development of Cultural Resources Management Plans (CRMP) for the targeted memorial and battlefield sites. This was also a part of a project to nominate the sites for gazetting them as Grade II heritage sites (Rainbow Heritage Institute n.d.).

> Limpopo Heritage Resources Authority wishes to nominate and declare Malebogo-Boer War Battlefield as a Provincial Heritage Site under section 27 of the National Heritage Resources Act, Act 25 of 1999. A Cultural Resources Management Plan for Malebogo-Boer War Battlefield is required for the smooth running of this envisaged declaration. LIHRA had invited applications from professional heritage practitioners to compile the required CRMP for the declaration (Mapungubwe News 2005).

In addition to designing a CRMP for the heritage site, the ToR required that a cultural database be compiled that could be used for comprehending the interrelationships of various heritage resources around the heritage sites. The ToR also proposed that for a useful conservation strategy, measures, and sustainable use of heritage resources for the benefit of host communities is determined. The general aims of the project were to build heritage site conservation management plans that would define the significance of the site and identify management issues that needed to be addressed in proportion to the declaration of the site as a Grade II heritage site; accumulate existing data on heritage resources in the area earmarked for declaration; find information that was not documented in order to fill the gaps in the existing data; conduct a field survey and motivate for nomination. These processes ended with the declaration of the sites in 2007, as can be seen below on the photo of notice of declaration..

Photograph 3: Declaration of sites as provincial heritage sites. Photo by Mahunele Thotse. **Question**: What is the difference between declaring sites as international/universal, national, and provincial heritage sites?

The potential of other battlefield areas, such as the Magoebaskloof area, even though they were not declared heritage sites, were also tested. In a report on the potential impact of prospecting activities on items of historical significance in Haenertsburg and its surrounding areas, Prof

Louis Changuion (1999) reflected on the 1894-1896 skirmishes and the war fought between the ZAR forces and the local Makgoba people. Less than a decade later this area was also impacted upon by skirmishes between Boers and British soldiers during the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902. These skirmishes left relics behind that today have become tourist attractions, hence modern prospecting with eventual mining in the area was discouraged as it would make tourism difficult and spoil the site (Changuion 2008). This area is not a declared heritage site, yet it still enjoys visitation among other things, for its recorded [hi]story of the Makgoba wars.

2.3 Sculpting the statues

The Project Team first looked within the borders of Limpopo province for potential sculptors. They soon realised that there were no reputable sculptors in the province of Limpopo who could qualify for the work in accordance with the ToR, which potential sculptors had to adhere to for them to be considered for the commissioning of the sculpting project. The ToR stipulated that competing sculptors had to complete detailed plaster models on a scale of one to twelve. The Project Team also requested that artists submitting models make their intentions known to compete by writing to the Heritage Unit of the DSAC prior to submitting their models. The ToR further stipulated that 'All statue work and bronze casting must be executed in South Africa' (Limpopo Heritage Resources Authority 1999). Competing sculptors were further instructed to submit full, written descriptions of their designs, including exact dimensions, materials to be used, and detailed cost estimates (Thotse 2014).

The ToR made no detailed stipulations regarding the monuments' style or iconography, requesting only that prospective sculptor's fashion their designs representing 'the character and individuality of the subjects honoured', and that each statue had to reflect the image of a true leader, a soldier (Limpopo Heritage Resources Authority 1999). To be able to achieve this, the Project Team needed pictures or photographs of all the selected historical icons (Limpopo Heritage Resources Authority 1999). Such photographs would then serve as source material for the sculptor/s. The term icon is derived from *eikon*, which is the Greek word for image (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary: 742).

Miller and Schwartz (1985: 522-527) provide enough reasons on why it is important to use pictures for the images of historical icons. The authors submit that four properties—likeness;

"manifestiveness"; moral stimulus; and sacredness—have clear parallels in political iconography. For the purposes of this study, as icons, the statues had to mirror a certain likeness to the represented leaders. The second property, manifestiveness is reflected in an icon's ability to show or manifest the represented person(s) by bringing them alive cognitively. The Limpopo province in this way, hoped to make these leaders' appearances and moral character known to those of their time as well as of later generations who would never see them in person. They believed that the statues would enable the provincial populace to stay in proximity to the revered, but distant or deceased leaders whose character and actions deserve to be emulated. The Limpopo Premier, Sello Moloto, in this regard, used Sefako Makgatho as an example of a prominent person who managed to link past and present:

> The great Sefako Makgatho emulated the example of Sekhukhune I amongst others, when he became the President General of the African National Congress in 1917 and continued the struggle for liberation and freedom for all South Africans. He was following in the footsteps of the generation of warrior traditional leaders like Shaka, Bambatha, Hintsa, Makhado, Malebogo, and Ngungunhane who fiercely fought colonialists in defence of the heritage. They fought for our freedom even before the formation of political parties. They were in the forefront fighting to free us from those who descended on the African shores to disposes (sic) of our land. They too must be honoured for what they were, heroes and heroines of the liberation struggle (Speakers Notes [Sello Moloto] 2004: 40).

This perspective of a link between the warrior traditional leaders and the liberation struggle is significant in contextualising those traditional leaders. Miller and Schwartz (1985: 522-527) emphasised that portraits can bridge the distances of space and time to bring a society's heroes and leaders to living presence for its members. Since moral qualities are commonly attributed to the countenance of public leaders, their images can exhibit those human qualities that society looks up to and promotes. Great leaders are "representative men", that is, persons who embody a community's most cherished ideals and virtues (Miller and Schwartz 1985: 522-527). This becomes clearly translated in Sello Moloto's speeches at unveilings with special reference to traditional leadership:

> The institution of traditional leadership has become an indispensable element of the democratic system; particularly in Limpopo...Traditional leadership has an important role to play in this phase of our struggle. It is an institution that emerged from the roots of our history and should therefore speak for the lives and souls of our people. In pursuit of the African Renaissance, traditional leadership should be seen in the forefront in defence and regeneration of our morals, norms, values, culture, and tradition (Speakers Notes [Sello Moloto 2004: 40).

The Project Team, therefore, set out to find pictures or photographs of all the warrior traditional leaders. This they managed to achieve, except in the case of Mokopane. Chapter Four contains details on exactly what followed. Johnson (2010) confirms that no photographs of Ngungunhane could be found, however, there were some paintings of him available. In the case of Makgoba, only a photograph of his severed head was found (Johnson 2010).

With the ToR, the Project Team then approached the University of Pretoria's Department of Fine Arts with a request for the latter to recommend suitable sculptors. The list of sculptors which the University of Pretoria made available included the names of Harry Johnson, Phil Minnaar, and Andre Otto. These sculptors were approached with the ToR and a request for quotations. Significantly, the Project Team stated in their ToR that they would not be bound to selecting any one design but were instead at liberty to reject them all if they saw fit.

In all the cases, members of the relevant royal families were to serve as advisory committees to adjudicate the sculptors and models and to select the best designs based on their knowledge of, in each individual case, the subjects commemorated (Mulaudzi 2013). The advisory committees assembled at the DSAC offices in Polokwane, examined the models and made their selections. Mulaudzi, the Senior Heritage Manager at DSAC confirmed that Harry Johnson emerged the least expensive of all the sculptors, quoting R250 000 per sculpture. He was then offered an opportunity to cast the statues of Sekhukhune, Makhado, and Ngungunhane (Mulaudzi 2013).

Indeed, Harry Johnson admitted in an interview that he did not know about the commission before he was approached, however, he seemed very confident that universities, particularly the University of Pretoria, rated his work highly. Harry Johnson had studied at the University of Pretoria. He also thought that Professor Alex Duffey of the same university might have been instrumental in nominating him to be included on the list of potential sculptors. However, Johnson also believed

that a telling factor in his selection, was that his work did the talking for him. He said that the committee that picked him for the commission was very happy that he was politically neutral and that there would not be any accusations of him getting the job because he knew somebody. The sculptor also mentioned some of the names that competed with him for the project, such as Danie de Jager, Phil Minnaar, Andre Otto, as well as a few young black sculptors from Limpopo whom he ended up helping in terms of preparations for the presentations of their works. Johnson was confident that it was mainly his track record that worked in his favour. He had previously done portraits for famous people among them, Anton Rupert and Nelson Mandela, hence, nobody could question the quality of his work (Johnson 2010).

The issue of not having to sign a contract or any Service Level Agreement did not seem to bother Harry Johnson, since he was used to working without signing such contracts. As if to qualify that contracts or service level agreements (SLAs) were not necessarily that important for him, he mentioned that he was once also commissioned by the Oppenheimer family for work for which he also did not have to sign any contract and yet he still received what was due to him—something he called a "gentlemen's contract". He had received requests, and in the case of the Limpopo province he also received the ToR, and in turn, he gave a quotation. Upon receiving the go ahead to do the job, that was reason enough to believe that his quotation has been accepted and therefore, he did not demand further contracts (Johnson 2010).

In addition to Johnson, the DSAC approached the sculptors Phil Minnaar and Andre Otto to make the statues of Malebogo and Makgoba. Minnaar, who was commissioned to sculpt Kgoši Malebogo's statue, also confirmed in an interview that he did not know about the project before being approached by Limpopo's DSAC official Dirk de Wet, in his capacity as heritage manager. Dirk de Wet handed Minnaar the ToR together with a request to submit models and a quotation on what he would need for a project of such a magnitude. Minnaar confirmed that he quoted R158 000 for the project. This begs one to question Mulaudzi's claim that Harry Johnson was the least expensive sculptor, as was indicated earlier on (Minnaar 2010). Both Johnson and Minnaar confirmed that a committee visited their studios for inspection and asked questions about how many people they (the sculptors) were employing and how long it would take for them to complete the work of the scope described in the ToR if they were commissioned. Like Johnson, Minnaar also could not remember signing any contract, however, did acknowledge that he was paid what he asked for (Minnaar 2010).

Upon this researcher contacting Andre Otto for an interview regarding his work, the sculptor was not prepared to share any information regarding the statue of Makgoba until such time that his work was erected by the province. Since the statue was never installed, this study has been robbed of the sculptor's comment (Otto 2010).

2.4 Early challenges confronting the Project Team

The project team met with challenges that delayed the project of erecting the statue of Makgoba. Initial successes were recorded when the Project Team and the Makgoba royal house agreed on the image of the traditional leader's statue. While only the image of his head was found, the royal family agreed that the artist be given the go ahead to design the rest of the torso to finish with a full life-size statue of the traditional leader. Makgoba was designed holding a bow and arrow. However, problems began to emerge when the royal family attempted to tie issues of land claims to the erection of the statue. While the DSAC argued that these were two different issues, the community continued to attempt to use this as leverage and to force the Limpopo government's hand to act swiftly to resolve the communities land claim application. As a result, the community gave an ultimatum to the effect that there would be no erection of the statue without finality to the issues of land claim. Since issues of land claims were neither their responsibility nor their mandate, the DSAC then decided to halt the project of erecting the statue of Kgoši Makgoba and therefore, the statue has since been stored in the warehouse of the provincial Department of Public Works and will probably remain there until the status quo has been resolved (Mulaudzi 2013).

Eventually, the land claim was at least partly resolved successfully when in 2006 farms worth more than R1 000 000.00 were returned to the Makgoba clan in settlement. However, problems at the tribe continued unabated amid claims of the money being misappropriated. A bitter struggle ensued over the control of the land and assets between the head of the royal family, Mokopa Makgoba (incumbent chief), the Mamphoku Makgoba Community Trust (administers of the fund) and the beneficiaries committee (Govender 2011; Molefe 2011). Unfortunately, this meant that the statue could still not be erected, since the problems were not yet resolved. This also explains why the sculptor of Makgoba statue, Andre Otto, would not offer any interviews as his work was never on display.

Mulaudzi further mentioned that no official complaints were recorded regarding the statue of Makhado, except that a few days after its unveiling, the statue was painted in the colours of the old South African flag (used between 1928 and 1994) one morning and a bullet had also gone through the head which demonstrated that some individual or some sections of the community were not entirely happy about the erection of the statue in Louis Trichardt.[3] The choice of paint colour indicates that the people who thus expressed their opposition to Makhado were probably white. A contemporary witness thus reported at the time:

3 The town had just become known as the City of Makhado after its name was changed for short period and before it assumed the old name of Louis Trichardt again after. Again, the Minister of Arts and Culture, Paul Mashatile approved the name City of Makhado, but after another court case in the second half of 2014, the town became Louis Trichardt again.

To commemorate Makhado, the municipal authorities in Louis Trichardt had decided to re-name the town after him. The statue was erected as part of that process. However, less than a week after the statue was unveiled in 2006, vandals defaced it by painting it in the colours of the old South African flag. The attack reflected the intense feelings about the name change, especially among the town's white population and its business community which felt the name change would cost more than it would benefit the local economy (and who fought and won a legal case to have the town's name changed back to Louis Trichardt) (NUIM Geography's Eye on the World 2013).

Photograph 5: Photo of Makhado statue with a bullet hole in the head. Photo by Mahunele Thotse.

Question: To what extent did these depictions draw complaints and treat Makhado as a fellow citizen?

Photograph 4: Image of Kosikhulu Mkhado's painted statue (Gabara 2005 [Zoutpansberger]).

However, it was not only a section of the white population who were unhappy about the situation surrounding the celebration of Makhado. Lithole, who was a SAHRA provincial officer at the time, had attended several consultative meetings with the community and other relevant bodies where some sections of the community voiced concerns about the appearance of the Makhado statue (Lithole 2013). Amongst others, they complained that Makhado was a man-about-town, that is, he liked suits as he had been exposed to white culture from a young age. In fact, a regional publication *ZOUTNET* on 13 April 2007 quoted one of Makhado's grandchildren Sam Ramabulana who was already in his eighties saying:

> That statue of Makhado at the Information Centre: I don't know where people got it from. I don't know where they got that picture. As far as I know, Makhado didn't put traditional dress. He wore normal clothing, a shirt and trousers. He even had a checkered (sic, should be chequered) morning gown! Moreover, the statue of Makhado should be at the town hall (Van der Westhuizen 2007).

The newspaper also quoted Makhado's great grandson, M.P. Marageni, agreeing with his uncle on the statue: '... [w]e don't want that one, we want one that looks like the well-known picture of Makhado. That one looks like Moshesh'. Marageni reportedly said this while pointing to a picture of Makhado held up by Sam Ramabulana. Indeed, the sculptor Harry Johnson admitted that it was his idea to dress him traditional to reflect his "Africanness". The descendants also complained that Makhado should have been given a gun and not a knobkerrie as he used guns, not only as one of the best hunters, but also during his combat times (Van der Westhuizen 2007). These complaints and concerns, however, were never made official, since Meshack Mulaudzi's office did not receive anything along those lines (Mulaudzi 2013).

Johnson completed the first three statues of Sekhukhune (2004); Makhado (2005); and Ngungunhane (2005) successfully. He, however, ran into trouble with the DSAC when he claimed payment for the little gifts he gave to members of the Makhado Royal family, which were not ordered, hence he was wrong to claim payment for, but for which he held the Department to ransom until he was paid before releasing the proper bronze statue of Ngungunhane (Mulaudzi 2013). Johnson confirmed that he was being owed money and when the DSAC requested that the statue of Ngungunhane be erected he was only prepared to make available a statue in fibreglass that looked exactly like bronze. This statue was the one unveiled (see picture below). He was paid his money a year after the unveiling of the fibreglass statue and only then did he release the bronze statue to replace the fibreglass one. The payment was only affected after an official intervention by MEC Joe Maswanganyi when he gave an instruction that the sculptor be paid (Mulaudzi 2013). It was at this stage that Johnson realised that a contract is often of great importance. The absence of a contract in this instance, brought about tension between Johnson and the DSAC which led to the latter abandoning the former (Johnson 2010). It is not farfetched to argue here that had it not been for the stand-off between Johnson and the DSAC, Phil Minnaar and Andre Otto would probably not have been appointed to sculpt the other statues.

The controversy surrounding the Ngungunhane statue did not end when the money issue was resolved. Even before the bronze statue could be unveiled, a delegation representing Shangaan

Chiefs met with the project leaders and opposed the location of Ngungunhane's statue in Giyani. The delegation was disputing the legitimacy of Ngungunhane, claiming that he had done nothing whatsoever for Giyani; that he never even reached Giyani and that his reign was only confined to Bushbuckridge, if at all in the Limpopo province; that he never ruled the Tsonga speaking people and that they (the delegation and their supporters), therefore, did not acknowledge him as their hero that deserved this kind of honour.

The Daily Sun newspaper extensively quoted those they called Shangaan and VhaTsonga leaders, criticising the Limpopo government's attempts to honour an anti-colonial warrior traditional leader by erecting a R250 000 statue in his honour. The leaders were quoted pointing out that while the Shangaan traditional leader Ngungunhane was undoubtedly a hero, he was a Mozambican who had never ruled over any South African territories or people:

> King Nghunghunyani was a great man who fought the Portuguese invaders in Mozambique and tried unsuccessfully to preserve the independence of his Gaza Empire," the group's joint spokesman, Hosi Muhlava was quoted saying. "But he never ruled any territory in what is now South Africa. He has no link with Limpopo. Government failed to consult with us (Daily Sun 2005: 11).

In the newspaper article, Muhlava was presented as a spokesperson for all major Shangaan and VhaTsonga traditional leaders in the Giyani, Bushbuckridge, Phalaborwa, and Tzaneen areas. The group complained that if the government was interested in honouring their heroes, they should have consulted with them and that they in turn, would have gladly suggested several great people who fought for their rights. 'The statue to King Nghunghunyani should perhaps rather be erected in Mozambique, where people remember and honour him' (Daily Sun 2005: 11).

Photograph 6: The fibreglass statue of Hosinkuklu Ngungunhane that sculptor Harry Johnson unveiled at Giyani, prior to replacing it with a bronze statue after he was paid in full, Johnson studios, Groblersdal. Photo taken at Johnson's workshop by Mahunele Thotse during interviews with the sculptor, 2010. **Question**: Why were statues of active chiefs more attractive to the Limpopo provincial government?

The saga of Ngungunhane's statue even ended up in court. This resulted from actions taken by one of the current traditional leaders of the Tsonga tribe, Mpisane Eric Nxumalo. Gezani Samuel Mabunda who was not only Traditional Leader Mpisane Nxumalo's advisor, but at the same time an official of the DSAC, was disturbed by what he perceived as ignorance of the facts by the traditional leaders of the Shangaan Chiefs. Traditional Leader, Mpisane Eric Nxumalo is said to be a descendant of Hosi Ngungunhane. During this period, and through the courts, Nxumalo attempted to be recognised as the rightful traditional leader of all Tsonga/Shangaan speaking groups in South Africa. Mabunda (2013) cited several government gazettes that confirmed that even tribal authorities represented by the Shangaan Chiefs were at some point part of the larger Gaza state. Amongst others, Mabunda noted the contents of Republic of South Africa Proclamation R. 15 of 1973 (Government Gazette no. 3772, 26 January 1973) which declared former Gazankulu as a self-governing state. The authorities represented by the Shangaan Chiefs were all part of the Gazankulu (literally translated as Greater Gaza or Gaza State) Homeland. Proclamation R. 148 of 1971 (Government Gazette no. 3163, 25 January 1971) also established what was called the Machangana Legislative Assembly. Mabunda claimed that these proclamations confirmed that there has always been only one Gaza, which was originally established by Soshangana of whom Ngungunhane was a descendent and to which the other tribal authorities also belonged, even if they now wanted to reject this link (Mabunda 2013).

However, on Friday 3 October 2014, the *Sowetan* newspaper reported that Traditional Leader Mpisane Nxumalo lost his Constitutional Court bid to set aside a decision which held that Ngungunhane's kingdom was destroyed over 100 years ago. The court found that the Commission on Traditional Leadership Disputes and Claims, which dealt with claims of traditional leadership, had been correct in dismissing Nxumalo's claim for the restoration of the kingdom. Nxumalo lodged the claim with the commission, commonly known as the Nhlapo Commission, for the restoration of the traditional leadership of the traditional community and for him to be recognised as its traditional leader. In 2010, the commission dismissed Nxumalo's claim mainly on the basis that the kingdom had been destroyed around 1894 and that he had not shown good cause for the restoration. It also found that the traditional leadership was never restored after it had disintegrated. Furthermore, in 2012 the case was dismissed by the Supreme Court of Appeal, after which Mpisane approached the Constitutional Court (Sowetan 2014: 5). The Constitutional Court decision, therefore, vindicated the position of the Shangaan Chiefs represented by Hosi Muhlava, even though for a different reason.

The Gaza Kingdom Committee charged with planning the unveiling of the statue of Hosi Ngungunhane, had earlier on in response to the objections of Muhlava on behalf of the Shangaan Chiefs, reacted angrily to what they considered to be efforts to undermine the occasion of the unveiling. One of the coordinators, Hosi John Ndindana, said that he found it surprising that people planned to form an "unholy alliance" to undermine history. Ndindana was reacting to statements attributed to Hosi Samuel Muhlava of the Nkuna tribe, that traditional leaders should have been consulted regarding the statue. Muhlava had, as already indicated, said that Hosi Ngungunhane had no history in South Africa and should be honoured only in Mozambique (Ntlemo 2006: 7).

Further, Chief Ndindana ruefully noted that the Gaza Kingdom Committee visited different tribal areas to seek the views of others, all of whom believed Ngungunhane was worthy of the honour. Ndindana stated that, 'people led by Soshangana who broke away from the Ndwandwe kingdom immediately after the defeat of traditional leader Zwide by Shaka Zulu in 1819 formed the Gaza state. They subjugated different tribes in Mozambique to form one nation...The kingdom stretched to parts of present-day Zimbabwe and South Africa, until colonialists dismantled it' (Ntlemo 2006: 7). Ndindana conceded that Ngungunhane was toppled by the Portuguese in 1895 and deported to Portugal and died in exile in 1906 after ruling for eleven years (Ntlemo 2006: 7).

The *Daily Sun* also quoted the DSAC spokesman Mbangiseni Masia confirming that the government would proceed with the unveiling of the statue despite the contestations: 'King Nghunghunyani is undoubtedly a hero who fought colonialism. Our government is honouring such leaders and will continue to build monuments to the wars of resistance', Masia was quoted saying (Daily Sun 2005: 11).

Masia declined to comment on the assertions that Ngungunhane had no historical link with Limpopo or other modern South African territories. This reaction was not surprising, since it was not the first time that it was used. In response to the same assertion, former Premier Sello Moloto bluntly confessed that the Limpopo provincial government wanted to appease the Shangaan speaking populace of the province (Daily Sun 2005: 11; Moloto 2009).

In consultation with the Giyani Municipality, MEC Maswanganyi learnt that there were political manoeuvres as the municipality felt that the erection of Ngungunhane's statue in Giyani would legitimise the claim of the Nxumalo family to be paramount. The Nxumalo Royal House claimed to be the biological descendants of Ngungunhane. Instead, the Giyani Municipality wanted Chief Ntsanwisi to be recognised. Among the four chiefs that formed the Shangaan Chiefs delegation were chief Ntsanwisi of Majeje village around Phalaborwa and Nkoankoa and E.P.P. Mhinga, brother to Chief Shilungwa Cydrick Mhinga. The delegation was eventually persuaded

by the Limpopo government in 2005 and agreed that the unveiling ceremony could go ahead. An estimated crowd of over 30 000 gathered to bless the occasion (Mabunda 2013; Mathebula et al. 2007).

Problems surrounding Sekhukhune and Malebogo were resolved when the offices of traditional affairs issued leadership certificates to the incumbent leaders. The project leadership could therefore only deal with these leaders, despite objections from other sections of the two communities respectively. However, Mulaudzi's office received no such objections in writing (Mulaudzi 2013). Unfortunately, Mulaudzi could not indicate details of the objections as he said they were not brought to his attention, and it would be speculation if he were to mention things that were not officially presented to his office. It would, however, have been interesting to know such details.

2.5 Symbolism of the statues

The selection of these leaders representing prominent ethnic groups in the province shows that the Wars of Resistance were not confined to one specific ethnic group. These groups could therefore be united under one umbrella as they all fought against the same threat—colonialism and imperialism—by white governments, be they Boers, English, or Portuguese. The selection of just these leaders which represent the BaPedi by Sekhukhune, the Venda by Makhado, the Shangaan by Ngungunhane, the BaHananwa by Malebogo, the Ndebele by Mokopane, and the BaTlhalerwa/Tlou/Kolobe (Krige 1937: 4; Van Warmelo, 1935)[4] by Makgoba, was also questioned. In response Mulaudzi indicated that they also had similar questions and invited the public to provide evidence that other than these, other leaders also took up arms to "fight the enemy" and that such evidence did not come forth. Mulaudzi went so far as to give the example of Queen

4 NJ van Warmelo, the State ethnologist of the early twentieth century, described the Makgoba people as Tlou (elephant totem) whereas JD Krige referred to them as Kolobe (duiker totem) and in the State publication, *Short History of the Native Tribes of the Transvaal* they are called Batlhalerwa (leopard totem). Van Warmelo admits that they were sometimes referred to as Kolobe and Batlhalerwa because they had people of those origins in their midst. Changuion noted that Makgoba himself stated in 1892, when he appeared before the Location Commission, that although they were previously subordinate to the Letswalo/Narene tribe (Nare-buffalo totem), they are closely related to the Molepos (Tlou-elephant totem).

Modjadji. Apparently, concerns were voiced from several quarters of the community about the exclusion of Modjadji from the ranks of those who were honoured. Mulaudzi pointed out that in response to enquiries, no one provided evidence to prove that any specific queen within the Modjadji dynasty fought encroachment by whites. On the contrary, the Modjadji dynasty was found to have been collaborating and siding with the white governments in most cases (Mulaudzi 2013). Contrary to Mulaudzi's assertion, Grimsehl wrote the following about Modjadji's conduct and reaction to white encroachment in her country in 1890:

> Op 26 September het Meriam, een van Eerw Reuter se bekeerlinge hom gewaasku dat Modjadji van plan was om die sendingstasie te oorval en af the brand. Sy het reeds bevel gegee dat alle weerbare manne ten volle gewapen en na die hoofkraal moet kom en vir 'n paar dae kos saambring. Nog dieselfde middag het gewapende bendes by die sendingstasie verbygetrek op weg na die hoofkraal. Een bende was so brutaal om hulle gewere by die stasie af te skiet. Reuter het dadelik boodskappers na die hoofkraal gestuur om te verneem wat aan die gang was. Hulle het die berig gebring dat Modjadji alle knopneuse binne haar gebied wil vermoor en ook die sendingstasie wou afbrand omdat Reuter die lokasie-komisie by hom opgeneem het. Modjadji is ontevrede oor die afbakening van lokasie. Eerw. Reuter en W. Boshoff het hulle hierop dadelik na Lt. Du Toit gehaas om hom van die toestand van sake te verwitting en om ook van hom, indien moontlik, die nodige gewere en ammunisie te kry om hulleself en die sendingstasie te verdidig. Lt. duToit het dadelik patrollies uitgestuur om ondersoek in te stel en volgens berigte wat hulle teruggebring het, het alles "geleek op eene groote voorbereiding van oorlog.
>
> [On 26 September, Meriam, one of Reverend Reuter's converts warned him that Modjadji was planning to attack the mission station and burn it down. She [Modjadji] had already given instructions for all able-bodied men to come to the royal kraal fully armed and to bring with them food for a few days. The same day armed troops marched past the mission station towards the royal kraal. One of the troops was so brutal that they shot at the mission station. Reuter sent messengers immediately to the royal kraal to find out what was going on. They brought back a report that Modjadji was planning to kill all knob nosed people [Shangaans] in her country and to burn down the mission station because Reuter had welcomed the location commission.

> Modjadji was discontented with the beaconing of the location. Immediately thereafter, Reverend Reuter and W. Boshoff hurried to Lieut du Toit to notify him of the state of affairs and to get from him if at all possible, the necessary weapons and ammunition to protect themselves and the mission station. Lieut. Du Toit also sent out patrols to investigate and according to reports received "it looked like one huge preparation for a war.] (Grimsehl 1955: 44)

If the above excerpt is a true reflection of what happened, then the assertion that Modjadji never resisted white encroachment could not have been entirely correct. This would then mean that there must be other reasons why Modjadji was not considered for the kind of honour accorded other selected leaders.

The significance of the selected leaders was that they all demonstrated the ability to mobilise their people to rebel against their perceived enemies (which significance Modjadji seems to have met in as far as Grimsehl's quotation above is concerned). Their supporters got concerned every time whites seemed to settle permanently in their territories; characteristics that demonstrated vigilance and alarm (Grimsehl 1955: 44).

Chapter Three

'Warrior' Leaders and the Wars of Resistance

"The notion of collective memory refers both to a past that is commonly shared and a past that is collectively commemorated." Barbara A. Misztal, *Theories of Social Remembering*

3.1 Introduction

Historian Lize Kriel observed that the history of South Africa, in particular history of the nineteenth century, is rich in actions by the indigenous African population to resist the colonial subjugation by the expanding settlers of European extraction and the British colonial power (Kriel 2009). By the early 1870s, the government of the Transvaal officially known as the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republic (ZAR), had become relatively successful in administering and controlling the black African communities in the central regions of their Republic (Kriel 2000: 57). However, as Bergh and Morton (2003: 9-10) noted, an important obstacle faced by the ZAR administration was its lack of proper control over black African polities in the western, northern, and eastern frontier districts. In the outlying northern and eastern districts of the Zoutpansberg and Lydenburg, black African communities rejected attempts by white officials to extract tax or tribute, whether in the form of labour or hunting trophies. From early white settlement in the 1840s, repeated attempts were made by white settlers and officials to impose such demands, and a series of small-scale wars were conducted as a result. However, with Africans, such as Malebogo's BaHananwa and Makhado's VhaVenda in strong fortified positions in the mountainous region, effective control was not possible. Meanwhile, Sekhukhune's BaPedi and Mabhogo's AmaNdebele in the eastern districts also offered resistance (Berg and Morton 2003: 9-10). These chiefs were not prepared to voluntarily relinquish their *de facto* sovereignty, nor were they willing to move to demarcated reserves and faithfully start paying taxes merely because the local Boer officials insisted upon it. These black African chieftaincies remained autonomous, and effective ZAR administration was

introduced only in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. From the 1870s the ZAR government eventually resorted to military force to coerce these communities into accepting its supremacy.

The focus of this chapter is on the traditional leaders who fought these wars against subjugation. Their reaction to the white governments' (ZAR, British, and Portuguese) measures to turn them into subjects through the appropriation of their lands, labour, and taxes will be considered. The Limpopo provincial government has since 2004, recognised the brave efforts of these leaders by honouring those selected with monuments erected under a collective theme "Warrior kings who fought the Wars of Resistance against Colonialism and Imperialism".

The emergence of this select group of traditional leaders as the preeminent heroes of the historic "Wars of Resistance" struggle in Limpopo province, requires some explanation. Kriel (2009) noted that like elsewhere in oral cultures, the moment of humiliation (defeat) was transformed in the collective memory into a celebration of brave defiance, an indictment against the perpetrators and a constant inspiration for future generations. The chapter considers the "Wars of Resistance" in the north-eastern Transvaal—what is today Limpopo province in the period 1850-1895. Resistance by each individual warrior traditional leader to white attempts at subjugation is examined. The aim of this chapter is not to investigate either the causes or the course of the wars. However, provision of information on the wars that culminated in the memorialisation of the selected warrior traditional leaders in Limpopo province is essential for understanding the process itself and to illuminate just why this select group of leaders was being honoured. The traditional leaders are discussed in no order.

3.2 'Warrior' leaders and the 'Wars of Resistance'

3.2.1 Kgoši Mokopane

During 1854, growing resistance amongst the northern Ndebele against the frontier of colonial expansion erupted in the murder of several Boers who were encroaching on their territory. Problems between the Ndebele chiefdoms and the Boers stretch back to the arrival of the Boers in the north-western Transvaal in the 1840s. By the end of the decade there was growing tension over land, labour, and allegations that Boers were enslaving indigenous children. The incursion

of white hunters, traders, and the then settlers into the territory that Ndebele chiefs had always considered their own did not please the latter. A growing Boer presence impacted on the local Ndebele living in the area. De Waal writes that the relationship between Mokopane and the first cohort of the whites he met were initially friendly.

> Soos reeds gemeld, was Mokopane se houding teenoor die eerste blankes met wie hy in aanraking gekom het, vriendelik...Op grond van Mokopane se optrede teenoor Tregardt, kan aangeneem word dat hy die blankes aanvanklik goedgesind was. Sy houding moes mettertyd egter verander het.
>
> [As already stated, Mokopane's attitude towards the first group of whites he met was friendly...Based on Mokopane's treatment of Tregardt, it can be assumed that he was very welcoming to the Whites. His attitude must have changed thereafter.] (De Waal 1978: 23-26)

In support of the notion of the initial good relationships between Mokopane and the whites, Naidoo also wrote that at first relations between the tribesmen and the settlers were cordial. However, the settlers' growing incursions in greater numbers was trying on the tribesmen. Naidoo maintains that the Trekkers had an unappeasable (and dislocating) appetite for tribal stock, land, and labour. Friction between the two communities was inevitable (Naidoo 1987: 177). This view is supported by Nel (1933: 23-26) who wrote::

> Toe die Boere hulle permanent in die omtrek van die teenswoordige Pietersburg en Louis Trichardt begin vestig het, het die naturelle die vrede nie langer vertrou nie.
>
> [When the Boers began to settle permanently in the vicinity of the present Pietersburg and Louis Trichardt, the natives no longer enjoyed peace.]

The two communities that severely felt the impact of the changes were those of chiefs Mugombane II (Makapan or Mokopane) and the members of his Kekana Ndebele chiefdom that lived near to the wagon route that was used by white travellers that visited the Soutpansberg area and that of Mankopane (Mapela) and his Langa Ndebele chiefdom. De Waal quoted Chief Sechele of the BaKwena tribe declaring:

> I had heard also from some of my people who had been working for the Boers, of the manner in which they had treated Mangkopane and Mokopane, two chiefs living to the eastward of the Mariqua, how they attacked these chiefs without cause, and taken numbers of cattle and children from them, and many of these children were sold (De Waal 1978: 21)

The turning point for Mokopane came in 1847/8, when some Trekkers attacked his people and made off with some of his livestock, as well as some women and children. Mankopane suffered similar losses. With only themselves to rely on for redress and protection, the two chiefs gradually started arming themselves (Naidoo 1987: 177-178).

The area was marked by continuing clashes, which culminated in the siege of the famous Makapan's Cave. Chief Mokopane was even more perturbed when, in the early 1850s, permanent white settlements in the Makapanspoort area began to emerge. Esterhuysen (2006) acknowledges the general perception that the Boers' interest in the Makapanspoort and more specifically the territory of the Kekana and Langa Ndebele chiefs, was based on its strategic importance as a major trade route to the ivory rich Limpopo River valley. In 1852 Commandant Hendrik Potgieter had plans to formalise the Makapanspoort settlement by proclaiming a town, and chose the name Vredenburg not only for it to celebrate his recent reconciliation with his arch-rival Andries Pretorius, but also to lay claim to the trade route and facilitate the movement of goods and people between the Soutpansberg area and the Magaliesberg area (Maguire 2007: 38). Commandant Potgieter could not carry out his intention as he died in December the same year. It was his son Pieter Johannes who achieved his father's intention when he later proclaimed the town. Finally, when the town Vredenburg, which was later named Piet Potgietersrust and recently renamed Mokopane was proclaimed, Mokopane's *mošate* (capital) Chidi was a mere two hours away by horseback, something that left the Ndebele leader uncomfortable (Hofmeyr 1989: 6). De Waal expressed this better:

> Die roete vanaf Schoemansdal in die noorde na Pretoria, het deur Makapanspoort, naby die huidige Potgietersrus, gegaan. Die blankes het hierdie roete gebruik en in baie gevalle getrek en gereis waar hulle wou, sonder om hulle aan die kapteins oor wie se grondgebied die roete geloop het, te steur. Mokopane en sy stam het op die huidige plase Pruissen en Vier-en-twintig Riviere, oos van die roete, gewoon. Een van

> sy hoofmanne, Lekalekale, het wes van die trekroete sowat 8 km vanaf Potgietersrus by Sefakaolokop of Lekalekaleskop gewoon. Die trekroete het dus reg deur Mokopane se grondgebied geloop. Mokopane moes hieroor ongelukkig gevoel het en hieroor kon wrywing tussen hom en die blankes ontstaan het.
>
> [The route from Schoemansdal in the north to Pretoria went through Makapanspoort near the present Potgietersrus. The whites used these routes and, on many occasions, travelled at will without bothering themselves about the chiefs over whose ground the routes crossed. Mokopane and his tribe stayed on the present farms Pruissen and Vier-en-twintig Riviere, east of the routes. One of his headmen, Lekalekale, stayed west of the travel route at Sefakaolokop or Lekalekaleskop somewhat 8 km from Potgietersrus. The travel routes thus, cut right through Mokopane's territory. Mokopane must have felt unhappy about this, and friction developed between him and the whites.] (De Waal 1978: 40)

By 1854 the Kekana, who had been victims of repeated Boer raids, demands, and various acts of cruelty, were ripe to join a growing network of resistance against the Trekkers. Mankopane suggested a meeting of the two chiefs, himself, and Mokopane, at the latter's kraal to map a plan to scare the white man away.

> Op voorstel van Mankopanie het die twee kapteins 'n groot vergadering met hul indoenas in die ,,Nkgoendla" (hofplein) van Sejwamadie gehou. "Die witmense is nie agter die volk nie, maar agter die kapteins, en dit is tyd dat ons een van hul leiers doodmaak," het Mankopanie gesê. Na 'n bespreking wat die hele dag geduur het, is 'n bondgenootskap tussen die twee stamme gesluit met die doel om die ,,Magoa" (witmense) 'n bietjie skrik te maak.
>
> [On the suggestion of Mankopanie the chiefs held a huge gathering with their indunas in Setšwamadi's "Nkgoendla" (palace). "The whites are not after the people, but after the chiefs and it is time to kill one of their leaders" suggested Mankopanie. After a discussion that lasted the entire day, the two tribes forged an alliance with the purpose of scaring the white man a little bit."] (Nel 1933: 23-26)

Esterhuysen (2006) observed that between 1850 and 1854, Mokopane (whom she calls Mugombane), had formed alliances with three other Ndebele chiefs, namely Sebetiele, Mankopane, and Maraba against the Boers. While the full extent of the network is not known, a letter written just after the 1854 siege by members of the white community who settled in Lydenburg to J.P. Hoffman, State President of the Orange Free State, suggested that the web of connections included Mapog (Ndebele), and Moshweshwe (BaSotho), who was able to provide guns and ammunition. The Boers made matters even more difficult when they shifted their trade route from Strydpoort to Makapanspoort—this after they were finding it increasingly difficult to exert their control over the BaPedi of Chief Sekwati (Esterhuysen 2006: 3).

Meanwhile, trouble continued to brew unabated. Hermanus Potgieter, a younger brother of the late Commandant, seems to have had an unappeasable predilection for livestock, land, and labour of the local people. Even amongst his own people he had a reputation for rough behaviour and for being a troublemaker of note. Field Cornet H.J. van Staden from Magaliesberg informed Commandant-General M.W. Pretorius on 14 May 1854 that Hermanus Potgieter, accompanied by nineteen other whites had attacked a chief named Ramaglabootla (Ramatlabotja) and his people. They robbed them of their cattle and deprived them of some of their women and children. Since there was not yet a united government of the white communities north of the Vaal River, their war council, aware of that misconduct, condemned it, and even instructed A. van der Walt (another field cornet) to order Potgieter to restore the stolen cattle and return the abducted women and children (Naidoo 1987: 176).

What seems to have made matters even more complicated was that there was little if anything to curb excesses of behaviour in that very remote frontier region. Hermanus Potgieter's methods to secure what he wanted were chillingly ruthless. He was notorious for demanding tributes of cattle, and more importantly, of children, who were forced into indentured labour under the *ingeboekt* (indentured labour) system, which was in effect a form of slavery (De Vaal 1953: 72). In 1853, the famous trader João Albisini who ran a safari trade from the Zoutpansberg to the Portuguese port at Delagoa Bay, warned the Boers of incipient hostilities...by Ndebele rulers (Maguire 2007: 39).

The last straw came in August 1854 when Hermanus Potgieter shot and killed the brother of Mokopane over a dispute concerning a buffalo that had been shot. The two allied Ndebele rulers decided that enough was enough. A month later, in September, twenty-eight Boers were killed in three separate incidents by the two chiefs. Mankopane avenged the death of Mokopane's brother by luring Hermanus Potgieter into his kraal at Fothane Hill with tales of ivory. Once there,

Hermanus and his supporters were tempted away from the wagons by bearers carrying great tusks of ivory. They were caught unawares and brutally killed (Acutt 1938: 47; Gerdener 1952: 37-40; Law 1955: 1079-10801).

There are conflicting accounts on how Potgieter and his entourage were killed. Theal contends that Hermanus Potgieter, a man of 'violent temper and rough demeanour' (Theal 1984: 415), entered Mokopane's capital with a party of men, intending to trade some ivory. Mokopane was, according to Theal (1984: 415), of ferocious disposition and had the reputation among the surrounding tribes of being a 'man of blood' referring to his nickname Setšwamadi (he who bleeds), which he was given when his (Mokopane's) tribe sustained heavy losses from attacks by BaPedi (De Kock 1972: 478; Theal 1984: 415-420). "Unfriendly" newspaper correspondents claimed that Hermanus Potgieter and his men made demands, without payment, for sheep and oxen. They also demanded gifts of African children, something that Theal considered improbable, for white men would hardly have ventured thus far. Theal, who obviously had little respect for indigenous Africans, felt tribesmen were easily irritable and it is possible that some banal act excited "the Africans to frenzy". Potgieter was 'flayed alive', and his skin was prepared in the same way as that of a wild animal (Theal 1984: 415-420).

Other versions of this incident, however, suggested that it was not Mokopane who killed Potgieter, but his confederate Mankopane (Acutt 1938: 47; Gerdener 1952: 37-40; Law 1955: 1079-1080). Potgieter was on friendly terms with Mankopane, so he would not have expected the treatment that he was about to receive. Mankopane lured Hermanus Potgieter and the other Boers to his capital by mentioning that there was a roaming herd of elephants in the area. This was sufficient to bait the ivory-hungry Potgieter, whose party outspanned near *Mapela's* (Mankopane's nickname) capital, and proceeded on foot to where they thought the elephants were located. They were met by Mankopane's warriors who had placed exceptionally huge elephant tusks on the distant ground, but also had assegais concealed under their clothing. Delighted, the Boers left their rifles and hurried to examine the specimen. While thus engaged, they were attacked and killed, all except Hermanus Potgieter who even though gravely wounded, managed a successful dash to his wagon, however, was finished off by Kheresa, Mankopane's right hand man, with his broken off assegai (De Kock 1972: 478; Maguire 2007: 39; Naidoo 1987: 174-175).

The other two murders were carried out near Mokopane's capital Chidi in the Makapanspoort district. The first was at a river crossing at *Esikgweni sengwenyama* where a Boer party of twelve people, who were camping under camel thorn trees next to a drift, was attacked and killed. In subsequent years this place acquired the name Moorddrift (murder drift). The sandstone

monument that was built there was declared a national monument in 1940 (Hofmeyr 1989: 6).

The third incident involved a smaller party of two white men that had gone to trade at the chief's village on the farms Pruissen and Twenty-Four Rivers, south-east of the newly proclaimed Transvaal town of Vredenburg. They too were murdered. The Ndebele chief (Mokopane) was hoping in this way, to scare the Boers from the territory they deemed to be their own. However, far from scaring or persuading the Boers to decamp, the murders prompted the latter to call up a commando against Mokopane. In fact, two Boer commandos were gathered under the joint command of Commandant-General Piet Potgieter of Soutpansberg and M.W. Pretorius of the Potchefstroom-Magaliesberg-Marico area and proceeded to the Makapaanspoort area. On 24 October 1854, Mokopane and his people retired to a massive cave fifteen kilometres further north where they soon holed up defensively (Hofmeyr 1989: 8; Oberholster 1972: 317-318).

Photograph 7: The monument at Moorddrift. Photo by Mahunele Thotse. **Question**: How does this ensemble represent the changing values of intergroup relations in the region?

The Boers devised several tactics to force the Kekana out of the cave, however, with no success. The first tactic was to storm the cave on 25 October and when this tactic bore no fruit, the attack was called off. Eventually, on 28 October the joint Commandos held a council to discuss further strategies. A second plan was hatched. This was to collapse the roof of the cave by setting off explosives. This experiment also failed and proved costly, and no second attempts were made using this tactic. The third tactic employed was to smoke the Kekana Ndebele out of the cave. Thomas Baines who was in the vicinity of the cave in the early 1870s, described how the attempt to smoke out the Kekana was made:

> The Boers adapted the ...expedient of bringing several hundred waggon loads of wood to the brow of the mountain hurling them down to the foot of the cliffs in which the caves were, and then throwing fire upon the mass (Baines, as cited by Hofmeyr 1989: 8).

When that too proved ineffective, the Boers cut off water supply to the cave by diverting the stream outside the cave. Stone redoubts were set up within firing range of the cave and from the cover afforded by the farmers, trained their guns on the cave's openings and kept up a twenty-four-hour watch. They had estimated that the store of food and drink was running low, and the tight vigil was an attempt to ensure that it would continue. On the fifteenth day of the siege, 8 November, they resolved to block up the openings of the cave. The Kekana reportedly tried to slip out of the cave under the cover of darkness, however, they paid dearly, as more than 700 reportedly fell victim to the gunfire of the night patrols. Women and children thereafter surrendered in greater numbers (Hofmeyr 1989: 8).

Meanwhile, recognising that they were holed up and faced with the possibility of extinction, Chief Mokopane decided to give up his heir to the Boers. Nel wrote about this in his article:

> Die volk het nou daagliks by die hope van dors gesterf en daar het gevaar bestaan dat die enigste seun van die hoofvrou van die koning ook sou omkom. So ŉ ramp moes ten alle koste voorkom word. Hierdie kroonprins was toe omtrent ag jaar oud. Sejwamadi [Mokopane] roep die Raad byeen. Nadat die saak deeglik bespreek is, besluit die Raad dat die enigste manier om die opvolger se lewe te red, is om hom uit die gat te jaag. Die volgende oggend jaag die volk hom uit die gat. Hy is dadelik deur die Boere geneem en aan die sorg van een van die burgers toe vertrou. Later het die stam hom

> van die betrokke burger, wat destyds in die distrik Pretoria gewoon het, vir beeste en olifantstande terug geruil.
>
> [Members of the tribe were now dying daily of thirst and there existed the danger that the only son of the main wife to the traditional leader would also die. Such a disaster had to be avoided at all costs. This crown prince was about eight years old at the time. Sejwamadi [Setšwamadi] summoned the Council. After the case has been thoroughly discussed, the Council decided that the only way to save the heir was to send him out of the cave. The following day he was sent out of the cave by the tribe. He was immediately captured by the Boers and was entrusted in the safety of one of them. He was later bartered by the tribe from the farmer who was then a resident in the vicinity of Pretoria in exchange for cattle and elephant tusks.] (Nel 1933: 17)

On 17 November, the Boer patrols were called off after several of them entered the cave and discovered many dead and decomposing bodies, thus concluding that the resistance was over (De Waal 1978: 105-115; Naidoo 1987: 179-189).

> Toe die Boere meen dat die Kaffers swaar genoeg gestraf is, het hulle die beleg opgehef. Sejwamadi [Mokopane] neem die deeltjie van die volk wat nog in lewe is na die plaas Vier-en-twintig-riviere, ongeveer ag myl [13 km] suidoos van Potgietersrust. Hy gelas hulle om hul stat daar te bou en die erfgenaam te gaan opspoor. Die derde dag na hul aankoms, op Vier-en-twintig riviere het die Koning selfmoord gepleeg deur gif te drink.
>
> [Once the Boers determined that the blacks have been punished enough, they lifted the siege. Sejwamadi took the remainder of the tribe to the farm Vier-en-twintig-riviere, approximately eight miles south of Potgietersrust. There he instructed that they settle to build their capital and to then search for the heir. On the third day after their arrival at Vier-en-twintig-riviere, the traditional leader committed suicide by drinking poison.] (Nel 1933: 63)

One consequence of the siege was the commemorative re-naming of the rather inappropriately named town of Vredenburg (town of peace, oddly the town did not know peace) to Piet

Potgietersrus to commemorate him. Piet Potgieter was killed during the siege. He was shot from the cave where there is a marker to indicate where he fell. There is also a memorial in front of the Mogalakwena Municipal building in his honour. Still more recently, the town was renamed Mokopane in commemoration of the chief whose tribe was almost destroyed in the cave. The history of the town has come full circle with the new name. History is tacked onto the landscape by signifiers, in the form of names and monuments that different people give them. Different names—a form of monument—record different perspectives of history and events. Is Mokopane the same as Potgietersrus? (Maguire 2007: 40)

It is strange that the provincial government of Limpopo could only choose to honour Mokopane when there is sufficient evidence that the two chiefs Mokopane and Mankopane, acted in collusion. It is therefore contented, that only one was enough to represent the Ndebele speaking groups.

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3.2.2 Kgošikgolo Sekhukhune

Sekhukhune was born *c*.1810 to paramount Chief Sekwati of the BaPedi Empire by his first wife Thôrômetšane (De Kock 1972: 646). Sekhukhune distinguished himself as a leader and a fighter in 1852 when Sekwati was besieged and deprived of drinking water in his stronghold Phiring by Commandant-General A.H. Potgieter. Sekhukhune rallied the Mathuba regiment, of which he was a member and together with a group of young women, crept under Boer fire to fetch water from the river. This was the exploit which earned the young Mašile (his original name) the nickname Sekhukhune, a nickname derived from the Sepedi verb- *khukhuna* (to creep). Sekhukhune was the traditional leader of the Marota people (commonly called BaPedi). He came to power in September 1861 after his father Sekwati's death (De Kock 1972: 646).

Friction between the BaPedi and the ZAR was nothing new in 1861 and certainly not of Sekhukhune's making. Some of the challenges were deferred and inherited from the time of his father Sekwati. One such problem related to the establishment of a Boer settlement in the eastern Transvaal in 1845, and the extension of the authority of the ZAR that resulted in the creation of overlapping areas of Maroteng and ZAR rule. Delius noted that by the early 1860s, in the northern reaches of the Lydenburg district, a multiplicity of Koni, Tsonga, and eastern Sotho groups lived under a loose dual hegemony. To the south-west of the BaPedi heartland, the BaKopa under Boleu

and the Ndzundza Ndebele under Mabhogo, who had earlier recognised Sekwati's paramountcy, had become subject to varying degrees of Boer control after 1845 (Delius 1980: 125, 1983: 91). After his accession, Sekhukhune's immediate concern in relation to the Boers, and particularly the Lydenburg authorities, was to ensure that they recognised him as the legitimate successor to Sekwati and that peaceful relations were maintained while he was occupied with imposing his authority on his rivals and subordinates. The Lydenburg *Krygsraad* (War Council) was quick to reply to Sekhukhune's initial letter with assurances of their recognition and their desire for 'peace and friendship'. However, they made several stipulations: *inboekselings* should be denied refuge within the BaPedi domain; stolen cattle should be returned; Sekhukhune should ensure that his subjects who took employment on Boer farms did not desert, and should put an end to raids by his subjects on Boer farms. In a letter dictated to the German missionaries A. Merensky and A. Nachtigal in late October, Sekhukhune agreed to these conditions. No mention was made of the land and boundary questions. In Delius's view, the subsequent exchange of gifts, letters, and messages in the early years of Sekhukhune's reign constituted no more than recognition of subjection to Boer authority. It was another attempt by both parties concerned to establish a framework for coexistence (Delius 1980: 131, 1983: 95).

Their coexistence opened the way for direct military co-operation in September 1863 between the BaPedi and the Boers. The most plausible cause was a major Swazi raid into the Lowveld in late August, during which five chiefdoms were attacked—an event which prompted Sekhukhune to improve his relationship with Lydenburg officials to another level. Delius, however, suspects that even with the subsequent gift of ivory, letters, and messengers to the *Landdrost* (Magistrate), reflected Sekhukhune's unease at possible Boer complicity in the recent Swazi raids and in future raids. On the other hand, the BaPedi gestures encouraged the Lydenburg authorities to also renew their requests for military assistance against Mabhogo. In October, the baPedi paramount agreed to mobilise the BaPedi army. Jointly the Boers and the BaPedi attacked the Ndzundza Ndebele on 3 November 1863, however, recognising that most of the Boers were content to do little more than supply covering fire, the BaPedi army broke camp the following day leaving the Boers to face their enemy alone. The joint attack represented a high point in co-operation between Sekhukhune and the ZAR. The outcome of the joint venture, though, persuaded Sekhukhune of the disadvantages of further direct military collaboration (Delius 1980: 134, 1983: 97).

Delius contends that Sekhukhune remained uneasy about the nature and extent of the relationship between the ZAR and the Swazi. This uneasiness emerged clearly in 1864 in his response to the appointment by the ZAR of J.M. de Beer as Diplomatic Agent for the eastern

Transvaal. The mandate of the Agent was to maintain good relations, monitor trade—particularly in arms and children—and investigate the perennial complaints over stock theft. Sekhukhune refused to deal with the diplomatic agent after a recent demonstration of essential support to Boer authority provided by Swazi military strength. Sekhukhune feared that De Beer was thus appointed largely because of his likely expertise in handling relations with the Swazi. His fears were confirmed when in their first official act, De Beer attempted to prevent a group of tribesmen fleeing Swaziland for the BaPedi domain, and even warned Sekhukhune against receiving them. Sekhukhune therefore, sent a letter to the *Landdrost* at the end of August 1864 with which he rejected any possibility of dealing through the Diplomatic Agent and expressed his wish to rather continue communicating through the *Landdrost* (Delius 1980: 137, 1983: 98).

Another challenge that Sekhukhune had to face that was passed on to him from the time of his father, was that of missionaries. The first missionaries to visit Sekwati were Alexander Merensky and Albert Nachtigal of the Berlin Missionary Society (B.M.S.) in 1860. Sekhukhune's father Sekwati had allowed the missionaries to enter the area under his protection. They were later followed by other missionaries, Heinrich Grützner and C. Endemann. Initially Sekhukhune maintained friendly relations with white people. The first mission station to be built was Kgalatlou in 1861. Two more mission stations were started in 1863 and 1864 at Phatametsane under Endemann and Ga-Ratau under Merensky. Mounting popular and chiefly hostility to the converts and missionaries, however, resulted in all three mission stations being abandoned by early 1866 (De Kock 1972: 646). The relationship between the missionaries and Sekhukhune had deteriorated irreparably. Sekhukhune became alarmed at the strides being made by the new religion and was soon complaining that the influence of the missionaries was undermining his authority. Delius maintains that one element in the hostility towards the Christians was a reaction against the cavalier fashion in which converts treated conventional ritual forms and observations. There had been a general unhappiness amongst African chiefs that converts no longer observed or performed some of the significant rituals and tribal obligations and duties. One affected chief summed it as:

> I like very much to live with the teachers (i.e., missionaries) if they would not take my people, and give them to the government; for they are my people. Let these school people pray for me. How is it that the government takes them to spill blood? How is it that you teachers take them away? Whenever one believes, he goes away from me. Why is it that you call them to all live in one place? I do not like your method of breaking up my kraal. Let the believing kaffir look to his own country men, and not go

away, but teach others (United Presbyterian Church, cited by Braun 2008: 300).

Sekhukhune was also irked as he was plagued by vigorous complaints from "elders" that the teachers/converts were intent on undermining their control over their women. In 1863 Merensky was appointed as the representative of the ZAR, among the BaPedi—an act that did not sit well with Sekhukhune, who early in 1864 described the missionaries as 'people of the Boers'. Merensky's appointment most certainly did little to improve Sekhukhune's cautious vigilance to the activIties of the converts. Sekhukhune, now antagonised, began to place strict restrictions on halting the spread of converts. Delius wrote that complaints made against the Christians by subjects and subordinate chiefs, the conversion of royal agnates and affines, the increasingly compromised position of Merensky as the representative of the ZAR, and the manifest weakness of the Lydenburg authorities, forced Sekhukhune to consider his continued accommodation of the Christians while he set about curbing Christian activities (Delius 1980: 166-167, 1983: 120-121).

Finally, when Sekhukhune's own wife converted and was baptised in November 1864, Sekhukhune eventually ousted the missionaries with his own half-brother, Johannes Dinkwanyane, who had also just converted. He forbade them to work their land; their guns, cattle, and grain supplies were seized as they were ordered to leave his capital Thaba Mosego at Tjate. By December 1865 all the mission stations within the BaPedi domain had been closed. The refugees established a new station, Botshabelo (Smith 1969: 122-123).

Smith wrote that during this period the number of people under Sekhukhune's rule increased rapidly. A report by G. Roth on tribes living in and adjacent to the district of Lydenburg estimated the total number of people under Sekhukhune at 75 000 in 1879 (Aylward 1881: 32-33; Smith 1969: 240). The number included many members from neighbouring tribes who had been persuaded to declare their loyalty to Sekhukhune. With the growth of Sekhukhune's power and the growth of the BaPedi population since they also welcomed refugees of Zulu and Swazi origins, it became increasingly difficult to maintain so many people on the land between the Steelpoort and Olifants Rivers. Sekhukhune therefore, was determined to expand eastwards, a move made possible through cattle raids and infiltration into Boer farms across the Steelpoort River. As Boers abandoned their farms in fear, consequently both of fever and BaPedi rustlers, Sekhukhune's followers occupied this land. Another consequence of Sekhukhune's growing power was that the collection of taxes by the ZAR came to an end as the tribesmen who professed loyalty to Sekhukhune refused to pay (Smith 1969: 240).

In July 1876 war broke out between the forces of the ZAR and the BaPedi. Bulpin (2002: 247)

stated that Sekhukhune was certainly anxious to try his strength against the Europeans. The largest ZAR commando thitherto assembled, 14 000 men as reported in an anonymous article in *Sechaba,* led by President Burgers failed, however, to break BaPedi resistance. *Sechaba* was an official organ of the African National Congress (ANC). In the early 1980s, articles published in this ANC mouthpiece did not carry the identity of authors for fear of being victimised by the apartheid government. In the case where an author would be identified, it was only the initials. It is important therefore, to acknowledge that as a mouthpiece of the ANC, this publication was always going to be biased in favour of that organisation. It was reported in *Sechaba,* that the ZAR troops were armed with 7-pounder Krupp guns and marched to Thaba Mosega, which they reached on August 1, 1876. They were supported by 2 500 Africans—who fought in the hope that the land under Sekhukhune would be given to them after Sekhukhune was defeated (Sechaba 1982: 18). Sekhukhune inflicted a humiliating defeat on the Boers and President Burgers. It is stated in *Sechaba* (1982: 18), that when the heat was on, the Boers retreated pell-mell and did not stop until they had re-crossed the Tubatse (Steelpoort River) and then dispersed to their homes—'*huis toe*' became their common cry! Bulpin agrees that the men seemed to have a contagious disease nicknamed *Huis Toe* (Go Home) as the whole commando was melting away, and there was nothing Burgers could do to hold it. This view is supported by Delius who contends that President Burgers and his *Krygsraad* had, in effect, been deserted by their army. This military debacle had dire consequences for the authority of the ZAR and welcomed additional ammunition to the British who were committed to securing the annexation of the Transvaal (Delius 1980: 250, 1983: 181).

Delius (1980: 166-167, 1983: 120-121) offers a collection of plausible explanations for the reasons behind President Burgers' decision to embark on war against Sekhukhune. Amongst others, Burgers mentioned the aggressive posture adopted by Sekhukhune, which reflected on the subordinate chiefs. Burgers allegedly explained Sekhukhune's adopted attitude as a suffering from overweening ambition.

The Pedi leadership was aware of the inspections carried out in their land and the implications thereof. Sekhukhune had broadcast complaints about the inspection commissions, and the act of inspection, far beyond the borders of the ZAR by 1873. At the same time, Sekhukhune sought to uphold his own claim to territory as far as the Komati River to the east and beyond Pretoria to the west as well as some distance north and south. Delius (1983: 185) hints at the inspections of Pedi lands as being part of a colonial strategy to break down Maroteng power by settling whites in their midst. Whether or not this charge was true, and despite it being the only clear case of core territory being deeded over to others, Sekhukhune certainly saw malice. That perception seemed

to be confirmed when the Boers and their Swazi allies made war on him in 1876.

Delius quotes Uys arguing that 'A study of the causes of the war, both remote and direct, leads to the conclusion that neither Burgers personally nor his government was responsible for Sekhukhune's hostile attitude' (Uys, as cited by Delius 1980: 251). In C.J. Uys's view, this hostility was the consequence of the supply of guns from the diamond fields, incitement on the part of Lt. Governor of Griqualand-West, R. Southey and his agents, and the influence of the Langalibalele War in Natal (Uys 1933, as cited by Delius 1980: 251). Delius also cited S.P. Engelbrecht, who went out of his way to defend Burgers and in the process placed heavy emphasis on external influences, suggesting—with a feel for mystery, if with almost no basis in the existing evidence—that 'the Sekhukhune trouble had been gradually planned and instigated by external powers' opposed to Burgers. Engelbrecht also points to the supply of guns from Kimberley and the activities of local traders and arms smugglers as contributory factors (Engelbrecht 1946, as cited by Delius 1980: 251). Other historians of the 1876 war produced variants of the same broad view. Sekhukhune's territorial aggression, in Otto's opinion, lay at the root of the conflict (Otto 1984, as cited by Delius 1980: 251). Van Rooyen maintained that the outbreak of war was shaped by the expansionist policy pursued by Sekhukhune: a policy fuelled by land shortage in the heartland of the BaPedi domain and the personal ambition of Sekhukhune.

> Sekukuni was gedetermineerd om nie af te sien van sy gebiedseise ten opsigte van die Noordoos-Transvaal nie, al moes dit dan ook tot oorlog tussen hom en die Boere lei.
>
> [Sekhukhune was determined not to part with his land possessions in the northern Transvaal even if it meant going into war with the Boers.] (Van Rooyen 1951: 240)

In October 1876, President Burgers wrote a letter in response to Henry Barkly's letter of protest. Barkly had written on 6 October that the unfortunate war with Sekhukhune could have been avoided had the Republican government been happy with the Transvaal's boundaries as they were earlier on in her (ZAR) official maps. In response, President Burgers stated that the Transvaal government in the first place, was forced to act in self-defence against the BaPedi. In the second place, the government had to act to demonstrate its authority over one of its subjects. While President Burgers listed other reasons for launching the war against Sekhukhune, he managed to demonstrate his aggression when he declared that:

> Dit sou ondenkbaar wees on hirdie gronde nou aan 'n onbeskaafde stam soos die Pedi "barely free from cannibalism, which they practiced up to the time within the memory of men still living" oor te lewer.
>
> [It would be unthinkable to leave these lands in the hands of the Pedi who are "barely free from cannibalism, which they practiced up to the time within the memory of men still living."] (Van Rooyen 1951: 240)

Further, Delius offers a substantially different explanation from C. de Kiewiet. De Kiewiet suggests that the war was in part, the consequence of the growing land crisis in the Transvaal which was reflected in increased pressure on African lands in the various areas—it was really a war for the ownership of land. Delius demonstrated that while De Kiewiet thus pointed to a vital dimension to the conflicts, his reliance on Colonial Office documents prevented him from detailing the nature of the land crisis, the form taken by the struggles over land, and the way in which conflict over land meshed with struggles over labour, tax, and tribute (De Kiewit 1937, as cited by Delius 1980: 252).

The war dragged on after the bulk of the Transvaal commando members left the front from August 1876 until February 1877, when a peace (or armistice) was concluded at Botshabelo. Although he had not been defeated, Sekhukhune was forced to sue for peace in 1876 because of the shortage of food, but also because he saw his power dwindling amid his surrounding chiefs submitting to the Pretoria government (Appelgryn 1979: 131). Some accounts claim that Sekhukhune ratified the peace treaty in February 1877. In the subsequent treaty, Sekhukhune acknowledged that he was a subject of the ZAR. Sekhukhune later denied that he agreed to certain stipulations in the treaty that was signed and refused to surrender the 2 000 cattle that he had to hand over as compensation in terms of the treaty.

> Op 15 February 1877 het Sekhukhune die ooreenkoms aanvaar; later het hy die geldigheid daarvan ontken.
>
> [On 15 February 1877 Sekhukhune accepted the treaty; but later denied it.] (Smith 1966: 1-69)

On 12 April 1877, Sir Theophilus Shepstone annexed the Transvaal on the pretext, *inter alia*, that a Boer Republic that failed to "pacify" the BaPedi threatened, by its very existence and weakness,

to destabilise the British colonies of the Cape and Natal. When the Boer force withdrew from the war with Sekhukhune, some gold diggers in the eastern Transvaal, of whom the majority were English, were greatly alarmed, thinking that they would be left unprotected against the BaPedi. These people agitated for the annexation of the Transvaal by Britain:

> Maar die pro-Britse element het dadelik hul kragte gemontster toe hulle daarop by hom aangedring dat hy die Transvaal moet annekseer. Dit het volgens hulle 'n dringende noodsaaklikheid geword, anders sou die land geruïneer word.
>
> [But the pro-British elements had immediately demonstrated their powers when they insisted that he annexed the Transvaal. According to them the situation had become an urgent emergency, otherwise the land would be ruined.] (Van Rooyen 1951: 302)

In response to their actions and misinformation, on 14 September 1876, Sir Henry Barkly sent a highly coloured and badly written report of the Sekhukhune war to the British Colonial Office:

> Army of President totally routed deserters pouring into Pretoria Sickakuni (Sekhukhune) pursuing in force meeting at Landrosts office Leydenburg agreed to ask British government to take over Transvaal... (Sechaba 1982: 17-24).

Shortly after the annexation of the Transvaal, Sekhukhune received a message from Shepstone informing him of the change of government, stating that if he and his people intended remaining in the Transvaal, they would be regarded as British subjects and would have to pay taxes. Several accounts have shown that initially the British had recognised Sekhukhune as an independent Chief. Thus, the historian Ken Smith (1969: 240) stated that when the Colonial Office first learnt that the ZAR had declared war on Sekhukhune, they condemned this as an aggression against an independent chief. Van Rooyen (1951: 289) refers to a letter that Shepstone received from Merensky which made Shepstone even happier. In the letter, Merensky stated that Sekhukhune signed the treaty '*onder 'n misverstand*' without understanding and that he did not see himself as the subject of the ZAR.

Upon being informed that he was now a British subject, Sekhukhune, however, rejected the new British position as a matter of course. The British, however, continued to insist that he was now a British subject. As a result, by March 1878 war was looming between the BaPedi and the

British. Delius categorised the war that ensued into three phases. The first was initiated by a British attack on Lekgolane (Sekhukhune's sister and chieftainess of the Maserumule chiefdom) which developed into a two-month siege, which ended only when Captain Clarke abandoned Fort Weeber and returned to the town of Lydenburg (Delius 1980: 327, 1983: 239). The Sechaba magazine mentioned that Captain Clarke who had been sent to subdue Sekhukhune, was actually defeated with heavy loss of life at Magnet Heights and barely escaped with his own life. A few accounts seem to corroborate the article by *Sechaba* including the Dictionary of South African Biography which supports the *Sechaba* article, when it refers to the fact that Capt. R.A. Clarke who was appointed a Special Commissioner by the British authorities, was dispatched to deal with the BaPedi situation. Captain Clarke built Fort Weeber and Fort Mamalube as bases and initially succeeded in maintaining peace. However, when the BaPedi soon recommenced with raids across the boundary, Clarke realised that his forces were not equal to their task and therefore, asked for reinforcements (De Kock 1972: 647). Van Rooyen (1951: 313) also wrote the following:

> Toe Sekukuni sy impi's in die rigting van Lydenburg gestuur het, was kaptein Clarke verplig om die vyftig vrywilligers wat hy by Fort Weeber gehad het, terug te trek, sodat hulle Lydenburg self kon verdedig en wag totdat kaptein van Deventer met sy vrywilligers daar sou opdaag. Lekgolwana [Sekhukhune's sister] het daarop die geboue by Fort Weeber afgebrand met die gevolg dat die hele westelike gedeelte van Sekukuni-land weer in die hande van die Pedi geval het.
>
> [When Sekhukhune sent his regiments in the direction of Lydenburg, Captain Clarke was forced to withdraw the fifty volunteers that he had stationed at Fort Weeber so that they could go to protect Lydenburg itself while waiting for the arrival of Captain Van Deventer with his reinforcements. Lekgolwana [Sekhukhune's sister] then burnt the building at Fort Weeber which resulted in the whole western part of the Sekhukhuneland back in the hands of the BaPedi.]

Whereas the above excerpt does not necessarily explain that Clarke was defeated as claimed in *Sechaba,* it however, confirms that indeed Sekhukhune did manage to take back some parts of his land. Delius only emphasises that direct confrontation was avoided (Delius 1980: 327, 1983: 239; Sechaba 1982: 20).

The second phase as far as Delius is concerned, began in August 1878 when Colonel Hugh

Rowlands was placed in charge of the troops in the Transvaal and regulars were made available for a military assault on the Maroteng capital. Rowlands commanded a force of 2000 men (1800 – *Sechaba)* which set out to either take the Maroteng stronghold or lay siege to it between August and October. On 3 October a force of 130 infantry and 338 mounted men failed to even reach Sekhukhune's stronghold as the BaPedi regiments ambushed the attackers. The mission had to once again be abandoned when Rowlands, after consulting with Clarke, decided to retreat to Fort Burgers (Delius 1980: 335, 1983: 240; *Sechaba* 1982: 20; Smith 1969: 246).

Sechaba (1982: 20) claims that the British made a third attempt (which no other source mentions) at subduing Sekhukhune in June/July 1879 under the command of Colonel Lanyon. That too failed to achieve the purpose.

The third and final phase in Delius' take (and according to *Sechaba)* of the campaigns against Sekhukhune is represented with the arrival of Sir Garnet Wolseley in South Africa at the end of June 1879, and in Pretoria specifically on 27 September. Having supervised the capture of Cetshwayo and the settlement of the Zululand question, Wolseley hoped that the destruction of Zulu power would scare Sekhukhune into accepting subject terms, the most important of which were that Sekhukhune should acknowledge British sovereignty and pay taxes. A deputation sent to Sekhukhune in October was told that he will never be subject to the English and that the BaPedi would rather fight than become British subjects (Bulpin 2002: 320; Delius 1980: 338-339, 1983: 242; *Sechaba* 1982: 20; Smith 1969: 247).

On receiving this response, Wolseley decided to attack quickly and overwhelm the BaPedi by sheer numbers. Wolseley therefore turned to the Swazis for military assistance. According to Smith, 5 000–8 000 Swazis, 8 000 according to Delius and De Kock, and 10 000 Swazis according to *Sechaba,* were mustered for this invasion to bring Sekhukhune down. Aside from the Swazi regiments, Wolseley's army also consisted of 3 500 troops and volunteers as well as 3 000 Transvaal African auxiliaries from Zoutpansberg chiefdoms and Ndzundza Ndebele of the eastern Transvaal. Wolseley chose November 1879 for this major military operation (De Kock 1972: 647; Delius 1980: 338-339, 1983: 242; *Sechaba* 1982: 20; Smith 1969: 247).

The Marota, as the BaPedi were also called, fought bravely with muskets obtained from Lesotho where Sekhukhune seemingly enjoyed royal support and had French missionaries as friends; from the Kimberley diamond fields where BaPedi worked; and from Delagoa Bay (Mozambique) with which Sekhukhune had close trade and other relationships. The British used more modern Mausers

(Delius 1983: 242).[5] As the battle raged, Sekhukhune was taken by surprise in the form of an attack from behind by the Swazis. This surprise attack virtually brought the war to a close. Sekhukhune took refuge in a cave called Mamatamageng on the Grootvygenboom Ridge (high up in the Leolo Mountains). There he was cut off from all sources of food and water. On 2 December 1879, when he was called out by Captain Clarke and Commandant Ferreira, Sekhukhune surrendered having claimed 500 Swazi lives. Sekhukhune and a few of his followers were taken to prison in Pretoria on 9 December. He remained in prison until 1881 when he was set free under article 23 of the Pretoria Convention which was signed between Britain and the Boers after the First Boer War of Independence. The article stated that Sekhukhune be released and returned home. He could not return to Thaba Mosega that had been burnt, however, settled in a modest abode in the nearby village of Manoge, where on the night of 13 August 1882 he was murdered by his half-brother, Mampuru.

Several accounts seem to agree on the reason why Mampuru killed Sekhukhune. In terms of Sepedi custom, Sekhukhune, though the eldest son of the first wife, was not the rightful heir to the paramount chieftainship, for his father Sekwati was a regent ruling in the name of a son (Mampuru) whom he (Sekwati) fathered on behalf of his late elder half-brother Malekutu (who was the legitimate heir) by a woman named Kgomomakatane of the house of Magakala. Kgomomakatane had shown her faithfulness to Malekutu. Upon Sekwati's death, Sekhukhune usurped power thwarting Mampuru's (who was twenty years his junior) legitimate claim, by staking his (Sekhukhune) own claim to the chieftaincy as the first son of Sekwati's first wife. Furthermore, Sekhukhune killed all the councillors who supported Mampuru for the chieftainship, but spared Mampuru's life, yet drove him away from his tribal territory. Thus, the BaPedi were divided and a lifelong enmity emerged between the rival half-brothers over the succession question. Then on the fateful night of 13 August 1882, Mampuru killed his long-time rival half-brother, thus ending one of the stormiest politico military careers and with that, the great Marota Empire of Sekhukhune (Bulpin 2002: 320; Delius 1980: 346-347, 1983: 251-252; *Sechaba* 1982: 22; Smith 1969: 252.

5 Probably rather Martini-Henry breech-loading single-shot lever-actuated rifles adopted by the British Army in 1871. The Mauser was a German rifle only introduced in the 1890s and was never used by the British Army.

3.2.3 Khosikhulu Makhado

Reliable sources (Boeyens 1990: 6; Tempelhoff and Nemudzivadi 1999: 104) recorded that Makhado was born between 1830 and 1840. He was the youngest son of Ramabulana and his wife Limani. Makhado worked as a labourer on white owned farms and, most importantly, as a tracker for elephant hunters. He was such a good assistant and gun carrier that the hunters taught him to use a gun and he became a good shot. He also earned their trust to such an extent that they gave him and his men guns to hunt on their own. Many of these guns were never returned and were later to be used against their attacking enemies, particularly the Boers (Boeyens 1990: 7).

When Ramabulana died in 1864, Makhado took over power from his brother Davhana. During his reign, troubles with the ZAR government surfaced when he refused census among his people, while he also refused to pay ZAR taxes. To make sense of the career of Makhado, especially against the background of the tension between the Venda and the Boers, it is essential to explore the tense and anxious relationship between the ZAR and the Venda leadership in the four decades before the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902). The Venda were remarkable because of their power under the paramount Makhado, combined with a concerted refusal to accept the paramountcy of the ZAR and their early recognition of its implications. This *inter alia* mooted the power of the ZAR's land surveyors and inspectors over them. Insight into the various strategies and meanings of resistance to "cadastralisation" are provided for by the exchanges between Makhado and the ZAR government (Braun 2008: 300). The power and autonomy of the Venda were remarkable in the ability of the latter to hold the Boers and their hunger for land, tax, and labour at arm's length (Braun 2008: 304).

One of the key events in what Braun (2008: 304) calls the 'rollback of Boer influence' was the evacuation and destruction of Schoemansdal in 1867-1868 due largely to Venda pressure. Tempelhoff considers the deterioration of the white community's relationship with the Venda under Makhado during the 1860s as the biggest setback for white settlement during the era of exploitation (Tempelhoff 1997, translated by Kriel 2009: 67). This rollback also seemed to cement official Boer respect for Makhado, known also as the "Lion of the North" (Tempelhoff and Nemudzivadi 1999: 113). This situation remained effective despite the maintenance of a titular official in the north by the ZAR government being the Portuguese trader João Albasini, who was already living in the area as a veritable warlord over people displaced from the Mozambican coast (Braun 2008: 29).

Makhado, who had demonstrated his power to the Boers, was particularly unlikely to buy into the "brilliant" ideas of state power imagined in far-away Pretoria, more so given that Boer settlers had been proven utterly unable to impose their will unilaterally in the north (note: The evacuation of Schoemansdal on 15 July 1867 after Commandant General Paul Kruger's army of 500 burghers had failed to bring Makhado down, was considered to be a clear defeat (Tempelhoff and Nemudzivadi 1999: 108). A similar situation, like in the lands of the BaPedi, developed in the Soutpansberg areas, especially where Makhado was concerned. It resembled the relatively loose formal institutions that had connected BaPedi groups under the Maroteng (Sekhukhune) paramountcy, where Boer coercion and military power had failed in 1876. A development that played into Makhado's hands was that the proven military danger of British arms had suddenly disappeared with the retrocession of the Transvaal to the Boers in 1881. In the eyes of Makhado and other rulers in the Limpopo region, the assumption of Boer rule in Pretoria in 1881 would have constituted a positive development for their security, such that Makhado and the other traditional leaders of the north were understandably dismissive of—if not simply offended by—any pretensions of imposition from Pretoria (Delius 1983: 305).

Despite Makhado utilising the land, the Location Commission (Locatie Commissie) (Lijst van afgebakende locaties 1883 [List of barkened off locations 1883]) of the ZAR, fearing that the former occupied far too large a swath of land, assigned to him eight standard (3 000-morgen) 2 570.1 hectares of farms in August 1883 based on the presumption that he had only 524 households based on taxes paid. Subsequently, the Commission took a resolution to send a surveyor to beacon that area "as soon as possible" (Minutes of Location Commission meeting 5 August 1889; Van Biljon 1947; Marais 1883) However, the government only moved to define locations for Makhado and others in the Zoutpansberg district in 1887, at a time when the Superintendent of Native Affairs had recognised the need for the reconsideration of the matter by the Commission. The settlement of boundary issues with Britain and the proclamation of the *Occupatiewet* (Occupation Law) No. 6 of 1886, had a great deal to do with matters of state and the need perhaps to reach an accommodation with Makhado if it were possible. The proclamation was designed to further white settlement and occupation by granting farmlands in the north. The farmlands would benefit from cheap African labour, generate taxes, and provide a standing militia. The discovery of vast taxable gold reserves at the Witwatersrand also needed labour. The taxes might pay for military confrontation if that was necessary. The proclamation could be seen as the official start of final white settlement offensive in the Zoutpansberg district. Braun is of the opinion that the presence of Commandant-General and Superintendent of Natives for the Republic P.J. Joubert

as chairman of the Commission further suggested the effect of other considerations, including military confrontation, should that be necessary (Braun 2008: 205-306; Tempelhoff 1997: 20-22).

In February 1887, the Location Commission met with Makhado near the Venda capital, Luatame. The prompt invitation from Makhado, notwithstanding he immediately made it clear to the commission that he felt the status quo was in no need of alteration and that all he needed to say he had already told Albasini long before—presumably referring to Makhado's own position as ultimate arbiter of his lands (Transcript of Conference 1887: 73). Joubert's response to Makhado specifically addressed the influx of people to the mines and thus the ZAR's aim to look for land in the north. Joubert stated that:

> [d]aarom heft de Regeering my gestuurd, om bijtijds te zien en om die locaties af te bakenen, zoodat de naturellen ook weten wat hun grond is en niet kunnen verdrukt worden. ... dan zal het Gouvernement er dadelijk naar zien en ook de Naturellen helpen dat zij niet verdrukt worden en de overtreders straffen, maar om dat te kunnen doen wil het Gouvernement vóór de menschen intrekken de bakens opmaken en de lijnen afgebakend hebben.

> [[t]herefore the leadership sent me to see and beacon the Locations, so that the natives also know what their land is and cannot be oppressed. ... then the government shall see to [it] and also help the natives not to be oppressed and punish trespassers, but because the government wants to be able to do this before people move in [they want] to make [your] beacons and have the [boundary] lines beaconed off.] (Transcript of Conference 1887: 73, translated in Braun 2008: 308)

Makhado's responses demonstrated his awareness of divisive tactics and questionable assessments on the part of the Commission. Indeed, the government had already announced the opening of the Spelonken area for white settlement, under the *Occupatiewet* on 6 October 1886, and inspections for occupation farms had begun at about the same time that the Commission was visiting Makhado, heightening the brinksmanship (i.e. bring a situation that could prove to

be dangerous, closer) (Braun 2008: 308; Tempelhoff 1997: 20-22).[6] Makhado's initial response to Joubert was that he knew all of those things, and that there were already foreign farms on the flatlands where his sheep grazed and which were otherwise under cultivation and use. Subsequently, Makhado refused to agree to give up any part of the plains south of the mountain where his animals grazed, or of the less arable region north of the mountains where people often migrated. Further, the Commission's request for a population count from Makhado, so they could assign a location size, met with the amusing and ironic, yet also witty response, that the Superintendent of Native Affairs was welcome to count the people himself if he so badly wanted it. Makhado furthermore declared, that he could not show the Commission the limits of his land, since he really did not know them—an uncertainty that arose because 'before, the entire land was Ramapulana'—suggesting that everything belonged to Makhado's predecessor Ramapulana and any peaceful land occupation by white settlers represented sheer hospitality and sufferance on the traditional leader's part (Braun 2008: 309; Transcript of Conference 1887: 73).

The fact that the Venda used a levy in labour to cultivate land and thus, production in the most fertile areas at any given time was essential to maintain cohesion and prosperity of the Venda state, is perceived by Braun to provide another perspective to Makhado's position. Whereas the consideration of the boundaries was a cadastral, financial, and administrative issue for the ZAR, allowing them to incorporate and alienate land; Makhado's statements on the other hand were articulations of sovereignty and control over the body of the state. These basic differences in the assumptions behind the two positions were surely crystal clear to both Joubert and Makhado. Further repetitions of engagements and attempted engagements between the Location Commission and Makhado reflected moments in changing power relations (Braun 2008: 309; Transcript of Conference 1887: 73).

The only definite information the Commission derived out of Makhado in 1887 was a statement of what he regarded as the *onderste vlakte* or level areas below the mountain belonging to the Venda people. The boundaries, Makhado maintained, were the Doorn River from Levhubu and parallel to the mountains to the source and from there to Machaba, then back towards the Zoutpansberg mountains along the Brak River, including the salt pans to the west of the mountains, and from

6 In the 1890s, other pastoral people in the area employed the tender of valuable cattle as peace offerings, while showing their arms and maintaining that they had no obligation to pay taxes on their own lands to the Boers. See for example, the account of Colin Rae, Malaboch: or Notes from My Diary on the Boer Campaign of 1894 (Cape Town: Juta, 1898), xviii-xix; Tempelhoff, "Die Okkupasiestelsel," p.268.

there to the *Krokodil*/Crocodile (Limpopo) River. Makhado, like most African traditional leaders, defined his lands not by population, but by those territories directly under his effective control—and that definition had not changed since he had expressed these boundaries to the Boers in the 1860s. Naturally, Joubert would refuse to guarantee such an extent, stating that it was the surveyor (Rissik) who would ultimately decide on the extent of land Makhado could retain based on his census—a response that was to render Makhado unhappy. The latter expected that tendering taxes to Pretoria—something he considered a gift, as it was mostly done in cattle should exempt his lands from being "subdivided" (*gesneden worden*). Makhado consequently refused to make any hard concessions, preferring instead to offer vague agreements with sentiments for peace and fairness (Braun 2008: 310; Transcript of Conference 1887: 44-45, 77-79, 92).

Just like other major chiefs in the region, Makhado recognised the threat that locations presented, and likewise, refused to conduct a census that would give legitimacy to it. Again, the tendering of cattle—seen as a precious source of wealth reserved for great *mahosi* (chiefs), and given as gifts to equals—entitled him, in his opinion, to better treatment or respect from quests. Given this status quo, it was "completely impossible" for the surveyor to undertake the beaconing without new instructions, and the Commissioners sent a resolution to that effect to the government along with reports of proceedings, however, not a map—a map, no matter how flawed, would have granted undesirable legitimacy to Makhado's side of the impasse (Braun 2008: 313).

When the Commission reconvened again a year later in February 1888 at the fortress of the District Native Commissioner, Captain Oscar Dahl, to make a draft of resolutions regarding reserves in the Zoutpansberg district, Albasini, related in no uncertain terms that he believed Makhado had only 3 000 households, many on "private" land and that the latter was neither obeying government regulations nor paying any taxes at all. Once again, the only resolution obtained was to grant Makhado a location as an independent chief, though what that meant remained unclear. Makhado made his disapproval clear of any such imposed land settlement later in the year (Braun 2008: 313; Notulen der Locatiecommissie 1888: 64-66; Tempelhoff 1997: 268).

The continuing unsettled state of boundaries for the lands of the Venda encouraged efforts on the part of the ZAR to surround and enclose Makhado in, through security. The erection of forts ever nearer his capital, encroaching on land he had claimed, was openly provocative—as was the parcelling out of occupation farms in the forts' shadows, which brought European grantees into conflict with people already living on the land. To both Joubert in Pretoria and to the local commissioners, this scenario presented a vital response to unrest in the area that was driving white farmers off the land and generating an increase in complaints of theft and trespassing (Braun

2008: 314; Tempelhoff 1997: 269). Joubert, therefore, decided not only to beacon all the locations of lesser chiefs first, but also to place a fort as close as possible to Makhado's capital, specifically to push him towards an acceptance of taxes and boundaries—a provocation Makhado categorically warned him against. Joubert further hoped to beacon Makhado's location with the backing of a significant military force and made numerous inquiries of the resources available locally while he also sought to convince neighbouring chiefs to put pressure on Makhado (Braun 2008: 315).

However, the government of the ZAR would not allow Joubert to provoke Makhado in that way for fear of starting a real war at an inopportune time. The State Secretary W.J. Leyds, was alarmed enough to send a telegram specifically refusing to allow him (Joubert) to establish the fort or to demonstrate military force even though he felt that both Makhado's claims and even Joubert's counter proposed location were unacceptably vast. Indeed, the government went so far in its efforts to avoid confrontation in 1889, as to order Joubert to put Makhado on notice that the government by itself ceased the occupation across the Doorn River, since it may appear that the present location may be too small and to remind Makhado that he must 'understand well [that] the goal is to keep the peace' (Braun 2008: 315). Peace in this sense would mean leaving Makhado's claim unchallenged by any alternate definition of the lands under him (Braun 2008: 315-316; Leyds to Joubert 1889; Tempelhoff 1997: 269).

Although the cessation of new grants on Makhado's side of the Doorn River did not stop further extension of the general white immigration to the area, the latter river became known by 1894, in the words of Leo Weinthal of the Pretoria Press as, 'the famous border "Rubicon" of Magato (Makhado)'s territory' (Weinthal 1984: 146) which they would defend. Perhaps the most telling point of the whole confrontation, in the opinion of Braun—the one that was never been specifically articulated anywhere:

> ...even as they carved out occupation farms to the west of the Sand River, inspectors never parcelled out the valuable salt pans that Makhado had deliberately included in his territorial claims, and left them as one large un-alienated plot (Braun 2008: 317).

Indeed, Makhado certainly stood to lose had he agreed to any such arrangement. Pressure, nevertheless, kept pace with opportunity and in the resulting atmosphere of non-cooperation, Makhado's forces drove away a Location Commission sent in 1894 as well as a separate visit from Joubert himself the same year, despite the assurance of the *Landdrost* in Pietersburg that Makhado was prepared to accept a location and pay taxes. Yet, by April 1895, Makhado was receptive to

meeting the Commission, since by the end of 1894, ZAR military actions against other powerful paramount chiefs in the northern regions, for example, the 1894 war against Malebogo, using new weapons, enjoyed devastating military successes, which did not fail to impress Makhado if not alarm him outright (Braun 2008: 319-320; Kriel 2009; Makhura 1993; Nemudzivhadi 1977: 26-28; Pretorius to Joubert 1895; Stiemens to Joubert 1895).

In May 1895, a new commission under H.P.N. Pretorius arrived at the foot of the mountain and requested an opportunity to meet with Makhado. The meeting was treated with protocol as a state affair. A body of 30 to 40 armed soldiers escorted the Commission into the mountains and Pretorius noted the presence of 'many armed "Kaffers" on both sides of the path' (Du Plessis 1945: 122-127), a show of military power that was certainly intentional. At the capital, the Commissioners met with several "*indunas*" including one Funyufunyu, whom the Boers referred to as "Tromp" and the Commission regarded as the "head *induna*". Funyufunyu, who was probably Makhado's *mukoma*—in effect, his private secretary—was sent to negotiate on behalf of the traditional leader, as his eyes and ears (Du Plessis 1945: 122-127). Funyufunyu stated in no unclear terms that his purpose was to convey the words of Makhado, that the latter refused to allow a count of huts or a census of people, and that he would also not allow the land to be divided. Funyufunyu further reiterated that they would not allow the land to be divided or have a census taken. Makhado then sent word that he would meet with the Commission in person the following morning (Braun 2008: 321-322; Dictionary of South African Biography n.d.; Kriel 2000: 57-70; Notulen der Locatiecommissie 1895).

Again, held in his dwelling, the audience with Makhado served simply to put an official stamp on Funyufunyu's words. When asked directly by the commission if that answer was final, Makhado responded that his *mahosi*/chiefs (all present at this meeting) could speak freely on the matter, at which point all echoed Funyufunyu's sentiments (Braun 2008: 323; Notulen der Locatiecommiessie 1895).

Pretorius's response that Makhado's attitude meant then that the status quo remained, demonstrated how little had changed in the eight years since Joubert first stated his opinion—that the demarcation line he (Joubert) had conveyed was not binding on the government (for it was neither beaconed nor surveyed), that new immigrants would continue to come in, and without a census the boundaries could not be fixed and Venda lands "assured". Makhado seemed to have recognised that the acceptance of cadastral integration meant the loss of land and abdication of sovereignty. Therefore, his final response to Pretorius was that it was unnecessary to talk further, since the southern boundaries were good as they were, loosely at the Doorn and Sand Rivers.

However, such natural boundaries were too imprecise and bounded too vast an area ever to meet with approval from Joubert, much less the government of the ZAR in Pretoria (Braun 2008: 323; Notulen der Locatiecommissie 1895).

Braun concludes that, Joubert, after hearing of the Commission's failure to exact concessions, proposed that stronger measures be taken in the next year, and in fact he approved an attack on Makhado by Commandant Vorster in the winter of 1895 that was only narrowly averted by a direct telegram from President Kruger. However, Makhado's death in September 1895, allegedly from (brandy) poisoning, would change matters entirely. Braun (2008: 323) contends that he may have been murdered specifically to allow the pursuit of a more conciliatory attitude towards the ZAR (Nemudzivhadi 1977: 29-32; Tempelhoff 1997: 272). This view is shared by Johann Tempelhoff and Henry Nemudzivhadi who also noted that it was only circumstantial evidence that suggested that Makhado might have been poisoned whilst on a visit to his friend the trader John Cooksley at Lovedale Park. The co-authors, like Braun, also concurred that it is possible that his own (Makhado's) people were responsible for the deed. Further, the authors believed that whites, especially the Republican troops stationed at Fort Hendrina, near Elim, were eager to get the upper hand over the Venda ruler. The poisoning and subsequent death of Makhado, therefore, might have been a combined operation (Tempelhoff and Nemudzivadi 1999: 113). In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the story of the poisoning remains merely a plausible explanation in account of Makhado's death.

3.2.4 Kgoši Makgoba

Kgoši Makgoba is famously known for resisting attacks by the Boer forces of the ZAR government in 1894, almost at the same time as the Malebogo-Boer War. Makgoba's people occupied the Lowveld around today's Magoebaskloof area, at the Houtbosberg (Makgoba) Mountains and Letaba River. The arrival of whites in the area caused friction. Accounts of the area show that the first white man to settle permanently in the Letaba area was a German missionary, the Reverend Mr Fritz Reuter of the Berlin Mission Society, in October 1881. In 1885, the ZAR Administration laid down new boundaries for the Republic. The Republican law stipulated that every Voortrekker or white person who had settled in the Transvaal before 1877, was entitled to a farm. Researchers interested in this history have yet to find evidence that any white person exercised that right in

the Lowveld before 1880. In 1886, in trying to lure more settlers to the area, the government promulgated Act No. 8, called (*Occupatiewet voor Gouvernementsgronden gelegen in het district Zoutpansberg*) 'Occupation Act for State Land' or the Occupation Farms Act no. 8 of 1886 as others referred to it (Changuion 1989). The act provided that white farmers might receive farms *gratis*/ free on condition that they occupy them permanently. According to the historian L. Changuion, the rationale behind this act was to create a buffer zone between black and white in that area. The first farms to be allocated in terms of that law were awarded in the Lowveld in 1888. These gifts of free farms were an incentive to many white people to settle in the area, yet there were no more than fifteen white families living in the Letaba towards the end of the eighties (Chaguion 1989; Kriel 2009: 67; Tempelhoff 1997:11)

Other events that pulled white people to the area include the gold strikes of 1870 that led to further discoveries which drew more people; the founding of the town Haenertsburg in the Houtbosberg Mountains; and the Murchison Range that yielded good mineral finds which lured miners, led to the proclamation of the Selati Goldfields in 1887 and the founding of yet another town, Leydsdorp in 1889. A further contribution towards opening the Lowveld came from C.H. Zeederberg in 1889, when the latter established a mail coach service between Pietersburg and Leydsdorp via Haenertsburg (Changuion 1989).

Changuion noted that not long after the coming of the first white men to Letaba, there were signs of friction between them and the local black tribes, chiefly because of the allocation of occupation farms. The area where the Makgobas stayed was within the area demarcated for the buffer zone. The black captains complained that it was their land which was being given to white farmers and they refused to be herded together in locations. Combined with the fact that more and more white farmers moved in and a tax system was introduced by government, these were the main causes of the war (Changuion 1989: 25).

The first open confrontation came in 1888 when the ZAR government attempted to carry out its location policy, as proposed by the Native Location Commission of 1882, in the Houtbosberg area. When the officials began to erect beacons for white farms in the territory of Chief Makgoba, his people summarily destroyed the beacons and threatened the officials of the commission (Changuion 1989: 26).

In applying the forced removals at the time, the ZAR government distinguished between tribes bigger than 500 families and those smaller. The bigger tribes in the Lowveld area, like the BaLobedu of Modjadji, the Mamabolo, and the Molepos, were given their own locations. The smaller tribes with less than 500 families, Tsolobolo, Maupa, Mosote, and Makgoba, had to move to one location

south of Letaba River where they would have been subordinate to Mmamathola whose territory that was. Makgoba did not want to be subordinate to Mmamathola and in fact requested that if he had to be moved, he would prefer that it should rather be to the Molepo location, since they were related to the Molepos. The request was rejected. The Native Commissioner for Soutpansberg, Oscar Dahl, negotiated with Makgoba trying to reach a solution. He failed to achieve success, since Makgoba refused to pay the fine imposed on him in the form of cattle due to his refusal to move. Makgoba was eventually arrested, however, soon afterwards escaped from prison and subsequently swore that the white people would never again capture him (Dicke 1933b: 19).

Conditions gradually deteriorated as the local black local people became openly hostile. The situation became so threatening to them that white farmers in the neighbourhood thought it prudent to mobilise themselves into commandos. Field Cornet Botha addressed petitions to the government to complain that they were being harassed on the mountain by Makgoba. The government in response, appointed a "Location Commission" again on June 20, 1892 to define the boundaries between the white men in the north and black tribes without delay. The commission completed their assignment the same year and informed each chief where his location was situated. However, unanimously the chiefs refused to accept the commission's instructions. Hardly had the commission returned when the first attacks on white farms were reported (Dicke 1933b: 63; Changuion 1989: 27).

Changuion wrote that the government seriously considered abandoning the Lowveld to the various black tribes and settling the white farmers elsewhere. However, after much deliberation, it was decided that a show of force might force the blacks to back off. Consequently, Comdt.-Genl. Piet Joubert, the commander of the armed forces of the ZAR army sent a final warning to Makgoba in March 1894 from Pretoria to move to his reserved place south of the Great Letaba River within one month or to suffer the violent consequences (Changuion 1989: 27).

Meanwhile, war had broken out between the ZAR and Kgoši Malebogo of the Blouberg, north of Pietersburg. Comdt.-Genl. Piet Joubert proclaimed a general mobilisation of the ZAR commandos to advance upon Malebogo. This campaign temporarily diverted the focus away from Makgoba. The war against Kgoši Malebogo ended on 31 July 1894 when the latter surrendered. The situation in the Houtbosberg had since deteriorated to such an extent that appeals for help by whites were being sent to Pietersburg almost daily. Most farmhouses were being destroyed by fire and cattle driven away by the warriors belonging to Kgoši Makgoba and others (Changuion 1989: 27).

Comdt.-Genl. Joubert and some commandos gathered in Pietersburg on 10 August 1894

where they decided to engage into immediate military action to diffuse the volatile situation in the Houtbosberg (Grimsehl 1955: 27; Kruger 1955: 117).

> Volgens rapporte het die toestande in die Houtbosberg elke dag meer gespanne geword en die kaffers het alreeds baie wonings afgebrand.
>
> [Following reports, the situation got tenser every day and the blacks have already burnt many houses.] (Grimsehl 1955: 27; Kruger 1955: 117)

Reinforcements were summoned from the Lydenburg, Rustenburg, and Marico districts and the combined forces attacked Makgoba. However, due to incessant rain, typical of this area, the immediate attack had to be postponed. The combined ZAR forces meanwhile kept themselves busy by dealing severely with the neighbouring villages of Maupa, Maphitha, and Tsolobolo who were all defeated without much difficulty (Dicke 1933b: 63; Grimsehl 1955: 27; Kruger 1955: 117; Tempelhoff 1997: 20-22).

After the rains had cleared in September 1894, the main village of Makgoba could be attacked. By then Makgoba had ignored yet another ultimatum. Makgoba and his people offered resistance in the beginning and then retreated into the dense forest where the Boer commandos could not reach them. The commandos were consequently allowed to return home. Realising how difficult it would have been to pursue Makgoba into the dense bush, the ZAR council of war therefore decided to encircle Makgoba' followers with forts. Two forts were erected, namely Fort Oscar near Modjadji's location under the command of Lieutenant du Toit and Fort Burger near Agatha under the command of Lieutenant Schutte. The forts were given the following mandate:

> Hulle moes die onderdane van die voortvlugtende kapteins Maupa, Makgoba, Mapitha e.a. opspoor en hulle nie toelaat om op hulle vroeëre plekke te gaan woon nie, of op verbode grond pik of bou nie. Hulle moes die Boere en ander bewoners beskerm en help. Hulle moes, sodra hulle kennis kry van veediefstalle, die vee opspoor en terugneem. Indien hulle weet van versteekte vyande, moet hulle die Kommandant-Generaal daarvan verwittig en volgens sy instruksies handel.
>
> [They must keep track of the subjects of the fleeing rebel chiefs Maupa, Makgoba, Maphita, etc. and not allow them to go back to their former places of residence, nor

> even to dig nor build on the forbidden grounds. They were supposed to protect and help the farmers and other residents. If they knew of any theft of livestock, they were supposed to track and bring them back. If they knew of any enemy fugitives, they were to alert the Commandant General and handle it following to his instructions.] (Grimsehl 1955: 104)

One way in which the Republican forces could achieve the above mandate was through patrols which were to be held on a regular basis to ensure the area was rid of the enemy. Makgoba, however, was by no means subdued and by February 1895 there were rumours afloat of his clashes with white farmers in the neighbourhood. The initial two forts were not sufficient and proved ineffective. The government finally decided to erect four more forts. Changuion (1989) maintains that the forts could still not improve matters even though the burghers in the forts succeeded in repulsing the many attacks made on them. Again, a decision was made in Pietersburg in April 1895 to once more call up the commandos of the other districts to make a concerted attack on Makgoba during the winter months. The native Commissioners of Lydenburg, Pietersburg, Waterberg, and Spelonken were instructed to bring a corps of black warriors from each of their districts (Grimsehl 1955: 95; Kruger 1955: 95).

There were soon altogether 1 000 white commando members and approximately 3 000 (6 000 according to Kruger) black warriors taking part in the war (Changuion 1989: 88). Before the first attack, on 29 May 1895, a third ultimatum was issued to Makgoba, however, his guards refused to allow the messengers to deliver it. The ultimatum was calling on Makgoba to surrender himself before Joubert to avoid the spilling of innocent blood that would happen if he continued to refuse (Kruger 1955: 83-84). The Makgobas were then attacked on 3 June. His stronghold was taken the next day and burnt down, Makgoba was, however, still at large, once more managing to evade capture.

> Sonder veel moeite is die hoofstat van Makgoba op 4 Junie verbrand en in puin gelê... Die werklike doel, nl. Om Makgoba vas te keer, het misluk.
>
> [Without so much difficulty, Makgoba's chief settlement was torched on 4 July and left to ashes...The main purpose, namely to capture Makgoba, had however, failed.] (Kruger 1955: 96)

Very early on the morning of Sunday 9 June, a contingent of Swazi warriors entered the forest and successfully captured one of Makgoba's wives, who had fallen behind on account of a sore foot. Out of fear, the poor woman was compelled to point out where Makgoba and his other wives were hiding. As a result, Makgoba was surrounded, forced to surrender, and was killed (Dicke 1933a: 61).

There are different versions on how Makgoba eventually died. Bernard Dicke (1933a: 61) recorded that when Makgoba realised that they would not be able to escape, he sent the women and children ahead to get away while he awaited the Swazis alone. He stood in a narrow footpath in the forest and defended himself until he was overpowered.

> Nadat hy by sy vrouens en kinders aangesê het om te vlug, het die dapper hoofman die aanstormende Swazies voorgekeer in die smal paadjie wat deur die bos geloop het. Hy het ń tweeloop-geweer gehad waarmee hy een Swazie doodgeskiet het. Die tweede skoot wou egter nie afgaan nie, en toe was die bende op hom.
>
> [After he had instructed his wives and children to run, the brave chief faced the attacking Swazis in the small corridor that went through the bush. He had a twin barrel gun with which he shot one of the Swazis. The second shot misfired, and he was overpowered.] (Dicke 1933a: 61)

Another version is that after Makgoba had been surrounded, the Swazi leader challenged him to a duel in which he was killed.

> Gleefully they (Swazis) formed a ring in the bush while their champion challenged Magoeba to mortal combat. And there, while the Swazis catcalled and cheered, Magoeba was slowly battered to his knees and then, defeated, rolled over on the ground and his head cut off and taken to the Europeans as evidence of his ending (Grimsehl 1955: 97).

As proof that Makgoba was dead, the Swazis cut off his head and presented it as evidence to Genl. Joubert (Changuion 1989: 37; Dicke 1993a: 61).

3.2.5 Hosinkulu Ngungunhane

Ngungunhane was the leader of the Gaza Empire in Mozambique between 1884 and 1895. He was the last paramount chief (Emperor) to resist the Portuguese campaigns when, after the Conference of Berlin in 1885, it was decided that possession of colonies had to be legitimised by effective territorial occupation. Kriel wrote that the most obvious umbrella under which to discuss European conquest of African communities in the late nineteenth century seems to be the 'Scramble for Africa' or 'the partition of Africa' (Kriel 2003: 74; Nowell 1947: 1-17).

The author concurs with Kriel that to understand what happened in Southern Africa during the 'Scramble for Africa', it is imperative to explore what the author describes as 'the notion of secondary empires' (Kriel 2003: 74) in more depth. By secondary empires, Kriel referred to African communities who exploited their partial monopoly over European military technology to colonise their neighbours. Ngungunhane fits this description, however, due to the restricted nature of this study such an exploration will not be accommodated here. According to Khosa (1987: 7), 'Ngungunhane was a Nguni leader who had come from what is now South Africa and who occupied the territories in the south of Mozambique, enslaving the Tsonga and Chope tribes, local ethnic groups.'

Khosa's quotation above is in sync with Wheeler (1968a: 165-220), according to whom, Ngungunhane was anathema to local ethnic groups, namely Chope, the Tsonga, and the Shona. Ngungunhana tried to rebuild the crumbling Shangana empire in Gaza, which he had inherited from his father Mzila, by means of conquest, collaborating with the Portuguese for firearms and money, as well as dealing with British commercial and official parties. Khosa depicts Ngungunhane as a dictator, a foreigner, and a powerful figure who controlled and enslaved a significant part of Mozambique. He became known in Portuguese colonial history as an example of the defeat of the Mozambican blacks. With the coming of independence in 1975, the figure of Ngungunhane was recuperated as a national hero and mythical figure, one who represented the first Mozambicans to resist Portuguese colonisation before the struggle for independence, led by FRELIMO (Isaacman 1976: 13).

Ngungunhane came to power in late 1884 (1885 according to Warhurst 1962: 81) after the death of his father Muzila, who was the chief of the Shangana of Gaza in southern Mozambique. He was the last Shangana traditional leader of any significance to rule in southern Mozambique and the last in the line of the Nguni dynasty that originated in Zululand, northern Natal, in the

early nineteenth century. The name "Shangana" is derived from his grandfather, traditional leader Soshangane (*c.*1800-1858 or 1859), who led Nguni refugees from Zululand after 1819, fleeing the wrath of Shaka Zulu. The Nguni regiments under Soshangane came to rest in the Limpopo Valley (on the plains from the Limpopo, across the Sabi, as far as the highlands of Manica). Wheeler observes that the Nguni regiments were frequently on the move thereafter, however, in the 1830s they attacked and unsettled Portuguese settlements on the south bank of the Zambezi River, thus acquiring a fearsome reputation with the feeble Portuguese communities. At the peak of Shangana power under Soshangane around 1850, the area of control and influence included most of the region between the Incomati and the Zambezi Rivers. There is, however, no indication that their control extended much beyond the edge of then Monomotapa, the would-be Rhodesian plateau (Wheeler 1968b: 170).

Soshangane's death in either 1858 or 1859, left a serious succession dispute between two of his sons, Muzila and Mawewe. Muzila is said to have prevailed after he obtained arms and aid from Portuguese authorities at Lourenço Marques. He finally defeated and expelled his brother in 1861. The help and aid were a result of a treaty of alliance and "vassalage" signed by Muzila with the Portuguese. The Portuguese government thereafter claimed that the Shangana were legally vassals to the Portuguese crown and that Muzila's royal heirs were under Portuguese authority. Ngungunhane was to bear the burden of this Portuguese claim in later years (Wheeler 1968b: 172).

Disputes between Ngungunhane and the Portuguese seem to have started in 1885 after the Conference of Berlin concluded that European possession of colonies had to be legitimised by effective territorial occupation. Added to that, in 1875 Portugal had won an arbitration dispute with Britain over the possession of the southern part of the strategic Delagoa Bay. Although the town was founded by Portuguese traders, the British came to contend that only a part of the bay was Portuguese territory. The British simply signed agreements with local native chiefs around the area and then claimed ownership of certain parts. Bixler (1934: 4) noted that in 1817 an Anglo-Portuguese treaty designed to limit the ravages of the slave trade, defined Portuguese possessions on the east coast of Africa as embracing the territory between Cape Delgado and the Bay of Lorenço Marques. The right to Delagoa Bay or Lorenço Marques was based partly on discoveries and partly on the right of conquest in the campaign of 1569. To resolve the impasse on the rights, the two powers presented a historical resume and argument on behalf of their claims to the President of the French Republic. Further, Bixler maintains that it was based on these claims that a decision was announced on 28 July 1875, by which decision the territory in dispute was judged to belong to Portugal because of the rights of discovery, exercise of the rights of sovereignty, exclusive

control of commercial transportation, and the defence against foreign nations. That award and the interest that it aroused seems to have served to awaken some Portuguese colonialists to the potential value of that great harbour and estuary. Due to its strategic potential as the natural port outlet for the Transvaal—where vast gold deposits were discovered in 1886—some Portuguese wisely asserted that the harbour would revolutionise Mozambique's economy and would be 'the centre of commerce for all of East Africa' (Wheeler 1968b: 170). Increasing pressure also came from the Portuguese colonial elite to develop, safeguard, and control southern Mozambique, in view of the Shangana power reaching within forty miles of the coveted harbour (Bixler 1934: 425-440; Isaacman 1976: 13).

Portuguese activity in southern Mozambique quickened somewhat after the arrival of a public-works expedition in 1877 from Portugal for the development of the harbour town and particularly after the beginning of railroad construction of the Lourenço Marques-Transvaal line in 1886. The first area over which Ngungunhane and the Portuguese came into conflict was Manica and the hinterland of Sofala. In 1884, the Portuguese administration created on paper "the District of Manica", despite having refused to grant concessions in 1881. Muzila considered the area his tributary holding. The principal reason for the Portuguese interest in Manica was the discovery of gold deposits in the area. The Portuguese planned to colonise the region and to exploit the minerals which they hoped would amount to a great deal (Wheeler 1968b: 177).

The Portuguese authorities next decided to send José Caseleiro d'Alegria Rodrigues as an envoy to Ngungunhane. Rodrigues persuaded Ngungunhane to send two *indunas* to Lisbon to sign an "Act of Vassalage" on 12 October 1885. In this document, it was stated that Ngungunhane willingly submitted to several conditions. The conditions included: (1) obeying laws and orders from the governor-general of Mozambique; (2) promising not to allow the rule of any other nation "in his territory"; (3) permitting a Portuguese agent (resident-chief) to live near him and to advise him on how to rule his people; (4) flying the Portuguese flag in his kraals; (5) allowing all Portuguese subjects to travel freely in his lands; (6) permitting the mining of minerals only by individuals who have Portuguese concessions and; (7) allowing the establishment of missions and schools (Wheeler 1968b: 177). In return, Ngungunhane was to have complete jurisdiction in Gazaland, as well as the right to govern and collect taxes. Article 2 of that treaty stipulated that Portugal could not use armed force in Gazaland without Ngungunhane's consent. Warhurst (1962: 79), however, wrote that Ngungunhane later asserted that the two purported representatives were worthless individuals, and not his representatives. He therefore refused to accept that he had ever made any such arrangement with Portugal. Wheeler (1968b) wrote that Ngungunhane had replied at

the mention of this treaty that the agreement was useless and only a Portuguese ploy to obtain his lands. Ngungunhane was quoted saying the 'paper [treaty] is good only for fishing for lands' (Warhurst 1962: 79).

Yet, from the beginning of 1886, José d'Almeida, the Portuguese official and later agent of the Mozambique Company, acted as *residente* at Ngungunhane's kraal. This was a demonstration of Portuguese power growing at the expense of the Gazas. D'Almeida continued to press for a concession to exploit Manicaland for minerals. Ngungunhane had been alarmed at how Portuguese influence had grown in the Inhambane district by means of treaty-making and promises. Fearing that the Portuguese would establish their rule in the interior of Gaza if allowed concessions in Manica, he refused to grant concessions.

Increasing Portuguese activity spurred the Gazas on to look elsewhere, particularly to Britain as a potential ally. When in 1887 Ngungunhane sent envoys to Natal with which he expressed the wish to be guided by British government, he was frustrated by the British response. In his response, the British Governor of Natal mentioned that he had heard that Umdungazwe (as Ngungunhane was also called) was now paying tribute to the Portuguese and that in fact a Portuguese Representative (referring to d' Almeida) was resident among Ngungunhane's people (Warhurst 1962: 82). This response was not necessarily new. Already in 1870, Muzila had sent emissaries to the Natal government asking for trade, a British visitor to Gaza, and some kind of protection. The British did send a visitor to St. Vincent Erskine, however, the British official position even at the time, was that the Gaza region was Portuguese territory (Wheeler 1968b: 181).

Meanwhile, as early as 1887 Ngungunhane had also begun to cast his attention toward the south where his vassals, the Tonga and the Chope, were rebelling against him. This was one area of European interior penetration even before 1880. The Chope tribe had become allies of the Portuguese thanks to the influence of one João Loforte, a former trader of French descent and the Portuguese laid the foundation for later interior expansion. Wheeler noted that by 1884 over twenty chiefs in this region were paying some form of tribute to the Portuguese in return for protection against him (Ngungunhane) and his Shangana. Hence, Ngungunhane found himself under pressure from two fronts: from the war party in Gazaland to reconquer the area and from the Portuguese officials to stop raids against tribes which were now considered Portuguese vassals (Warhurst 1962: 82).

In 1888/9, Ngungunhane and his advisors reached a vital decision when they made a major move by transferring his capital from the far interior on the edge of the Zimbabwean plateau to a spot in the Limpopo valley. This move would profoundly affect the future of the Gaza nation.

The new capital also called Manhlagazi (Manjacaze) and named after the old capital, was approximately forty kilometres north of the Limpopo River (Warhurst 1962: 83; Wheeler 1968a: 588).

The two main sources consulted are not in agreement on the reasons behind this move. Warhurst wrote that it was because of the growing power of one Manuel António de Sousa in Manica, while Wheeler, on the other hand, maintained that Ngungunhane was consumed by a determination to settle an old score with the Chope tribe and to assert his sovereignty over other rebellious tribes in southern Gaza (Newitt 1973: 76). The migration of the Shangana in 1889 had the effect of dislocating groups in southern Mozambique, and moving Ngungunhane closer to Portuguese coastal settlements. During the first battle at Baul Island, some Chope refugees including Chief Speranhana, escaped to the north into the Inhambane district where he came under the protection of Portuguese authorities (Wheeler 1968a: 93).

To complicate matters, Dr Aurel Schulz, ostensibly another concession-seeker, arrived from Natal in 1890. Schulz had been sent by Cecil John Rhodes' company—the British South Africa Company—to secure a treaty with Ngungunhane. Rhodes had taken note that the chief lay claim to the coastline between the mouth of the Zambesi River and Delagoa Bay, except for Inhambane. This proved an opportune moment for Rhodes to secure an approach to the sea from Mashonaland, which was shortly to be opened by the Pioneer Column. Schulz persuaded Ngungunhane of the necessity for a treaty. Recognising an opportunity with a desired ally (Schulz had claimed to also represent the British government), Ngungunhane drove a hard bargain for the concession and insisted on 1 000 rifles, 20 000 rounds of ammunition and an annual subsidy of £500. Ngungunhane only promised to ratify the agreement in writing if, and when, the goods were delivered (Warhurst 1962: 83).

Meanwhile, the Portuguese were taking positive measures to ensure the loyalty of Ngungunhane in the face of British action. In December 1890, Almeida arrived at Manhlagazi with the greatest expedition Ngungunhane had yet seen. On 29 December a great indaba was held at Violente (Zefunha) at which Almeida made every effort to get the traditional leader to acknowledge his loyalty to Portugal. According to Portuguese reports of the meeting, Almeida was successful. The reports stated that Ngungunhane had renewed the subjection to Portugal which his grandfather Soshangane (also called Manicusse), his father Muzila (also known as Umzila), and he himself had pledged. He admitted having sent emissaries to the Natal government, however, denied that he had compromised his loyalty to Portugal. He had simply wanted support in an inter-tribal war. Warhurst noted that British reports of the meeting were quite different. It was claimed that

Ngungunhane had vehemently denied vassalage to Portugal. The most plausible explanation was that the chief's leanings towards Britain as an ally had received a severe set-back when confronted by Almeida's *tour de force* (Newitt 1973: 61).

On 22 February 1891 a British hundred-ton steamer, the *Countess of Carnarvon,* was caught by the Portuguese at the mouth of Limpopo offloading the goods for Ngungunhane towards the concession still to be ratified in writing. The seizure of the steamer led to a first-class diplomatic row and brought the whole question of Gazaland before the Foreign Ministers of Portugal and Britain. The Schulz concession had been invalidated by the signing of the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of 11 June 1891 which partitioned the kingdom of Gaza between Britain and Portugal. This was a confirmation of another August 1890 convention between the two nations. In August 1890, Britain and Portugal struggled to define their respective boundaries in East Africa by means of a Convention. Negotiations progressed rapidly and on 20 August the Convention was signed between Lord Salisbury, British Foreign Secretary, and Senhor Freitas, Portuguese Minister in London; all that was now required to make things final was ratification by both governments. In terms of the two, northern Gazaland, in effect, became British territory, however, the greater part of Ngungunhane's kingdom in the south was officially recognised as Portuguese territory. At least, in the realm of international diplomacy, Ngungunhane's fate seemed sealed by mid-1891 (Barnes 1975; Wheeler 1968b: 181).

To resolve the impasse, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Salisbury, who was not indifferent to those who felt that it was Britain's moral duty to protect Ngungunhane, however, whose attitude towards the Ngungunhane affair was always consistent, implicitly explained why Britain had always upheld Portuguese claims throughout. Lord Salisbury, whose speech made to the House of Lords on 11 June 1891 seemed to reflect on plain dictates of international Law, had said that:

> By a Treaty signed on behalf of this country in 1817, which was confirmed in fuller terms by a Treaty signed in 1847, the whole of this littoral from the Zambesi to Delagoa Bay which Ngungunhane claims, and which some persons would like to claim through him, was recognized by this country as belonging to the King of Portugal (Warhurst 1962: 99).

After these pronouncements, Shangana hostility toward the Portuguese and toward concession seekers in general increased after December 1893. After the Salisbury's speech, Rhodes accordingly

advised the chief to send two *indunas*, namely Huluhulu and Umfeti, to Britain to put forward their case in person. He must have expected that their appearance would tip the balance in favour of British annexation to "save" the Gaza from Portugal. The two indunas were well received in England. Their visit unfortunately did not alter the position at all. Queen Victoria told them that a communication would be made to Ngungunhane, which was done after their return. It was to the effect that much of his (Ngungunhane's) territory was now Portuguese by virtue treaty and he could, therefore, not be protected by Her Majesty (Warhurst 1962: 104-105).

Meanwhile, continuing battles with the Chope exacerbated the enmity between the Gaza chief and the Portuguese. In June 1894, Ngungunhane lodged a formal, written protest with the British South Africa Company (BSAC) using the services of Swiss missionaries. This, he did based on the verbally agreed concession treaty of 4 October 1890 with BSAC representative Dr Schulz, who also claimed to represent British government; although, he in fact had no authorisation from that government. The concession was a 'Treaty of Alliance between the said nation and the government of Her Britannic Majesty, Queen Victoria' and went as follows:

> The occupation of lands for farming purposes, by white people within my boundaries, is an unwarranted proceeding as no grant whatever has been given by me to white people to farm, or otherwise to occupy land for agricultural purposes ... [and I protest] against settlement in the Umsaapa [Musapa] district of my country, a district it was understood should be exempt from interference by white people, as I told Dr Aurel Schulz and the Felses in 1890, 1891, when they were with me on behalf of the English people ... [I have given to Mr Dennis Doyle] no grants whatever concerning rights in my country (Wheeler 1968a: 595).

As Shangana grievances and fears mounted, so did Portuguese impatience with Ngungunhane. Skirmishes in Matabeleland aggravated the situation. The Matabeleland War of 1893 spread waves of confusion into Gaza, and drove African refugees in several directions from Rhodesia (now known as Zimbabwe). Portuguese authorities observed that several Ndebele fled from Rhodesia and settled in the lower Baleen area following an arrangement with Ngungunhane. The Portuguese acted swiftly to hold up to Ngungunhane the example of the defeat of his neighbours. In March 1894, an official told the Portuguese residente at the royal kraal in Gaza to inform Ngungunhane that 'good words' were no longer sufficient; they wanted him to keep his word referring to an alleged concession by Ngungunhane made at a great indaba held at Violente on 29 December

1890 at which he agreed to being a Portuguese vassal, which he later denied (Warhurst 1962: 84).

As events approached a final confrontation between the two conflicting forces, conditions in adjacent territories aggravated the situation. Trouble had been brewing over a decade in the Lourenço Marques district as Ronga chiefs struggled for supremacy. In 1894 a war began in this district. Ngungunhane was initially careful not to get involved, however, would eventually be drawn in. Warfare broke out in August 1894, as Ronga chiefs involved in a succession dispute resisted arrest by Portuguese African troops at Angoane. Within weeks, the peoples of Chiefs Mahazul and Matibejana of Zixaxa attacked Lourenço Marques. The Portuguese considered the conflict 'a matter of life or death' for their control of Mozambique, and they dropped the cautious, peaceful policy of 1891-94 (Warhurst 1962: 84).

The peaceful policy had been founded mainly on a survey of respective strengths. In a report of December 1890, Almeida had advised that it would be very difficult to defeat Ngungunhane, and that it would be foolhardy even to try it for fear of a reverse effect and the consequent possibility that Britain might take advantage of the Portuguese weakness and seize what was now the province of Mozambique or an important part of it. At the time, the Portuguese obtained international recognition of much of what they considered 'the province of Mozambique', their power, prestige, and resources seemed incapable of supporting their sovereignty (Wheeler 1968b: 187).

The attack by Chiefs Mahazul and Matibejana's people on Lourenço Marques caused the Portuguese to send in António Enes as Royal Commissioner to the Gaza area in January 1895. Enes grimly set about building Portuguese strength to a force of over 2 000 troops. At the battle of Marracuene on 2 February 1895, the Portuguese won a victory over the Ronga chiefs by means of machine-guns and repeating rifles. Disturbed over the arrest, imprisonment, and subsequent exile to Angola of some chiefs in southern Mozambique, Ngungunhane requested that their families be protected in his kraal. Other chiefs subsequently fled into his territory for protection in early 1895. Ngungunhane gave them protection as well. Negotiations at the eleventh-hour proved inadequate as Enes refused to meet a delegation of Shangana *indunas* sent by Ngungunhane to confer with him. Enes's reasons for his refusal were that by harbouring the Ronga rebel chiefs in Gaza, Ngungunhane had been a disloyal Portuguese vassal. A meeting brokered by two Swiss missionaries, Junod and Liengme (acting as Ngungunhane's agents), with Enes also failed to bear fruit. The Portuguese requirement that Ngungunhane surrender the refugees under his protection was regarded by the Swiss missionaries as an immoral and un-Christian demand. They insisted that Ngungunhane could not break his promise to those chiefs that he would protect them. Enes,

on the other hand, was adamant and the meeting was fruitless (Wheeler 1968a: 597-598). Enes now assumed a tougher stance, and on 14 July he issued his 'Conditions with which the submission of chief Ngungunhane will be accepted' (Wheeler 1968: 597-598). The *sine qua non* condition, one which the chief never fulfilled completely, was the surrender of Ronga Chiefs Mahazul and Matibejana, to be duly punished. In the other remaining conditions, the Portuguese authorities demanded: an annual tribute of £10 000; Ngungunhane's recognition of Portugal's right to establish military posts and garrison troops in Gaza; an end to war between the chief and vassal chiefs; the placing of African armed forces at the disposal of Portugal; and the last condition, that if Ngungunhane failed to comply, 'he will lose the right to rule the lands of Gaza, thus occasioning chiefs of those lands to meet and choose his successor' (Wheeler 1968a: 597-598).

Acceptance of these conditions would have meant the loss to Ngungunhane of that 'real and practical independence' (Wheeler 1968a: 598) which Enes in 1893, had acknowledged as his major objective. Ngungunhane received the document on 8 August, however, refused to hand over his subject chiefs; he still claimed, nevertheless, that he wanted peace (Wheeler 1968a: 598). A week later, Ngungunhane stated his own terms: Portuguese acceptance of *saguate* (gift of tribute) from his people, in return for which the chief would surrender several important *indunas* to Enes, however, not Mahazul and Matibejana. He also claimed that he was willing to pay £1 000 in gold as tribute.

Ngungunhane refused to limit his negotiating position despite it being evident to his Portuguese opponents that he was committed to an eventual *détente* with Portugal, if not outright defeat. Again, to bring Britain into the picture, Ngungunhane sent envoys with ivory tusks as gifts, via Pretoria to Natal and Cape Town to obtain a promise of protection or alliance, however, it was in vain. Until this last attempt had failed, Ngungunhane harboured hopes that he could enlist British aid at least to get protection against the military forces now camping on his frontiers (Wheeler 1968a: 598).

Still refusing to surrender the rebel chiefs, on 19 August Ngungunhane stated that he would pay tributes demanded in the "conditions" as well as accept the establishment of forts in Gaza. By 25 August, Enes believed that peace negotiations were concluded. However, desultory negotiations continued into September and later. Ngungunhane now complained to D'Almeida that Portugal had broken the rules by invading Cossine territory, which he considered to be part of Gaza. Almeida himself complained to Enes that his position as envoy had been compromised by this demonstration of Portuguese aggression, and that peace was now impossible. Almeida understood that it was illegal to use an army in any part of Gaza, in line with Article 2 of the

1891 charter of the Mozambique Company as well as Article 2 of the 1885 Act of Vassalage of Ngungunhane, both of which recognised that in Gaza, the chief had complete jurisdiction as well as the right to govern and to collect taxes (Wheeler 1968b: 190). D'Almeida left Ngungunhane's kraal in mid-September, after the Portuguese defeated several of Ngungunhane's regiments at Magul. Ngungunhane now summoned a war party and pressed for an all-out attack on the approaching Portuguese force. He, however, still held out for a negotiated peace settlement, and sent envoys to Enes to request for peace on 20 September, with no definite reply. Ngungunhane's war party prevailed by early November 1895. On 7 November at Lake Coolela, using effective small-arms fire, the Portuguese crushed some eight Shangana regiments. Ngungunhane fled to Chaimite, a village north of the Limpopo River. Chaimite was a sacred village for Ngungunhane as it was the resting place of his grandfather Soshangane. On 28 December 1895, after learning of the chief's location from informers, Mousinho de Albuquerque, now military governor of Gaza, captured Ngungunhane at Chaimite (Wheeler 1968a: 599). Ngungunhane was exiled to Portugal where he died in 1906.

There is sufficient evidence to confirm that throughout his whole life, Ngungunhane's reign was restricted and confined to the Gaza area in Mozambique. Preller confirmed Ngungunhane's location in Mozambique; when in reference to the movement of the Sakana (Chakana or Shangaans) he wrote that:

> Nadat die grens tussen Mozambiek en Transvaal later gereël was, het Sakana se opvolgers na die Portuguese gebied getrek, om nader te wees aan hul hoof-kaptein, Gungunyana...
>
> [After the boundary between Mozambique and Transvaal had been determined, Sakana's followers moved into the Portuguese territory to be near their paramount chief, Ngungunhane..."] (Preller 1938: 349)

This then calls to question the decision by the Limpopo provincial government to honour him with a statue at Giyani in the Mopani District. As will be demonstrated in Chapter Five, the only plausible explanation is that in the absence of any prominent leader of the Tsonga/Shangaan speaking groups of the province, Ngungunhane was probably the closest the group could identify with. Hence, Ngungunhane's monument in Giyani was meant to appease the Tsonga/Shangaan speaking groups of the Limpopo province.

3.2.6 Kgoši Malebogo

The Boers of the ZAR attacked the Bahananwa under Kgoši Malebogo in June 1894, attempting to force the community out of their stronghold in the Blouberg Mountains onto the plain adjacent to the Mogalakwena River. The main purpose of the conquest was to extend stronger Boer control over the people so that they could be compelled to contribute to the state income by paying tax and providing labour for farms as well as the gold mines of the Witwatersrand. The campaign against the Bahananwa was part of a series of expeditions against African communities in the Soutpansberg district still regarding themselves as independent political entities (Bergh 1999: 201-213; Kriel 2000: 57-70, 2003: 78; South African National Archives TAB, SS 4700, R2000 n.d.).

The Bahananwa originated from the Bahurutse branch of the Batswana nation. They are a break away section whose roots are in present day Botswana. Before the break away, they were the Malete people of the Bahurutse. Oral history has it that this break away was caused by the fact that Kgoši Malete had no sons by his senior wife to succeed him to the throne. This wife only had one child, Mmatsela, a girl. Without brothers, Mmatsela was the natural heir to succeed her father. However, there were people who strongly opposed the fact that they could be ruled by a woman. As a result, there were plots to kill Mmatsela, especially by Kgoši Malete's one son by a junior wife (Makhura 1993; Setumu 2005a: 4). To avert bloodshed, Kgoši Malete advised his daughter Mmatsela to flee. Mmatsela took her followers and headed to the east, crossed the Limpopo River, and settled in today's Blouberg area. Malete had tipped his daughter, to swiftly cross the Limpopo River before they could even rest, making them Bagananwa (rebels, resisters, or dissidents) (Makhura 1993; Setumu 2005a).

Setumu concedes that due to lack of records, especially written records, much of the history of the Bahananwa in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth century is scant. Much light on this history was shed by the arrival of the missionaries—who kept written records—in the second half of the nineteenth century. The missionaries arrived in the Bahananwa country during the reign of Kgoši Matsiokwane. The first missionary to arrive was Reverend Beyer in 1868. Beyer was warmly welcomed by the Bahananwa and was even given a piece of land to establish himself so that he could be able to perform his duties of spreading the Holy Gospel among the Bahananwa (Setumu 2005a: 8).

Setumu noted that reception of the missionaries by Kgoši Matsiokwane consisted of more than just embracing the Holy Gospel. The Bahananwa viewed the White missionaries as important

diplomatic agents in the increasingly changing environment in which colonial forces were slowly encroaching on their area. Just like most black communities, the Bahananwa found the missionaries to be useful sources of information on broad world view issues, such as the presence of whites, and other related matters which the missionaries knew about, as they had travelled extensively. The missionaries also acted as advisers to black communities in the face of the approaching aggressive colonialists. In other words, in addition to the missionaries' role of preaching the Word of God, they inevitably became involved in the diplomatic and political matters of affected communities (Setumu 2005a: 8).

Like most commentators, Setumu also noted that, even if the missionaries were useful to the African communities and their leaders, their roles soon caused trouble among these communities. In their quest to spread Christianity, the missionaries found some obstacles along the way. They were very intolerant of some of the traditional customs of the Africans which they wanted to eliminate so that these communities could be "saved" and "shown the light". They found some of the African customs as "evil", "backwards", and "barbaric". For instance, they worked tirelessly to discourage polygamy, *magadi* (bride price), *koma* (initiation), and such related African customs. The attacks on the Africans' way of life by the missionaries created divisions and confusion within communities. Those people who were converted began to look down upon those who resisted conversion. Tensions among communities due to the missionaries' presence varied. In most instances, missionaries used the political intervention of the colonialists to overthrow the African tribal system which disabled them to achieve their goal of converting Africans to Christianity (Setumu 2005a: 8).

It is important to note that similar encounters with the missionaries and other white groups were experienced by the other chiefs who came before Malebogo. Both Magoši Sekwati and Sekhukhune had embraced the missionaries before they fell out with them; the relationship between both Magoši Mokopane and Mankopane with the whites in the 1850s was also reported to have been very welcoming, cordial, and friendly before the eventual fallout. The Bahananwa themselves certainly had friendly interaction with both the Buys family, descendants of Coenraad de Buys, and with the pioneer Voortrekker Louis Tregardt, since he referred to such connections in his diary in 1836 (Tregardt 2013: 42-44).

The missionaries' divisive impact was also felt by the Bahananwa. As already indicated, the missionaries created tension within tribal politics and in the Blouberg Mountains, the Bahananwa of Kgoši Matsiokwane were divided as a result. This tension, partly due to power struggles and partly because of Christian/non-Christian factors, resulted in Kgoši Matsiokwane expelling

the missionary, Stech, who had succeeded Beyer in 1874. Matsiokwane expelled Stech from his country because in addition to causing divisions, he also regarded the piece of land he was allocated as his own private property and began prospecting for minerals on that piece of land. The Bahananwa (and other African neighbouring communities) did not know of such a thing as private land ownership and they were disgusted by Stech's actions. Stech was also accused by the officials of the ZAR of trading firearms to the Bahananwa (Majeke 1952: 43).

As shown in the context of other polities above (Setumu 2005b: 5), tension within the Bahananwa polity reached a climax when Kgoši Matsiokwane was assassinated in 1879 and a succession struggle erupted. The missionaries' involvement, which complicated the power struggle, partly accounted for this tragic event. The main contestants for power after Matsiokwane's death became Ramatho (Kibi) and Kgaluši (Mašilo/Seketa/Ratšhatšha). There were allegations that it was the section of Kibi, with the help of the Christians, which orchestrated the assassination of Matsiokwane, in the hope of seizing political power. However, their hopes were dashed when Ratšhatšha succeeded to take the throne. As a result, Kibi fled with his followers and settled on the north-eastern side of the Blouberg Mountains (Setumu 2005a: 10).

After the turmoil which even split the Bahananwa chiefdom into two, Ratšhatšha slowly rebuilt the remaining larger portion of the chiefdom on the south-western side of the mountain. He also became weary of the missionaries after learning of the damage they had caused. However, as much as he was suspicious of the missionaries, he still needed them as diplomatic agents in the rapidly changing world. After the unceremonious departure of Stech, Blouberg remained without a missionary for a while. Mission activities were managed from Makgabeng mission station which had been established in 1870 by Trumpelmann. However, eventually in 1892, Christoph Sonntag arrived in Blouberg to resume missionary activities among the Bahananwa. As much as Sonntag was cautious in dealing with the Bahananwa, especially the chieftaincy, because of his predecessor's experiences, Kgoši Ratšhatšha was also cautious of the new missionary. Ratšhatšha even rejected gifts from Sonntag stating that, should he accept them, the missionary would later claim that he had bought land with those gifts. This was a reference to Stech who claimed private ownership of the land he was given by Matsiokwane (Setumu 2005a: 10-11).

Sonntag arrived in Blouberg when tension was mounting between the Boers of the ZAR and the Bahananwa in 1892. The Boers had divided the ZAR into districts or divisions for administrative purposes. The Bahananwa resided in the Zoutpansberg district of the ZAR. When Sonntag arrived in Blouberg in 1892, Barend Vorster was the Commissioner for Native Affairs in that district. Paul Kruger was the President of the ZAR, while Piet Joubert was Commandant-General of the ZAR

armed forces. Native Commissioner Vorster by that time had already made several attempts to bring the Bahananwa under the ZAR authority. Up until then, his efforts had been in vain (Sonntag 1983: xiii-xvii).

Makhura believes that ever since their early contact, the economies of both African and Trekker societies were mainly based on pastoralism, agriculture, hunting, and trade. Therefore, the struggle to control resources, such as land, water, grazing, hunting grounds, and labour inevitably led to competition and conflicts (Makhura 1993: 130). The struggles over land ownership were further exacerbated by a land speculation drive in the area in the early 1890s. Linked to the land pressures were attempts by the ZAR government since 1882, to implement the 1878 British Commissioners' plans in the region. In 1878, a "Native" Commission constituted of, among others, Commissioners Dahl and Barlow, paid the Blouberg capital an official visit. The purpose of the visit was to inform the Bahananwa that they were British subjects and that they would, consequently, be given a location and be expected to pay taxes to the new government. The Commissioners' report clearly manifested the unfolding of British policy in the region (Makhura 1993: 131). However, even before implementation, British attention in the Bahananwa was distracted by their involvement in the military campaign against BaPedi of Sekhukhune in 1879. From 1880 to 1881, the British were further drawn into a battle with the Boers which eventually cost them the colony.

The Transvaal was restored to the Boers in 1881. No serious restructuring of the former British system took place, for example, Dahl retained his post as a Commissioner in Rhenosterpoort ward (Pietersburg). The Law of 1880 gave the Administrator of the "Transvaal province" the authority as 'a Supreme or Paramount Chief over all the native chiefs and natives of this Province' (Makhura 1993: 138). The Department of Native Affairs with its Secretary and his duties had been co-ordinated with local offices, like those of the *landdrosts* and field cornets. The law clearly spelled out the system of tax collection, pass regulations, and local administration of justice. With the new Boer state strengthened by the inheritance of this superior administrative scaffold the British had left in 1881, the ZAR government was simply implementing the British Commissioners' plans of 1878. One of the plans was the allocation of a location for the Bahananwa. The Native Commissioner Barend Vorster accompanied by some African policemen and a few local burghers visited Kgaluši in May 1888 instructing him to move to the new location from his own land. Kgaluši rejected diplomatically what he considered an eviction order. Nothing further happened until 1891 when the idea of a location for the Bahananwa was mooted again in the ZAR *Volksraad* (Makhura 1993: 143).

Until 1894, the Bahananwa refused to move from their original areas on the mountain

stronghold to a (40 000 morgen) 34 268 hectares strip location along the western portion of Mogalakwena River for various reasons. Amongst others, the specified area was considered very small in size; the area had been used for many years as pasture land for Bahananwa livestock and was therefore, not fit for habitation; the area was partly a settlement for the Babirwa subjects, many of whom were herders of the Bahananwa (especially royal) livestock; most importantly, the Bahananwa understood that such a removal not only meant the uprooting of their settlements, but also the sacrificing of their strategic mountain stronghold and lastly, it would seem that the location was also rightly understood as a colonial move to satisfy the local Boer farmers in terms of more land, labour, and easy control of the local people (Makhura 1993: 145).

Neither Malebogo or the Bahananwa were prepared to submit under the ZAR nor to leave their mountain stronghold unless the matter was amicably negotiated. The Boers of the ZAR expected the Bahananwa—just like all the African communities within what they viewed as their jurisdiction—to be counted in a census, pay taxes, and recognise their authority. Another reason why the Bahananwa rejected the Boer authority was that they had much more respect for the British than the Boers, and that they preferred the British authority to that of the Boers'. However, the reality was that the Boers had regained power from the British in 1881 and regarded themselves as masters (Setumu 2005a: 13; Sonntag 1983: xv-xvi).

With the Bahananwa polity still independent and their communal possession of land still entrenched, they could offer firm resistance to mounting pressures over land. Kgoši Ratšhatšha and the Bahananwa's refusal to meet the demands of the Boers led to the mobilisation on both sides which set the stage for a military confrontation to settle the struggle over land.

Parallel with the struggle over land, were intensified pressures on labour. Between the 1880s and 1890s, the demands for labour increased somewhat on the Rand following the formation of the Chamber of Mines by the mining magnates in 1887 and the establishment of the "tout" system for labour recruitment around 1889. It appears that in 1887, in response to a growing demand for more labour, the ZAR passed the Squatters Law (Act 11 of 1887) with the aim of redistributing African families and thereby meeting labour needs of the local Boer settlers by limiting African squatters to five families per Boer farm. Generally, the Bahananwa refused to be redistributed along similar lines in almost similar ways as they resisted the location issue. Makhura noted that the Squatters Law was in fact inextricably linked to the issue of taxes, for both (the Squatters Law and taxation) had similar objectives of coercing labour for European employers. The Bahananwa continued to oppose labour procuring laws and taxation (Makhura 1993: 152).

The ZAR was deemed powerless when in 1891 the Bahananwa refused to be counted because

they still considered themselves to be independent. The Superintendent for Native Affairs sent circulars calling on all the Commissioners to conduct a census in African occupied territories. The main reason behind the census was to enable the state to estimate the total amount of taxes to be collected. Vorster's subsequent delegation to the Bahananwa capital late in 1891 failed when they were dismissed with a defiant response from Kgaluši after a prolonged ceremonial procedure of communication when the paramount declared 'I am *baas* (boss) upon this mountain and shall not allow census to be taken' (Makhura 1993: 153-154).

When Sonntag arrived in Blouberg, he found himself more involved in the Bahananwa-Boer conflict than his mandate of preaching the Holy Gospel (Setumu 2005a: 13; Sonntag 1983: xiii). However, in his handling of the conflict, Sonntag mainly requested the Bahananwa to submit under the Boers, while he failed to restrain or at least ask the Boers to refrain from attacking the Bahananwa. Sonntag's siding with the Boers was evidenced by numerous incidents. His maxim of 1892 is recalled to explain his approach adopted towards the Bahananwa: 'We [the missionaries, unlike the Boers] must simply fight [against the indigenous people] with other weapons: we must use the velvet glove...' (Sonntag 1983: 2). Sonntag himself documented his assistance of Boers with valuable information about Bahananwa and their area which helped the former to finally defeat the Bahananwa (Setumu 2005a: 13). Makhura believes that Sonntag's objective of using an iron hand in a velvet glove against the people among whom he worked, clearly showed that he identified himself to a large extent with European interests, while he appeared to be friendly to the Bahananwa (Makhura 1993: 134). Of course, he later conceded when he admitted in his account that '... the old heathen independence, chieftainship and everything that was connected with it ... must be superseded by something else [probably, colonial rule] if the Word of God was to be successfully preached...' (Sonntag 1983: 28).

Although all the odds were stacked against him, Malebogo put up a brave fight against the Boers from June 1894. His people had gathered a substantial number of sophisticated firearms which they used effectively during the war. Rev. Sonntag, quoted by Makhura, wrote that 'There was not a member of his [Kgaluši's] tribe who was not aware that his thoughts and actions were concentrated on the desire to arm himself and his people well enough to be able to withstand all enemies, especially the Boers.' (Sonntag, as cited by Makhura 1993: 157). Indeed, by this time the Bahananwa had developed their own munition plant for the manufacturing of gun powder, later referred to by Schiel as '*Kaffernpulver*' (Makhura 1993: 157; Sonntag 1983: 32-34). Boer commandos came mainly from the Soutpansberg, Waterberg, Lydenburg, Middelburg, Pretoria, Rustenburg, and Zeerust (Marico) districts. What occurred was the mobilisation of one of the largest combined

forces yet seen in the history of the ZAR. They had one mission—to attack and subjugate the Bahananwa of Kgoši Malebogo. These large numbers of commandos were also added to by black warriors from allied Chiefs Kibi, Mapene, Matlala, and the Matebele (Makhura 1993: 162; Sonntag 1983: 102-104).

The war comprised four main phases. The first phase, which is called the peripheral war phase by Makhura, began seriously from May to June 1894. This phase came in the wake of Commandant Piet Joubert's first ultimatum which had reached the Bahananwa on 25 April 1894. The ultimatum demanded, among other things, that: first, the Bahananwa should abide by the laws of state, that is, leave the mountain stronghold, allow the taking of a census and pay taxes. Second, Paramount Kgaluši had to appear before Vorster at Kalkbank to answer questions regarding the issues raised above within three days of receiving the ultimatum. Thirdly, failing to appear, the Bahananwa would have to suffer the indignity of bearing the cost of the results of resultant violence. The ultimatum was the last warning. Joubert is quoted saying:

> "Indien u en u volk nie gehoor gee aan hierdie laaste waarskuwing nie, sal julle verantwoordelik gehou word vir alle koste en skades of wat die gevolge ook mag wees."
>
> [Should you and your people not give heed to this last warning, you will be held responsible for all the costs and damages incurred of whatever the results.] (Rae 1898: 53)

With numbers on the side of the ZAR forces mobilised from Marico, Rustenburg, Pretoria, Waterberg, Lydenburg, and Middelburg added to by African warriors from allied Chiefs Kibi, Mapene, Matlala, and some Matebele, it was inevitable that the Bahananwa were going to lose. However, it was not going to be easy. The Bahananwa were not submissive bystanders. The Boers were so frustrated by the bravery of the Bahananwa that they even used dynamite, which they hoped would destroy the Bahananwa among the rocks. They again tried petroleum which they burnt in the hope of smoking out the Bahananwa from their mountain strongholds (Makhura 1993: 162-163).

Despite all such unconventional methods of warfare, the Bahananwa still resisted. Sonntag condemned the use of dynamite and petroleum against the Bahananwa. After the Boers' failure to subdue the Bahananwa with their numbers, black allies, dynamite, and petroleum, they finally

decided to surround the water hole which supplied the Bahananwa with water. This marked the crucial stage of the war. Heavy gunfire was exchanged around the water hole. Some Boers also lost their lives as they tried to capture the water hole (Makhura 1993: 171).

Other highlights of the war included a scene in which the Matebele were ambushed by the Bahananwa and killed in large numbers. The Bahananwa blocked other entrances and opened one line so that their enemies could be forced to follow the open path with excitement only to plunge into a hail of bullets. Sonntag (1983: 75) wrote:

> The Matebele warrior in the lead tried to pull away the thorn-branches barricading the entrance. Others were so impatient that they wanted to leap over the thorny obstruction. Then, waving their war-banner, which consisted of a huge bunch of pitch-black ostrich-feathers, and uttering their unearthly-sounding, blood curdling war-song and clamorous battle-cries, the Bahananoa [Bahananwa], with a terrible, irresistible suddenness broke forth and with tremendous force and impetus threw themselves upon the fast-moving enemy column. The leader of the Matebele, riddled with many bullets, crashed backwards stone-dead. All this was too much for the Matebele and overwhelmed them with such an overpowering fright, that like one man they turned tail and fled helter-skelter.

Another significant incident on the same date 20 June 1894 during the war was that the Boers were so determined to crush the Bahananwa that they carried their canon up the mountain in the hope of firing at the royal kraal. On their way up, they struggled to push the heavy machine in between the rocks and huge boulders. During that tiresome job of pushing the canon up, the Bahananwa attacked and fired heavily on them. The Boers left the canon and ran away (Sonntag 1983: 75).

After a bitter skirmish and loss of life, the Boers eventually took control of the water hole at the beginning of July 1894. This marked a turning point in the war. Thirst took a heavy toll on the Bahananwa. There is no life without water. Lack of water soon proved to be unbearable for the Bahananwa.

On the other hand, Sonntag continued to push Kgoši Malebogo to submit. Women and children began to surrender to the Boers at the water hole. The other thirsty Bahananwa also followed and large numbers flocked to the water hole where they quenched their thirst and surrendered. With his people surrendering in large numbers, Kgoši Malebogo had no option but to consider surrendering himself (Makhura 1993: 201; Sonntag 1983: 120).

The decision to surrender to the Boers was very difficult for Ratšhatšha. He thought of the number of Boers his warriors had killed, and he then feared that the Boers might execute him on sight. The available sources could not come up with an approximation of how many Boers fell in the war due to what Makhura calls 'cover-ups in Boer sources' (Cape Argus 20 June 1894; Rae 1898; Weidemann 1947). Sonntag tried very hard to allay Malebogo's fears, however, it persisted. Again, in his engagements with Sonntag, who was more of the Boers' messenger and spokesperson than anything else, Ratšhatšha appeared convinced to surrender, however, his councillors, especially Monyebodi, appeared to have been against surrendering, since he was unsure of the leader's safety. After bickering for a long time, Ratšhatšha sent messages to the Boers that he was prepared to surrender. It is also claimed that it was Kibi who helped the Boers in their plan to surround the water hole (Makhura 1993: 201; Sonntag 1983: 120).

Eventually, Malebogo surrendered. To show that he was reluctant to hand himself to the Boers, he is said to have attempted to commit suicide by throwing himself into an open fire. His face was badly burnt; however, he was rescued out of the fire. Kgoši Malebogo and those close to him surrendered on 31 July 1894 to the Waterberg commandos' camp of Commandant Malan. Kgoši Malebogo tried to show his peaceful intentions to Malan by offering him £100. Malan was so arrogant that he even ignored Kgoši Malebogo's gesture of shaking hands. Earlier on, Kgoši Malebogo had made a request to be given water to wash before meeting the Boers, however, that request was rejected. After handing himself to his enemies, he was subjected to humiliation by being tied with thongs like an animal. A make-shift shelter of branches was built for him (Sonntag 1983: 122).

The surrender of Kgoši Malebogo ended a short but bitter war. Ratšhatšha and his close associates were taken to Pretoria as prisoners. When the Boer commandos dispersed, they instructed that all the Bahananwa should settle on the flat plains and those who were still in the mountain strongholds, should come down to the designated location on the flat plains. They further requested their ally, Kibi, to cleanse the mountain strongholds, by killing Ratšhatšha's people who still occupied the mountains (Setumu 2005a: 23).

After the Boer commandos had left Blouberg, many people came down and most of them settled around the mission station. They joined Sonntag's converts who had not been involved in the war (Setumu 2005a: 23).

While the ZAR was sure that it was in control of the republic after they subjugated most of the black chiefdoms, it was again faced with yet another war in 1899. This time it was against their White counterparts, the British. The mineral wealth discovered in the republics—diamonds (1868)

and gold (1886)—tempted the British interest in the interior. Eventually, war broke out in 1899 and the Boers were on the receiving end. It was during this war—referred to mostly in literature as the Anglo-Boer War—that Kgoši Malebogo was released in 1900.

After his release, Kgoši Malebogo went back to Blouberg and found his son, Mabea, who was leading the Bahananwa, staying at Kwarung, on the southern foot of the Blouberg Mountain. He refused to stay in his son's household permanently. He later returned to his original royal capital on top of the mountain. Although he took Mabea with him up the mountain, Ratšhatšha was in charge. He continued to rule his people until his death in February 1939, at the age of ninety-five. After his death, Mabea's son, Seiphi, took over the reins of power.

3.3 The collective and the need for a memory

In responding to a question on why the Africans lost their Wars of Resistance, Kriel referred to the main reason put forward by many other scholars that the whites had better weapons in their possession than the Africans. Plausibly, this was probably the single most decisive factor in the white victory over the Africans during the Wars of Resistance in the Limpopo province. Another reason that was advanced in cases such as the Sekhukhune's war against the British and the Malebogo-Boer war, was that the indigenous communities were outnumbered by their opponents and their allies (Delius 1980; Kriel 2003: 88; Makhura 1993: 162-163; *Sechaba* 1982: 18; Smith 1969: 237-252).

Further, Kriel also attempts to answer the question whether the Wars of Resistance can be said to have been fought collectively or not. Kriel, in her discussion, noted that the African communities, who had been incorporated, for example, the Ndebele Empire of Mzilikazi after previous conflicts, as well as some neighbouring communities eager to settle old scores, gave the invading force (whites) convenient passage through their territories toward the crisis on the new periphery. For example, Kibi not only allowed the ZAR forces to attack Malebogo from the side of his (Kibi's) territory, but also offered human resource support to the attacking Republican forces. The same can be said about the Chope who supported the Portuguese against Ngungunhane; and the Swazis who fought on the side of both the ZAR and the British against Sekhukhune. The Swazis again helped Joubert by killing Makgoba. Furthermore, by cooperating against other resisting African chiefdoms, these communities were put to good use as carriers, road builders,

and even soldiers. The white campaigns against rebel African chiefdoms were also meant to serve as examples and a warning to other communities still hostile to white governments for those communities to take note of what would happen to them had they also decided to rebel. Kriel noted that these communities also did not join in the fighting against the white forces. While it is true that this most certainly made it a lot easier for the Boers as it did also for the British and the Portuguese to conquer, it perhaps also demonstrated that the African chiefdoms never fought their Wars of Resistance as a collective (Kriel 2003: 88).

Benjamin Talton (n.d) shares the same observation when he highlighted that rapid imperial expansion did not necessarily change relationships among African communities. Those in conflict with one another tended to remain in conflict, despite the impending threat from other powers. There was, moreover, no broadly accepted African identity to unite around during this period. The complexity of Africans' political relationships among themselves influenced the nature of their resistance to colonial rule. Much to the detriment of African societies, the enmity between them often fostered alliances between Africans and Europeans against the common threat by indigenous polities. As they resisted European invasions, they confronted both European and African soldiers. That is, they confronted a political hierarchy imposed by Europeans that included African proxies. The power was European, however, the face of it on the local level was often African (Talton n.d.). Thus, even the British made, in an ironic twist, extensive use of black soldiers against the Boers during especially the latter phases of the Anglo-Boer war of 1899-1902.

In an interview for a documentary on the war between Malebogo and the Boers, local expert on Blouberg, Phophi Raletjena also stated that the reason why 'African people were actually defeated was because they waged this struggle against the ZAR divided at different stages' (Setumu n.d.).

Despite these military losses and the subsequent subjugation of Limpopo's black African communities, the provincial government saw it prudent to honour the defeated leaders with statues to preserve their memories. The social memory of the military subjugation of (black) African communities reveals that the fact that the black Africans lost, was less important than the knowledge that they had offered courageous resistance. In all the cases (except for Makhado who died before he was defeated), the defeat on the battlefield was converted not into a memory of humiliation, but a landmark representing the pride and courage of a people and the defiance of their leaders. As the story of resistance, rather than defeat, nourished imagination in other African nations and provided the yarn for determining an identity which Kriel summarised, so was the imagination of the provincial leaders of Limpopo also nourished (Kriel 2003: 88).

The erection of public art in honour of these warrior traditional leaders as vehicles of their

remembrance, absolves the futility of the failure of their resistance against colonialism and dispossession by their white conquerors. Indeed, several strategies were employed to deal with the enemy. Some, like Makgoba, fought from the onset and resisted until the end; others, like Sekhukhune, Malebogo, Mokopane, and Ngungunhane fought and only surrendered when defeat was inevitable. Still others, like Makhado, tried to bargain the terms of cooperation. Had this select group of leaders surrendered peacefully before the white man, if remembered at all, they would most probably have been regarded as collaborators who had sold out their people's land to the invading white forces. Their resistance, although unsuccessful, provided a point of departure for a story of continued resistance that culminated in the liberation struggle and the resultant democracy in 1994 (Kriel 2003: 88). Kriel's thoughts are corroborated by Levinson when in reference to Hungary's Millennium Monument, the author indicated that the memorial ironically was dedicated to the soldiers of a war in which they had lost everything they had been fighting for. Like many other societies, the Hungarians proved themselves thoroughly capable of organising their public psyche around a "lost cause" (Levinson 1998: 8). Almost always, a monument is an attempt to interpret an event in which those who have erected it take pride. They are ways by which a specific culture names its heroes, those 'people who made us what we are in a prideful way' (Levinson 1998: 65).

Chapter Four

Sculpting the Warrior Traditional Leaders

4.1 Introduction

This chapter views the sculptors' designs for the various Warrior Traditional Leaders' Monuments within the full spectrum of Limpopo provincial government's approach. An investigative analysis of the sculptors' proposals offers insight into the Warrior Traditional Leaders' significance as historical figures and reveals a remarkable consistency in the interpretation of their characters. The designs also provide a rich resource with which to evaluate sculptural interpretations of Wars of Resistance as conceived almost a century after the wars were fought. The chapter also considers the Ubuntu Memorial Monument—a collaborative project of the NHC and the Limpopo provincial government erected in honour of the same select group of traditional leaders.

Viewing the sculptors' designs in context, further reveals that the Warrior Traditional Leaders' Monuments embodied an iconography that differed from others in its presentation of the results of violent warfare. Changes in the interpretation of the Wars of Resistance, as embodied in the Warrior Traditional Leaders' Monument reveal the existence of important connections between these sculptural expressions and the varied ways in which military leaders, politicians, and the South African public viewed the nation and its future. The meanings of Wars of Resistance thus, came to be more tied to shifting implications of the historical event than the event itself. The wars and the images of popular, yet previously marginalised warrior traditional leaders represented a rich and eminently usable past when put into the service of uniting the plural Limpopo community.

The plurality of the Limpopo province requires some qualification. The population of the province consists of several ethnic groups distinguished by culture, language, and race. Based at least on the 2001 census statistics, BaPedi/Northern Sotho speakers make up the largest number, being nearly 57 per cent. The Tsonga/Shangaan speakers comprise 23 per cent, while the Venda speakers make up 12 per cent. Afrikaans speakers make up 2.6 per cent while English-speaking whites are less than half a per cent. Compressed within the borders of the province are the four previous administrations which were created during the apartheid era: Lebowa; Gazankulu;

Republic of Venda; and Transvaal Administration (Provide Project 2005: 2).

In this chapter the many layered significance of the Warrior Traditional Leaders' Monuments in Limpopo province will be analysed. The objective is to gain a clear understanding of both the nature of public sculptures in South Africa during the first years of democracy and the culture that underwrote the endeavour. The chapter will therefore consider the following in the proper analysis of the sculptures: form; function; symbolism and location; provision of space; motivation; and inventive resources for continued engagement.

First, to understand the importance of the Warrior Traditional Leaders' Monuments, one must understand the high esteem and reverence with which black South Africans still hold the memories of these selected traditional leaders in the present time. They are especially significant as symbols of reconciliation with a difficult past. The expression of that esteem culminated in the decision to commemorate their role as pioneers of the liberation struggle by launching the costly public theme, "Wars of Resistance against Colonialism and Imperialism" in the Limpopo province. It is the costliest heritage project which the provincial government had thus far underwritten.

Plaster models submitted by sculptors competing for the opportunity to create the statues were no longer available, however, the erected statues themselves and their designers' descriptions were available to enable the author and researcher to re-construct the vision with the designs. These documents provide not only an artistic and philosophical context in which to view the designs that were chosen, but also a comprehensive picture of the ways in which some of the country's leading commemorative sculptors perceived the traditional leaders' characters and significance.

The Project Team issued their programme of competition in 2003 and asked prospective entrants to create designs that would represent the character and individuality of each selected traditional leader or kgoši. When the models were finally approved, there was virtual consensus about the proper expression of each traditional leader's persona by members of the Project Team and members of the kgoši's respective royal houses (Mulaudzi 2013).

The six selected warrior traditional leaders were all males. As explained above, only four statues were eventually erected due to the absence of a picture of Kgoši Mokopane as well as due to the unavailability of the Makgoba statue which was not yet installed at the time of collection of the data.

4.2 Designing the statues

Most visible about the designs of the Warrior Traditional Leaders' Monuments is the dominance of two types of composition: the statue of a traditional leader sitting (see statues of Makhado and Malebogo) and the statue of a traditional leader standing in a posture as if ready for war, with a weapon in the one hand (see the statues of Ngungunhane and Sekhukhune). The emergence of these forms of icons suggests the extent to which the responsible people in Limpopo, with the power to shape commemorative plans, reached an agreement about how to look back at the Wars of Resistance. This sort of pose (at least where the four are concerned) represents the idea of '*vigilance*' (Brown 2004: 26).

"Vigilance" seems to have also been the "typical idea" represented by several Civil War monuments in the United States of America (USA). As products of independent decisions in that country, some Civil War monuments inevitably took a wide range of forms, however, more striking than that variety, is the dominance of one type of composition: the statues of a uniformed standing soldier, holding the barrel of a rifle that rests upright on the ground in front of him. Contemporaries often read these as depictions of soldier at "place rest" or "parade rest". However, when the 1861 Civil War commenced, the Seventh Regiment Memorial in Central Park, New York City—an early example of the same pose that had become standard—was said to be on Guard, prepared for immediate action and ready to take its place as a watchful *Sentinel* in front of the Picket line (Brown 2004: 26).

The designers of the Limpopo Warrior Traditional Leaders' Monuments seem to have taken a leaf out of the examples from the USA and replicated, if not copied the design and interpretation thereof, even if not officially acknowledged. While the warrior traditional leaders seem to be resting, they however, remain on guard, prepared for immediate action and ready to take their place as leaders of their warrior troops. This is represented with the arms in their hands (see all the photographs below with Malebogo still holding some bullets in his left hand).

The physical characteristics no less than the pose, expressed ideas about the warrior traditional leader—clearly appearing to represent a traditional African leader. The perception, particularly in view of the assortment of arms held, (assegai/spears in the case of Sekhukhune and Ngungunhane; knobkerrie in the case of Makhado) and traditional attire worn, is that the typical Warrior Traditional Leader / Kgoši's monument illustrated the patriotism, self-sacrifice, bravery,

and devotion which traditional leaders in the mould of Shaka, Moshweshwe, and Sekhukhune to name a few, have always displayed and therefore would, in the words of former President Thabo Mbeki, inspire viewers to follow their example.[7]

The traditional leader at rest was evidently an image that appealed to the Limpopo provincial government as sponsors of the monuments (Mulaudzi 2013). The convergence of these kinds of commemorative designs did not result from a lack of alternatives. The level of consensus is easy to exaggerate. Disagreement often took place as debates between the advocates of monuments and proponents of utilitarian memorials posed the most basic choices. Names of streets, towns, and cities and other geographic features were also being touted and changed at the time. Thus, Pietersburg changed to Polokwane, Potgietersrus was renamed Mokopane, Bochum changed to Senwabarwana, Nylstroom changed to Modimolle, as well as the highly contested Louis Trichardt renamed Makhado and later changed back to Louis Trichardt, just to mention a few examples (Thotse 2010: 176).

Arguing in support of name changes, the NHC noted that South Africa has suffered a long history of typologies of colonial conquest not only in a material sense, but also in the form of psychological plundering, and of the distortion and obliteration of the history and heritage of African people that often is inscribed on ancestral land and cultural landscapes. Volumes of historical accounts, ranging from popular travel writings to racial science (anthropometrics), would partially narrate the early European experiences of Africa and encounters with its peoples, where the European travellers and historians often depicted territorial places of African people as open, depopulated vast tracks of barren land, while in contradiction, describing Africans as noble savages occupying the territory. The NHC contends that colonialism and later apartheid shared a particular obsession with territorial acquisition and the obliteration of the indigenous African names of places occupied by indigenous African people. The deliberate intention here was to displace African people and render them landless without a sense of belonging except in the carefully constructed tribal reserves. Indeed, more than three centuries of colonial and apartheid domination resulted in the subjugation, denigration, and marginalisation of languages, cultures, customs, and traditions of the indigenous communities (Mancotywa 2010).

7 In his celebrated speech delivered on the adoption of the Constitution, former President Thabo Mbeki, paying homage to the heroes and heroines, the forebears of liberation struggle, said, 'I am the grandchild of the warrior men and women that Hintsa and Sekhukhune led, the patriots that Cetshwayo and Mphephu took to battle, the soldiers Moshoeshoe and Ngungunyane taught never to dishonour the cause of freedom.'

The obliteration of original African names of places gained prominence through the dispossession of land and colonial occupation where a flurry of European names replaced indigenous names of places that were previously there in pre-colonial times. The marginalisation of pre-colonial geographical names in favour of the new colonial names that were institutionalised and formed part of the dominant political discourse, defined and characterised South Africa's social, political, and heritage landscapes. Such colonial reconfiguration impacted and still impacts on human psyche (Mancotywa 2010).

It is against the background sketched by Mancotywa and the total extent of the marginalisation of the indigenous communities in the past, that a public discourse around the changes of place names was framed and conceived. As South Africa emerged from a deeply fragmented and unforgettable painful past under the siege mentality of colonial and apartheid domination, the advent of a democratic government ushered in the hope for social transformation and restorative justice (Mancotywa 2010).

A survey found that the Limpopo community had dedicated libraries, town halls, or other public buildings to warrior traditional leaders. Overall, however, support for remembrance of the Wars of Resistance through museums was weaker than the momentum behind monuments or statues (Mulaudzi 2013).

The warrior traditional leader statues offered more as a strategy for remembering collective effort and sacrifice. Their inscriptions reflected on in Chapter Five, featured the message of the provincial leader, Sello Moloto. The iconographic shape of the individual statue and the prominence of such visual symbols was in effect, the casting of a political vote in favour of a specific notion of what the province was meant to be all about (Rausch 2007: 74).

4.3 Position

The positioning of the Warrior Traditional Leader statue was crucial. It was essential that the commemorated *magoši* (plural form of *kgoši* (traditional leaders)) should be seen by the respective communities as occupying their rightful position, that is of leadership. It was important that the artists produced figures that were representative of not just a traditional leader / kgoši, but of warrior traditional leaders. Consequently, the declared representations of warrior traditional leaders in commemorative war monuments could not be placed flat on the ground, but had to

be elevated on a higher locality, for example, on the hill in the case of Kgošikgolo Sekhukhune or on a high plinth / pedestal in the case of the other three leaders, as a sign of respect to the traditional leader. To some extent the positioning reveals a metaphorical association of height and power as theorised by Kress and Van Leeuwen (2006: 56). Drawing on Arnheim's theories on the visual composition of works of formal art to develop their semiotic theories on the information value of left / right, centre / margin composition of image on the page, Kress and Van Leeuwen show how angles can realise power relationships between that which is represented and the viewer. However, a display of the metaphorical association of height with reverence warrants a further investigation, which is not the topic of this work. Suffice to indicate in this chapter that, what the two authors indicate is that social distance, closeness, and attitude can all be suggested by the angle from which the subject on the statue is viewed. Thus, a low angle that forces the viewer to "look up to" the subject puts the balance of power in favour of the subject and not the viewer, whereas an equal angle that allows the viewer to see the subject at eye level would suggest equality. For the analysis of statues in the commemorative Warrior Traditional Leaders' Monuments, this aspect of the theory also relates to the question of the height of the monument. Kress and Van Leeuwen (2006: 140) explained that: 'If the represented participant is seen from a low angle, then the relation between the interactive and represented participant is depicted as one in which the represented participant has power over the interactive participant.'

As with angles in art or photography, this analysis demonstrates how looking upwards to view a sculpture that is placed on a plinth that allows it to tower high above its viewer achieves the placement of the figure into the ideal position; thus, achieving the unequal power relationship between the viewer and the traditional leader represented in the statue (Abousnnouga 2012: 8). Corroborating this view from a different angle, Marschall suggested that all relocated statues in Durban were to be taken off their pedestals and lowered to the ground to stand on their feet. While literally and metaphorically signifying a 'deposing' of these grand leaders of the past, this measure would simultaneously render them more human, allowing people to confront them face to face and 'look them in the eye' (Marschall 2009: 149).

These new monuments in Limpopo province were expected to exemplify a new breed of Warrior Traditional Leaders' Monuments and reflect an expression of changing ideas about the object of war (of resistance) and its place in the life of African traditional leadership, ideas that found considerable sculptural expression after 1994 in South Africa. The appearance of the new iconographic type seemed to have established a tradition which will continue to influence sculptural commemoration of African traditional leadership, particularly in South Africa (Marshall 2009: 149).

All four statues made a spectre of peacetime the guiding principle of their design, and they did so in realistic terms, partly explaining the choice of the "statue of the traditional leader at rest" pose. The bronze warrior traditional leader had become an *icon* in the Limpopo province. The provincial government had funds available and a desire to erect monuments of greater originality, hence intended to avoid the prospect of receiving a standard fare warrior traditional leader representation. Each statue had to reflect the true nature of the warrior traditional leader soldier as was perceived by the sensitivities of the first decade of the new millennium in the Limpopo province. In a circular sent to the prospective competitors for the Warrior Traditional Leaders' Monuments, the Project Team stipulated that it would not accept a figure that looked as if he were ashamed that he was a royal soldier (Mulaudzi 2013). Similarly, an observer of the model designs in Polokwane lamented that some of the entries lacked 'that original and earnest force so much needed in a Warrior Traditional Leader's Monument of this nature' (*Seipone/Xivoni/Tshivhoni* 2004).[8]

An editorial in *Seipone* newspaper commended the selected designs as examples of a new breed of memorials in the province which better reflected the values and aspirations of African traditional leadership. Harry Johnson's models were put forth as examples of statuary that convey meaning, or emphasise a quality not only of human nature, but one of traditional leadership which shall teach a lesson for all time. Instead of being yet another of the "simple effigies" which were "but models depicting ordinary soldiers", Johnson's Sekhukhune model designs presented for contemplation, edification, and emulation of the viewer, 'the character of an African warrior leader—endurance, devotion, [and] heroism' (*Seipone/Xivoni/Tshivhoni* 2004). Sekhukhune's monument was the first of the four to be erected in 2004. The writer concluded the editorial in *Seipone* with a plea for the creation of more of these assertive and didactic monuments, a call that other sculptors heeded.

> An African warrior monument should give place to some originality, wherein the warrior's deeds could be extolled, not by meaningless effigies, but by single statues or groups, in which virtue or idea connected with the warrior traditional leader might be handed down in imperishable material, not only in 'memoriam' of the deeds performed, but suggestive of what kind of a man the warrior leader of the Wars of

8 Extract from: Constructing a collective memory: monuments commemorating warrior kings and name changes in Limpopo province South Africa.

> Resistance was among his people. These monuments successfully represent the patriotism, self-sacrifice, bravery and devotion which our traditional leaders have always displayed. These works hopefully exalt present and future generations of South Africa to emulate the deeds of their forebears during the Wars of Resistance. *(Seipone/Xivoni/Tshivhoni* 2004)[9]

Most importantly, the Limpopo provincial government noted that, since some of the wars had been fratricidal, nothing in the monuments' conception should suggest any war's cruelty or atrocities. Such a portrayal, it was believed, would have only served to perpetuate disunity not only in the province, but in the country at large. In keeping with this view, the seemingly reluctance of the statues were also hoped to assert that the province stood on the eve of a new era, when there is to be great harmony between all the resident cultures (Mulaudzi 2013).

4.4 Location

Sculptor Frederick Wellington Ruckstuhl, in 1902 delivered a lecture at the Boston Public Library in the USA entitled "The Proper Functions of the Open-Air Statuary", as one of a series of lectures on the aesthetic development of cities. He told his audience that open-air statuary had only four possible functions: to delight; to refine; to console; and to stimulate. Ruckstuhl ranked these in order of ascending importance, explaining each of them in turn. The Warrior Traditional Leaders Monuments would in all probability, fall in the third and fourth categories of Ruckstuhl's ranking, in particular, that of consolation, which likened statues to private monuments found in cemeteries. Private cemetery memorials and most traditional public monuments to battle casualties or martyred figures serve largely to console the viewer. While admitting that 'the function of consoling is one of the most important in life; Ruckstuhl believed that a far more important function of open-air statuary was to 'stimulate the nation to action' (Monumental News, as cited by Montagna 1987: 153). To convince his listeners that a 'fine public monument is a powerful stimulus to mankind', Ruckstuhl described how that stimulation might occur:

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9 Extract from: Constructing a collective memory: monuments commemorating warrior kings and name changes in Limpopo Province South Africa.

> Let any father take his son out walking on a spring Sunday and he will soon see that as he approaches a monument his boy will ask him: 'Papa, what is that?' Papa will have to explain, of course. He will be compelled to tell his boy the story of the life and achievements of the man monumented. In the very process of doing this he will be newly fired to dedicate himself once again to the task of emulating the hero whose noble life he has been allured to describe to his son—and, in that new self-dedication, resolve to push his boy as far as he can on to a finer manhood, and to make him his votive offering to his country and thus enrich mankind with the most royal gift a father can offer (Monumental News, cited in Montagna 1987: 153).

Ruckstuhl's declaration that a public sculpture's highest calling is a stimulus to the present and future action on behalf of the nation, is in perfect harmony with the objectives of the Limpopo government when the decision was made to erect the Warrior Traditional Leaders' Monuments.

4.5 Warrior Traditional Leaders' statues

4.5.1 Kgošikgolo Sekhukhune

Sekhukhune's lonely bronze statue stands three meters high on the hills of Tšate village, which is also called Ntswaneng. At the foot of the hill is the mass grave of thirteen British soldiers who were killed by Sekhukhune's warriors during a battle in 1879. Sekhukhune is characterised as a brave warrior traditional leader. Sculptor Harry Johnson (2009) proposed that Sekhukhune be presented as 'quiet and thoughtful' and that he should be portrayed in his war regalia, holding his assegai and shield. Such armaments would have been in keeping with those used at the time of Sekhukhune wars with the Boers and the British as well as those still found among some older generations of the BaPedi households who would identify with the traditional leader. This design also embodied the calm determination and deep thought shown in the attitude and facial expression of Sekhukhune (Johnson 2009).

Photograph 8: Kgošikgolo Sekhukhune's statue at Tjate. Photo by Mahunele Thotse.
Question: What aspects of this design commended it to the leaders of the project?

Harry Johnson (2009) strove to create an iconic portrayal of Sekhukhune. To achieve this ideal, he proposed that the statue should be marked by its 'calmness' and 'deep thought'. Johnson also said that the guiding motive of the model he designed for Sekhukhune was that the greatness of the traditional leader is equalled only by his simplicity. The figure of Sekhukhune is treated in a

very straight-forward way, standing with the sharp point of his assegai or spear in the right hand stuck into the ground, his shield in the left hand dropped a bit. He is thus not in a defensive mood, while the face tilted over his right shoulder is expressive of the absence of self-consciousness and the earnest direction of his character. This, the sculptor said, was an instruction from the Limpopo provincial government that indicated that all war between cultures is over. Johnson also wished to render Sekhukhune's character and disposition as a plain *MoPedi* (singular) by representing the leader in a quiet and dignified pose avoiding all manner of flamboyant action (Johnson 2009).

4.5.2 Khosikhulu Makhado

Of all his comments regarding the characterisation of his subjects, Johnson was the most explicit about Makhado. Johnson (2009) stated, 'I had carefully borne in mind the character and individuality of traditional leader Makhado, which are the essence of his Venda greatness and simplicity'. To best communicate these virtues, Johnson depicted Makhado wrapped in a royal cloth, sitting quietly at ease on a rock with a knobkerrie in his left hand tucked between his legs on the ground, rather than with a rifle, even though Makhado was known to be an expert at handling rifles after he had been exposed at a young age to game hunting by white friends of his father. In striving for such a conception, Johnson sought to approximate the characterisation of Makhado provided by informants from the royal household and the readings he did on the traditional leader. The sculptor admitted that he did not claim any originality for the conception of Makhado's quietness and reserve of power. Johnson in fact conceded that he read books and was also informed by people who were close to the Makhado family (Johnson 2009).

The sculptor said that he initially imagined Makhado as a solemn figure on a wooden chair. He later, from a standpoint of characterisation of the traditional leader from the readings, imagined the traditional leader as quiet and reserved. Describing the idea behind the posture that was finally approved, Johnson said that members of the royal house and the Project Team chose the moment when Makhado was considering a proposal from ZAR Commandant-General Piet Joubert regarding the taking of census among his people, for their motif.

The statue also zoomed in on a moment when Makhado was gazing at his warriors pondering what the next move would probably be. 'We endeavoured in the statue of Makhado to give something of the latent force of the traditional leader, manifesting itself through perfect passivity.

If the statue impressed the beholder by its force as having character and stillness, it would have fulfilled its mission' (Johnson 2009).

Makhado's positioning and the knobkerrie signifies wisdom; one who knew when to attack, hence his nickname "*Tshilwavusiku*" literally meaning one who fights during the night (Johnson 2009).

Photograph 9: Khosikhulu Makhado's statue in Louis Trichardt. Photo by Mahunele Thotse. **Question**: What traits of Makhado's leadership did Johnson suggest in this statue?

4.5.3 Kgoši Malebogo

Information on Kgoši Malebogo was obtained from Professor Lize Kriel of the University of Pretoria's Department of Historical and Heritage Studies and photos were obtained from Kgoši Malebogo's family and the Limpopo province's DSAC before work on the model commenced. Available information confirmed that Kgoši Malebogo fought the Boers and finally surrendered. He was taken to jail in Pretoria and released after the Anglo-Boer war ended (Minnaar 2010).

Photograph 10: Kgoši Malebogo at BaHananwa Tribal Offices, Blouberg. Photo by Mahunele Thotse. **Question**: What qualities of traditional leadership does this monument identify in Malebogo?

The statue shows Malebogo sitting defiantly and proud on a rock with his favourite toy—a rifle which is facing down with bullet shells around his feet. Thamagana Mojapelo[10] noted that Kgoši Malebogo held a rifle in his hand which was a demonstration of his bravery as well as how he used it during the war. The rocks forming the base of the statue are a sign that shows he used the rocks on top of the mountain as his fort. The sculptor Phil Minnaar said in his interview, that this portrayal was an instruction from the government to symbolise that all war between all cultures in the country were over. This monument, while reflecting a relaxed traditional leader, also recalls to the mind the patriotic pride and the consciousness of sufficient strength which animated and sustained his people until that supreme hour of surrender. With the possession of arms, the monument also primarily illustrates events that had taken place on the battlefields. Minnaar said it was an honour and achievement for him to have sculpted some of the world's greatest leaders and royalty. He believed this will help future generations learn more about history's heroes (Minnaar 2010; Nthite 2006).

10 Narrator for 'Ntwa ya Kgoši Malebogo le Maburu (Malebogo-Boer War) – a documentary written by Tlou Setumu commissioned by the NHC.

4.5.4 Hosinkulu Ngungunhane

Photograph 11: Hosinkulu Ngungunhane's statue in Giyani. Photo by Mahunele Thotse. **Question**: How would you compare the ideas expressed in this bronze design with those in the fibreglass design of Ngungunhane?

The supreme quality of quiet strength of Ngungunhane was also foremost in the sculptor Harry Johnson's mind as he designed the model of that Warrior Traditional Leaders' statue. When the DSAC called on Johnson to bring forward a statue of Ngungunhane, among their reasons was

because they were uncertain that his portrayal of Ngungunhane would embody the nobility and reserve power that it should possess. Unlike the other traditional leaders who have always been resident in Limpopo, Ngungunhane's residency in Limpopo is questioned and contested. He is largely commemorated in Mozambique, where he had ruled most of the time and where he fought his wars against the Portuguese, which also explains his capture by the Portuguese and exile to Lisbon where he died in 1906. Ngungunhane's statue, therefore, was not readily welcomed without question in Giyani. Given this background, the DSAC did not believe that the sculptor could achieve the necessary characterisation of the traditional leader as was expected (Johnson 2009).

However, as in the cases of Sekhukhune and Makhado, Johnson brought to a higher degree of finish a quiet strength as the key ingredient for proper portrayal of the *Hosi* and was also confident that the product mirrored the reposeful, however, uncompromising character of Ngungunhane. The life-size bronze statue portrays Ngungunhane in traditional Zulu-like apparel, standing with his assegai held in both hands with its sharp point facing upwards. He is depicted as firm and astride on the ground, supposedly observing a stirring scene unfolding some distance before his very eyes (Johnson 2009).

4.5.5 Kgoši Mokopane

It has been mentioned in Chapter Two that the Project Team were unable to locate any pictures of Kgoši Mokopane. The Project Team then negotiated with the Kekana Ndebele royal family. At one stage it was suggested by members of the royal family that pictures of Mokopane's son Vaaltyn (also known as Piet to his former Boer keepers, since they did not know his actual name) could be used instead. This suggestion was set aside as agreeing to it would have meant that it was his son Vaaltyn who was being honoured and celebrated, and not the father Mokopane.

A further argument against the use of Vaaltyn's picture in the place of that of his father was that as pictures and images play a vital role in civic education and provide examples to live by as well as a rich source of moral inspiration, Vaaltyn would have come forth as the hero to be emulated. Moreover, images also evoke loyalties as well as attachments not only to the persons portrayed, but also to the larger collectives that those persons represent, thus they are important agencies of integration and solidarity.

Photograph 12: A memorial commemorating the 1854 Siege of Makapan (Lithole 2010: 51). Photo supplied by Donald Lithole. **Question**: How did placement of this monument at the declared world heritage site reinforce its intended themes?

Eventually, an agreement was reached between the Project Team and the Kekana Ndebele royal family that a monument be built in Mokopane's honour (see photograph above) and that a tombstone rather than a statue be placed at his gravesite which was located somewhere on a cattle farm. These two commitments have since been fulfilled. The memorial plaque or tombstone (see below) is 1.7 m high, located in the thickest of bushes in the vicinity of the Makapansgat valley, exactly inside the declared world heritage site near the Cave of Hearths-Historic Cave Complex (Mulaudzi 2013).

Photograph 13: A tombstone commemorating Kgoši Mokopane at his gravesite. Photo sourced from Mogalakwena Municipality, Mokopane, on August 13, 2014. **Question**: How would you compare the representations of Mokopane at his gravesite and at the declared world heritage site?

The tombstone was unveiled by the Premier Sello Moloto on Heritage Day 24 September 2005. The plague was unveiled in collaboration with SAHRA. SAHRA acknowledged its role in the building of both memorials in their official report for the year which ended in 2006 as follows:

> SAHRA joined the people of Limpopo and the Provincial Department of Sports, Arts and Culture in celebration of Heritage Day. The focus of the celebration was the inscription of Makapan Valley on the World Heritage List. As part of the activities SAHRA and the Department of Sports, Arts and Culture collectively built the memorials, in commemoration of the 1854 siege which took place in Makapan's cave and the memorial for Chief Mokopane Setswamadi (Kekana) respectively. Traditional health practitioners from all over the province conducted a cleansing and healing

ritual at the cave as it is a practice in African culture to appease the ancestors (South African Heritage Resources Agency 2006: 49,79).

Makapansgat was declared a World Heritage Site in 2005 by SAHRA on account of its rich and multi-layered heritage extending in an almost unbroken record from Ape-man times approximately three million years ago to the present (Maguire 2007: 40). The Historic Cave wherein Mokopane and the Kekana were besieged has been declared a national monument since 1936.



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DEPARTMENT OF SPORT, ARTS & CULTURE

LAUNCH OF HERITAGE MONTH : MAKGABENG
02 SEPTEMBER 2005

CALENDER OF EVENTS

2 SEPT 05 (07h00) Site visit by media and VIP'S to selected rock Art sites (MEC: Sport, Arts & Culture)

(10H00) Public address and media launch at the village of Ga/Hlako (MEC : Sport, Arts & Culture)

(13H00) Lunch, music and entertainment

3 SEPT 05 (11H00) Launch of the monument at Batlokwa to commemorate forced removals, (MEC: Sport Arts & Culture)

8 SEPT 05 (01h00- 06h00) Cleansing ceremony

(09h00 – 12h00) Launch of the Dzata museum in Nzhelele Valley (Premier: Limpopo)

8 SEPT 05 (13H00 – 14h30) Unveiling of the statue in honour of Khosi Makhado at the Tourism centre, Makhado. (Premier: Limpopo)

(14H30 Public address and entertainment at Makhado Rugby Club. (Premier: Limpopo)

24 SEPT 05 **HERITAGE DAY CELEBRATIONS** at Moshate, Mokopane.

(06H00) Cleansing Ceremony _ Makapans Valley World Heritage Site (MEC: Sport, Arts & Culture)

(08H00) Unveiling of Memorial in honour of Kgosi Mokopane (Premier: Limpopo Province)

(09H30) Unveiling of the Tombstone of Kgosi Mokopane. (Premier: Limpopo)

(11H00) Public address and entertainment at Moshate, Mokopane (Premier: Limpopo)

Photograph 14: Heritage month programme (2005) of the Limpopo province, please note that 24th September 2005 was reserved for Mokopane.
Question: How has Heritage Day been observed in your town over the years?

A few inconsistencies have been noted with the title of the honoured Kgoši. On the one panel he is addressed as Kgošikgolo Mokopane—an equivalent of Paramount Chief Mokopane, while on the other panels he is referred to as simply Chief Mgombhani and *Koning Mgombhani* in English and Afrikaans versions respectively, for a simple Kgoši. There is no evidence that Mokopane ever ruled over other chieftaincies which would have justified him the paramountcy. It is also interesting to note that some of the inscriptions on the monument are written in Afrikaans, which is the "supposed" language of the coloniser against whom Kgoši Mokopane fought and by whom he was besieged.

Unfortunately, both monument and memorial plaque are not being maintained and are in a bad state of disrepair due to rain, heat, and other bad weather conditions. This is as evident as can be seen from the above photographs. It is worth noting though that due to rains and other conditions, the palisade security fence surrounding the memorial has lost paint and its condition appears to be deteriorating further. The uncontrolled grass and shrubs surrounding the monument is also evidence that these are not being well maintained. The most plausible rationale is that the grave site is on a private farm which is reportedly not always accessible.

This, however, does not necessarily mean that the project is a failure. Some Ndebele people conduct their annual rituals at the heritage site just as the Mogalakwena Municipality, if not the provincial government celebrates Heritage Day at the heritage site every year. Some individuals interviewed by Lithole believed that the practicing of rituals at the heritage site brings ordinary people into contact with something great, even sacred, and that allows them to reaffirm those precepts around which the community is constituted (Lithole 2010: 51).

4.5.6 Kgoši Makgoba

The Limpopo provincial government commissioned sculptor Andre Otto from Pretoria to sculpt the statue of Kgoši Mamphoku Makgoba. Information from officials of the Limpopo government reveal that the statue was complete and ready for unveiling. However, due to factional squabbles among the BaMakgoba people, the statue could not be unveiled unless such factional problems were resolved. Unfortunately, the researcher was taken from pillar to post, and nobody seemed interested in taking him to the chambers where the statue was said to be stored in wait for the day of erection. In the attempt to get clarity regarding the nature, form, structure, and symbolism

of the statue, the researcher contacted the sculptor Andre Otto for an interview regarding his work. The sculptor, however, was not prepared to share any information regarding the statue of Makgoba until such time that his work was put up by the province. Since the statue was never installed, there was consequently no comment from the sculptor.

There was a bust of Kgoši Makgoba in Limpopo province, however, that did not form part of the Warrior Traditional Leaders' Monuments project. It was well-meaning local white businessmen who in 1999 erected a monument for Kgoši Makgoba at the hotel that bears his name – Magoebaskloof Hotel.

Photograph 15: Bust of Kgoši Makgoba commissioned by well-meaning local white businessmen at the Magoebaskloof Hotel. Please note reference to King Mamphoku Makgoba instead of Kgoši or Chief Mamphoku Makgoba on the inscription. Photo by Mahunele Thotse. **Question**: What meaning would you appropriate to be the intention with a bust rather than a life-size statue of "King" Makgoba?

Changuion (2009: 8) himself conceded to carrying the responsibility for creating the belief that such a monument was necessary. Changuion admitted to being the one who coined the phrase 'Lion of the Woodbush' that was later used by other authors including Makgoba's own grandson Prof. William Makgoba (Makgoba 1997). That might have culminated in creating a much bigger image of the man than he really was. Eventually, when the monument was erected, Kgoši Makgoba was now elevated to a King. Makgoba was never a paramount chief—an equivalent of "king" (Changuion 2009: 8).

4.6 The Ubuntu Memorial Monument

Photograph 16: The Ubuntu Memorial Monument in Musina. Photo forwarded by Siseko Ntshanga of the NHC. **Question**: How did the placement of this memorial in Musina reinforce its intended themes?

The NHC of South Africa, in partnership with the Limpopo provincial government, unveiled the Ubuntu Memorial Monument in honour of the same six warrior traditional leaders at an event that was held during heritage month at Musina Municipal premises on 25 September 2008. The monument, built of stone, carries the names of all the six traditional leaders, namely Makgoba, Sekhukhune, Ngungunhane, Mokopane, Malebogo, and Makhado which are inscribed on it. It was unveiled by the Premier of Limpopo province Sello Moloto, in the company of six traditional leaders from the different tribes represented and descendants of the honoured, namely Khosikhulu Vho Toni Mphephu Ramabulana (Venda of Makhado), Hosi Eric Xumalo (Shangaan of Ngungunhane), Kgoši Joseph Malebogo (Bahananwa of Malebogo), Kgoši Kenneth Kgagudi Sekhukhune (BaPedi of Sekhukhune), Kgoši Vaaltyn Mokopane (Ndebele of Mokopane), and Kgoši Mokopa Makgoba (BaMakgoba) (De Wet and Marolen 2008).

In his address on the occasion, the Premier said that heritage month served to remind the people of the importance of the past as well as the present. Moloto also warned that Heritage Day should not only be relevant to historians, archaeologists, and anthropologists because 'to do that will be denying the youth of the country their past and their present' (Matlala and Makana 2008; Muthambi 2008).

The chairperson of the House of Traditional Leaders in Limpopo, Kgoši Sefogole Makgeru, who attended the unveiling, said that he appreciated the good work which the NHC and the Limpopo provincial government had done in honouring and recognising the warrior traditional leaders. The monument would help the younger generations to understand the values and customs of the history and different cultures of Limpopo (Muthambi 2008).

The Ubuntu Memorial is made from stone. Stone monuments are said to represent part of the world's cultural heritage. In the past, stone monuments were used to commemorate individual rulers and their ceremonies associated with specific dates. Stones were imbued with a sense of making permanent, an elapsed moment in time. The traditional leaders depicted on the *Ubuntu* memoriam also embodied overlapping ideas involving time, the material of the stones, and the royal person celebrated. In the past, material stone, often media for royal portraits and ceremonial scenes, could occupy even a central role in the ideology of rulership. The *Ubuntu* Memorial has therefore been created to embody a particular period during which the traditional leaders had to defend their peoples' land and possessions (Levinson 1998; Muthambi 2008).

In its conceptualisation, the *Ubuntu* monument also contained several general claims that might shed some light on the motivations of its sponsors. The monument was uniquely designed to encompass several important religious ideas. The monument was designed by Ramadwa

Building Construction at a cost of R6 000.00. It resembles an African architecture of communal living around a fireplace with a pot from the local Royal House of the Venda people. Boulders (rocks) from the domains of the six traditional leaders were brought from their royal residences to be incorporated into the half-moon shaped wall (see above photograph) of a traditional hut to symbolise unity of cultures and traditions.



Photograph 17: Draft initial design of the half-moon *Ubuntu* Memorial Monument with labels depicting the original religious ideas, NHC 2008a. Photo supplied by Helene Vollgraaf of the NHC. **Question**: What significance do you attach to the depiction of a pot on the fireplace in this draft proposal?

There are round openings under each of the boulders that protrude through the smooth wall on the one side paved with cow dung and on the other side with stones that were used to build what are now ruins of the early rulers in the Venda region. The openings reflect hope for cultures

to reach-out to each other and open conversations among each other.[11] It was declared that the stones represent the Royal House of the six traditional leaders as written on the inscription of the monument.

The occasion of unveiling was also used to honour Cuban President Fidel Castro, a recipient of the *Ubuntu* Award, with a memorial plaque. Due to ill health, the Cuban President could not attend the occasion, hence the award and the plaque were received and unveiled on his behalf by a representative of the Cuban government, Acting Ambassador, Mr Enrique Orta. As inscribed on the granite stone of the memorial, President Castro was honoured for 'his sterling role in the liberation of South Africa and Africa'.[12]

Advocate Mancotywa of the NHC emphasised that the monument was erected as a way of showing appreciation for the heritage contribution made by the six traditional leaders of Limpopo. 'The six traditional leaders expressed the spirit and values of *Ubuntu*. They have distinguished themselves as an embodiment and champions of the values and principles of humanity, in a manner consistent with *Ubuntu'*, (Mancotywa 2010) he said. Mancotywa also reiterated that 'it is high time that people started to revive the African values of *Ubuntu* to assist in nation building and also creating a South African identity and social cohesion' (Muthambi 2008).

The erection of the *Ubuntu* Memorial Monument formed part of the NHC's *Ubuntu* in Nation Building programme. In a document entitled *An Update of Heritage Programmes: reference Period August – October 2008*, the "*Ubuntu* in Nation Building" was described as a strategic programme which derived from the mandate of the NHC, that of integrating living heritage with the functions and activities of the Council and all other heritage authorities and institutions at national, provincial, and local level. Engaging with the broader society on this programme, a strong view was expressed that required strategies for cultivating ways of ensuring that communities be organised around *Ubuntu* in a way that would translate to a change in behaviour and attitude of individuals, families, and communities, in an attempt to restore the lost values and morals in the South African society (NHC Symposium 2008b). Employing Limpopo province's six warrior traditional leaders can be regarded as a meaningful contribution to this programme.

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11 See artist impressions of the 'Design of the memorial' attached to a fax with the subject: *Memorial* sent by Pedron Nndwa on behalf of Musina Local Municipality to the attention of Thabo Manetsi on behalf of NHC on 11 September 2008 at 15:31.

12 See inscriptions on the monument; also see *Heritage Unit Programmes - An update of heritage Programmes: Reference Period August – October 2008*.

4.7 Functions and form

The idea of the traditional leaders' characterisation in the various proposals and the eventual sculptural statues erected in their honour is noticeably consistent. In all four statues, the traditional leaders' images are those of reluctant heroes who were reticent. They all possessed quiet strength, a plain and direct manner, thoughtfulness, imperturbability, and calm determination. These qualities also appeared in several appraisals in the dedication and commemorative speeches mostly by black political leaders, which may have served in large part, as the basis for the sculptural interpretations of the traditional leaders. The perception of these selected traditional leaders as pioneers of the liberation struggle who launched and fought wars of resistance against colonialism, dispossession, and imperialism in the second half of the nineteenth century gave rise to concerted popular interest in the lives of these then little-known heroes, which culminated in the launching of the commemorative theme "Wars of Resistance against Colonialism and Imperialism" and the subsequent erection of the statues in their honour.

Looking at the producers of Limpopo's commemorative Warrior Traditional Leaders' Monuments, one finds that they were multi-produced; the end product was not solely shaped by the designer, that is the sculptor, but by a chain of agents. These agents were both elitist (politicians), in the sense of their powerful positions in government, and ordinary individual members of the community (some members of the royal families of the honoured traditional leaders) that did not occupy influential positions; each of whom had a different input into the final product.

The Limpopo government, in developing the ideas of monuments, did not necessarily overlook other subtle, interrelated aspects that may enhance community building and identity. While they focused on broadening audiences, public programme, collections, and exhibitions that formed part of discussions enclosed with the decision to declare heritage sites as described in Chapter Two, they also did not make a mistake of regarding physical spaces as necessarily armature, however, as catalysts in themselves. Although there is no demonstrated evidence of formal plans, there seems to have been a thought at least to allow some subtle, interrelated and essentially unexamined ingredients to play an enhanced role in the building of community and a people's collective social life.

Underlying this argument is the notion that the monuments and the memorial spaces surrounding them, whatever their overt mission may be, are becoming an important agent in the creation of a more cohesive community. Increasingly, government leaders and specifically town

planners in Limpopo, are asserting that these memorial spaces can become safe spaces for meeting grounds for diverse peoples, and neutral forums for discussing issues of the day. Proponents hold that to build a functional sense of community and civility, (town) planners should fashion spaces that foster a sense of place, and offer a mix of activities which appeal to the common people. They maintain that the juxtaposition of spaces that form mixed-use environments must be present if community building is to succeed (Lithole 2013).

The South African government, through the national Department of Arts and Culture, has for some time been pursuing initiatives that support the contribution of arts, culture, and heritage to drive social cohesion and economic growth in recognising the increasing evidence that arts, culture, and heritage make a positive contribution to the liveability of places. Investment in heritage sites, along with support for vibrant and diverse arts programming are among others, ways of enhancing the reputations and attractiveness of areas as places in which to live, work, and invest (Mzansi Golden Economy Strategy n.d.).

From that perspective, the declared heritage sites are expected to provide a conducive and enabling environment for the consumption of arts, culture, and heritage, thereby attracting visitors and tourists to the neighbourhood. The government believes that the identity of a place generally has more to do with the quality and diversity of its cultural activities and services than with its economic or commercial functions. At the same time, a vibrant cultural / heritage sector as well as a good place for residents to work, live, and play is from an economic perspective, a place to invest in and make money. The government further recognised the considerable contribution made by these traditional leaders to the South African story of liberation struggle which is both of national and international interest and believes that telling these stories will contribute towards building greater social cohesion, promoting community healing and thus, paving the way for prosperity in the community. It is in this context that the heritage sites were envisaged and declared at the sites of the battlefields (Küsel 2008; Tlouamma n.d.).

Indeed, the Tjate battlefield, where Kgošikgolo Sekhukhune fought some of his battles against the Boers and the British, as well as Malebogo battlefields where Kgoši Malebogo fought against the Boers, have since 2007, been declared Provincial Heritage Sites (Grade 2) by the Limpopo Heritage Resources Authority in terms of section 27 (6) of the National Heritage Resources Act, 1999 (Act No. 25 of 1999) (Limpopo Heritage Resources Authority n.d.). Owing to the richness of the histories of resistance battles, the Limpopo provincial government recommended that these battlefields be developed into resourceful heritage sites while other resources may include the graves of warrior traditional leaders, missionary buildings, and other related heritage resources.

Photograph 18: Tjate (Tšate) has, since 2007, been declared a heritage. Photo by Mahunele Thotse, 31 August 2013. **Question**: What would you say is the cultural significance of this site for it to be declared?

The statues of both Khosikhulu Makhado and Hosinkulu Ngungunhane are located at the Tourism Information Centres in Louis Trichardt and Giyani respectively. This is also an acknowledgement of the role these leaders of the past can still play today. The following photographs of the two information centres demonstrate that even their buildings in terms of structure, have been standardised and collectivised. Both are thatch roofed and painted in the same yellow colour.

Photograph 19a: Makhado statue at Tourism Info Centre: Louis Trichardt. Photo by Mahunele Thotse.

Photograph 19b: Giyani Tourism Info Centre where Ngungunhane statue is located. Photo by Mahunele Thotse.

Inclusivity of affected communities into cultural tourism and heritage programmes was one of the key motivating factors for supporting the declaration of heritage sites on the battlefields. In almost all the sites, particularly with Sekhukhune and Malebogo, the sites are underdeveloped and economically depressed with little if any amenities. The declaration as heritage sites will enhance the values and principles inherent in heritage. It was anticipated that these initiatives would encourage redevelopment of the areas to be vibrant and safe places to live and work, while the spaces would also be allowed to be celebrated and enjoyed.

Indeed, the Limpopo provincial government had plans to enhance the inclusion of communities in cultural tourism and heritage programmes using of statues. In an interview for a documentary titled 'Ntwa ya Kgoši Malebogo le Maburu (Malebogo-Boer War)', Limpopo Premier indeed noted that:

> Our government has just started campaigning to communities about the importance of cultural tourism and heritage and how it can be used to benefit the communities. When you visit other countries, you will realise that their heritage sites and icons are being used to promote their leaders and emperors. We have not done much in this regard and I think that as a government it is our responsibility to have places like

> these declared as heritage sites. This should benefit our people... We have unveiled the statue of ruler Malebogo as a sign of respect to him and his people and also to grow cultural tourism. What can we improve to make sure that the area attracts more people in terms of product offerings? There should be other forms of entertainment to attract more visitors to this place (Moloto n.d.).

The BaHananwa, therefore, found it necessary to erect the statue of Kgoši Malebogo at the entrance of the tribal offices to welcome visitors to the Buffelshoek premises of the BaHananwa local government. A skin of a baboon hangs on the side of the statue during special occasions which it is said symbolise the origins and culture of the BaHananwa people. The office building is also a sign of triumph and success of the tribe. Many of the residents have since descended the mountain to the village below to access basic services.

Of significance regarding all the envisaged heritage sites in the Limpopo province is that they were intended to benefit local communities taking advantage of the linkage that exist between arts, culture, heritage, and tourism. To this end, Tlou Makhura, on behalf of the Freedom Park, indicated that people who died fighting the wars of resistance would be honoured at Freedom Park. Makhura said:

> 'The people paid a very huge sacrifice because the wars of resistance relate to part of the struggle for the liberation of black people. The wars of resistance were against colonialism, colonial forces, colonial domination and the purpose was to defend land, to defend resources, and to defend political independence.' (Makhura n.d.)

Photograph 20: Wall of Remembrance at the Freedom Park on which people who fought the Wars of Resistance would be honoured. Photo by Mahunele Thotse on 27 September 2014. Kgošikgolo Sekhukhune's name already appears on one of the panels. **Question**: What does this Wall of Remembrance offer in design, in theme, and the experience it offers to visitors?

Explaining the funding of the documentary on *Ntwa ya Kgoši Malebogo le Maburu* (Malebogo-Boer War), Sonwabile Mancotywa[13] of the NHC stated that the story of Kgoši Malebogo fitted well with the mandate of the NHC, more especially in the context of preserving intangible cultural heritage. The story also linked up well with one of the NHC's pinnacle projects, unsung heroes and heroines. These were stories that must be mainstreamed.

13 Chief Executive Officer of the NHC.

Chapter Five

'Shared Memories' of the Wars of Resistance in Limpopo Province

"To remind ourselves that we are a united nation." Lyn Spillman, *Nation and Commemoration*

5.1 Introduction

Collective memories are about shared experiences. In political philosophy shared values are often seen as a product of social unity. This chapter will demonstrate that the Warrior Traditional Leaders' Monuments are not only commemorative, but more than anything, they represent an attempt at fostering the unity of the community of Limpopo as a province. The chapter will briefly explore the formation of Limpopo as a province in 1994 and the challenges inherent in that processes that seemed to threaten the very fabric of unity in the province. The chapter will also reflect on the selective representation of prominent traditional leaders and ethnic groupings in the province. Limpopo's conception as a united province made a profound impact on the life of diverse ethnic groupings and thought.

Chapter Three has illustrated that indeed, all the traditional leaders selected for honour have had encounters one way or the other with white governments, be they ZAR, British, or Portuguese. Mokopane suffered at the hands of the early Boer settlers in the siege of 1854; Sekhukhune fought and survived the onslaught of the ZAR in 1876, however, suffered defeat at the hands of the British three years later in 1879; Malebogo fought bravely, however, surrendered to the ZAR forces in the face of defeat in 1894; Makgoba fought the ZAR to the end when he was overpowered and beheaded by Swazi mercenaries who presented his head as evidence to Commandant General Joubert in 1895; Ngungunhane was captured by the Portuguese and exiled to Lisbon in 1895; Makhado died in 1895 after some protracted negotiations with the ZAR and the Venda were eventually overwhelmed in 1898.

The subjugation of the African chiefdoms was not a coincidence, but rather planned and organised processes which were more systematic and overt. As an example, Bergh demonstrates that after the defeat of the BaHananwa of Malebogo in July/August 1894, Commandant General Piet Joubert's attention turned to the rebellious communities in the Lowveld areas. These communities comprised of the chiefdoms of Modjadji, Mmamatlhola, Moshuti, Tsolobolo, Mogoboya, Maupa, Makgoba, and Maphitha and their followers. Like the BaHananwa, these communities were also unhappy with ZAR government systems, particularly payment of taxes and the beaconing of reserves for them (Bergh 1999: 161; Dicke 1933b: 63; Grimsehl 1955; Kruger 1955; South African Archives 1995; Tempelhoff 1997: 20-22; Tempelhoff and Nemudzivadi 1999: 110). Tempelhoff and Nemudzivadi (1999: 110) even compared the campaigns against these communities in the northern frontier as similar to the colonial wars fought by the British elsewhere in southern Africa during the nineteenth century. Thus, it may be safely postulated that the objective was to create republican authority over the indigenous peoples within the borders of the ZAR state.

It is well documented that for a long time the Balobedu of Rain Queen Modjadji would not pay taxes as was expected of them. Subsequently, when the Location Commission began its work in around 1888, it started in the Houtbosberg and Modjadji areas. The Commission already anticipated problems with Queen Modjadi when it recommended in February 1888 that her reserve not be beaconed in the mountainous parts (Grimsehl 1955). Makgoba was to follow next in October 1888.

Johnson noted that in the Boer Republics, the main source of wealth was land. He believes that such was what the Boers were for—the Boers moved into the interior to find and occupy land. 'For a white, acquiring land in the Transvaal was simplicity itself: he just had to find a piece of vacant land and register his claim.' The claiming of territories by whites brought about difficult questions not only about land but also about taxation and labour dues, both of which African leaders flatly refused to provide for they did not recognise white sovereignty over their lands (Johnson 2004: 73-74,83).

Photograph 21: Rain Queen Modjadji of the BaLobedu (Setumu 2005c)

Indeed, one can claim that the Boers felt that by defeating Mzilikazi and occupying the land, they had won the privilege to demand tribute from the local communities in the form of labour and other taxes. A tribute is wealth, often in kind, that one party gives another as a sign of respect or, as was often the case in historical contexts, of submission or allegiance. Historically, states exacted tribute from the rulers of land which the state conquered or otherwise threatened to conquer. Before subjugation, African traditional leaders in the Transvaal resisted the exaction of tribute by white governments. They (warrior traditional leaders) did not recognise the sovereignty of the white governments over their own subjects. Neither did they recognise their political submission or allegiance to the white governments. The demand for tribute by white governments was therefore not acceptable to the African leaders. Hence, there is no doubt that this would have contributed to the causes of conflict between these cultural groups.

Many of the available historical accounts on the wars between white governments and African chiefdoms in the Transvaal have cited these as the real causes of the problems in support of the processes of subjugation of the Africans. Bergh (1999) observed that after the whites settled north of the Vaal River, there were often skirmishes and quarrels with the African communities residing in the area.

> Verskeie faktore was hiervoor verantwoordelik, onder meer botsende grondaansprake, die blanke boer se behoefte aan arbeid en sy pogings om dit te bekom – onder meer die inboekstelsel waardeur swart arbeid deur Boere op 'n gedwonge basis verkry is, die heffing van belasting op swart gemeenskappe en probleme met die invordering daarvan, die verkryging van gewere en ammunisie deur swart gemeenskappe en die blankes se pogings om dit te verhoed. Veediefstalle oor en weer en die stryd oor die algemeen om oppergesag en die behoud van onafhanklikheid.
>
> [Various factors were responsible, among others differences in land claims, the white farmer's demand for labour and his attempt to access it – amongst others the induction system by which black labour was obtained in a coercive way, the imposition of tax on black communities and problems obtaining such, the acquisition of guns and ammunition by black communities and white attempts to prohibit that, consistent livestock thefts and the struggle in general for power and the maintenance of independence.] (Bergh 1999: 153)

Bergh simply divided the territory north of the Vaal River into four districts/parts, namely western, central, eastern, and northern districts to deal with the narrative in a more convenient manner. This also confirms that indeed, the objective was the same for all the African chiefdoms resident north of the Vaal River. This is also confirmed by Maylam who concluded that 'the last of the traditional chiefdoms of South Africa was conquered just a year before the white people fell out among themselves' (Maylam 1986: 13). The conquest of the Venda marked the end of the process of colonial subjugation in South Africa.

The approach adopted by Bergh of dividing the Transvaal into districts, in as much as it applied then, it is still applicable to the Limpopo province today. It also brings another dimension to how one should investigate the interpretation of the rationale of launching the "Wars of Resistance against Colonialism and Imperialism" commemoration project.



Map 1: Limpopo province showing all the district Municipalities (Maps of World.com n.d.)

Limpopo province comprises five district Municipalities. The selection of the warrior traditional leaders was also strategic along these lines. Each district is represented by at least one traditional leader. Sekhukhune's country is in the Greater Sekhukhune District Municipality; Malebogo in the Capricorn District; Ngungunhane and Makgoba both in the Mopani District; Makhado in the Vhembe District; and Mokopane in the Waterberg District Municipalities. It is thus plausible to constitute that the selection of at least one traditional leader from each district would ensure that no municipal district felt left out.

The location of the monuments as demonstrated above confirms the earlier assertion that the placing of monuments in Limpopo province is not only a social public action, but also a confirmation of space as a territory of groups. Limpopo's monuments to the traditional leaders are visible markings of such collectively stressed territory, in line with the theory of the imagination of nationalistic ideology, that a territory specifically belongs to a certain ethnic group: the term "public space" relates to questions of affiliation and "othering". By all indications, these are political representations and staging in the area that belongs traditionally to the repertoire of (re) presentations of political power. Monuments, like road and place names, as well as the "political" or "heroes" squares are among the most important vehicles of physical memory, since they are in principle, the most durable media of identity-political marking of public areas. The main function of these markings is the manifestation and/or production of wanted forms of collective memory by material inscriptions into public space, the manufacturing of "collective identity" and the marking of collectively claimed territory (J. Duncan and N. Duncan 1988: 118).

Further, the analysis above also corroborates another earlier contention that a hegemonic representation of history, shared by all groups within the Limpopo province, was aimed to facilitate a positive correlation between at least provincial, if not national identity and subgroup identities. Hegemonic representations exhibit properties of what Cinnirella (1996: 262) has termed 'positive networking'. That is, when all the subgroups within the province share the same representation of history, it is likely because the history offers an adequate position for each of them. The representation should contain narratives that allow for conflict resolution and subgroup reconciliation, so that the activation of provincial identity may simultaneously activate ethnic identity, and vice versa (Liu and Hilton 2005). The above narrative is indeed consistent with the notion that hegemonic representations of history are associated with positive correlations between ethnic and provincial/national identity. In this specific case, the overall representation appears to be a narrative about the emergence of a province as part of the South African nation from the forces of colonisation. This representation appears to be capable of smoothing over ethnic and provincial differences. Social representations, therefore, appear to be relevant to defining the content of what makes the Limpopo province positively distinct compared to other provinces.

It should, therefore, not be far-fetched to claim that experiences suffered and shared by the black African chiefdoms were collective to the extent that the provincial leaders of the government in Limpopo wanted to unite them around the theme, as demonstrated above that all the districts of the Limpopo province felt the brunt of defeat inflicted by white opponents.

Another philosophical view in the absence of empirical evidence is that the Limpopo provincial government would have gone ahead to present, for instance, Makgoba alone in the Mopani district, since the nature of the struggle and the manner of his death makes a compelling case for such an honour. Had it not been for the existence of Tsonga/Shangaan groups in the district, the above would have remained the case. However, recognising the latter groups and noting that they would not be represented by any traditional leader in the province, the government was then forced to consider using Ngungunhane, even though there was already a representation of the Mopani district and amid uncertainty about him ever been involved in the history of that specific area. It constituted the endeavour to appease the Tsonga/Shangaan groups.

There is perhaps credit to the argument that Modjadji was left out simply because her country is part of the same Mopani District which is already overrepresented with the honour of both Makgoba and Ngungunhane.

Similarly, several historical accounts converged on the fact that the two Ndebele chiefs, Mokopane and Mankopane, had colluded in the killing of twenty-eight white farmers with several of these accounts actually sharing the number of the fatalities equally between the two Ndebele allies (Acutt 1938: 47; De Kock 1972: 478; De Waal 1953: 72; Esterhuysen 2006: 9; Gerdener 1952: 37-40; Law 1955: 1079-1080; Maguire 2007: 39; Theal 1984: 415-420). It is further recorded that Mankopane continued to put the ZAR through torrid times until he was finally defeated *c.*1867. Despite of this clear evidence, the provincial government of Limpopo chose to ignore these facts and honoured Mokopane alone. The point is simple, Mokopane is Ndebele and therefore, represents the Ndebele groupings, hence there was no need to honour Mankopane as well. Moreover, both leaders resided in the Waterberg district.

Indeed, representation according to district and ethnic group seems to have been a determining factor. Makhado who represents the Venda and the Vhembe district seems to have been the only convenient leader to represent the group and district for the period under discussion. The government of the Limpopo province was aware that Makhado had been engaged in protracted negotiations with the ZAR. Chances are that the Limpopo government was also aware that Makhado did not fight in combat against the whites. This explains the justification through war and as such, a fabrication in Premier Sello Moloto's speech at the unveiling of Makhado statue in 2005. Sello Moloto (2005) said:

> By 1867, the Boers had assembled a formidable force under the command of Paul Kruger. A fierce war ensued in which the Boers eventually retreated, abandoning

> Schoemansdal. The Boers retreated to Marabastad in the vicinity of the present-day Polokwane. The humiliating retreat of the Boers in 1867 became a significant victory which was to later inspire other wars of resistance in southern Africa.

While it is true that Paul Kruger mobilised approximately 500 burghers to the area, no records indicate that there was ever a war, let alone a fierce one. In defence of what he called the 'rollback of Boer influence', Braun (2008: 304) stated that it was largely due to Venda pressure that Schoemansdal was evacuated and destroyed in 1867-1868. The pressure came from both Venda leaders Makhado and Madzie who had allied in defending the region (Braun 2008: 304; Tempelhoff 1997: 67). Tempelhoff (1997) considers the deterioration of the white community's relationship with the Venda under Makhado during the 1860s as the biggest setback for white settlement during the era of exploitation (Tempelhoff and Nemudzivadi 1999: 113). The pronouncement by Premier Sello Moloto may be seen as a typical example of fabricating a war in the absence of an actual war, since a war is necessary in the context of the speech and the commemoration, to justify the honour bestowed on the Venda leader with a statue in the Vhembe district. From the perspective of collective remembering as typically providing an essential basis for the creation and maintenance of groups, Moloto's line of reasoning reaffirms the notion that modern states often pursue this agenda by providing its citizens with official accounts of the past.

5.2 Constituting collective memories and shared experiences

The adoption of the theme "Wars of Resistance against Colonialism and Imperialism" was a master stroke—a well thought out, meticulously calculated idea crucial to the concept of a cohesive society. The creation of a collective memory in Limpopo province is very important to the cohesion of the province. Renan (as cited by Keykhah 2003: 31) noted that a nation's identity and stability are centred on what people remember and what they forget, and some of the most powerful memories come from times of war when nations are fighting for their constructed identities. The choice of the theme satisfied this. Maurice Halbwachs' (1980: 34) account on collective memory gives a glimpse into what is necessary for the creation of such a memory and how it is affected by the society that creates it. Every social group holds a certain sway over its members and for all intents and purposes, a nation is just a large social group, within which there are many subdivisions.

As a collective group, it must retain cohesion for it to be successful, and the surest way to keep such cohesiveness, is for members of the group to have shared memories to be able to connect with one another (Halbwachs 1980: 34). It is plausible, therefore, to argue against the background of the above discussions that it was important for the provincial government of Limpopo to forge a collective memory of some sort for the cohesion of their province.

The previous chapter referred to the plurality and subdivisions of Limpopo province that required some qualification (see Chapter 4 pp. 78-79) (Provide Project 2005: 2). Thus, in line with Halbwachs's (1980) theories, for such collection of and subdivided ethnicities to be cohesive, an element of shared memories should be sustained, and that is found only in the past.

Halbwachs (as cited by Keykhah 2003) further asks that if a present society emphasises the past, would that not detach the members of that social group rather than bring them together? He goes on to answer the question when he points out that the present society itself, especially modern society, is heavily involved in the way that we as individuals view the past. Society may even amplify certain memories, attributing to them more importance than was given to them in their own time (Keykhah 2003: 34).

Corroborating Halbwachs' assertions of society's influence on collective memory, Paul Connerton (1989: 1-2) questioned how group memory can be conveyed or sustained, thereafter, considered social memory as a dimension of political power. Connerton continued to indicate that our experience of the present depends on the knowledge of the past. Present experiences are connected to the past events in such a way as to place our present into a certain context, depending on how we remember the past. However, this sort of contextualisation does not necessarily function in one direction. Past events do also influence or even distort our views of the present. It is also the case that present factors distort our views of the past (Connerton 1989: 1-2; Keykhah 2003: 34).

Connerton (1989) is of the opinion that certain images of the past are used to legitimise the present social order. To participate in any social order, presupposes a shared memory. The most powerful of these images are related to war. In efforts to create a community identity, war is quite often a very defining event. In war, a community can define enemies and allies, and it can define its role within the conflict. War also provides the opportunity for a community to come together as a cohesive community under the umbrella of political nationalism. The memory of war and a particular people's role in it, can keep the thread of unity running through the community. The creation of a community's memory is as much a political process as a social one. Connerton maintains, the 'ruling group will use its knowledge of the past in a direct and active way' (1989:

1-2). That is, the community's memory can be manipulated to bring out certain events that can legitimise the way the current ruling group is governing the community (Connerton 1989: 1-2; Keykhah 2003: 35). The question asked by Keykhah then is, how the ruling group can advocate certain memories and events without seeming too heavy handed? The goal is, without a doubt, to create some sort of propaganda, but also make it elegant and sophisticated enough so that it can be more easily accepted and treasured (Keykhah 2003: 35-36).

Connerton (1989: 43) further sustained the argument that, the most successful way to promote such a memory is through commemorative monuments and ceremonies, not only to remind people of certain events and personalities, but also to re-present them and to preserve a certain viewpoint of the situation. A government will want to show and celebrate its national or provincial heroism and to stimulate certain emotive responses that will promote provincial feelings (Keykhah 2003: 36). By creating commemorative rituals and memorials, the provincial government creates 'emotionally and symbolically charged signs of club membership...' (Hobsbawm 1983: 11)—what Hobsbawm terms invented traditions. Something Simon Harrison (1995: 258) refers to as 'innovation contests' involves the invention or competitive creation of traditions and symbolic forms by one societal group to establish and (symbolically) represent a separate identity from other groups. On the other hand, Marschall (2009: 136), believed that the concept often concerns ethnic minority groups seeking to assert themselves in the face of the dominant power, it can easily be applied in present-day South Africa, where the previously marginalised black African majority is striving to symbolically represent itself through, for example, monuments in competition with the existing bulk of representations inherited from the previous order (Harrison 1995: 255-272).

The construction of a collective memory through such invented traditions, is thus crucial to the development of a cohesive Limpopo community. Without having a past (or creating a past) to legitimise certain views or actions, the leaders of the province would have had a difficult time convincing their people to follow them. This was already confirmed in 2004. However, at the time, simply referring to the public service administration of the new province, MEC for Finance and Economic Development, Mr Thaba Mufamadi in his budget speech delivered at the Provincial Legislature in Lebowakgomo on 26 February 2004, summed up the realities of the challenge:

> Limpopo inherited four administrations [referring to former homelands of Lebowa and Gazankulu, former Republic of Venda and the former Transvaal provincial administration]. Some of the provinces that inherited no such administrations envied us. We, at the time thought we inherited a working civil service while other provinces

> had to build theirs from scratch. Later we discovered that the civil service inherited were founded on sand – quick sand at that – and had to be demolished. It was nothing but a mirage. We had to demolish it and start building fast in order to catch up with those that started by building their public service (Mufamadi 2004).

As far back as 1996, commentators could foresee problems such as these. Commenting in an article on the relocation of civil service from the parliamentary offices of the former Republic of Venda, Mary Braid of *The Independent* newspaper said:

> As regional government goes, the new Northern province (as Limpopo was called then)—encompassing Venda and the formerly quasi-autonomous homelands of Gazankulu and the heart-breaking poor Lebowa—faces one of the hardest tasks... (Braid 1996)

To create a cohesive community out of the situation described above, Hobsbawm (1983: 11) argues that a nation have a need to create pasts for themselves, and in order to do that, they must invent traditions and practices that are of a ritual and symbolic nature in order to instil 'certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which normally implies continuity with the past'.

The act of commemoration is important for a society, especially since war calls for sacrifice in the interests of the nation. The commemoration of such sacrifices is meant to encourage future sacrifices to be made when the nation's leaders feel it is necessary for the nation's survival. This was explicit in Limpopo Premier Sello Moloto's speech:

> They [the warrior traditional leaders] fought for our freedom even before the formation of political parties. They were in the forefront fighting to free us from those who descended on the African shores to dispossess us of our land. They too must be honoured for what they were, heroes and heroines of the liberation struggle. In honouring them we will be reaffirming our being, our own identity as Africans, confirming the significance of traditional leadership institution and, more importantly, preserving our own heritage (Moloto 2004).

Barthel (1996: 80) calls commemoration 'an unwritten pact between the dead, the living, and the unborn', enacted through social rituals. The remembrance of such events by future generations is

therefore crucial to the stability of the identity of the community.

Keykhah notes that a nation's identity depends on its memory and that a nation's memory depends on its identity. The author further observes that memory and identity are subjective and selective, and both are tied to the politics of the nation. This notion is supported by John R. Gillis that the relationship between memory and identity is historical, and that such a relationship can be traced through acts and works of commemoration, which are inevitably tied to group or collective memory (Gillis, as cited by Keykhah 2003: 37).

Furthermore, Keykhah (2003) posits that in the quest to forge an identity and create a unique heritage that would be in the interest of the community, there is oftentimes a drive towards the embellishment of events. In constructing a view of the past that legitimises the current and/or future order of things, there is a need to create legends. Both history and legend are socially constructed representations of the past through narrative (Zerubavel n.d.). When a nation creates an official memory of war or conflict, the leaders are in the business of nationalising the war. The creation of these commemorative memorials even presses the dead traditional leaders back into the service of the people by becoming symbols in this case of the "Wars of Resistance against Colonialism and Imperialism". They have become representations of Limpopo province's involvement and commitment to the cause or fight. The effort of the provincial leaders to create such ubiquitous rituals and symbols works towards creating a common purpose and identity for the people of Limpopo (Piehler 1994).

Affecting the collective memory of a nation is indeed a type of psychological warfare, and as Wallace Carroll (1948: 72) states, the effects of psychological warfare extend far beyond the actual battlefield. Such a war of impressions, ideas, and emotions goes on long after victory has been achieved on the battlefield itself (Keykhah 2003: 27). In Keykhah's view, such is representation of a lasting form of propaganda that can be seen in the public memorials that have been created to remember those who fought and died for a certain cause. Memorials can create a national identity based on the grief of families who shared in the similar experience of losing loved ones to a war. Instead of being individual losses, the war dead become the collective national family's loss. Just as defending a nation became equated with defending one's family, home, and way of life, war memorials are also a way of nationalising very personal forms of grief (Clark 1997: 108). As part of a nation's identity is built around a collective expression of grief; it is as if the nation, and in this case the Limpopo province itself, has become personified as the one family from which all the commemorated traditional leaders extended (Castriota 1986: 8). Propaganda images must then be created that induce a sense of patriotism among the populace as provincial leaders try to

maintain the provincial fervour of unity stirred during the war, to create a common identity and an official memory of that conflict, just as posters had done for Europeans and Americans during World War I and II (Piehler 1994: 179).

Physical monuments are very helpful in creating such an image. They are visible, tangible, and they give a form to a nation's role in the specific conflict. Instead of having the monument (theme) dedicated to one man, these monuments have a very democratic feel (Sherman 1994: 187). They must instil in people a sense of belonging to a whole, collective suffering. These monuments prevent certain memories (wars of resistance) from fading into the past, while also encouraging others to disappear. Palonen (2008) has illustrated that place names and statues are some of the ways through which perpetuation of remembrance and forgetting of the unwanted past is done. These place names and statues undergo similar processes as political discourses that are created and regimented through practices of inclusion and exclusion and inscribed through key elements (Palonen 2008). There are a few examples of such exclusions in the post-apartheid commemorative landscape. One such example is the renaming of places and other geographical features. Through the act of renaming, for instance the town of Louis Trichardt and replacing political symbols, for example, removing Louis Trichardt's statue and instead erecting that of Makhado, an attempt was made to make Louis Trichardt's contribution in that region disappear, as simple as that while elevating the Makhado legacy on the memory scale (Thotse 2010: 174; Timothy 2007: 87-107). Scale in commemoration as observed in recent works by geographers (Burk 2006: 41-48; Johnson 2002: 293-298; Mitchell 2003: 442-459) represents an intrinsically important facet of memorialising the past and bringing public attention to the historical contributions of figures from the past. The geographic scale on which memory is produced, or commemoration is carried out, determines in large measure which groups will be touched by the memorial meanings being communicated. By expanding the scale of memory, or by increasing the geographic extent of commemoration, social actors and groups may attempt to make images of the past accessible to a larger public. On the other hand, by having his name removed from the map, Louis Trichardt's retrievability and accessibility is limited (Thotse 2010: 181).

Marschall (2009: 136) stated that the fact that the memory of Verwoerd is extremely offensive to most of the population prompted the newly-elected ANC-dominated (Orange) Free State Legislature to vote for the removal of Verwoerd's statue, as well as renaming the Verwoerd building, the prominent high rise government administration building in front of which the statue was enthroned on a high plinth. Hendrik F. Verwoerd (1901-1966) was a Minister of Native Affairs and then became Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa in August 1958. More than any other

political figure of the past, Verwoerd is widely perceived by the black African majority in South Africa as the architect and symbol of apartheid. Indeed, Marschall is correct in pointing out that some of the busts and statues that have been removed end up in storage rooms and quickly slip into oblivion. In what Simon Harrison (1995: 258) refers to as an 'expansionary contest', one group in society tries to displace the symbols of a competing group's identity with its own symbols. This may result in the disappearance of the defeated side's identity symbols, not necessarily in the sense of the physical destruction, but in the sense that they are no longer used to present the identity of the group. The aim of suppressing the rival group's identity symbols is not to leave that group without an identity, but 'to integrate or absorb the group by supplanting its symbols of identity with one's own (Harrion 1995: 255-272).

Marschall (2009: 136) further highlights as another form of exclusion, the relocation of monuments. The Durban municipality's "heritage department" organised a workshop on monuments and memorials in 2000, attended by various stakeholders within the heritage sector, including representatives of local communities and interested parties from the public. One of the measures recommended in dealing with the commemorative legacy of the past was the physical repositioning of statues and smaller, movable objects away from the highly official, prestigious places, for example, in front of the city hall to less prominent locations and 'community spaces' (Marschall 2009: 136). Marschall, however, also noted that in some cases, the relocation or alignment of monuments was not politically motivated, however, merely the pragmatic result of local town planning measures in which case it would be a mistake to assume that every such move invariably leads to a deflation of the monument's significance or symbolic authority (Marschall 2009: 136).

Marschall observed that questions of exclusion and inclusion particularly in terms of ideologically charged structures, often virulently contested identity symbols, posed unique challenges for the newly elected ANC-led GNU in South Africa. These questions occupied debate even before the official beginning of the post-apartheid era (Marschall 2009: 136,142).

The above discussion does illustrate that indeed physical monuments propagate a certain image of the history of a nation to its future citizens. Instead of having individual benefactors, the government itself becomes the patron. Provincial leaders in Limpopo hired artists to create images of the traditional leaders that will last into the future, giving the province a certain image of heroism and righteousness. '[I]f war is politics by other means, preservation is also politics continued by other means. These "means" revolve around the act of commemoration.' (Barthel 1996: 80). Such historic preservation represents the attempt to revalue and re-present the past through the

heightened public awareness of certain things and their ignorance of others. Through the creation of war memorials, the province wishes to preserve certain ideologies, creating a visual image of the past (Barthel 1996: 2,5). What better way to propagate a certain image than by creating an artistic, physical representation? Such commemorative monuments are usually attractive, and the advantage of such memorials is that they can only present one idea and one image of a collective identity that permeates through a society and through history. A common and clichéd phrase states that one picture is worth a thousand words. Such is the case for propaganda art throughout history. A picture, poster, painting, or statue appeals at the very basic level to the emotions, as does propaganda, and put together, they have been used to shape national histories and identities (Keykhah 2003: 29).

5.3 Collective inscriptions of shared experiences

The collective memories of the "Wars of Resistance against Colonialism and Imperialism" are well captured on the inscriptions for the monuments in Limpopo province. This brings a different dynamic to consider in the analysis of the commemorative war monuments: that of the relation between text and image. Two broad elements emerge that have potential meaning; both the physical form of the inscriptions, such as the font style, and the conceptual structures they express in written language. In terms of their ability to create meaning through their physical characteristics, Kress and Van Leeuwen (2006: 231) view inscriptions as: '...a culturally and socially produced resource for meaning-making'. An inscription is a significant producer of meaning. This chapter also considers the inscription of the monuments to the warrior traditional leaders of Limpopo province to determine the meanings they carry and the collectivity of the message. Apart from the physical structure or the form of the inscriptions, the conceptual content of the written language can also be analysed to assess their contribution to the meaning of the whole monument.

Kress and Van Leeuwen base their analysis of the conceptual structures that the written language component of a text communicates using Halliday's (1985: 331) concept of 'relational' and 'existential' processes. Kress and Van Leeuwen (2006) were influenced by Barthes (1977) who argued that the visual image is related to written text; that a linguistic message is a technique which pulls together the various signifiers, that is, intended meanings expressed in language in an image to anchor or extend the meaning of the image. Kress and Van Leeuwen (2006: 231) argue

that the visual component of a text does not depend on written text for its meaning; instead, it exists as an 'independently organized and structured message'. Although Kress and Van Leeuwen deal with the relationship between the word and the image in some detail, acknowledging the defined role that can be played by each in a single text, Abousnnouga (2012: 99) views their application of Halliday's theory as limited for the purpose of the analysis of the commemorative war monument data and further argues that a blending of a critical discourse analysis-based linguistic theory with semiotic multimodal theory will allow for a greater uncovering of meaning from the commemorative war monument data.

The shared experiences of Limpopo's warrior traditional leaders are no more explicit than in the inscriptions of each monument. These monuments share the same inscription; word for word and with that, the same message. Inscriptions are written forms of communication that are intended to be read alongside the non-verbal image. They appear on all four of the warrior traditional leader's commemorative monuments. Inscriptions at these monuments were placed in positions that allow the viewer to easily read them. From an interactive viewing perspective, this positioning should impress that the artist intended that the inscriptions should be integral to the message communicated by the monument. Kress and Van Leeuwen (2006: 231) emphasise that it is the relation between text and the image that is crucial to the meaning of the whole.

The importance of inscriptions as written text to the Warrior Traditional Leaders' Monuments is exemplified well in all the four monuments under discussion:

Photograph 22: Inscription for Kgošikgolo Sekhukhune statue at Tjate. Photo by Mahunele Thotse.

The Warrior Traditional Leaders' Monument relies on the common written inscription to define its purpose. The inscription in each case informs the viewer that:

> This monument was officially unveiled by the Hon Premier ... Sello Moloto ... in honour of ... for his leadership during the Wars of Resistance against colonialism and imperialism.[14]

14 See all four inscriptions on the monuments of Sekhukhune, Makhado, Malebogo and Ngungunhane.

Kress and Van Leeuwen (2006) propose that as a significant signifying system, inscriptions should be considered as product of meaning separately. To fully expose the potential meaning of commemorative war monuments, Abousnnouga (2012: 336) argues that 'we need to employ a discourse analysis method suited to the analysis of the inscriptions' conceptual content (Kress and Van Leeuwen 2006). Abousnnouga (2012: 337) adopted Philosopher Arthur Clutton-Brock's contention on inscriptions on war memorials:

> A good inscription 'says what it means simply and finely', and the lettering is also simple, fine, clear and permanent...good lettering performs its function well, like a good motor car.

Indeed, looking at the inscriptions of Limpopo province's Warrior Traditional Leaders' Monuments, there is no doubt about what it says, as it is written in simple and fine language; the lettering is also clear and permanent on granite stone mounted on the monument's pedestal. However, one cannot but agree with Marschall (2009: 150-151) who suspected that many aspects of South African history and its commemoration mirror examples of the United States.

The uniformity of the content on Limpopo's Warrior Traditional Leaders' Monument inscriptions, demonstrate how the monument's sponsors devoted even more attention to their inscription than to their design. Upon analysis, a set of conventions and repeated formulations emerged and are shared. It seems that the most basic purposes of the inscription were to identify its originators or sponsors and those to whom it was dedicated.

Photograph 23: Inscription for Khosikhulu Makhado statue in Louis Trichardt. Photo by Mahunele Thotse.

Inscriptions on the Warrior Traditional Leaders' Monuments always identified the sponsors. An explicit statement of sponsorship was seemingly crucial to the idea of Limpopo's provincial monuments:

> This monument was officially unveiled by HON. PREMIER SELLO MOLOTO on ...[15]

When circus promoter Dan Rice had his name chiselled into a monument that he presented to Erie County, Pennsylvania, in a highly publicised spectacle in November 1865, a local newspaper asked whether the obelisk was 'a memorial to the dead, or an advertisement of the living' (Brown 2004: 36). This study argues that the same question could be asked if it was necessary for the statues of warrior traditional leaders in Limpopo province to be advertising the Hon. Premier Sello Moloto, particularly considering that it was government and not an individual as patron. By virtue of his name entrenched, Sello Moloto has succeeded in having himself memorialised. He will always be linked with the "Wars of Resistance against Colonialism and Imperialism" in the province of Limpopo.

15 See all four inscriptions on the monuments of Sekhukhune, Makhado, Malebogo, and Ngungunhane.

Another observation is that each monument honoured the traditional leader from the district, town, region, or even tribal group in which the monument was erected. Sekhukhune's monument is at Tjate where he used to reign; Malebogo's is in front of the BaHananwa Tribal Authority Offices; Makhado's among the VhaVenda in Louis Trichardt, and Ngungunhane in Giyani, supposedly among his descendants although this has been contested.

Photograph 24: Inscription for Kgoši Malebogo statue in Blouberg. This inscription is now detached from the statue and was reportedly taken to Polokwane by government officials. Photo by Mahunele Thotse.

However, beyond the common goals of identifying sponsors and those whom the monuments honoured, the inscriptions also expressed the exact same sentiments. All the monuments quoted or shared the same adage: 'IN HONOR OF ... FOR HIS LEADERSHIP DURING THE WARS OF

RESISTANCE AGAINST COLONIALISM AND IMPERIALISM'.[16] This adopted verse suggests the framework through which the Limpopo provincial government sought to comprehend the role played by these traditional leaders during the specific wars.

Abousnnouga (2012) concurs with King (Traditional Leader, A 1998) that those are the principles followed by several artists, which originated in the nineteenth century. The question that remains unanswered is, how to establish what an inscription says exactly and what it means? To answer this question, Fairclough's (2003) approach to uncovering ideological implicitness and assumptions in a text will be employed to achieve a close analysis of the ideological significance on the inscription found in the commemorative monuments of the warrior traditional leaders. Of the relationship between ideology and assumptions, Fairclough (2003: 58) says:

> Assumed meanings are of particular ideological significance—one can argue that relations of power are best served by meanings which are widely taken as given.

Subsequently, Abousnnouga (2012) asks the following question: Are monuments purely symbols of grief and commemoration of the loss of loved ones, or do they have multiple roles tied to the individual's banal participation in nationalism? Put in more specific terms: Are the Warrior Traditional Leaders' Monuments in Limpopo province purely a symbol of grief and commemoration of the loss of the loved traditional leaders and with them the land, or do they have multiple roles tied to the individual traditional leader's banal participation in nationalism? (Abousnnouga 2012: 337). Raivo (1999: 337) claimed that nationalism, the ideology of belonging to the nation, was an essential part of war remembrance, but to what extent are the "given" meanings of nationalism, warfare, and sacrifice explicit in the commemorative Warrior Traditional Leaders' Monuments of the Limpopo province? At a basic level the Warrior Traditional Leaders' Monuments inscriptions appear to fulfil the latter function, that is, an expression of commemoration of the individual traditional leader's participation in nationalism:

> ... For his leadership during the Wars of Resistance against colonialism and imperialism.[17]

16 See all four inscriptions on the monuments of Sekhukhune, Makhado, Malebogo and Ngungunhane.

17 See the inscription dedicated to Kgošikgolo Sekhukhune, Khosikhulu Makhado, Hosinkulu Ngungunhane, and Kgoši Malebogo.

This study argues that this inscription does its ideological work for nationalism through the inclusion of the words "leadership during the Wars of Resistance". Leadership represents a position held, that of traditional leadership; leader of a people; particularly, their positions as traditional leaders of their respective black African chiefdoms.

The inscription also does the ideological work of bolstering nationalism by its repetition at all four of the monuments. Similar, or in fact identical assumptions regarding "leadership during the Wars of Resistance" are seen in the inscriptions of all four monuments, since they were presumably all engaged in one and the same collective—"Wars of Resistance", all of them as traditional leaders and leaders of their polities. The choice of the same inscription for all four monuments, suggests a consentient group of people led by these four traditional leaders (and others) in the province that honours these traditional leaders in the same way. This view was confirmed by Premier Sello Moloto in his speech in 2004 at the unveiling of Kgošikgolo Sekhukhune's statue at Tjate:

> Sefako Makgatho [the second president-general of the ANC, 1917-1924] ... was following in the footsteps of the generation of warrior traditional leaders like Shaka, Bambatha, Hintsa, Makhado, Malebogo, and Ngungunhane who fiercely fought colonialists in defence of the heritage. They fought for our freedom even before the formation of political parties. They were in the forefront fighting to free us from those who descended on the African shores to dispossess [us] of our land. (Moloto 2004)

The suggestion of a consentient group of people led by these traditional leaders (and others elsewhere) in the province and in the rest of the country represents an 'Existential Assumption' in Fairclough's terms; one which implicitly refers to the community of the nation (Fairclough 2003: 58) and perhaps in this specific case of the community of the Limpopo province.

In more simple terms, the assumption is that people of Limpopo share a common history that unites them. Thus, South Africans could observe statues of Limpopo's warrior traditional leaders sharing space with other national heroes on the cultural landscape all incorporated into a story of at least provincial, if not national identity and historical progress.

The narratives on the inscriptions which were referred to above all point to key themes characteristic of a large body of work that highlights the tendency of war-related discourses to become shaped by the ideological positions of elites who participate in their distribution.

Photograph 25: Inscription for Hosinkulu Ngungunhane statue in Giyani. Photo by Mahunele Thotse.

It is therefore argued that these monuments that have been commissioned to stand in public spaces as a memorial to the '*Warrior Traditional Leaders who fought the Wars of Resistance against Colonialism and Imperialism*' in Limpopo province are a key communicative tool that has been used to realise certain discourses of war. They may also be interpreted as an area where discourses of war are disseminated in society and offer one very useful site for understanding the processes of the legitimisation of and sacrifice to war.

Continued overleaf

5.4 Political iconography in Limpopo province

An important idea behind a war memorial is to instruct posterity. The proliferation of government constructed memorials in Limpopo province, like in many other countries, reflects the construction of political iconography. If a war memorial is indeed an affirmation of the patron's unstated intention, then the Limpopo provincial government, as a patron in this case, has commissioned the construction of the Warrior Traditional Leaders' Monuments as works of art to promote a certain image and to "instruct" future generations. Such public art is powerful since it stands for the 'powers that be' (Sennie 1992: 243). This sort of image of the past ties in heavily with war memory, since the "Wars of Resistance against Colonialism and Imperialism" represent the struggle to create or maintain both provincial and national identities. Tying with the last statement, Ashplant, Dawson, and Roper (2000: 8) identify two paradigms in the functioning of war memory. The first, is the political motivation that memories and rituals surrounding them are symbols for national identification that also binds the citizens into one collective identity. The second functional paradigm is a psychological one. Ashplant et al. (2000) in this regard, cites Hobsbawm and Ranger's *The Invention of Tradition*, in which they state that constructed versions of the past enable the establishment of social cohesion, legitimated authority and a common culture.

In his book *Imagined Communities*, Benedict Anderson (1991: 199-200) further highlights that the living generations of a nation feel a connection to the nation's dead, which thus secures the 'nation's imagined continuity and transcendence of time'. The symbolic value and national contribution of the venerated traditional leaders are marked by the monuments, which are an arresting emblem of the modern nation. While these monuments are simply works of art, they are also emblems 'saturated with ghostly national imaginings' (Anderson 1991: 9). What is also important about those traditional leaders is that their national sacrifice becomes a tragedy of fratricide. Further, Anderson, considers fratricide to provide reassurance for the formation of modern nationalism. Thus fratricide 'turns out to be a characteristic device in the later construction of national genealogies' (Anderson 1991: 199-201).

The proliferation of monuments and other narrative references, such as place and street names to the dead traditional leaders have important implications for the Limpopo province, since the dead traditional leaders are not 'a random assemblage of forgotten, anonymous dead' (Anderson 1991: 199-201). Their death acquired a significant meaning since it is inextricably linked with the sacrifice

through which these traditional leaders are transformed into heroic figures. The significance of the ground in Limpopo province is largely attributed to their sacrifice, just as much as pointed out by Abraham Lincoln (1863) in his Gettysburg Address:

> The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it [this burial ground], far above our poor power to add or detract. (Chronis 2005: 386-406)

Keykhah (2003) contends that war commemoration is a combination of politics and psychology, which enables governments to form the opinions of citizens regarding history and their role in it. Nora (1998: 616), however, notes that the politicisation of commemoration, which has been partly responsible for the proliferation of monuments, has transformed the entire system, which has been secularised, democratised, and turned into something closer to political demonstration by the government. This has had two contradictory consequences, Nora observed further: on the one hand, control of the interpretation and meaning of commemoration has passed into the hands of private groups, political parties, trade unions, and other organisations, with concomitant potential for internal conflict and controversy over the staging of every ceremony, as each detail affects the overall symbolic signification; on the other hand, commemoration at the national level has become less a matter of militant expression of unity of a single group and more of pluralistic unity of many groups with conflicting agendas that constitute a democratic polity (Nora 1998: 616).

Pierre Nora deemed the commemorative phenomenon as the concentrated expression of a national history, a rare solemn moment, an invariably difficult form of collective return to the sources, a symbolic affirmation of ancestry, a choice of heritage for a form of transmission, and a bridge between the past and the future. However, this has now been atomised to the point where in Limpopo province, it has become, for each of the ethnic groups concerned, a search for the one thread in the social fabric of the present that will permit direct contact with the irrevocably dead past (Nora 1998: 616).

Chapter Six

Unveiling and Dedicating the Monuments

"Every one admits that commemorations have their uses; producing national identities in celebration." Lyn Spillman, *Nation and Commemoration*

6.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the occasion of unveiling and dedication of the traditional leader's statues by analysing the addresses of the Premier of Limpopo province Sello Moloto as a manifestation of the multidimensionality of commemorative speeches and rituals. Images of the past and recollected knowledge of the (events) past are conveyed and sustained within ritual performance of commemorative speeches. Commemorative political speeches are seen as essential in bringing collective norms and values to a wider audience. Therefore, Limpopo Premier Sello Moloto's speeches delivered at the occasions of the unveilings and dedication of the monuments will be analysed. The other vehicle, that is inscription, has been dealt with in the previous chapter. However, other vehicles, such as rituals and celebrations during the days of unveiling and dedication will also be explored. Most importantly, this chapter will start by taking note of various theories on this phenomenon and reflecting on the timing of the commemorations.

6.2 Timing of the commemorations

Pennebaker et al. (1997: 14) reflect on groups of individuals and entire societies collectively looking back at specific times. Immediately after achieving democracy in 1994, the South African government led by the ANC began to look back and openly discuss and acknowledge

the relevance of past events to their own (black) personal development and that of the country at large. Grobler (2008: 174) noted that when the new ANC-led government took over, they congratulated themselves, claiming that they had led the struggle to overthrow white supremacy and had brought freedom to the peoples of South Africa; they needed a new foundation myth which would give due credit to black South Africans. At work, in the observation of Pennebaker et al. (1997: 14), were at least three interrelated processes that accounted for people being able to look back. The first concerns the idea that people have a critical period in life in which national events are most likely to affect their identity, which is called 'The Critical Period Hypothesis'. The second, 'The Generational Resource Hypothesis', which overlaps with the first, and is also most relevant to this study, concerns a specific generation argument, that monuments are built when people have the power to create them (Panhorst 1988: 9). The third hypothesis, 'The Psychological Distance Hypothesis', explains the role of time gradually removing the pain of recalling negative events (Pennebaker et al. 1997: 16).

The Generational Resource Hypothesis emphasises that events are commemorated when people have the economic resources and social and political power as well as the means to do so. If, for instance a war was to erupt, members of a society must immediately cope with the event rather than worry about building monuments. Months and years sometimes go by before people can stand back and commemorate the event. In the case of Limpopo province and black-led South Africa in general, it took more than a century for blacks to commemorate their dead warrior traditional leaders. During the last century of white rule in South Africa, blacks did not have the economic or political clout to establish monuments. The government led by the black dominated ANC since 1994 is now able to openly acknowledge the black past by building monuments, as a way of looking back and progressively validating their black lives and their contribution to South Africa.

Concurring with above view, Michael Kammen (as cited by Shackel 2003: 13) further contends that the increasing interest in local events has produced depoliticised commemorations. While Kammen reads de-politicisation in the commemoration of local events, Harvey Kaye (as cited by Shackel 2003: 13) on the contrary, sees highly politicised forms of commemoration. In his attempt to take Pennebaker's 'The Generational Resource Hypothesis' a step further, Kaye added that, those who can commemorate the past are those who have the money and political power to publicly remember a particular past, is more of a step toward reinforcing hegemony even if by a new dominant group. The governing class secures its political and social standing in the community through consensus building. Kaye's criticism thus, takes one of the most influential

works on public memory a step forward and argues that power, rather than consensus, constructs public memory (Kaye 1994, as cited in Shackel 2003: 13).

Contributing to the discussion, Peter Stachel (2008: 69) believes that control over indications and symbols in the public area, is of crucial importance for power and ruling. "Public area" refers concretely to its topographic meaning: areas, in which social and political life takes place and where political indications are "written" (Stachel 2008: 69). Further, Stachel saw monuments and ensembles of monuments, national encoded heroes' squares, and street names as paradigmatic examples of 'memory through architecture' (Stachel 2008: 69): they can be defined as consciously produced indications in the public arena, in which a meaningful structure, a narration connected to the identity-politics of a group, is written. These narratives can be analysed as intentional visualisations of desired and/or ordered collective identity or a collective memory; in the sense that collective memory is understood as a form and medium of identity politics (Stachel 2008: 69).

Stachel further believes that memory is related to the past; however, in its functional aspects, it is always a product and expression of the present. To become collectively effective, a memory-narrative must be visualised in everyday life to become an element of social communication. Whoever has the power to define the collective memory of a society, shows that they are the norm-setting power and vice versa, whoever is the norm-setting power, tries to prove this fact through public illustration of their definition of power over the leading memorial-narrative and their visualisations in the public space, which is not only a carrier of indications, but also a surface for forming a political public (Stachel 2008: 69).

6.3 Unveiling and dedication of Warrior Traditional Leaders' Monuments as political ritual

Certain prescribed practices of commemoration consecrated the places of Wars of Resistance against Colonialism and Imperialism memory (Brown 2004: 41). The dedication of monuments in Limpopo province is one of a series of ceremonies of remembrance of the Wars of Resistance, along with Heritage Day. The rituals, however, differed significantly in their structures and key participants, providing instruments for negotiating several different meanings in the remembrance of the various conflicts. Coombes (2003: 150-151) argues that monuments are

animated and reanimated through performance or rituals and that the visibility of a monument is 'entirely contingent upon the debates concerning the re-interpretation of history that take place at moments of social and political transition' (Coombes 2003: 150-151).

This section is concerned with the role played by the ritual of unveiling and dedication in the politics of Limpopo province's commemorative monuments of the traditional leaders of the 'Wars of Resistance against Colonialism and Imperialism'. This study concedes, like Mackenzie (1967: 212), that this is a relatively uncharted and unexplored area, infested with theoretical difficulties and ideologically controversial issues, into which this contribution is merely an exploratory foray. The very first difficulty is in determining or extracting a working definition of the word "ritual" from the disputes of social anthropologists. There is considerable dispute among anthropologists about how the term ritual is to be identified and interpreted. Edmund Leach wrote:

> Even among those who have specialized in this field, there is the widest possible disagreement as to how the word ritual should be used and how the performance of ritual should be understood (Leach 1968, as cited in Lukes 1975: 291).

For the purposes of this study, however, the author had to settle for the proposed definition adopted by Lukes and most writers who consider ritual to be rule-governed, in the sense of being both patterned and usually involving normative pressure on participants. The proposed definition of ritual therefore is:

> Rule-governed activity of a symbolic character which draws the attention of its participants to objects of thought and feeling which they hold to be of special significance (Connerton 1989: 44; Lukes 1975: 291).

The above definition was drawn from exceedingly condensed discussions. Sperber (as cited in Lukes 1975: 291) understood ritual as an activity to be symbolic where the means 'appear clearly disproportionate to the end, explicit or implicit, whether this end be that of knowledge, communication or production'. In response, Beatie (1966: 60-74) asks, but what then, does the symbolic nature of ritual consist of? It seems unduly loose to see it simply as the 'expressive, even dramatic' aspect of acts which have 'meanings' and involve 'mental associations' or, quite generally, as the 'aesthetic' and 'communicative aspect of behaviour', that is, an 'aspect of almost any kind of action', that which "says" something about the individuals involved in the action (Beatie

1966: 60-74). In this view, all activities would be rituals. Ultimately, Lukes suggests that Radcliffe-Brown's approach in characterising referents of ritual symbolism be adopted. Referents of ritual symbolism have a special significance or social value within the relevant social group. The ritual itself serves to reinforce such a significance and value. Such referents are objects, relationships, and roles situations, ideas, which have a special place in the life of the group and towards which, at certain times through the mediation of ritual, the attention of its participants is drawn, at different levels of consciousness and with varying emotional charge (Radcliffe-Brown 1952, as cited in Lukes 1975: 291).

Furthermore, there are several acute methodological problems involved in the study of ritual, chief among them being how to establish whether one interpretation of its symbolism is more valid than another. The observer cannot simply accept the actor's interpretations, the 'rationalizations (sic) of the devout' (Leach 1968, as cited in Lukes 1975: 291); indeed, these themselves must be interpreted. On the other hand, the observer cannot be completely uncontrolled in his interpretations. The observer's task is to interpret the ritual within its context: objects of thought and feeling which are the referents of the symbolism and their special significance within the given social context, are matters that must be empirically established. Thus, reference to comparative accounts is both indispensable and non-definitive, and this poses real problems for verification and falsification in the interpretation of ritual. The most one can hope for in this instance is to achieve interpretations which can be compared with one another for plausibility and tested in the light of new data. An attempt will be made to achieve this in the following analysis of the Limpopo Premier Sello Moloto's speeches. It is thus, important to establish whether indeed Moloto's speeches were patterned and if there were signs of normative pressure on him in line with the definition of the word ritual..

6.4 Premier Moloto's commemorative speeches as epideictic addresses

There is probably an element of truth in normative pressures of rituals on participants. Usually, politicians do not deliver speeches as individuals, rather as representatives of political parties, governments, or nations. In these conditions, they are limited as political actors as to what they can do and say, and how. Commemorative addresses are a case in point and this chapter will refer

to addresses which the Limpopo Premier Sello Moloto delivered at the occasions of the unveiling of statues of Sekhukhune in 2004; Makhado in 2005; and Malebogo in 2006. Unfortunately, the address made at the unveiling of Hosi Nghunghunhane's statue on 8 December 2005 in Giyani could not be accessed even after a thorough search and many requests from relevant bodies and authorities. It is not even included in the published complimentary copy of the collection of the Premier's Speeches.[18] However, after looking at the three speeches, it is believed it would not have differed in any significant way from the three speeches obtained.

The chapter will also demonstrate that these addresses represent a clear example of multidimensionality of political communication. A method of discourse analysis to Sello Moloto's addresses will be applied. Discourse analysis is focused on language and speech in their context. Linguistic structures are not studied independently, but related to their institutional, political, ideological, or personal functions in the communicative situation. Social functions thus, determine the form of discourse. On the other hand, discourse influences society by shaping or reshaping institutions, or by reproducing ideologies. This chapter also aims to demonstrate how the method of discourse analysis sheds light on the functioning of political communication. The application of this method may render the surface material of Sello Moloto's addresses more informative as a basis for the understanding of the meaning of the monuments under discussion. The chapter will illustrate that these commemorative addresses are representative of a characteristic genre of the "epideictic address", a genre that combines the goal of reaching persuasion with the offer of verbal means that are used to establish consensus regarding norms and values in society (Ensink 1996: 205-232; Schaffner 1996: 201-204).

6.4.1 Background to Premier Moloto's addresses

Chapter Two delved on the conceptualisation and the appropriation of funds toward the project to commemorate "Warrior Traditional Leaders who fought the Wars of Resistance against Colonialism and Imperialism". This project was to be achieved through the sculpting and erecting of statues in the Limpopo province. The unveiling and dedication of these statues warranted

18 The researcher received a complimentary copy of the Premier's published collection of speeches from the Premier himself on the date of the interview on 1 October 2009, Polokwane.

an official celebration at which occasions the Premier would have to make a speech. The main commemorative or political issue that the premier had to reflect on was the role played by traditional leaders then, and the role such institutions could still play in the present day in the face of diversity, however, he also had to balance that with other issues of the present that would be acceptable to the audience.

6.4.2 Finding an acceptable perspective

The act of commemorating calls for a perspective from which to look at the commemorated event. Such an event should ideally be linked to the present national, human, or political situation in general, without burdening or contaminating this link too much with specifics, particularly party interests. This calls for reference to a generally accepted set of themes, presuppositions, and values, such as freedom and justice (Kopperschmidt, as cited by Ensink and Sauer 1995: 39). Reference to such values serves as a means of reaffirming them, thus providing the community with a sense of coherence and consensus (Kopperschmidt, as cited by Ensink and Sauer 1995: 39). After all, nations or societies are communities 'because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship' (Anderson 1991: 16).

It is important at this stage, to identify the issues that the Premier had to raise in composing his address. These issues were not listed in any order: the character of each of the selected traditional leaders; the justification for their selection; the role of traditional leadership; the identification of nation builders; the perceptions on heritage; the payment of tribute; and the acknowledgement of diversity and government commitment. These issues were not necessarily of equal importance. At the core of the occasion was the character of the selected traditional leaders and their role as nation builders. The other issues, however, were quite real to the task at hand. In the following analysis, it will be illuminated how Moloto orientated himself toward these issues. The text of the Premier's address in each case shows "traces" of this multiple orientation, but most importantly, its patterning.

An understanding of and full realisation of the message of the Warrior Traditional Leaders' Monuments cannot depend or rely on the inscription alone as discussed in the previous chapter.

The importance of context and its relationship with the image and inscription is also exemplified in the commemorative speeches of the provincial leader Premier Sello Moloto at the occasions of unveiling and dedication of the monuments including the decision to select only one leader from each of the different African polities in the Limpopo province. The following are the Premier's speeches:

6.4.3 The speeches:

6.4.3.1 Unveiling of *Kgošikgolo* Sekhukhune's statue
04 September 2004

Ritual opening: exchange of greetings, and occasion

1. Programme Director, Kgošikgolo Sekhukhune, Members of Executive Council here present, Honourable Traditional Leaders, MPs and MPLs who have graced this occasion, Mayors of District and Local Municipalities, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen.
2. Today marks an important event in the distinguished history of the Sekhukhune people, and indeed of the entire Limpopo province as we celebrate and unveil the statue of the great warrior King Sekhukhune I.
3. Few weeks ago, we commemorated his death. He passed away on the 13th of August 1882.
4. Sekhukhune I dominated the political and military scene in the former Transvaal colony for more than half a century. His famous military victory at Thaba Mosega over 14 000 strong Boer army, armed with sophisticated rifles and cannons was recorded in international publications and history books. Our archives are full of his heroic tales.
5. Between 1877 and 1879 Sekhukhune inflicted three successive defeats on the armies of the British colonists until he was subdued by a sheer weight of numbers and weaponry pitted against him and his brave warriors.
6. His leadership and wisdom was (sic) an inspiration to many who came after him. They followed his example of resistance against colonialism, racism, discrimination, and the system of separate development.

7. The great Sefako Makgatho emulated the example of Sekhukhune I amongst others, when he became the President General of the African National Congress in 1917 and continued the struggle for liberation and freedom for all South Africans.
8. He was following in the footsteps of the generation of warrior kings like Shaka, Bambatha, Hintsa, Makhado, Malebogo, and Ngungunhane who fiercely fought colonialists in defence of the heritage. They fought for our freedom even before the formation of political parties. They were in the forefront fighting to free us from those who descended on the African shores to disposes (sic) of our land.
9. They too must be honoured for what they were, heroes and heroines of the liberation struggle.
10. In honouring them we will be reaffirming our being, our own identity as Africans, confirming the significance of traditional leadership institution and, more importantly, preserving our own heritage.

Programme Director

11. We would like to once more announce here today that the provincial government is hard at work to ensure that Tjate is soon declared a national heritage site. We believe this tourist attraction will add more value to the economy of Sekhukhune. It will also provide us with an opportunity to showcase this rich heritage to the people of the world.
12. Heritage is the most important ingredient for success of our people and should therefore be located at the centre of development.
13. The institution of traditional leadership has become an indispensable element of the democratic system, particularly in Limpopo. To a large degree you represent generations of culture and traditions, and to this day you give voice to the ideals and aspirations of the communities that you represent.
14. In this province and elsewhere in the country, we need the quality of traditional leadership that is dedicated to the economic development and social upliftment of the communities it serves. The government requires social partnership with traditional leaders in its efforts to build a better life for all.
15. We have just entered the second phase of our hard-won freedom and democracy. Traditional leadership has an important role to play in this phase of our struggle. It is an institution that emerged from the roots of our history and should therefore speak for the lives and souls of our people. In pursuit of the African Renaissance, traditional leadership should be seen in the

forefront in defence and regeneration of our morals, norms, values, culture, and tradition.

Programme Director

16. The continued participation of traditional leaders in municipalities is beginning to add more value to our cause of bringing government close to the people. As opposed to those who spread the wrong message that their participation in these structures diminishes the powers and status of traditional leaders, we see it providing an essential linkage that helps strengthen and consolidate our democratic system of cooperative governance.
17. It is important therefore Programme Director, that traditional leadership continues to join hands with the democratic government structures in pursuit of a common goal.
18. The President has identified Sekhukhune as one of the nodal points for the implementation of the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Initiative. In this regard, we call upon traditional leaders to support this initiative so that our people could become beneficiaries.

Ladies and gentlemen

19. The befitting tribute we could pay to Sekhukhune I, is to work side by side in our battle against poverty, illiteracy, hunger, and disease.
20. We also trust that you will take it upon yourselves, particularly members of this community, to look after this monument of our struggle. You should protect it from vandals who may want to deprive you of your own heritage.
21. Pula! (Moloto 2004: 40)

6.4.3.2 Unveiling of *Khosikhulu* Makhado's statue

8 September 2005

1. Programme Director, Thovhele Khosi Vho Toni Ramabulana Mphephu, Members of the Executive Council, MPs and MPLs, Honourable Mayors and Executive Mayor, Councillors from various municipalities, Traditional Leaders and Healers here present, representatives of the South African Heritage Resources Agency, representatives of national departments and

parastatals, ladies and gentlemen.

2. Today marks an important event in the distinguished history of the VhaVenda people, and indeed of the entire Limpopo province as we celebrate and unveil the statue of the great warrior King Tshilwavhusiku Makhado Ramabulana.
3. It must be remembered that, in our State of the Province Address, we committed ourselves to honour our historical warrior kings such as Makhado, and Nghunghunyane during the course of this year as we have already done with King Sekhukhune I. It must also be mentioned that government is committed to honour other leaders, like Malebogo and Mokopane in the same way. We have clearly indicated that, this is being done to assert and reclaim the pride of our people and their heritage as a free nation. The official opening of King Makhado statue, here at the city of Makhado, should be seen as the realisation and fulfilment of this pledge that we have made to the people of Limpopo.
4. King Makhado was a glorious leader who fought colonial battles against the imperialists who wanted to take his land and subjugate his people to oppression. The history of the struggle against colonialism is marked with Makhado's heroic contribution. He is counted amongst other great warrior kings, such as Sekhukhune, and Nghunghunyane, who like Makhado fought fearlessly to restore dignity and self-worth to their people.
5. Oral history tells us that, Makhado was born between 1830 and 1840, and was the son of Khosi Mphephu Ramabulana. He worked as a labourer on white owned farms and also, importantly, as a tracker of Elephant hunters. He was such a good assistant and gun carrier that the hunters taught him how to use a gun which he became good at. The young Makhado earned their trust to such an extent that they gave him and his men guns to hunt on their own. Many of these guns never returned and were later to be used against their attacking enemies, particularly the Boers. When his brother Davhana fled after the death of Ramabulana in 1864, Makhado succeeded him as king. During his reign, troubles with the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR) government surfaced when he refused census among his people, while he also refused to pay ZAR taxes. The Boers, just like in all instances, regarded this as a defiance of their authority.
6. The Voortrekkers had established their settlement next to the VhaVenda chiefdom, naming it Schoemansdal, and this set out a scene for direct confrontation. By 1867, the Boers had assembled a formidable force under the command of Paul Kruger. A fierce war ensued in which the Boers eventually retreated, abandoning Schoemansdal. The Boers retreated to Marabastad in the vicinity of the present-day Polokwane. The humiliating retreat of the Boers in 1867 became a significant victory which was to later inspire other wars of resistance in southern Africa.

7. The great leadership of Makhado and his wisdom was an inspiration to many who came after him. They followed his example of resistance against colonialism, racism, discrimination, and the system of separate development. Our protracted struggle for freedom and democracy was also inspired by the great example that Makhado set in 1867. Makhado was a traditional leader who believed in the liberation of his people. The institution of traditional leadership can learn a great deal from Makhado's contribution, leadership, and vision.
8. In this province and elsewhere in the country, we need the quality of traditional leadership that is as dedicated to the cause of their people as Makhado was. Traditional leaders are today challenged by economic development and social upliftment of their communities. The government requires social partnership with traditional leaders in its efforts to build a better life for all.
9. The continued participation of traditional leaders in municipalities is beginning to add more value to our cause of bringing government services closer to the people. During these oncoming local government elections, we would like to encourage traditional leaders to occupy a leadership role in leading their people to register to vote. We believe that the strength of local government depends on their undivided support.
10. The befitting tribute we could pay to Makhado is to work side by side in our battle against unemployment, poverty, illiteracy, hunger, and disease.
11. We also trust that the municipality and members of the community will take it upon themselves, to look after this monument of our struggle and protect it from vandals who may want to deprive us of our own heritage.
12. Let Makhado's name be used to unite our people.
13. Ndaa. Nala dza vhathu!! (Moloto 2005)

Issued by: Office of the Premier, Limpopo provincial government

6.4.3.3 Unveiling of *Kgoši* Malebogo's statue

24 September 2006

1. Programme director, Kgoši Malebogo, Executive Mayor of Capricorn District Municipality, Mayor of Blouberg Municipality Cllr D.R Kubjana, MEC for Sport, Arts and Culture Mr Joe

Maswanganyi, Traditional Leaders of our province, MPs, and MPLs, veterans and stalwarts of our liberation struggle, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen.

2. The first President of Botswana Sir Seretse Khama once remarked that: *"A nation without a past is a lost nation. And people without a past are a people without a soul."*
3. Nothing can best capture the importance of heritage month than these words which locate heritage in the centre of our nation's soul and pride. Underpinning this occasion is an understanding that Heritage month has profound meaning both to government and our nation, as the very act of celebrating this month means that our nation has resolved and is committed to the preservation and declaration of that which has value and significance to our people. These range from our collections of various kinds of artefacts, restoration and care of sites which have religious, political, cultural, scientific, archaeological, or environmental significance, including the celebration of our living heritage in the form of praise poetry, song, folktale, dance, and literature.
4. The richness and diversity of our cultural tapestry should therefore become the source of strength and not a divisive tool. Our cultural diversity must help us to play a major role in the renewal of Africa and in uniting all her people. In this regard, we must ensure that Heritage month enable us to pull together all our various strengths and resources for nation building and national reconciliation.
5. There are many sites of historical significance in our province that only deserve to be graded to the status of heritage sites. High amongst these include, Tjate in Sekhukhune, Soutini in Baleni (Mopani), Fundudzi Lake, and Dzata in the Vhembe District. These sites are bequeathed from our ancestors and are equally deserving to be called national symbols.
6. Our government is committed to doing everything possible to facilitate the optimum conditions in which these sites can be developed and marketed for the benefit of local communities and for tourism purposes.
7. The protection and conservation of heritage should not only be the exclusive domain of government but all of us need to get involved in this effort. Our municipalities and communities, particularly Traditional Leaders and Healers must be in the forefront of identifying and promoting new heritage sites found in their localities. This will assist in accentuating the best from our past and help in stimulating local economic development where people live. Community involvement in heritage matters will also help to protect our monuments from neglect and possible vandalism as we have recently witnessed in Makhado and Sekhukhune where the statues of our leaders where desecrated by unknown people.

Programme Director

1. In unveiling the statue of this great leader of the BaHananwa people, one is reminded about the many protracted battles Malebogo and his people had to endure in their journey to liberate themselves. The legacy of this great chief of BaHananwa continues to inspire us even today in our pursuit for justice, freedom, and a better life for all.
2. Today, Kgoši Malebogo's name has become a rallying point and an embodiment of noble anticolonial battles of the BaHananwa people. Malebogo is counted amongst the many nation-builders of our country, such as Nghunghunyane, Shaka, Bhambata, Sekhukhune, Makhado, Mokopane and many others who shed blood for our own liberation.
3. This is indeed a proud moment for the province and the BaHananwa people in joining fellow South Africans in finally honouring the memory and spirit of Kgoši Malebogo and those who fought side-by-side with him. The statue we are unveiling today serves as a token of our appreciation for the role played by him and the BaHananwa people in the liberation of South Africa and Africa in general. The monument we have unveiled today will serve as a heritage site and a source of honour for the people of Limpopo and South Africa in general. Our Traditional Leaders in particular, can draw lessons and inspiration from Malebogo's courage and bravery. We expect them to show true leadership by partnering with their municipalities in leading their people out of the trappings of joblessness, crime, illiteracy, and poverty. This monument will forever remain a reminder of the defeat of the stranglehold of apartheid and colonial conquest on our people. It should therefore be looked after at all times so that our children can learn their indigenous history and further appreciate their cultures.
4. There is no better tribute we could ever pay Kgoši Malebogo than to continue working side by side in our battle against unemployment, poverty, crime, illiteracy, hunger, and disease.

I thank you (Moloto 2006)

6.4.4 Analysis of Premier Sello Moloto's addresses

Discourse analysis methods offer at least two stages. The first stage is a description of the text. Three levels of the text are usually analysed: the structure; the grammar; and the vocabulary. This study, however, will be analysing neither the grammar nor the vocabulary used by Premier Moloto; however, the structure will be considered. The second stage of discourse analysis methods is interpretative. The characteristics found in the descriptive stage are interpreted to find functional relations with the situation in which the text has been uttered, in order to explain these characteristics.

In the descriptive phase, questions are systematically asked and answered concerning structure. Since it is possible to ask almost infinitely numerous questions concerning this aspect of a text—which would yield a very long, but at the same time rather pointless analysis—this section will be limited to only those questions which seem most relevant to the text at hand. Selection has been made of those questions which yield insight into the way Premier Sello Moloto realised his goal by means of discourse characteristics. Hence, for the structure of Premier Moloto's address, focus is placed on two interrelated aspects.

The first aspect concerns the interactional relationship. Moloto's addresses concerned the role played by traditional leadership in the past and how they can continue to play a role in the present. Hence, the question must be asked in which way he addressed this concern and which position he takes as representative of government towards traditional leaders. The second aspect concerns thematic development. The central theme of address is "Warrior Traditional Leaders who fought the Wars of Resistance against Colonialism and Imperialism". Questions then relate to how does Moloto refer to this theme, which aspects of the warrior traditional leaders are focused on, and which connections link these aspects?

In the interpretative stage, questions asked relate to how the results of the descriptive stage may be related to and explained within the framework of the tasks Premier Moloto faced.

Description: Multidimensionality in Premier Sello Moloto speeches

In the analysis of the structure of Premier Moloto's addresses, the focus is on the development of the interactional relationships, and on the development of its themes. Both are shown in Table 1. In

the column *Structural function,* the main lines of Moloto's addresses may be read with references in the identified paragraphs under each speech made: **ritual opening**: exchange of greetings to hosts – *paragraph 1* in all the speeches; description of **purpose of occasion** – *paragraph 2* in the case of Sekhukhune and Makhado and *paragraphs 2-3 and 8* in the case of Malebogo, since at this occasion two aspects were being celebrated, that is, Heritage Day and the unveiling of the statue; **character** of honoured leader – *paragraph 6* for Sekhukhune, *paragraphs 5 and 7* for Makhado, and *paragraph 10* for Malebogo; **justification for the selection** of the honoured traditional leader – *paragraph 4 and 5* for Sekhukhune, *paragraph 4-6* for Makhado, and *paragraph 10* for Malebogo; **role of current traditional leadership** – *paragraphs 13-15 and 18* for Sekhukhune, *paragraphs 8-9* for both Makhado and Malebogo; **perceptions on heritage** – *paragraphs 11-12* for Sekhukhune and *paragraph 5* for Malebogo; recognition of traditional leaders as **nation builders** – *paragraph 7-10* for Sekhukhune, *paragraph 4* for Makhado, and *paragraph 9* for Malebogo; paying **tribute to the leaders** – *paragraph 19* for Sekhukhune, *paragraph 10 and 12* for Makhado, and *paragraph 11* for Malebogo; acknowledging **cultural diversity** – *paragraph 4* for Malebogo; **Government commitment** – *paragraph 18* for Sekhukhune, *paragraph 3* for Makhado, and *paragraph 6* for Malebogo; warning against **vandalism of monuments** – *paragraph 20* for Sekhukhune, *paragraph 11* for Makhado, and *paragraph 7* for Malebogo.

Structural function	Speech at unveiling of Sekhukhune Statue, Tjate 04 September 2004	Speech at unveiling of Makhado Statue, Makhado 08 September 2005	Speech on Heritage Day and unveiling of Malebogo Statue, Ben Seraki Sport Centre 24 September 2006
1. Ritual opening: exchange of greetings	Par. 1	Par. 1	Par. 1
2. Purpose of occasion	Par. 2	Par. 2	Par. 2-3; 8
3. Character of honoured leader	Par. 6	Par. 5 & 7	Par. 10
4. Justification for selection	Par. 4-5	Par. 4-6	Par. 10
5. Role of current traditional leadership	Par. 13-15; 18	Par. 8-9	Par. 8-9
6. Perceptions on heritage	Par. 11-12		Par. 5
7. Recognition as nation builders	Par. 7-10	Par. 4	Par. 9
8. Tribute	Par. 19	Par. 10 & 12	Par. 11
9. Acknowledging cultural diversity			Par. 4
10. Government commitment	Par. 18	Par. 3	Par. 6
11. Warning against vandals	Par. 20	Par. 11	Par. 7

Table 1: Interactional structure of Moloto's addresses, and reference to the issues under each of the speeches at unveilings of statues of Sekhukhune, Makhado, and Malebogo

6.4.4.1 Discussion

This section of the work has analysed Premier Sello Moloto's commemorative addresses as an instance of the multidimensionality of political messages. It is important to note that Moloto's speeches were made one year apart from each other. The Sekhukhune speech was made in September 2004, the Makhado speech in September 2005, and the Malebogo speech a year later in September 2006. It is noticeable that in some instances, however, the speeches were an exact replication of the previous speech word for word which confirms the collectivity of events within the theme.

This also demonstrates that Premier Moloto felt successful in approaching the issues he had to raise, hence there was no need to change a winning speech, if not a total laziness to come up with a new speech. Thus, he mastered the dominant commemorative issues to be addressed. Perhaps this was also an illustration of the fact that the problems facing people at Sekhukhune were appropriated as exactly the same as, or similar challenges to those facing Makhado's and Malebogo's people respectively, which was obviously the case since this is one province. The following are examples of exact excerpts taken from the Premier's speeches that he repeated. Even the sequencing is the same.

6.4.4.2 Excerpts from the speeches

Excerpt of speech at unveiling of Sekhukhune statue: 4 September 2004 at Tjate

> Today marks an important event in the distinguished history of the **Sekhukhune people**, and indeed of the entire Limpopo province as we celebrate and unveil the statue of the great warrior King **Sekhukhune I**. (par. 2)
>
> The befitting tribute we could pay to **Sekhukhune I,** is to work side by side in our battle against poverty, illiteracy, hunger, and disease. (par. 19)
>
> We also trust that you will take it upon yourselves, particularly members of this

> community, to look after this monument of our struggle. You should protect it from vandals who may want to deprive you of your own heritage. (par. 20)

Excerpt of speech at unveiling of Makhado statue: 08 September 2005 in Louis Trichardt

> Today marks an important event in the distinguished history of the **VhaVenda people**, and indeed of the entire Limpopo province as we celebrate and unveil the statue of the great warrior King **Tshilwavhusiku Makhado Ramabulana**. (par. 2)
>
> The befitting tribute we could pay to **Makhado** is to work side by side in our battle against unemployment, poverty, illiteracy, hunger, and disease. (par. 14)
>
> We also trust that the municipality and members of the community will take it upon themselves, to look after this monument of our struggle and protect it from vandals who may want to deprive us of our own heritage. (par. 15)

Excerpt of speech at unveiling of Malebogo statue: 24 September 2006 at Ben Seraki Stadium, Blouberg

> There is no better tribute we could ever pay **Kgoši Malebogo** than to continue working side by side in our battle against unemployment, poverty, crime, illiteracy, hunger, and disease. (par. 12)

It is important to note, in particular with reference to paragraphs 2 in the case of both the Sekhukhune and Makhado speeches and paragraph 8 of the Malebogo speech, that the premier acknowledged that the ethnic groups are distinguished, however, that they are distinguished groups of the entire Limpopo province. This reiterates the suggestion that the objective was also to persuade the people of Limpopo province to perceive themselves as united in belonging, that is, one community despite their historical differences. Thus, it may be constituted that after careful consideration of the history and character of the province, it may be postulated that the ethnic groups within the province did not necessarily have a history of closer relations and cooperation. Being aware of this situation and perhaps desperate to bring about unity and change in their towns and cities, the provincial leaders recognised the power of monuments and other vehicles,

such as names to move people, and have since 2004 embarked on the mission to erect statues of prominent traditional leaders (and to adopt new names) with which most people are familiar. It is, therefore, no coincidence that amongst those honoured traditional leaders are Kgošikgolo Sekhukhune I of BaPedi, Hosinkulu Ngungunhane of (Tsonga) Shangaan, Khosikhulu Makhado of VhaVenda, Kgoši Malebogo of the BaHananwa, Kgoši Mokopane of the Amandebele, and Kgoši Makgoba of Batlhalerwa. This argument also concedes that in the absence of any empirical evidence on the handling or addressing of the traditional leaders, a philosophical approach is therefore necessary. One is therefore of the opinion that the uniform address could simply be a formalisation out of respect for the traditional leaders' positions as leaders.

The communities that were selected are at least some of the major prominent ethnic groups apart from the whites that comprise Limpopo province and this has been an intentionally planned project. This, the Premier also confirmed when he announced in his speech at the unveiling of the Makhado statue:

> Let Makhado's name be used to unite our people. (Paragraph 12)

By warning against vandals in paragraph 20 (Sekhukhune), paragraph 11 (Makhado), and paragraph 7 (Malebogo), Premier Moloto was demonstrating the significance of the monument in terms of its meaning. Meaning production can be activated through a real or perceived threat to or a violation of the integrity of the monument—be it through vandalism, alteration, removal, or destruction. Such acts of violation will not only increase public visibility, but may make the monument more meaningful and significant to a community as a site of highly charged political acts (Marschall 2009: 167-168).

To substantiate the above claims, it is important at this juncture to recall the definition of ritual proposed above: namely, "rule-governed activity of a symbolic character which draws the attention of its participants to objects of thought and feeling which, they hold to be of special significance". This study is hereby aligned with Luke's positive suggestion that political ritual should be seen as reinforcing, recreating, and organising "représentations collectives" (to use Durkheim's term), that the symbolism of political ritual represents, *inter alia*, models or political paradigms of society and how it functions. In this sense, such rituals play, as Durkheim argued, a cognitive role, rendering intelligible society and social relationships, serving to organise people and their knowledge of the past and present, as well as their capacity to imagine the future which the Premier's speeches seemed to achieve. Lukes (1975) thus believes that rituals provide a cognitive dimension which

is a more illuminating way of interpreting rituals. Hence, institutionalised activities, such as the unveiling and dedication of Warrior Traditional Leaders' Monuments seen as rituals, can serve to reinforce and perpetuate dominant and official models of social structure and social change, of the Limpopo province. Official ceremonies such as these draw people's attention, and invoke their loyalties towards a certain powerfully-evoked representation of the social and political order (Lukes 1975: 291).

6.5 Commemorative ceremonies

Commemorative ceremonies are of cardinal importance for communal memory. Through their formalism and performativity, they can transmit and articulate memory non-verbally, encoded in set postures, gestures, and movements, sending a simple and clear message. On feast days, as the members of a group commemorate the past, their thoughts are centred upon their common beliefs, their common traditions, the memory of their great ancestors, the collective ideal of which they are incarnation; in a word, upon social things. As people, through memorised culturally specific postures, gestures, and practices in the highly emotionally charged co-presence of others, enact their image of the past, their mutual bonds and feelings of belonging are reinforced (Misztal 2003: 126-127). For Durkheim (as cited by Misztal 2003: 127), by boosting peoples' feeling of belonging, these ceremonies reduce their egoistic orientation, which 'has no moral value'.

In actual practice, the services of an events management team were employed to oversee each unveiling ceremony. Those tasks included the duty to organise ceremonies at unveilings; to map out the roles of each participant, to prepare the venue, provide accessibility, and estimate costs incurred. Among the sub-committees one at least always found the following: logistics; transport; entertainment; marketing and publicity; catering; accommodation; disaster management; and exhibitions and monument or memorial symbol cleansing and healing. The DSAC was always tasked with the responsibility of mobilising the masses working together with the relevant local district municipality. Organisers were thus involved in a host of activities in preparation for the day's activities. Invitations were extended to invitees and cultural groups, such as traditional dance groups to the venue.

Traditional leadership was always represented and was, therefore, a permanent feature of these celebrations. Where necessary, transport and accommodation were also organised, including

busses to ferry communities from further outlying areas. Several goods and services always had to be procured, for example, a stage with sound, tents, and chairs for the event. Quotations for catering during the event were sourced. All costs and logistical arrangements were put in place including marketing and promotional materials, such as posters and banners that carried the message of the eventful day. Posters and banners were always designed with the DSAC logo. Strict security measures were always put in place to ensure the safety of the dignitaries and the VIP guests. Mobile broadcasting units were arranged with relevant departments including, for example, SABC TV or radio, to market and broadcast the events.

Activities during the day of unveiling were always kick-started with a cleansing ceremony. The cleansing ceremony became a permanent feature of these occasions. During this ritual, led by both traditional leaders and healers, an animal, be it goat or sheep, was usually slaughtered and the blood and beer offered to appease the ancestors. The cleansing ceremony is an attempt to keep the ancestors' content. The end-product is to propitiate the ancestors *ante factum* rather than *ex post facto;* hence the cleansing was always conducted early in the morning on the day of the ceremony. The ritual attempts to appease and satisfy the ancestors to keep them from interfering with the lives of their descendants. It is believed that ancestor spirits and the living people exist at opposite poles; that they have different desires and to keep the ancestors from thwarting the desires of the living, the living must satisfy the desires of the ancestors. Most importantly, however, the indigenous Africans believe that if they do not give thanks to the ancestors, they will bring sickness and even death upon themselves (Mönnig 1967: 60-61).

It is important to note that the events always took place in the month of September, which is heritage month in South Africa. Every year during the month of September, South Africa becomes colourful with traditional attire that citizens wear in celebration of their culture and heritage. This is most evident on Heritage Day, 24 September.

Photograph 26: Performing the cleansing ceremony (Masemola 2008: 2)

It was not compulsory to stage events in Heritage Month. Thus, for example, the event celebrating the unveiling of the *Ubuntu* Memoriam Monument (Chapter Four) for the warrior traditional leaders held at Musina, was on 3 October 2008. It nevertheless attracted officials from government departments, the private sector, traditional leaders, and members of the public from throughout the Limpopo province. The presence of traditional leaders was never surprising, since heritage seems to form the anchor part and parcel of traditional leadership. The occasion was marked by traditional dances. There were approximately twenty local groups that availed themselves to perform and two groups from Zimbabwe. As always, Musina was very hot, yet the heat did not deter the groups from performing at their best. After the formal programme, the celebrations continued with local artists entertaining the crowds (Maphiri and Shibambo 2008: 1).

At another heritage festival celebration held at Tjate on 26 September 2008, thousands of people from the greater Sekhukhune district converged at Ntsoaneng village, greater Tubatse Municipality to celebrate heritage as well as remember and honour the warrior father of the BaPedi, Kgošikgolo Sekhukhune I. Addressing the crowd, the acting paramount chief of the

BaPedi Kgoši K.K. Sekhukhune spoke of his great grandfather as a warrior who fought against colonialism and forced removals of the BaPedi people from their land by the unjust system of apartheid (Masemola 2008: 2). The connection of Sekhukhune and apartheid calls for some qualification. Sekhukhune was murdered in August 1882, by his own brother. Apartheid as an official system of government was instituted in 1948. Thus, Sekhukhune could not have fought it. While this is correct, in the memory of most traditional leaders, apartheid was launched long before it was formalised and it will, therefore, always be associated with colonial and liberation struggles of later periods. The dispossession of land from, and ousting of communities from their original spaces to reserves long before 1948, is but just one example. Whereas officially, colonial struggles and liberation struggles were not one and the same struggle, traditional leaders found continuity and connection between the struggles fought by their forefathers during the second half of the nineteenth century and those fought during the official apartheid years. Indeed, many of the descendants of the warrior traditional leaders, both biological descendants and spiritual descendants, believe the two struggles to be a single campaign of long duration; that the two struggles merge in their memory into one struggle for freedom which they finally won. Kgoši K.K. Sekhukhune, thus, outlined in his speech that the celebration would be meaningless if the values and the principles that led his great grandfather to gallantly fight the system are compromised.

> The legend that he was, Kgošikgolo Sekhukhune I fought to protect the wealth of the great land that Sekhukhune is. He is fondly described as someone who was firmly grounded because of his respect for the African value systems, culture, norms, and principles (Masemola 2008: 2).

Reiterating on the significance of performing a ritual, Kgoši K.K. Sekhukhune emphasised that it was going to be unjust for the event to begin without an early morning ritual of thanking the ancestors. In his closing words, he encouraged young people not to neglect their culture and view it as irrelevant. The day's events were concluded with a music festival led by the legendary Hugh Masekela and Culture Spears from the neighbouring Botswana (Masemola 2008: 2).

Concluding the events with a music festival was a crucial part of the project. Recently, scholars (Momcilovic 2008; Roberts 2012a, 2012b: 1-9; Stokes 1999: 141-156; Thornton 1990: 87-95) consider music as potent a symbol of national or local identity as traditional representations, for example, national and regional insignia, food, drink, and sport. In his research, Van der Hoeven (2014) noted that songs often elicit emotions from the past; many people connect music with

specific memories from their lives. At a session on "Popular music and cultural heritage", held in 2012 at the Association of Critical Heritage Studies, selected papers (Brandellero and Janssen 2014; Khabra 2012; Roberts and Cohen 2012; Reitsamer 2012) related to a series of questions concerning the relation between popular music, identify formation, and cultural heritage conceptualisations which emerge in the social practices of individuals and groups. Brandellero and Janssen (2014: 224-240) concluded that popular music heritage is present in national and local public sector heritage institutions and practices in several ways, ranging from the preservation and exhibition of the material culture of heritage in museums and archives to a variety of "bottom-up" initiatives, delineating a rich landscape of emblematic places, valued for their attachment to certain musicians or music scenes. Gurdeep Khabra (2012) specifically noted that active popular music contributes to shaping the collective memory and identity of communities, particularly in the United Kingdom. In South Africa, almost all the national day celebrations are concluded with some form of music. This shows that music has a role to play in the negotiation of cultural identity, both in local and national contexts. It also demonstrates that music has a contribution to make to the narratives of cultural identity and the representations of cultural memories as well as the promotion thereof. These additional symbolic and musical elements were also aimed at creating a set of sensory experiences and impressions designed to back up official rhetoric and to attract a wider audience through related reports (Rausch 2007: 75).

Chapter Seven

Final Thoughts and Conclusion

7.1 Introduction

To conclude, it was once again Sello Moloto who brought the curtain down on the project when he declared in his state of the province address in 2007 that:

> Our work of honouring all warrior traditional leaders who fell in the course of the struggle against colonial dispossession has been completed (Moloto 2007).

Moloto also expressed happiness that SAHRA had finally approved the declaration of four provincial heritage sites in terms of section 27 of the National Heritage Resources Act (Act 25 of 1999). The sites would include Tjate in Sekhukhuneland, Dzata in the Vhembe district, Soutini Baleni in the Mopani district, and Malebogo-Boer War Battlefields in the Capricorn district. Indeed, in the same speech Moloto disclosed that the next chapter was going to be that of erecting Heroes Acres in memory and honour of those who fought in combat.

We are aware about the outcry in various communities, particularly by those who have lost their loved ones and their remains are lying in different parts of the country and some even in the frontline states. These heroes and heroines of our liberation struggle deserve a proper send-off and we therefore implore on our Department of Sport, Arts and Culture, the Freedom Park Trust and the post Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) unit to find ways of assisting the families concerned. We however, maintain that our liberation struggle was a people's war against apartheid colonialism and no amount of compensation can replace the lost lives... (Moloto 2007).

Continued overleaf

7.2 Discussion

Commemoration of past wars has been an area of increasing public interest since World War I. In Limpopo province they take the form of monuments that commemorate warrior traditional leaders. These monuments are intended to be the physical points of collective remembrance and stand in the public spaces in Limpopo province as permanent reminders of the "Wars of Resistance against Colonialism and Imperialism". These monuments seem to also serve as symbols that carry meaning about the reasons for the wars and the nature of the role of the individual traditional leader's participation in the nations and provinces' wars. This study draws out the war discourses buried within the monuments' material semiotic resources and written inscriptions; describing and analysing the communicative resources used in the construction of the monument to reveal the discourses buried within them.

South Africa's nine new provinces were challenged by the national government after 1994 to commemorate wars of resistance. A concept document entitled "*Eastern Cape House of Traditional Leaders Commemorates Wars of Dispossession*" provides perhaps the most explicit rationale behind these commemorations. As background, it needs to be explained that the Eastern Cape House of Traditional Leaders, in 2002, resolved to embark on a programme that aimed to commemorate the wars that were fought in the Eastern Cape area which were spearheaded by the traditional leaders in the resistance of land dispossession by the British colonial authorities. The House seemed to have been aware of the void in promoting the historical past of the province by giving publicity to its rich history of wars of dispossession. The House had also noted that other provinces were ahead in terms of marketing the wars of resistance to the spread of colonialism. Also, of concern was that the present generation was not being educated on the role played by traditional leaders in the liberation struggle. Western influence and enculturation seem to have distorted their perceptions about traditional history and their indigenous past (South African History Online n.d[b]). Limpopo province in turn, chose to commemorate the "Warrior Traditional Leaders who fought Wars of Resistance against Colonialism and Imperialism" as their theme.

In a way, the commemoration of wars of dispossessions is also perceived as a tribute to the 'fallen sons and daughters of the African soil and this will seek to address the idea of promoting African Renaissance (South African History Online n.d[b]). This rich historical past is therefore portrayed by remembering the wars that were fought against colonial advancement. The criteria used to select a particular war was that the war was between the colonialists and the indigenous Africans;

that the war reflects unity amongst tribes; that the war's impact was felt across river boundaries; and that the war was an expression of great resistance from the part of the chieftainships (South African History Online n.d[b]).

These war commemoration project initiatives were had on a national level to support strategic priorities of the House of Traditional Leaders, such as the promotion of nation building and of the spirit of reconciliation, the restoration of historically disadvantaged chieftainships, redressing imbalances of the past in the portrayal of its history, and last, promotion of social cohesion. In its implementation, the project would be in line with national, provincial, and local growth strategies as PGDP, IDPs, ASGISA, JIPSA, and Expanded Public Works Programmes.

The DSAC in Limpopo province viewed involvement in projects of this nature as an opportunity to contribute to the African renaissance in line with former President Thabo Mbeki's vision, namely of instilling an awareness of South Africa's common heritage and nationhood. Moreover, this would help to promote and to invest in a South African cultural diversity through heritage and common nationhood, while at the same time building a strong sense of South African unity. More importantly, this project was significant in that it took place at a time when traditional leadership and African heritage was being challenged by the influence of modernisation. It was also aimed at unifying the province and the nation by way of showcasing the past experiences which in turn, would be part of agencies of social change and social cohesion (South African History Online n.d[b]).

Throughout the study, the "Wars of Resistance against Colonialism and Imperialism" theme seems to have been intended to condense the war history of the Limpopo province of the second half of the nineteenth century into a single, complex symbol with a unified narrative.

The study also explored the extent to which monuments and statues that relate to issues of provincial and national conflict can lead to the construction of shared memories or narratives of the past. The findings demonstrate that even though rhetorical integration is elusive, monuments/memorials can, through aspects of form, function, symbolism, and location, provide space, motivation, and inventional resources for continued engagement.

The focus in this study has been on how the Limpopo province hoped to develop a sense of provincial identity as a part of national identity. It was with this objective in mind that emphasis was placed on the efforts to utilise the statues in the processes of inventing ritual and creating landscape spectacles to build up provincial identity and to develop an 'imagined community' (Anderson 1991: 199-201). Sanford Levinson (1998: 10) proposes that states always promote privileged narratives of the national experience and thus, attempt to form a particular kind of

national consciousness. Organisers of the new regime must decide which, if any, of the heroes from the past deserve to occupy public space, and if these heroes might serve as potential symbols of resistance for adherents among the population, who must at least from the perspective of newcomers, ultimately acquiesce to the new order (Levinson 1998: 10).

Kirk Savage (1994: 135-136) reminds us, 'Public monuments do not rise as if by natural law to celebrate the deserving; they are built by people with sufficient power to marshal (or impose) public consent for their erection'. 'A public monument represents a kind of collective recognition—in short, legitimacy—for the memory deposited there.' (Savage 1994: 135-136)

The warrior traditional leaders' statues and other dynamic monuments of their time reinterpreted the Wars of Resistance and suggest that perceptions of the event changed in the first years of the twenty-first century. These new interpretations can be understood within the context of cultural, social, and historical contestation in South Africa as well as through an examination of Limpopo province's awareness of, and relationship to, other provinces. Such examination reveals that verbal, written, and sculptural images of the Wars of Resistance were invoked with recent frequency in demonstration of the role played by African leaders in defence of their land possessions and protection of their chiefdoms. These images also depicted the Wars of Resistance not as isolated, unfortunate incidents receding into the distant past, rather as a test of both provincial and national strength needing continuing renewal if Limpopo province was to take its place among South Africa's great provinces. As images of peace and reconciliation, these monuments might also help to forge a renewed sense of provincial unity as well as contribute to Limpopo province's developing role in traditional leadership and local governance.

The Warrior Traditional Leaders' Monuments should be understood on several levels. At the most basic level these statues impart information or knowledge about the "Wars of Resistance" lead by traditional leaders in Limpopo province. They depict reality, or versions of it, in an accessible way. They give the wars recognisable human faces, pictures for the mind to hold onto as the second half of the nineteenth century fades into oblivion and the distant past. On another level, monuments of the Wars of Resistance shape the past as much as they record it. A dominant theme of material representations created in the years after the wars is that of heroism. Kinsell (1992: 434-435) insists that 'battlefield photographs are sometimes grim, but in paintings and sculpture there is less room to question the validity of the war or splendid heroic efforts of the men who fought it'. The traditional leaders' statues serve as lasting tributes to heroism and sacrifice. Such tributes are recognitions and validations of these sacrifices (Kinsel 1992: 434-435).

Through institutionalised remembrance, governments want to ensure that selected individuals

or collective memories are incorporated into cultural memory. In South Africa, it is primarily the memories of apartheid, colonial oppression, and resistance that are preserved for transferal into cultural memory: they form the basis of understanding 'who we are and where we are coming from' (Marschall 2005a: 20-21). Monuments and other "products" of the heritage sector are means of visualising these myths. Much has been written about how images of the past commonly serve to legitimise a present social order. Monuments and memorials are means of literally casting in bronze or carving in stone such images of the past, thus, solidifying and preserving carefully selected memories for the future. Since the experience of the present is intricately connected with the memory of the past, public monuments serve to control and guide people's perceptions of the contemporary socio-political order. National monuments, or those initiated by the state, contribute to forging a new national identity by presenting key themes of a country's myths of origin (Marschall 2005a: 8). The Warrior Traditional Leaders' Monuments in Limpopo province was established to visualise and institutionalise the memory of the "Wars of Resistance".

The tradition of selective remembering (and historical fabrication) contributes to the shaping of belief that the "Wars of Resistance" were spontaneous, yet well-organised, consolidated events. The celebration of the Wars of Resistance—through monuments and rituals—functions as a powerful unifier and assists in attempts at forging a coherent identity in Limpopo province, specifically and generally in South Africa. In his new year's message in January 1968, former ANC leader O.R. Tambo, acknowledged that the African people were conquered since the Europeans had the guns and were better organised:

> In addition, our forefathers fought separately and divided. In this way the Whites were able to defeat our people one by one. Therefore, we had to concentrate first on moving the divisions among ourselves and creating a single African nation owing allegiance to one organisation, the African National Congress (Tambo 1968).

Marschall (2005a: 26) contends that in the current post-Apartheid era, the challenge lies in creating a convincing new foundation myth and inventing a new, inclusive past that can be shared by all, or most, Limpopoans or South Africans, to form the basis of the new province and nation. Based on the emerging "heritage products" as evidence, it appears that the function of foundation myth is currently performed by the meta-narrative of the "struggle" for liberation. Virtually all new monuments and cultural heritage sites, built and proposed in post-apartheid South Africa, are in one way or another linked to the notion of struggle or resistance. This refers not only to resistance

against apartheid, but against colonial domination and all forms of disenfranchisement of the non-white population and negation of their value systems. Paralleling the function of the Afrikaner myth of the "Great Trek", the foundation myth of the "struggle" is intended to forge people of widely diverse origins and experiences into one nation (Marschall 2005a: 26). Monuments are there to represent the story—as chosen for remembrance by the now dominant political forces—to the people. Monuments are lasting, public, visual expressions of narratives; they interpret history for the people. Ambiguities and complexities are rarely acknowledged and indeed are often more comfortable to suppress in the current process of selective remembering for the purpose of provincial/nation-building (Marschall 2005a: 34-35).

It is through elaborate monuments, solid memorials, and bronze statues on pedestals—imitating colonial and apartheid era commemorative practices—that the post-apartheid state chooses to virtualise, nurture, and disseminate its newly constructed identity. New heroes are being worshipped in post-apartheid monuments, sometimes in the form of bronze statues on pedestals—such as the Warrior Traditional Leaders. The dramatic story of the event and the complex narrative of these traditional leaders' lives are condensed into one succinct, catchphrase label: Wars of Resistance against Colonialism and Imperialism (Marschall 2005a: 27-30).

In the final analysis, the invention of the Limpopo province through a war theme on the one hand and the (manipulative) use of symbols based on "collective memory" as well as the specific importance of public monuments on the other, are key issues discussed in (recent) literature on nationalism. For example, research on the history of European nationalism in the nineteenth century has long advanced the study that the concept of a nation emerging from a war was one of nationalism's most powerful legitimising myths. The triumphant progress of nineteenth-century (European) nationalism has essentially been attributed to a "national memory" that is both genuinely developed and skilfully advertised. Both the nature of the nation as an "artefact" and the procedures involved in commemorative nation-building have received ample attention. In both contexts, various *loci classici* apply: From an 'invention of tradition' perspective, nations basically result from inventive 'social engineering', and symbols like flags and hymns serve as tools of 'national invention' (Rausch 2007: 7-101). Such findings are readily compatible with the concept of the nation as an 'imagined community' that needs personification—chiefly through memorial or allegorical monuments—simply because it would otherwise be wholly abstract. Emphasis has been placed on the construction of a '*mémoire collective*' at specific '*lieux de mémoire*' where national societies rally round to assert a common identity. It is, however, often difficult to see the actual origins of the populations' affinity for the national core (Rausch 2007: 7-101).

The practice of erecting monuments in Limpopo province, like everywhere else, consisted of a now familiar sequence of events. The process began when government commissioned monument committees and started subscriptions to elicit wider participation. What followed was the search for appropriate sites in what was usually an already highly contested public space. The resultant iconographic shape of the individual statues and the prominence of such visual symbols was in effect the casting of a political vote in favour of a specific notion of what the province was meant to be all about.

The subsequent inauguration ceremonies had become a third constituent part to the process in all five districts of the province. The additional symbolic and musical elements included in such ceremonies aimed at creating a set of sensory experiences and impressions designed to back up official rhetoric and to attract a wider audience through related activities. The sequence of events leading to the erection of monuments to what one can describe as provincial cult figures, came to a temporary close with the public reception of the statues. They were, however, likely to reappear on the agenda of provincial debate during days of remembrance, such as national Heritage Day (24 September) or with the subsequent development of the heritage site in their vicinity as a tourist attraction. Thus, the aesthetic appearance, the ceremonial unveiling, the official rhetoric, and perhaps even journalistic and political topography of these statues, were all vitally important to the expression of the provincial objectives associated with them. These were, in fact, part of an extremely didactic used to pass on a provincial message, that of unity, yet this was also a didactic that could not, of course, ever wholly anticipate its public reception.

7.3 Conclusion

This study contends that the cultural combination of provincial community and war was obviously and visibly expressed in the erection and commemoration of the traditional leaders' statues as heroes in Limpopo province during the first decade of democracy in South Africa. Defeat against white powers delegitimised African traditional leadership. More than one hundred years after the wars, the province of Limpopo witnessed one of the most outstanding efforts to memorialise the experience of the years of defeat and subjugation of the latter half of the nineteenth century between 1850 and 1900. The government celebrated the successful inauguration of the theme commemorating the "Wars of Resistance against Colonialism and Imperialism" with official

unveilings of statues in honour of traditional leaders, Sekhukhune, Malebogo, Ngungunhane, and Makhado.

The unveiling ceremonies were always lavish. The Premier of the province appeared, together with several high-ranking guests. During the official speeches, the political programme of the "Wars of Resistance" monument was articulated quite bluntly.

By repeating the same message made since 2004, the Premier illustrated the considerable objective to arouse a sense of provincial, if not national unity and thus, an attempt to avoid divergent memories of the wars, hence the expectations and projections into the future for the different ethnic groups were the same for the BaPedi of Sekhukhune, the BaHananwa of Malebogo, and the VhaVenda of Makhado to mention just these three as reflected in the Premier's speeches. The theme "Wars of Resistance" in Limpopo can conclusively be said to have been meant to show that the provincial black communities are becoming a homogeneous community through shared suffering, loss, and deprivation. Official statements were thus aimed at demonstrating some sort of moral primacy that would foster provincial regeneration under the ANC-led provincial government.

Aside from being visible attempts to galvanise provincial public opinion, these remarkably monumental projects appeared to some insignificant extent, to be symptoms of an overweening and ambitious propaganda. This became quite clear when the Premier continually had to warn against vandals in his speeches. Indeed, as has been indicated, both the Makhado statue and the Sekhukhune monument have been the target of vandals. Among other things, the Premier's warning brought to light a vague unease about the ostentatious excess characteristic of both the province and war myth and its attended symbols. It also furthered convictions, at least among those on the political left, that provincial greatness was less a matter of military bravery than of economic strength and socio-political modernisation.

A combination of factors including official rhetoric, ceremonies, and iconography in the analysis of the Limpopo province's Warrior Traditional Leaders' Monuments offered useful evidence for a cultural history of the wars of resistance in that region. Elevated military figures representing the selected traditional leaders eloquently show how experiences of war were meant to leave deep impressions in public memory. In the same breath, they testify to the eagerness of official governments to shape a conception of war based on heroic figures, not on moral revulsion. In conclusion, the study argues that the examination of commemorative war monuments' potential to communicate discourses of war, sacrifice, and nationalism is only achievable when taking the whole phenomenon, including representation, inscription, location, and other vehicles, for example celebrations/rituals, into account.

QUESTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION

1. Did the celebration of traditional leaders from different ethnic groups make Limpopo a more unified province than it otherwise would have been? How would you measure provincial unity?

2. What characteristics of traditional leadership has the commemoration of the Wars of Resistance honoured?

3. How have the Wars of Resistance commemorations represented intergroup relations in the Limpopo province?

4. How has the form of celebrating the Wars of Resistance related to its content?

5. Is there a monument commemorating the Wars of Resistance in your area: If so, how did it come to be placed?

6. Why are the statues depicting the honoured traditional leaders as if they were still active?

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THE PUBLIC ART OF COMMEMORATING THE WARS OF RESISTANCE: A BRIEF LIMPOPO CHAPTER

This book is an examination of sites in Limpopo Province where the history of the Wars of Resistance is represented on the landscape through public art that celebrates the traditional leaders who fought those wars. *The Public Art of Commemorating the Wars of Resistance: A Brief Limpopo Chapter* explores the overlapping and oftentimes complex relationships between identity, memory, heritage and the cultural landscape. The book draws particular attention to the powerful role that statues, honouring traditional leaders who fought wars of resistance, have played to save their peoples' land from colonial conquerors. This book is a welcome addition to the growing literature on the memorialisation of the Wars of Resistance in South Africa. The book further provides a stimulating introduction to the issue of how South Africans commemorate the Wars of Resistance.

Mahunele Thotse's book is the first to document so thoroughly and so persuasively the process by which the Limpopo Province came to narrate the wars of resistance through public art. The documents and photographs discussed in the book make for an essential text for those interested in cultural studies, and historical and heritage studies, including tourist guides.

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