CHAPTER SIX

Constraints and Challenges to Tanzania's Development: Leadership, Debt and International Pressure

Tanzania's development path has been characterized by periodic swings from one extreme to another. At the start of the country's independence and under the advice of the World Bank, the leadership opted for a capitalist, private-led development path. The focus was on luring foreign investors into the country. The First Five-Year Development Plan (1964-1969) was primarily focused on industrial growth through import substitution industrialization. It differed from the 1961/1962-1963/1964 three-year plan, which was focused mainly on agricultural transformation and development. Instead of inflows of investments, the country experienced outflows. This prompted the leadership, in particular president Nyerere, to decry, under the Arusha Declaration, the country's focus on both industrialization and foreign investments. There was then a swing towards self-reliance or state-led development and a refocus on agricultural development and rural transformation. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the country found itself at a crossroads with falling agricultural production, falling prices for the country's agricultural exports, resulting in falling foreign reserves and failure to pay for the needed imports. At the height of the crisis, the country turned to aid donors. These demanded the total transformation of the country's development path from state-led to private-led development and a reliance on foreign investors and aid donors. Privatization became the buzzword, and under external pressure, the government lost control of the development process.

Under President Mkapa, the country experienced economic growth as foreign investments shifted their attention to mining, in particular gold mining. At the same time, part of the country's debts was written off under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) international regime. But the growth in the mining sector, because of the Mining Development Agreements (MDA), did not trickle down to the rest of the economy for lack of linkages nor did it translate into increased government revenues. The growth under Mkapa and Kikwete was a jobless growth resulting in the swelling of the self-employed population in the urban informal sector and turning agriculture into a refugee sector for excess labour (Wuyts and Kilama 2014). This growth came to be characterized by what Yonathan Morse (2018) has referred to as 'wild capitalism'. This refers to a situation where a new politico-economic elite tries to amass as much wealth as possible from the public purse. The result was growing inequality, with a few amassing billions while the majority of the population stagnated or became poorer. This is the situation under which Magufuli ascended to the presidency. He confronted this situation by pursuing a personalized approach to government. This had mainly two elements. First was a hands-on approach to the activities of the government, which translated into surprise visits to various institutions and demanding accountability from those managing government departments and state institutions. This led to the public firing and shaming of those who failed to fulfil their responsibilities. The second was the personal selection of leaders in both the government and state institutions on the basis of their ability to work and implement the set government policies. There was thus a preference for technocrats rather than politicians. The above earned Magufuli various titles. Those who admired his approach referred to him as "mchapa kazi" (workaholic) and "Tinga Tinga" (bulldozer). Those against him called him a petty dictator who was uncompromising and ruthless. The above was all possible because of the executive powers conferred on the president by the country's constitution.

The Executive Presidency and Tanzania's Development Path

The Tanzanian Constitution gives too much power to the presidency, to the extent that national development has been closely tied to the personal vision of the president. If you want to influence development policy in Tanzania, you have to find a means of influencing the presidency. It should not be surprising that a lot of institutions are based on the presidency as this gives them a stamp of presidential authority. The power to make policy decisions lies with the president, as granted by article 35 of the constitution, and all others act on behalf of the president. Furthermore, the president has the powers to constitute and abolish any office in the service of the United Republic (36 (1)) and to appoint persons to hold positions of leadership responsible for formulating policies for departments and institutions of government and the chief executives who are responsible for the supervision of the implementation of those departments and institutions (36 (2)). The list of presidential appointees in Tanzania is very long and can easily be abused into a patronage system. In the name of maintaining the discipline of the public servants and the public services of the government, the president has full control of the entire civil service.

On top of the above powers, article 37 (1) of the constitution states that the president shall be free and shall not be obliged to take the advice given to him by any person save where this is required by the constitution or any other law to act in accordance with the advice given to him by any person or authority. In this setup, the cabinet, including the prime minister who acts as leader of government business in the National Assembly, is just an advisory organ to the president. Article 54 (3) of the constitution thus notes: cabinet shall assist and advise the president over any matter which shall be submitted to the cabinet pursuant to specific or general direction issued by the president. Nobody, including the courts, can question any advice or what advice is given. The president thus has carte blanche to act as he pleases in the running of government business. To the above must be added the fact that the constitution grants the president immunity from criminal and civil proceedings in anything done or not done, or purported to have been done or not done, by him in his personal capacity as an ordinary citizen, either before or after he assumed the office of the president (46 (2)). This immunity is extended to the president after leaving office.

The concentration of power in the hands of the president has its own implications. First and foremost is that all presidential appointees, ministers, top civil servants and heads of government institutions are bound to implement presidential directives once issued, even when they foresee negative implications of the issued orders. This has often created a situation of fear and turned the advisors into yes-men. This fear has been heightened by Magufuli's personalized leadership style of giving imperial orders, a style which was replicated by the entire top leadership of ministers, regional and district commissioner, etc. The rule-by-order style of leadership does not address the implementation challenges of the orders. Tied to this leadership style was the public firing of officials or rather the public humiliation of officials including ministers.[1] The public humiliation is seen as part of squeezing the boils (kupasua majipu), that is, forcing out the rotten pus to heal the corruption and dereliction-of-duty diseases in the public realm. Ministers were shielded in the past by their political standing in the party, but with the collapse of the various party factions during Magufuli's election, this disappeared as he was now free to appoint ministers outside the party hierarchy. He sought to create a technocratic government manned mostly by those who were not within the government/party machinery, referred to as workhorse magicians, whose central loyalty was to the president (Kelssal 2018).

Besides the presidential powers, one needs to look at the new economic directions that Magufuli was pushing forward. The major change under Magufuli was in Tanzania's mining regime, in which four major legislations were enacted. These were the National Wealth Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act of 2017, the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendment) Act of 2017, the Natural Wealth and Resources Contracts (Review Negotiations on Unconscionable Terms) Act of 2017 and

1 See footnote 3, Chapter 5.

the Mining (Local Content) Regulations of 2018. The above were detailed under "Magufuli's Drive to Increase Government Revenue and the Confrontation with the Mining Companies". Two things need to be noted here. First and foremost is the overall public dissatisfaction with the old mining regime. While there was an upsurge in growth in the mining sector, resulting in the growth of GDP. There was very little benefit to the government in terms of revenue and to the public at large as mining represented an economic enclave with little ties to the rest of the economy. Second is the rise in economic nationalism, in which citizens pushed for meaningful participation in the mining sector that was dominated by foreign mining companies. It is this that was behind the local content regulations which had been already legislated upon in the natural gas sector. Thus, a change in the mining regime was publicly supported.

New laws did not result in immediate changes but opened negotiations with mining companies to come up with a more acceptable compromise. The negotiations, though long, were slightly easier in the gold sector where companies had already invested heavily and were thus ready to compromise by reducing the high profits they had enjoyed for a long time. In the gas sector, where investors have not yet sunk huge investments, negotiations are likely to be harder and to Tanzania's disadvantage. Magufuli died before completing negotiations on the setting up of an LNG complex in Mtwara to bring into full exploitation the huge natural gas reserves. This task is now left to the new president.

There was no major shift in the industrial and agricultural sectors. The only visible change was the reintroduction of the "state" as a main player in the national economy. The years of Mwinyi, Mkapa and Kikwete were marked by the privatization of state enterprises and the push for the private sector as an engine of growth. The end result was the growth of wild capitalism noted above. Magufuli's actions in this regard could be seen as an attempt to discipline the private sector and to empower the state. The government was pushing for a greater share in the public-private partnerships in all sectors of the economy. The government was using procurement contracts, state-owned banks and pension funds to channel finances towards parastatals, military-owned enterprises, the prison services and various government agencies or starting new ventures in construction, agricultural production, processing and manufacturing. This was being justified in terms of saving money for the government. This had, however, broader economic implications as it negatively affected the private sector and the informal sector that previously survived on government contracts.

Magufuli paid more attention to the development of infrastructure, which had been identified as a bottleneck to economic growth and investments. This formed the backbone of what has been referred to as Magufuli's flagship/priority projects elaborated in the second five-year plan

(2016/2017-2020/21) and the budget speeches. The only caution is that despite the continuous boasts of being able to fund these projects with local revenue, the government had to borrow heavily to finance the broad outlay of infrastructure it had embarked on. This carried the danger of pushing the country into heavy debt, which could inhibit its future choices in development.

In terms of development and economic transformation, not much changed under Magufuli. The country continued to export unprocessed agricultural and mineral resources and import machinery and manufactured goods. What changed was the direction of trade, which had started under Kikwete, with the growing importance of China and India. China currently supplies 19.3 per cent of our imports but only takes 3.2 per cent of the country's exports. India supplies 15 per cent of the imports but takes 23.7 per cent of exports (Bank of Tanzania 2018). The industrialization drive that was constantly talked about by Magufuli had not yet born fruits by the time of his death. This is the area that needs attention, as every regime in Tanzania has had grand industrialization plans that never materialized.

Managing the National Debt

One of the major obstacles to Tanzania's development has been the "debt trap" in which the country has repeatedly fallen. Magufuli was aware of this and often referred to debt sustainability. There is therefore a need to keep an eye on the country's debt situation. In discussing the national debt, several things need to be taken into consideration. First is the distinction between external and domestic debt. External debt is defined as the outstanding amount of current and contingent liabilities that require payment of interest and or principal by the borrower at some point in the future and which are owed to non-residents by residents (Upendo Samson 2015). Thus, external debt includes not only borrowings by the government but also by the private sector and, in the case of Tanzania, by public corporations. In the discussion of debt sustainability, the focus is on the external debts because these have to be paid in foreign currency. Debt sustainability refers to the country's ability to meet its current and future external debt service obligations in full without recourse to debt rescheduling or the accumulation of arrears and without compromising growth. In the late 70s and 80s, Tanzania faced a debt crisis and had to go for debt rescheduling under the Paris Club. But the terms and conditions set out included accepting in total the IMF and World Bank conditions of completely changing our socialist development path and accepting the private sector-driven growth. As a country, therefore, we know the pains of a debt crisis and would certainly wish to avoid it in the future.

There are various ways of looking at debt sustainability ratios, with thresholds established by the IMF, and the country is said to be in distress if it surpasses these thresholds.

Table 2: IMF Debt Sustainability Thresholds and Tanzania's Current Status.[2]

Sustainability Ratios	Threshold	Current
PV of debt to GDP Ratio	40.0	19.7
PV of debt to exports	150.0	81.8
PV of debt to revenue	250.0	117.1
Debt service to export ratio	20	9.7
Debt service to Revenue Ratio	20	13.3

Source: Bank of Tanzania 2018 Annual Report

Despite the constant assurance by the government that the current debt levels are sustainable, there has been a steady growth in the country's external debt since the 2006 HPIC debt relief. This resulted in the decline of the country's debt stock from US$ 6.112 billion in 2006 to US$ 4.644 billion in 2007. Since then, it has been on the rise, hitting US$ 16.4082 billion in 2016 and US$ 21.6008 billion in 2019. The table below indicates the debt stock by borrowers from 2016 to 2019.

2 For a more detailed discussion on debt burden and sustainability and economic growth in Tanzania, see Mnaku Honest Maganya 2019; Mutaju Marobhe 2018; Rashid Saleh et al. 2017; Moga Tano Jilenga et al. 2016; Upendo Samson 2015; Faraji Kasidi and Makame Said 2013.

Table 3: External Debt Stock by Borrowers in Millions of US$ (June 2019)

	2016	2017	2018	2019
Central Government	13282.9	14686.4	15823.5	16336.2
DOD (I)	12548.2	13901.6	14978.8	15441.0
Interest Arrears	734.7	784.8	844.7	894.6
Private Sector	2727.5	3654.4	4467.8	5105.8
DOD	2218.5	3067.4	3605.7	4153.9
Interest Arrears	509.0	-	-	951.9
Public Corporations	397.2	310.3	217.7	158.8
DOD	387.8	282.2	180.4	124.7
Interest Arrears	9.4	28.1	31.3	34.1
Totals	16408.2	18651.1	20509	21600.8

Source: Bank of Tanzania, Quarterly Review, June 2019
DOD (1): Disbursed Outstanding Debts.

It is not enough to talk about the external national debt. One needs to understand the creditors and how the debts are used. The Bank of Tanzania provides figures on both as of May 2019.

Table 4: Tanzania External Debt Stock by Creditors in Millions of US$

Creditor	Amount	Share
Multilateral	9890.7	45.8
Bilateral	1937.1	9.0
Commercial	7356.2	34.1
Export Credit	2416.8	11.2
Total	21600.8	100

Source: Bank of Tanzania, Monthly Report June 2019

It is important to note that bilateral credit represents the lowest share. The multilateral donors, which include the World Bank, IMF and African Development Bank, have become the main creditors (45.8 per cent). This gives them greater influence in shaping the country's development. Disagreement with their recommendations leads to stoppage on disbursement, and money would have to be found elsewhere to continue with the development programmes. One should remember the special influence these multilateral creditors have had on Tanzania. They are the ones that pushed for privatization and the mining agreements from which the government benefited little. They are likely to oppose the government turn to a statist approach to economic development in Tanzania. The second source of credit is commercial (34.1 per cent), which is mostly short-term and at higher interest rates. If you add export credit (11.2 per cent), 45.3 per cent is short-term credit. This has a big impact on debt repayment, and any shortfall in government revenue and external liquidity would push the country into a debt crisis and force it to go to the IMF for short-term relief – with conditions, of course.

At the same time, one needs to address the issue of how the borrowed funds are used. From table 5 below, a few things can be noted. First and foremost, the government has to borrow to meet the balance of payment and its budget needs. This accounts for 14.8 per cent of the borrowing. But after this, how do you justify the 16.3 per cent on social welfare and education? The only justification for this is the multilateral focus on poverty reduction and hence forcing the government to borrow to meet the specified need. One should also note that little money is spent on industrialization despite the heightened talk about it becoming the main growth sector of the economy. Similarly, little is spent on agriculture despite this being a major sector of the economy absorbing the surplus-labour. Therefore, critical questions need to be asked on what we use the borrowed money for, given that it has to be paid back.

Table 5: External Debt by Use of Funds in Millions of US$

Activity	Amount	Share
BoP & Budget Support	2126.8	14.8
Transport & Telecom	4390.0	22.3
Agriculture	1246.0	6.3
Energy and Mining	3070.0	15.6
Industries	658.0	3.3
Social welfare & Education	3209.0	16.3
Finance and Insurance	1191.0	6.0
Tourism	171.0	0.9
Real Estate and Construction	1069.0	5.4
Other	1789.1	9.0
Total	19719.9	100

Source: Bank of Tanzania, Monthly Report June 2019

In discussing debt sustainability, the focus is always on external debt as if the government does not have to repay the domestic debt. But if you combine the external and domestic debt the government liability goes beyond the 40 per cent GDP threshold. Total debt stock as a percentage of GDP stood at 51.5 per cent in the 2017/2018 financial year. The domestic debt stock accounted for 12.4 per cent of GDP in the same financial year has risen from 7.2 per cent in 2010/2011. According to the Bank of Tanzania (2018), the government was unable to pay the entire domestic debt that fell due for payment in the 2017/2018 financial year. TSh 6.1433 trillion was due for payment at the time but the state had to roll over TSh 4.7871 trillion that is equivalent to 78 per cent. This is not a healthy situation as it is likely to affect the operations of the financial institutions who are the main holders of government domestic debt, as can be seen from the table below.

The main domestic borrowing instruments are government securities that in June 2019 stood at TSh 13.3173 trillion, equivalent to 86.2 per cent, treasury bills, government stocks and government bonds. Domestic borrowing has increased in part to meet budget deficits caused by non-disbursement of promised funds by the development partners whenever they are in disagreement with the government or dissatisfied with government activities. It thus becomes important for the government to manage its development partners/aid donors.

Table 6: Government Domestic Debt by Holders, June 2019, in Billions of TSh

Holders	Amount	Share
Commercial Banks	5232.4	33.7
Bank of Tanzania	3411.9	22.0
Pension Funds	3812.6	24.6
Insurance	1362.2	8.8
BOT Special Funds	294.7	1.9
Others	1399.6	9.0
Total	15513.3	100

Source: Bank of Tanzania, Monthly Report, June 2019.
Others include Public Institutions, Private Companies and Individuals

Managing Development Partners

Starting with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005, one no longer talks of aid donors but development partners. This is, of course, with respect to the OECD-DAC members. The change in nomenclature is to emphasize the fact that aid has always been to promote the development of the poor recipient countries. This hides the true motives of aid, which have always been to promote donors' political, economic and strategic interests (Andrew Giovanni 2011; Bearce and Tirone 2010). This was apparent in the 60s and 70s when aid was used as a weapon in the Cold War struggles between the East and the West. In the 1980s, aid was effectively used to force developing countries to adopt a liberal market economy. In the case of Tanzania, the government had to abandon its socialist state development path as a precondition for receiving aid to get out of the debt trap the country found itself in (Aili Mari Tripp 2012). What also needs to be noted is that development was and still is mostly defined by the same aid donors, who then determine where and how their aid should be used. Their idea of development has constantly been shifting, and with it, the focus and manner in which their aid was disbursed and utilized (Alden, large and Mendez 2019).

This is not the time or place to discuss how aid has affected Tanzania's development. This has been covered by others (Nyoni 1997; Rotarou and Ueta 2009; Choog et al. 2010; Sebatian Edwards 2014; Luc Martial 2015; Choray Rukia Hassan 2016). The focus here is the type of partnership that

Tanzania has forged with the development partners since 2006 under the Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania 2006-2011. The first step in operationalizing the strategy was the signing in January 2006 of the Partnership Framework Memorandum on General Budget Support. The 14 development partners that signed this memorandum were: AfDB, Canada, Japan, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the World Bank. The main aim of the memorandum was to ensure the predictability of aid, to ensure that the government can realistically make budget planning, to ensure that most of the aid support government budget plans and aid disbursement goes straight to the government thus reducing aid outside the government budget. The focus on a Public Finance Management System was essentially meant to ensure that donor funds disbursed through General Budget Support or Sector Budget Support were being properly utilized. The government then established the Aid Management Platform under the ministry of finance to capture and monitor aid flows into the country (Ministry of Finance 2011).

The Joint Evaluation of Budget support that was carried out in 2012/2013 by Itad (2013) noted a number of things. First was the growing use of budget support by the development partners to the extent that by 2009/2010 almost 50 per cent of all ODA was channelled through budget support. This, however, had dropped to 33 per cent in 2011/12 and has continued to drop ever since, prompting the finance minister to reduce budget dependency on external aid as this disrupts the budget when the promised funds fail to materialize. Secondly, the evaluation notes the underlying principles that were critical to the continuation of budget support by the development partners. These included: sound macroeconomic management; commitment to meeting the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSRGP) known in Swahili as Mpango wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umaskini Tanzania (MKUKUTA) objectives and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); sound budgetary and Public Finance Management (PFM) systems; continuing peace and respect for human rights, the rule of law, democratic principles and the independence of the judiciary; and good governance, accountability of the government to its citizens and integrity in public life, including the active fight against corruption. The corruption scandals that became public under Kikwete's second term made the development partners delay the disbursement of promised funds until specific actions had been taken, others went to the extent of suspending the promised funds. There was, in fact, a loss of trust by the development partners in the government. The result was that by 2017, only four of the 14 development partners that signed the memorandum in 2006 still used budget support (Kaberuka Report 2017). Most of the development partners resorted to traditional project funding, to the frustration of the government. It no longer had full control of the development process which had been achieved through general budget support and sector budget support.

There was also, according to Kaberuka, a lack of a common vision on the needs of Tanzania, with the development partners pursuing their own independent agendas, which, while important, could not be synchronized with the government's immediate goals. Kaberuka's recommendations were for the government and development partners to re-establish an effective dialogue which should involve: government's institution of an investment week in which development issues would be debated to establish a common vision; reduction of Development Partner (DP) meetings with the ministry of finance and recommended that issues should be debated under the ministry of foreign affairs and that sensitive issues should not disrupt the budget process; and having a comprehensive review of the sector groups.

It is important to note here that despite the changes in the partnership framework, including the entrance of new development partners like China and India and the growing partnership between the private sector and the government, the development partners are still very important in Tanzania. The Kaberuka report noted that at least a third of the development budget was still funded by the development partners. A substantial amount of aid still flowed from the DAC countries, as can be seen in Table 7 below.

Table 7: ODA from DAC Countries in Millions of US$ 2013-2017

Country	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
US	793.8	865.8	463.8	587.5	666.2
UK	306.8	313.7	313.0	251.3	216.8
Switzerland	38.9	52.9	32.3	31.5	30.8
Sweden	94.5	96.0	131.3	99.9	112.8
Norway	99.5	76.4	47.4	47.2	43.6
Netherlands	33.3	37.8	53.8	21.5	241.3
Korea	56.9	79.9	71.4	63.7	39.3
Japan	185.3	111.8	118.9	595.8	227.7
Ireland	43.6	33.1	31.6	28.1	22.7
Germany	112.6	75.0	185.0	71.1	86.2
France	-	-	42.9	80.2	30.0

Finland	45.0	61.2	27.0	23.2	20.0
Denmark	89.3	71.3	40.8	53.7	52.3
Canada	165.5	85.8	84.8	50.3	90.1
Total	2097.2	2054.8	1637.8	1997.2	1914.2

Source: OECD 2019.

What is at stake is not the withdrawal of aid but how this aid is being disbursed. This is what underlies the Development Cooperation Framework 2017/2018-2024/2025, which is discussed in more detail below.

At the centre of the Development Cooperation Framework was the government's demand to take full control of, or rather domesticate, the entire aid process. In the first instance, the development partners were called upon to use government systems for planning, allocating, procurement, auditing and monitoring and evaluation. With regard to procurement, it insisted that, as far as possible, the DPs should provide development assistance to the government that is freely and fully available to finance the procurement of goods and services from any country or source. Secondly, the DPs were requested to provide timely and disaggregated information on the assistance, to enable the government to better plan utilization of resources and also record the relevant assistance in the annual budget. While still allowing direct project funding, the government insisted that this should be done through the exchequer system, whereby development partners deposit funds at the Bank of Tanzania with the corresponding amount allocated to the project in the government. In the case of direct funds, goods and services and equipment are provided directly to a specific project, then a project report should be made to the treasury on the quantity and value of goods and services received with relevant supporting documents to evidence the disbursement and purchase. This type of direct project funding should, however, only be used in large-scale infrastructure investment, in emergency aid, where quick and localized service delivery is needed. In short, every aid project must be reported to the government. In this regard, non-state actors, both domestic and international, have to provide the government with their sources of funding and utilization. This demand was made into law in the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) (no 3) Act of 2019, which established control by the government over NGOs finances as discussed in the chapter on corruption.

It has not been possible to establish how the DPs have reacted to these demands thus far. But continuous confrontations between the DPs and the government under Magufuli indicated that the issues were still being negotiated. At stake was the power balance between the government and development partners, and the concern was over what type of leverage the DPs had over government policy. The importance of the DPs goes beyond the provision of aid and includes their influence over the multilateral and commercial aid donors to which the government moved when the bilateral aid was not forthcoming. They have also a great influence on Foreign Direct Investments available to the country, as these come mostly from these countries. It is therefore crucial that cordial arrangements be maintained with them. The entry of what has been referred to as South–South Development Partners – in particular, China and India in the case of Tanzania – is not enough to marginalize or diminish the influence of Western donors. The new donors are focused more on trade ties and gaining market access, which is limited by poor infrastructure. This is why they have a specific focus on infrastructure development (Alden, Large and Mendez 2019). Chinese loans to Tanzania, which the Ministry of Finance considers as semi-concessional because of their favourable conditions of a five-year grace period and a maturity of twenty years, have grown considerably since 2010. They were US$ 299 in 2010 million, US$ 743 million in 2012 and US$ 1.4 billion in 2015. The cumulative disbursement of Chinese loans to Tanzania between 2010 and 2015 is estimated at over US$ 4 billion (Jean Pierre and Jean Raphael 2016). There is thus a growing indebtedness to China. To this should be added the skewed trade balance in favour of China and the fact that China is not among the top foreign investors in the country. This, has made Magufuli's government try and limit the country's growing indebtedness to China. India's interests have been much more commercial, with loans advanced to purchase Indian goods and the country becoming a destination for our agricultural raw materials (Lunegelo and Baregu 2013). Of course, having a more prosperous Indian community has led to some flow of investments from India, but mostly in terms of assembling goods from India.

The post-Magufuli government has to address the issues of debt sustainability and the management of development partners (aid donors) as it moves forward.