Chapter 4
Women and Electoral Politics

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Introduction

The under-representation of women in politics is widely regarded as an ongoing problem despite the fact that some political parties have adopted measures to increase the proportion of women elected. The case for gender parity, rather than a more modest claim for just increasing the number of women elected, has been promoted by feminist scholars such as Phillips (1998), who provides four main arguments that are generally put forward in justifying gender parity in political representation. The first argument dwells on the fact that successful politicians serve as role models: when more women candidates are elected it boosts women's self-esteem, it encourages other women to follow in their footsteps and disrupts deep-rooted conventions on the role of men and women (Phillips 1998). For Phillips this argument has no relevance to politics per se and she concentrates on the other three arguments. The first argument for gender parity is based on justice – the fact that it is 'grotesquely unfair for men to monopolise representation' (Phillips 1998: 229). The second relates to women's interests that would otherwise be overlooked. It is argued that women's needs and interests, and the concerns that arise from their specific experiences, will be inadequately addressed in a political sphere dominated by men (Phillips 1998). And lastly, gender parity (changing the composition of elected assemblies) would revitalise democracy by bridging the gap between representation and participation (Phillips 1998). Phillips argues that although there is a case to be made for both the first and second arguments (they provide a basis for substantial change), they fall short on some key concerns. For her, bridging the gap or changing the balance between representation and participation enhances democracy. Therefore, the case for gender parity, as Phillips (1998: 239) notes, is the 'strongest when it is associated with the larger dream'.

In chapter 2, the electoral malpractices that undermine the integrity of elections in Anglophone African countries were highlighted. However, the under-representation of women in political decision-making as a result of their lack of equal opportunities to run for office was deliberately excluded. 'The lack of equal opportunities for women to run for office' is listed as one of the

performance indicators or measures to establish the overall integrity of elections (see Grömping and F. Martinez i Coma 2015: 37)

In the last decade or so, it has become common practice for election observation mission groups, such as the European Union Election Observation Missions and the African Union Election Observer Missions, to also include a section on women's participation in their final reports on the elections they have observed in African countries. However, the discussions on women are limited to, for example, the existence of a legal framework that guarantees women's equality, the presence of women at campaign rallies, the female component of the polling staff, the fact that women are more subject to sexual violence than men during disturbances, the mentioning of legislated or reserved seats in cases where these exist, the low representation of female candidates and then, finally, the number of women elected to parliaments. No attention is paid though to the underlying causes of the low number of female candidates.

Studies done in different parts of the world have found that sexist views among the electorate are not holding women back from political participation, nor is there any clear correlation between hostility to women in leadership positions and the actual number of women in political decision-making positions (see, for example, NDI and FIDA 2018; Morgan and Buice 2013; Sabonmatsu 2002; and Norris and Inglehart 2001). Explanations for women's under-representation lie in a combination of institutional and social factors: on the one hand, political institutions such as the electoral system and political parties, and on the other, social obstacles such as financial, lifestyle and cultural constraints (Lovenduski 2005: 45-46).

Since the return to multi-party elections in most Anglophone countries in the early 1990s, there has been a steady increase in the representation of women in national parliaments. The importance of the full inclusion of women in political decision-making by the UN and international and regional women's organisations influenced women's rights norms throughout Africa, although African women's movements were themselves active in helping shape these global trends (Tripp and Badri 2017). The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995) was very influential in calling on governments to take measures to, among other things, ensure women's equal access to and full participation in power structures, integrate women into political parties and increase women's participation in the electoral process and political activities. In 1995, it set a target to have women occupy at least 30 per cent of political and decision-making structures by the year 2005.

The African women's rights movements also engaged the African Union (AU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and other sub-regional organisations to put pressure on member states to advance women's rights. The AU has adopted some of the most progressive

declarations and protocols on gender equality. Its Maputo Protocol, adopted in 2003 (officially registered as the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa), stresses the principle of gender equality, while in its Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa of July 2004, it confirmed the principle of 'gender parity' and re-affirmed its commitment to 'promote gender equality at all levels'. Furthermore, in 2009 the African women's decade (2010-2020) was also adopted and committed AU member states to universal ratification, full domestication and implementation of the Maputo Protocol by 2020 (AU 2018). Botswana is one of three African countries that had neither signed nor ratified the protocol by 2018.

At sub-regional level, the SADC Protocol on Gender and Development (signed by the SADC heads of state and government in August 2008) commits member states to endeavour to achieve a target of at least 50 per cent women in decision-making positions in the public and private sectors by 2015 (article 12 (1)).[1] This protocol is a legally binding agreement, compelling SADC members to hasten efforts towards gender equality in the region. All Anglophone SADC countries have signed the protocol and have undertaken constitutional reviews, with the exception of Botswana, which does not have specific references to gender equality in its constitution. As argued by Scribner and Lambert (2010: 58), constitutional gender equality provisions matter for political and judicial outcomes in that they affect legislation and judicial decisions. Gendered constitutional provisions, therefore, provide a legal tool for women's rights advocacy and social equality.

Despite the target set by the Beijing Platform of Action for at least 30 per cent women in political decision-making structures by 2005 and the commitments to gender parity, the majority of Anglophone African countries have, by 2019, not even reached this target. As shown in Table 1 below, only South Africa has passed the 45 per cent mark, while Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe are between 31-39 per cent; Zambia and Ghana are below 20 per cent and Botswana and Nigeria trail with 9.5 per cent and 3.38 per cent respectively. South Africa is ninth on the world ranking of women in parliament, surpassed only by Rwanda (61.25 per cent) on the continent. Uganda, Tanzania and Zimbabwe rank within the top 46 countries in the world in terms of parliamentary representation, while Nigeria is close to the bottom of the 192 ranked countries. Nigeria's representation of women in the 2019 elections saw a decrease from the 2015 elections, from 5.6 per cent to a low of 3.63 per cent. This is not surprising given the fact that in the 2019 elections women made up only one

1 Most (six) of the ten Anglophone countries in Africa are members of the SADC: they are Botswana, Malawi, Tanzania, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

per cent of the 8 875 total number of candidates for the national and gubernatorial elections, 560 women were competing for the 360 seats in the House of Representatives compared with 4 139 men (11.9 per cent women), and of 73 candidates running for president only five were women (UN Women 2019).

Table 1 Women in parliament, electoral systems and gender quotas

Country	Women in parliament (National Assembly) 1 March 2020 %	World ranking 1 March 2020	Electoral system	Gender quota national type
South Africa	46,58	9	List PR	Voluntary – parties
Tanzania	36,9	33	FPTP	Reserved seats (Constitution)
Uganda	34,86	36	FPTP	Reserved seats (Constitution)
Zimbabwe	31,85	46	Parallel	Reserved seats (Constitution)
Malawi	22,92	85	FPTP	Voluntary – parties
Kenya	21,78	93	FPTP	Reserved seats (Constitution)
Zambia	16,77	127	FPTP	None
Ghana	13,09	149	FPTP	None
Botswana	10,77	163	FPTP	Voluntary – parties
Nigeria	3,63	185	FPTP	None

Source: Inter Parliamentary Union. Women in National Parliaments (1 March 2020)

While great emphasis is put on women's representation in parliaments, their appointment to cabinet positions is even more significant given their policymaking power. The number of women appointed in cabinets is generally low,[2] with Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Botswana having the lowest percentage of female cabinet members of the Anglophone countries. During his first term of office, Buhari (2015-2019) was criticised for only appointing fifteen women ministers (of

2 The figures only reflect full ministers and not assistant or deputy ministers

a 36-member cabinet), though he promised to address this during his second term. However, the opposite has happened. In his second term, Buhari has appointed only seven women to an enlarged cabinet of 43 members, which not only suggests that the government is tone-deaf to gender equality but is also a violation of the national gender policy – it requires a minimum of 35 per cent female representation on the president's cabinet. In Mnangagwa's cabinet in Zimbabwe, women constitute a mere five out of 30 cabinet ministers (17 per cent), with no women deputy ministers. In Botswana, Masisi's cabinet consists of only 11 per cent (two of eighteen) women, and in Malawi President Mutharika also only appointed two women (11 per cent) to his 18-member cabinet after the country's 2019 elections.

The proportion of women in the cabinets of Tanzania, Kenya, Ghana and Zambia range between 20 per cent and 30 per cent: Tanzania 27 per cent (six of a 22-member cabinet), Kenya 27 per cent (six of 21), Zambia 28 per cent (eight of 29), and Ghana 27 per cent (ten of 37) . The list is topped by Uganda with just over 33 per cent (ten of 30) and South Africa, which has, for the first time, reached gender parity after the 2019 elections (fourteen of 28-member cabinet).

In addition, the representation of women in provincial legislatures in South Africa also parallels the national level, where the speakers in the national and provincial legislatures are all women. However, the African National Congress (ANC) appointed only two female premiers in the eight provinces it controls after the 2019 elections, while the Democratic Alliance (DA) also has a male premier in the Western Cape. The appointment of female speakers, as the South African Commission of Gender Equality pointed out, is hardly an equivalent substitution, since the office of speaker does not carry the same constitutional, legislative and political authority (cited in Rama and Lowe Morna 2019). To compensate for the absence of a parity in female premiers (after the 2019 elections), the ANC committed to appointing women to 60 per cent of the executive councils/provincial executive in the five provinces with male premiers. However, in three of these provinces the required 60 per cent falls substantially short (between 7 and 19 per cent) (Rama and Lowe Morna 2019).

This chapter will provide some explanations for why women are under-represented in parliaments and will focus on: political institutions such as the electoral system; the prevalence of quotas for women; and the barriers women face, such as a patriarchal culture, socio-economic disadvantages and violence.

Electoral systems and women's chances to be elected

Electoral systems influence the chances of women being elected. Countries with proportional representation (PR) tend to have more women elected than those with a winner-takes-all majoritarian or plurality single-member district system, that is, first-past-the-post (FPTP). In PR systems, where seats are allocated according to the percentage of votes received, parties try to balance the field of candidates to appeal to a variety of groups in society, such as women (who happen to comprise more than half of the population), without leaving men out, as would be the case in a majority system. In other words, as is often argued, parties in PR systems risk less when fielding equal numbers of female and male candidates in elections. In majority systems, the motivation is different: parties field candidates who, in their view, have a greater chance of winning the most votes. In most of these cases, the party leadership chooses male candidates.[3] In this regard, the deputy speaker of parliament in Malawi, Esther Mcheka-Chilena, emphasised that the first-past-the-post-voting system makes it hard for women to win seats as it pits them against male candidates who have more resources (Chakamba 2017).

Another important reason why PR systems can help women is that a process of 'contagion' (where parties adopt policies initiated by other parties, for example, nominating a percentage of women as candidates) is more likely to occur in a PR system than in a majority or plurality system. For parties competing in a PR system, the cost of adopting such a policy would be lower than the cost for parties competing in a majority/plurality system and the gains could be greater (Maitland 2014: 101-102).[4]

However, some PR systems are preferable to others. The most advantageous PR system for women is where the whole country is one electoral district, provided that women occupy a 'winnable' place on the party list (with a zebra-style 50 per cent representation on party lists being

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3 This was clearly evident in, for example, the gender outcome of the 2016 local elections in South Africa where the electoral system is a combination of proportional representation and the FPTP system - 50 per cent of representatives are elected in ward elections and 50 per cent are elected from a proportional closed list. The percentage of ANC women in proportional seats is 48 per cent, compared with only 33 per cent women in ward seats (Sadie 2017: 49-50).

4 This contagion effect has, for example, been evident in the party lists of opposition parties in South Africa since the 2004 elections. The ANC has been the only party with an informal 50 per cent quota, but it seemed the party's quota system has had a contagion effect on the party lists of opposition parties (see Sadie 2017: 49; Rama and Lowe Morna 2019).

the ideal) (Maitland 2014: 105-107).

Although a PR system seems to provide women with a better chance to be elected, this can only be achieved in combination with positive action measures such as quotas, whether formally legislated by government or informally applied by political parties. Therefore, a PR system should be considered a 'facilitator' rather than a 'guarantor' of better female representation (Evans and Harrison 2012: 243).

Although candidate quotas are more common in PR electoral systems, it does not mean that affirmative action measures cannot be instilled in majoritarian or single-member constituency systems. Reserved seats (which can take many forms) can be mandated in the constitution or law in order to fast-track equitable representation and remedy the significant under-representation of women.

Across the world there has been a rise in the number of countries that implement gender quota policies for parliamentary candidates to promote gender equality in parliaments. In 2019, 61.9 per cent (120) of the 194 countries in the world used gender quota policies for election to the national parliament (lower house). Of these, 91 countries implemented either legal gender quotas for parliamentary candidates or reserved seats for women, while in 29 countries at least one of the three largest parties have adopted voluntary party quotas which, to a greater or lesser extent, has contributed to the increase in the number of women in parliaments (Gender Quota Database 2019). Furthermore, as pointed out by Norris and Dahlerup, (2015), close to half of the 80 countries that had adopted gender quotas in 2014 have strengthened their quotas while only a few countries, such as Italy, Venezuela and later Egypt, have abandoned theirs.

As shown in Table 1, reserved seats for women have been legislated in Uganda, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, though they use different mechanisms to elect reserved-seat MPs, while South Africa is the only Anglophone African country with a PR (list) electoral system (for national and provincial elections) with a voluntary commitment to zebra-style 50 per cent representation by only the ANC and the EFF.

Given the ANC's overwhelming victories in elections over the years, South Africa has always been one of the top ten countries in the world in terms of female representation in parliament. However, in the past few years, the number of female representatives at national and local levels has decreased, along with the ANC's support, from 43.5 per cent in the 2009 national elections to 41.9 per cent in the 2014 elections (it also did not always meet the quota). Although support for the ANC in the 2019 national elections declined by a further 4.65 per cent (down to 57.50 per cent,

amounting to a loss of 19 seats in parliament), the EFF's support increased by 4.46 per cent (gaining 18 seats in parliament). Both the ANC and EFF have 52 per cent women of their total representation in parliament and gains by smaller parties also bolstered the increase in the number of women represented at this level (Rama and Lowe Morna 2019: 6).

Although the electoral system in Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya is a FPTP system, the Ugandan constitution mandates quotas to ensure a more balanced representation of women in its national legislature by creating a separate and parallel system of affirmative action. Affirmative action laws created 112 district seats reserved for 'Women Representatives', who contest exclusively against other women. This system is parallel to the Constituency Representative seats, which are open to both males and females. Women or District Representatives are responsible for a district, which is larger than a constituency and consists of multiple provinces. Each province, therefore, has a Constituency Representative and a Woman Representative (who is also responsible for other provinces). Women hold only nineteen of the 290 open seats (6.5 per cent) (Clayton et al. 2016: 9). Uganda is also one of the countries that has strengthened its quota policy over the years. Before 2006, women in reserved seats were elected indirectly as opposed to the above-described direct election.

In Tanzania, on the other hand, 113 seats of 393 (that is, nearly 30 per cent of all parliamentary seats)[5] are reserved for women (allocated to political parties in proportion to their share of the electoral vote), while five of the ten members appointed by the president should be women and two of the five members from Zanzibar should be women. Each party has its own internal mechanism to nominate special-seat candidates. Women also contest in the open seats and only 25 were elected from the 264 constituency seats in the 2015 election. Therefore, without special seats, women would occupy less than 10 per cent of parliamentary seats (Inter Parliamentary Union 2015: 4-5; Yoon 2016: 192). Zimbabwe's national quota of 30 per cent borrows from the Tanzanian model where women can compete freely at national level, but an additional 30 per cent of the seats in parliament (91 seats) are reserved for women and are distributed among parties on a proportional basis. This temporary special measure (introduced before the 2013 elections) is valid until 2023. In the 2018 elections, women constituted a mere 15 per cent of the parliamentary candidates, despite the fact that the ruling Zanu-PF has a 30 per cent quota for women and the MDC Alliance a 50 per cent quota. Therefore, without the legislated quota, the number of female parliamentarians would

5 When the quota was introduced in 1995 only 15 per cent of the parliamentary seats were reserved for women. Over the years this percentage progressively increased.

be significantly lower. When the quota was introduced in 2013, the representation of women in parliament increased from 18 per cent to 35 per cent (Lowe Morna and Zvaraya 2018). However, this increase in representation due to gender quotas has come with a discernible decrease in female candidates running for reserved seats.

Women County Representative Seats (WCR) were introduced in Kenya in 2013 to increase women's representation. Candidates nominated by political parties contested for these seats in each of Kenya's 47 counties. This system also does not exclude women from contesting constituency seats. The constitution further provides for twelve nominated or appointed seats to the National Assembly to be selected from a zebra list. Although the WCR increased the number of women MPs, the share of women holding National Assembly constituency seats decreased to sixteen in the 2013 elections (Ohman and Lintari 2015: 7) but increased to 23 (of 290 General Assembly constituency seats in the 2017 elections – 8 per cent). Kenya's constitution requires that women occupy at least 30 per cent (117) of the total 349 seats in parliament. However, it falls short by 41 female MPs (Kachambwa 2018); seriously calling into question the government's commitment to bridging the gender gap.

It is therefore evident that without the affirmative action measures, the representation of women in the above three parliaments would have been substantially lower and would have resembled the low percentage of women in the legislatures of Ghana, Botswana, Malawi, Zambia and Nigeria.

However, in both Tanzania and Uganda, the special-seat system has created a stigma against special-seat MPs, and voters tend to look down on these MPs. Clayton et al. (2014) have, for example, also found that quota women in parliament in Uganda are not treated on par with other MPs, whereas winning a constituency in Tanzania seems to present additional rights: women are more easily appointed to higher-level political positions compared with those who entered parliament through the special seats (Meena et al. 2018: 44). Nonetheless, the number of switches to open seats over the years have been small in both countries due to common obstacles to women's political participation (discussed below). The quota design also makes it more difficult in Uganda than in Tanzania for special-seat MPs to contest in constituencies due to the fact that special-seat MPs in Uganda are not tied to one specific constituency, but have their work spread across multiple constituencies. Therefore, their achievements are not easily noticeable, and they do not build up a relationship with a constituency to be elected in an election (Yoon 2016: 200).

In Uganda (and to a lesser extent in Tanzania), the reserved-seat system has 'ghettoised' MPs. It has created a gendered perception that constituency seats are for men and quota seats are for women. The two separate avenues to parliament resulted in the reluctance of parties in both

Uganda and Tanzania to field female candidates for open seats (Wang and Yoon 2018: 301). In Kenya, the WCR seats are also perceived by some as 'men's seats' (Ohman and Lintari 2015:19). Sustainable representation can be seriously undermined by any quota design that creates a gendered perception of open seats as men's seats (Wang and Yoon 2018: 321). In Zimbabwe, the quota system is also stigmatised. Women's participation is viewed by many as 'a token or a privilege granted by men' (IFES 2018: 12).

The future of the special seat system in Tanzania appears to be in the balance. In the draft constitution of 2013, which was approved by the legislature in 2014, no provision is made for special seats for women. The final step will be a referendum on the draft constitution. This should have taken place in April 2015 but has been postponed, and no new date has been provided (Yoon 2016: 205). In the meanwhile, special seats remain.

Explanations for the initial adoption of quotas

The following question arises: what explains the fact that the above-mentioned countries have adopted some form of a gender quota system while other countries, such as Botswana (the oldest democracy in Africa) and Ghana (which receives a perfect score from Freedom House for political rights and the second-best possible score for civil liberties), have not? One would assume that the adoption of legal quotas would be affected by the level of democracy in a country.

In their multivariate analysis covering 196 independent states from 1990 to 2014, Norris and Dahlerup (2015: 4, 18-21) found that the initial adoption and subsequent strengthening of these measures can be attributed to the role of the international community. Multilateral international actors such as the UN (followed by regional organisations such as the AU) – by means of, for example, treaties, conventions and protocols – shaped the global (and regional) norms of gender equality and women's rights. This, coupled with domestic mobilisation by networks of women advocates in political parties and the women's movement, termed 'glocalisation' by Norris and Dahlerup (2015: 3), led to domestic policies designed to strengthen gender equality in elected office. In their study, Norris and Dahlerup (2015: 18-21) also controlled for socio-economic conditions and cultural values and found that the adoption of gender quotas was unaffected by these.

Studies on South Africa (see Geisler 2004 and Hassim 2006), Tanzania (Yoon 2013) and Uganda (Goetz 1998 and Goetz 2002) showed that networks of women advocates in political parties (in South Africa) and the women's movements in these countries indeed played a role in introducing quotas. However, Waylen (2006: 527) argues that women's mobilisation on its own is no guarantee

of success and emphasises the importance of a 'relatively favourable opportunity structure' within which a women's movement operates (as in the case of South Africa and Uganda).[6] Besides the existence of strong women's movements and the widespread mobilisation of women, Okeke-Ihejirika and Franceschet (2002: 442) also emphasise the meaningfulness of democratisation. Where the transition to democracy is a less decisive break from a past regime, women's gains are relatively weak. Women's ability to promote their interests effectively within the political system is, therefore, strongly impacted by the quality of democratisation. The lack of an 'opportunity structure' (such as a decisive break from the past), as well as the absence of a broad-based women's movement which actively organises around gender issues in the transition period (and linking them to the nations struggle for democracy), seems to explain the non-existence of quotas and, consequently, also the lowest representations of women in parliament in African countries such as Botswana, Ghana and Nigeria. However, as will be shown below, these factors play out differently in these countries.

Botswana, the oldest African democracy (Chapter 2) and often hailed as the region's model democracy, is an interesting case. Banda (2006) and Scribner and Lambert (2010) highlight the fact that other African countries have written new constitutions during their political transitions and included gender equality provisions (changed to more women-friendly). But, as Banda (2006: 17) notes, Botswana, among other southern African countries such as Zambia, have remained with their original British-drafted constitution, and in doing so 'have merely kept the gender provisions that they were given'. She further remarks that it 'speaks poorly of them that they have not moved beyond that discriminatory phase' (Banda 2006: 17). Therefore, the adoption of the Botswana constitution (1965) – which was well before the appearance of international women's organisations or broader norms about the promotion of women's rights – and the absence of a strong women's movement in Botswana help to explain the scarcity of gender-equality provisions in the constitution (Scribner and Lambert 2010: 43). The women's movements in Botswana arrived on the political scene not because of the opening up of the political system by democracy, but

6 In South Africa the political opportunities provided by the struggle against apartheid, the nature of the transition period and the associated discourse of rights and citizenship framed the women's movement's demands (Waylen 2006: 527). In addition, the ANC committed itself to gender and racial equality. The 'opportunity structure' in Uganda was created by the suspension of multi-party politics, the personal support of President Museveni for women's rights and the simultaneous growth of a women's movement to become a strong mobilising force. The period of suppression of party activity opened some space for women to become political actors and for activists and legislators to build coalitions to promote an agenda for gender equity in public policies (Goet, 1998: 244-245).

in an attempt to challenge the further tightening of women's rights, instead of fighting for greater equality. Since the mid-1990s, women's organisations and women politicians have managed to influence the amendment of key pieces of legislation that affected women, such as the Citizen Act, the Employment Act and the Marital Power Bill, while influencing the adoption of new legislation regarding domestic violence (Scribner and Lambert 2010: 51). However, as Scribner and Lambert (2010: 46) argue, these 'generally focused on removing discriminatory legislation' rather than on 'proactive measures to increase women's economic or political power'.

Although women's organisations such as Emang Basadi were involved in mobilising around the adoption of gender quotas in the late 1990s, and the issue of quotas was explored at national conferences in 2002 and 2006, these initiatives have been unsuccessful (Bauer and Burnet 2013: 105).

In Ghana, the democratisation process was based on the legacy of repression under the military rule of Rawlings (1981-1992) and the presence of the 31st December Women's Movement, which was tied to the state. Rawlings's regime, the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), was characterised by people living 'under a culture of silence' and 'not speaking out against the government' (Fallon 2003: 529). This fear continued with the transition to democracy in 1992, when multi-party elections were held but were boycotted by opposition parties. Rawlings and his party, the National Democratic Party (NDP), maintained power. Of further importance was the establishment of the 31st December Women's Movement by Rawlings in 1982 (and since 1985 under the presidency of his wife) in order to mobilise women to become socially, economically and politically active (though it acted as an organisation to mobilise women under the PNDC). The movement not only co-opted women's organisations and dominated women's issues, but it also received financial support from the government to improve women's economic and social situations. Women who supported it received more funding. With the transition to multi-party elections in 1992, the movement continued its activities under the National Democratic Congress (NDC) (Fallon 2003: 530). Women's organisations were, therefore, only active at a local level and concerned with women's socio-economic issues.

Although women had the opportunity to address their concerns at a national level to improve their rights in the democratisation period, women had to overcome two challenges: the fear of addressing political issues instilled by the military regime and the existence of the 31st December Women's Movement, which could challenge their organisation if they were to address political issues, and the repercussions that could follow. Consequently, women's organisations either shied away from political issues or, at most, only became involved in non-partisan political issues at a

national level, such as motivating and educating women to vote in order to improve their economic and social positions (Fallon 2002: 149). Therefore, the fear that remained from the military rule and the existence of the state's 31st December Women's Movement not only hindered the development of a larger women's movement to pursue issues such as quotas for women's representation, but also prevented other organisations from creating opportunities to address issues of political representation (Fallon 2003: 531).

In Nigeria, a strong military presence over the years has also shaped its post-colonial history, political climate and gender relations. The post-independence period in Nigeria, characterised by instability and a continuous change of government (as a result of long periods of military rule mingled with civilian intervals), inhibited the emergence of a broad-based movement prompting the collapse of military rule. Consequently, women could not align with such a movement, which could have provided them the opportunity to re-negotiate unequal gender relations. The rise of an autonomous women's movement capable of making political demands did not mirror the process of political change (Okeke-Ihejirika and Franceschet 2002: 448).

Furthermore, political competition around ethnic divisions, rather than ideologies, also extended to women's organisations, affecting the type of women's movement that was emerging and the way in which political institutions could be accessed. The patterns of patronage resulting from the ethnic conflict that dominates politics in Nigeria have also shaped women's organisations and their limits. In addition, the deep divisions that existed between women with connections to the male ruling class and women's organisations that operate outside these networks of political power complicated the creation of cross-ethnic women's movements (Okeke-Ihejirika and Franceschet 2002: 450, 455).

On the other hand, the above-mentioned scholars argued that the continued ethnic tension, combined with the lack of economic recovery, has continued to undermine the goals of democratisation in general and women's participation in particular. The delay in satisfying 'women's interests' 'is justified in the face of the overarching need for stability' (Okeke-Ihejirika and Franceschet 2002: 458). Therefore, Nigeria's male-dominated and ethnically based political parties, and the ethnic rivalries in terms of party competition, have inhibited the insertion of gender in mainstream political discourse (Okeke-Ihejirika and Franceschet 2002: 454).

Although women's groups in Nigeria had, by 2018, started to campaign for gender quotas, this campaign is, according to Ako-Nai and Obamamoye (2018: 73), 'still at the elementary' stage. Not only are the number of women involved in the struggle for legislative change very limited compared to the number of women in Nigeria, but no specific bill regarding gender quotas has yet

been advanced to the National Assembly. Unlike the public protests by women in the colonial era against insensitive gender policies, the current approach by women's organisations is deliberately non-violent and non-confrontational. In addition, no coordinated movement exists, and women's organisations and individuals committed to quota campaigns vary, with some residing only within a specific state, while the campaigning of others covers a geo-political zone. Women's activism also focuses only on a 35 per cent representation for women, instead of gender parity (Ako-Nai and Obamamoye 2018: 71-74).

In Ghana, on the other hand, women's activism for gender quotas dates back to 2003/2004 with the publication of 'The Women's Manifesto for Ghana', which emanated from a politically conscious women's movement. The manifesto recommended affirmative action measures within political parties in order to achieve a 50 per cent women's representation by 2012. Since then, women's activism for gender quotas has led to the demand for national quota legislation (Ako-Nai and Obamamoye 2018: 74). An Affirmative Action Bill was introduced in Parliament in 2016. The Bill, which provides for a 40% representation and participation of women in governance, public positions of power and decision-making, has yet to be passed. Article 38 also proposes that those who insult or obstruct women who are vying for public office should be prosecuted. By March 2019, the Bill had still not been passed into law. Gender activists have been critical of the government for dragging its feet. This delay, they argue, results in the perpetuation of the gender inequality gap (GhanaWeb 2019).

Substantive and symbolic representation

A large body of literature has been generated by the spread of both nationally mandated and party-based electoral quotas. The 'first generation' mainly focused on issues such as increasing the number of women, the design of the quota and its impact on the number of women elected and the political will to introduce such quotas (Krook and Zetterberg 2014: 4) (that is, some of the types of issues addressed in the discussion above). The so-called 'second generation' of work, according to Krook and Zettenberg (2014: 5), considers the impact of quotas 'beyond numbers', focusing on women's substantive representation – in other words, women's impact on, for example, policymaking and legislative diversity.

Whether more women represent women's interests once elected and whether they indeed make an impact on the form and content of policymaking has been addressed by a number of scholars who have shown that the growth in women's representation has enhanced the influence of female

MPs in various ways. In Tanzania, South Africa and Uganda, for example, studies have found a change in the parliamentary culture following women's greater presence. The increase in numbers has not only created parliamentary environments where female MPs feel more comfortable to press for their agendas but has also increased the proportion of women's contribution to parliamentary debate, has broadened parliamentary discourse and has established cross-party women's parliamentary caucuses (Yoon 2013: 147). In Uganda, an increasing number of male MPs have also become associated members of Uganda's women's parliamentary caucus (Clayton et al. 2016: 23). The face of parliamentary structures such as parliamentary committees have also changed as a result of increased female numbers, especially in South Africa. More 'masculine' portfolio committees such as Safety and Security, and Justice and Constitutional Development were, for example, chaired by women after the second democratic elections in 2000 (Sadie 2005: 26).

Issues affecting women, children and families are better articulated and more frequently debated in Tanzania, and women MPs have played a significant role in mainstreaming women's and children's issues into the budget process (Yoon 2013: 147). A content analysis of legislative speeches in Uganda also showed that female MPs in the Ugandan parliament raised women's issues more actively and more frequently than male MPs. Furthermore, the increased presence of women acts as a catalyst for more general debate on women's interests in parliament. 'Male MPs are becoming more receptive to legislative issues that disproportionately affect women' (Clayton et al. 2016: 22). An analysis by Sadie (2005: 28) of the speeches outside parliament by female cabinet ministers in South Africa also showed the extent of their commitment to the advancement of women's/gender issues. In the period 2000-2005, more than half of the speeches made by, for example, the Minister of Public Works, referred to women. Also, ministers in ministries not traditionally associated with women, such as Justice and Communication, have specifically referred to women's issues in nearly a quarter of their speeches.

Scholars have also highlighted the advocacy and adoption of new laws and amendments with the increased presence of women in parliaments. In Tanzania, these include the Labour Act of 1997, the Sexual Offences Act of 1998, the Land Amendment Act of 2004 and the repeal, in 1996, of the law that expelled pregnant girls from school (Yoon 2013: 147). In Kenya they include the Sexual Offences Act of 2006 and Amendments to the Employment Act of 2007 to provide for paid maternity and paternity leave.

In Uganda, the enactment of important pieces of women's rights legislation in the areas of, for example, domestic violence, rape and female genital mutilation can be attributed to the women's parliamentary caucus and the enhanced collaboration with male MPs (Clayton et al. 2016: 23). In

South Africa, these include laws on gender-based violence, family law, land rights, the Domestic Violence Act (1998), the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act (1996), improvements to the Child Maintenance Act resulting in the Child Care Amendment Act (1996) and the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act (1998) (Govender 2005: 83-84).

Although Philips, as mentioned above, has not considered the symbolic role of women's representation (that is, public attitudes towards women in politics) as an argument for justifying women's political representation since it takes place outside of national legislatures, its importance in breaking down patriarchal attitudes has been highlighted by a number of scholars. For example, in both Uganda (Juma 2011) and Tanzania (Meena et al. 2017) it is acknowledged that the increased presence of women in parliament has slowly been changing people's attitudes to women in politics. The presence of women in politics is becoming more acceptable, creating a new political culture in which politics is no longer a 'man's world'.

Factors that complicate and prevent women's political participation

To a greater or lesser extent, persistent resistance to women candidates takes many forms across Anglophone Africa. As discussed below, several factors reinforcing each other and acting simultaneously with each other prevent or hamper women's political participation. These range from culturally engrained gender roles to unsupportive political parties and violence against women.

Culture, religion and traditional gender roles

In most Anglophone countries the constitutional and legal gains supporting gender equality have not affected entrenched gender roles and stereotyping effectively preventing women from participating in elections. Traditional beliefs and cultural attitudes – especially concerning women's roles and status in society – remain strong. Women's identity is still predominantly conceived as being domestic in nature and this continues to act as a barrier to their entry into formal politics. Culture, which defines and controls how people perceive women and their participation in politics, has been regarded by numerous scholars as the root of women's exclusion from playing a political leadership role in countries such as Zambia (Gudhlanga 2013) and Zimbabwe (Zulu 2011). These cultural beliefs based on the concept of male supremacy perpetuate the belief that politics is male territory. In Nigeria, patriarchal relations at the family level also reinforce the devaluation of

women in the public realm. Since politics is regarded as the domain of men, women participating in politics are stigmatised and are discouraged by their husbands to run for elections (Samuel and Segun 2012: 12).

The gendered nature of traditional roles and the division of labour also manifested in the 2017 elections in Kenya where elders, male rivals and family members told many women to pull out of the race since it was unbecoming for a woman to run in elections, that women cannot lead and that it is against religious principles (NDI and FIDA 2018: 41).

Political parties

Political parties, which are the key gateway for women's successful participation in elections, are the most serious obstructers. They replicate gender relations of male supremacy and female subordination. Party leadership is controlled by men and it is difficult for women to reach the top positions in party hierarchy where decisions are taken. The patriarchal nature of political parties often restricts women from competing in elections. In many cases women lack party backing and, in some instances, women experience active exclusion, discrimination and open hostility.

Despite the fact that women's representation in parliament in South Africa stands at 45.73 per cent, the deeply embedded culture of masculinity also pervades political parties in the country and is still the most difficult obstacle to increased female political representation in South Africa. Political party rhetoric on gender equality does not match the selection of women as party candidates or their election to party leadership structures. Furthermore, parties have not been forthcoming in terms of capacity-building interventions to, among other things, build women's skills and confidence, which would encourage them to make themselves available as candidates for political decision-making positions (Sadie 2017: 65). The absence of capacity-building initiatives by political parties is a common feature in all Anglophone countries (see for example, NDI and FDI 2018: 37 on Kenya).

Political parties control women's political participation in numerous ways. In the 2017 elections in Kenya, for example, only 11 per cent of all the contenders in the party primaries were women (excluding special seats). Parties pushed women to compete for the women's special seats in order to open up more opportunities for men to compete for the constituency seats. Some parties have also nominated non-members in the primaries over female members (NDI and FIDA 2018: 27, 36-37). They also intentionally tried to prevent women from running by deliberately misinforming them on the proper timelines and procedures to vie for office. Parties also discouraged women

from challenging election offences in exchange for a nominated seat (which was not always upheld) (NDI and FIDA 2018: 35-36). Another way that parties prevent women from being elected is by fielding women in constituencies in which the parties concerned have minimal support – as has been the case in, for example, elections in Zimbabwe (Gudhlanga 2013: 166).

Despite this, some female candidates have had positive experiences in their political parties, although these are the exceptions. Some of the women elected in Kenya in the 2017 elections reported to have been supported by their party in the form of discounted nomination fees, funding for campaigns and material support, including T-shirts and posters. A few party leaders are even cited as having accompanied women to constituencies to campaign for female candidates and using their clout to enhance women's chances to be elected. The latter, of course, underlines the gendered nature of politics and men's supremacy.

Lack of financial resources

One of the major problems in all these countries, with the exception of South Africa (mostly due to the closed list PR system), is the fact that women lack the necessary financial resources to effectively participate in electoral processes as candidates (see, for example, Sossou (2011) and Bauer (2017) on Ghana, Wang and Yoon (2018) on Tanzania and Uganda, and Nasong'o and Ayot (2007) on Kenya). The amount of money required to run for election is often large, and women generally do not have these resources. Money is required for campaign expenses (such as hand-outs to voters, contributions to formal and informal community projects, payments to campaign teams, transport and entertainment), and what is seldom considered is the amounts that have to be paid in the candidate nomination/selection process. In Ghana, for example, the cost for running for political office increased by 59 per cent between the 2012 and 2016 elections (WFD 2018: 5). The two rounds of primaries are prohibitively expensive – the first primary secures the party's approval to contest the election while the second secures the party's nomination as a parliamentary candidate. The average expenditure in 2016 for these was, respectively, GHC 156 000 and GHC 134 000,[7] while expenditure for the parliamentary election was significantly higher (GHC 235 669). The average cost for a successful election campaign is equal to almost two years' salary of an MP – illustrating how much of a barrier money can be. Furthermore, in 2016 for example, women were unable to match the spending of male competitors. Overall, on average, men outspent women by

7 The exchange rate of the GHC to the USD was 4.51 GHC to 1 USD in December 2017, at the time of writing (WFD 2018).

more than GHC 50 000 (WFD 2018: 12-14,18). Although both the major parties offered discounted filing fees (women paid half the fees of men) to women aspirants during the primaries and women candidates in the 2016 general election, Bauer (2017a: 18) emphasises that this is 'a drop in the bucket' given the overall campaign costs. The reduced fees, unfortunately, hardly had a significant effect.

Since the introduction of special parliamentary seats for women in Kenya, women who wished to represent a party in a regular constituency seat had to spend (in some instances) more money in the nomination phase because the regular seats were now perceived as 'men's seats' (Ohman and Lintari 2015: 14).

Similar to Ghana, aspirants in Kenya and Nigeria also have to pay to be considered in the candidate nomination process. As highlighted in the previous chapter, the monetisation of party politics and elections in Nigeria, for example, has led to the exclusion of many people, particularly women, from political decision-making positions. Not only are the nomination fees that the major political parties charge astronomical (ranging from N1 million to N5 million, depending on the level of representation, for example in the Federal House of Representatives, governorship positions or as president), but candidates are then expected to run a monetised election campaign in which large amounts of money are required for, among other things, crowd-renting for party rallies, adverts (posters) and vote-buying (material gifts) (Onah and Nwali 2018: 13-16). Despite there being comprehensive laws limiting campaign spending in Nigeria, these laws are not enforced (see chapter 2).

Violence against women

The increasing violence against women in most Anglophone African countries restricts their political activities or deters them from standing for elections. Women encounter various forms of violence: physical violence (causing direct bodily harm), physical assault, verbal assault and psychological violence (psycho-intimidation, social sanctions and punishment, family pressure and character assassination) in public. Given the zero-sum nature of the political contest in countries with the plurality electoral system (FPTP), where competition is a do-or-die affair, violence against female candidates seems to be more prominent. In Kenya, for example, gender-based electoral-based violence experienced by women is regarded as one of the 'primary barriers' to their participation in elections. In the 2017 election, for example, women were subjected to various forms of violence, ranging from physical, psychological and economic violence to threats and coercion. Reports of

the Elections Observation Group in Kenya also emphasised the seriousness of the violence against women candidates during the campaign (NDI and FIDA 2018: 39; Kachmbwa 2018; Wang and Yoon 2018: 313). Violence and abuse against women also deterred women from standing as candidates in Zambia's 2016 elections.[8] Women who participated reported that they experienced 'immense' violence during the campaign period (Commonwealth Observer Group 2016: 21), while violence and intimidation, particularly sexual violence, during the election campaigning also exacerbate hurdles for women seeking to contest the open seats in Uganda (Wang and Yoon 2018: 313). Violence, and threats of violence are also regarded as one of the main reasons for the low number of women who stood as candidates for the 2019 elections in Nigeria (*IOL* 2019).

A norm in the political campaigns of women in Ghana, for example, is 'a politics of insult', consisting of, for example, character assassination. This is described as a favourite weapon in the arsenal against women candidates. Especially during the primaries, women candidates are particularly targeted in a number of unsavoury ways, resulting in not enough women wanting to stand for elections (Bauer 2017: 11). Although women in Tanzania do not encounter physical violence, they too experience verbal abuse and intimidation from their male competitors (Wang and Yoon 2018: 313).

Over the years there has also been an endless cycle of victimisation of women in Zimbabwe in terms of election to political office or within political parties. The run-up to the 2018 elections was no different and was also characterised by allegations of intimidation and hate speech towards women. The perception that participating in politics is dangerous is, therefore, also regarded as one of the predominant reasons why women do not participate in politics (see for example, IFES 2018: 14; News24 2018).

Media coverage

A practical manifestation of the patriarchal nature of most Anglophone African countries is that despite the fact that the voices of both men and women are significant in elections, women are far less visible in the media during the election campaign period. In the countries where statistics are available, media coverage of women candidates and women in election-related coverage has been far less than that of male candidates. In Zambia, for example, approximately 77 per cent of coverage

8 Violence against women and the degrading treatment in public of women candidates have also been evident in previous elections (see Zulu 2011).

by the four public media outlets (ZNBC TV, ZNBC Radio 2, the Times of Zambia and Zambia Daily Mail) was devoted to male candidates (*Lusaka Times* 2016), while in Zimbabwe, surveys on election coverage in the 2018 elections showed that women candidates received minimal attention from the media – around 5 per cent (Zim Fact 2018).

In an election coverage study conducted by Media Monitoring Africa (MMA) of 61 South African news media outlets (including online, radio and TV) before the 8 May 2019 elections, it was found that in the period 1 to 30 April, men outweighed women in coverage fourfold (82 per cent versus 18 per cent) in election-related articles/programmes. In the words of the authors of the report: 'This is astonishing considering that women make up more than half of South Africa's population and that there are two million more registered female voters than their male counterparts' (MMA 2019: 9).

Another problem faced by women in, for example Kenya, is that when they attract the attention of the media, women are generally more linked to negative news than men. Gender stereotypes and stigma also characterise the coverage of female candidates (also evident in Tanzania and Uganda (Wang and Yoon 2018: 313)). Therefore, due to the double standards applied to men and women, it is argued that women are cautious about participating on radio and television if given the opportunity. Women, therefore, tend to capitalise on social media such as Facebook and WhatsApp to communicate with voters (NDI and FIDA 2018: 38).

Equally discouraging is 'sexist backlash and mudslinging' as experienced by the four women who stood as presidential candidates in the 2018 Zimbabwean elections, which Lowe Morna and Zwaraya (2018) described as 'a reminder of the underlying patriarchal norms that define Zimbabwe's ageing leadership'. In Botswana, the media has, over the years, failed to give special coverage to the campaigns of female candidates or to interview them, which further reinforces women's marginalised situation (see, for example, Sebududu and Osei-Hwedie 2005; Balozwi 2019).

Conclusion

Similar to international evidence, women in Anglophone African countries with FPTP constituency systems stand less of a chance of being elected to parliament than women in a closed-list PR system, as is evident in the low representation of women in Botswana, Ghana, Nigeria, Zambia and Malawi. To get around the rigidity of the FPTP (an inheritance of the British colonial system), Kenya, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Uganda have adopted legislated measures to increase women's representation. With the exception of Kenya, these countries have a representation of women above 30 per cent. Kenya's failure to reach the 30 per cent representation mark, despite the quota of special candidates and the country's constitutional requirement that women occupy at least 30 per cent of the total number of seats in parliament, can be attributed to the small proportion of special candidates (around 15 per cent) relative to the total number of members of parliament.

South Africa's PR closed-list system combined with its voluntary gender parity party quota of two major parties (ANC and EFF), on the other hand, is testimony to the fact that PR systems (combined with quotas) result in a high representation of women. Quotas, despite their shortcomings, have contributed to increasing the number of women in parliaments. However, these numbers – except in the case of South Africa – are still well below the ideal of gender parity.

The will of governments to include women in political decision-making at the highest level is reflected in their inclusion of women in cabinet positions. This, however, paints a rather dismal picture. Although South Africa has achieved gender parity in terms of cabinet appointments and Uganda's cabinet consists of just over 33 per cent women, the remaining Anglophone countries trail far behind (below 30 per cent). At the lowest rank are Malawi, Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Botswana, where cabinets consist of less than 20 per cent women. The low number of women in cabinets across the Anglophone countries seems to suggest that government leaders do not take their constitutional and continental commitments to gender equality seriously, effectively perpetuating the deeply embedded culture of masculinity that pervades political parties and societies as a whole.

The increased presence of women in most of the legislatures in Anglophone countries has been effective in a range of institutional and legislative reforms, which has influenced the democratic process and is consistent with the ideas of democracy. The increase in female MPs has not only created more women-friendly parliamentary environments conducive to addressing women's interests and concerns and broadening parliamentary discourse but has also contributed to enacting or amending legislation on women's rights, for example, laws on gender-based violence, labour and land and the progressive legislation in South Africa on the choice women have to terminate

pregnancy. The symbolic value of women's representation should also not be underestimated. The large number of women in parliament in a number of countries has contributed to a change in political culture, in which the political arena is no longer the exclusive preserve of men.

However, a number of barriers, such as discriminatory cultural beliefs, lack of political party support, lack of financial means and violence, are still common threads which run through the explanations for women's political under-representation in most Anglophone countries. Cultural beliefs and practices based on the concept of male supremacy and female subordination, which exclude women from political leadership roles, are mirrored in political parties and the media, where the coverage of female candidates during the election campaign period is far less than those of male candidates.

Considering the patriarchal culture and socio-economic disadvantages hindering women's entry into politics, and that these take a long time to change, the only way to fast-track women's entry into politics is through quotas. Quotas are not a panacea but should be seen as a temporary measure (as is the case in Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe) to set in motion a process of incorporating a larger number of women in legislatures and to achieve the continental minimum of 30 per cent and desired target of 50 per cent for women's representation.

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