

# Chapter 1

## The promise of democracy in Anglophone Africa

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### Peace, prosperity and trust.

**D**emocracy promises to deliver each, assuaging our fears and fuelling our hopes. After all, who can resist the allure of being in control and determining not only *who* governs but also *how* they govern. But these ideals are more than snappy, and standard, campaign slogans.

Strong democratic systems depend on the same notions they promise to deliver. These promises feed a country's political institutions, structures and leaders to produce a form of stability, encourages a type of economic attractiveness, and subsequently reinforces a level of confidence. If any of these links fail . . . well, then so does our faith in the overall system.

In a report assessing democratic trends across the African continent between 2015 and 2018, Nic Cheeseman (2019) describes the precariousness of this feedback loop. First, the quality of democracies across the continent has suffered given the decline of political and economic governance. Public participation, for instance, has waned as have indicators that measure the rule of law and the capacity of political and social institutions. Although the drop was not massive, it was tangible and has seemingly pushed the continent towards political and economic instability. The link between income per capita and democracy is something Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) first uncovered and, as Burbidge (2019) notes, social capital and economic prosperity certainly affect a country's stability. Considering Cheeseman's findings, the rosier economic outlooks that once pointed to the continent's political progress seem to have dulled. The apparent positivity of the past decade (Tvedten 2014; Radelet 2010; Rotberg 2013; Moghalu 2014; *The Economist* 2011) had prompted the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) 2014 'Africa Rising' conference in Mozambique and spurred trend reports from the World Bank and the African Development Bank Group encouraging investors to support renewed human and physical infrastructure efforts. But money is fickle and when it dwindles, tracking who benefits, especially if it is only a select few, has a way of eroding public confidence.

Second, Cheeseman notes that among the continent's 54 states, fifteen can be classified as defective democracies while more countries – sixteen in total – have moved towards authoritarian rule as governments enforce hard line measures at the expense of human rights and political liberties.

The report further suggests that these trends are pushing opinions towards the political extremes effectively threatening public trust in democratic systems and encouraging more undemocratic controls. Cheeseman bolsters his findings with another study that cites:

‘About a third of all autocratization episodes started under a democratic dispensation. Almost all of the latter led to the country turning into an autocracy. This should give us great pause about the specter of the current third wave of autocratization. Very few episodes of autocratization starting in democracies have ever been stopped.’  
(Luhmann and Lindberg 2019)

Studies that look to understand this predicament across the continent tend to treat “Africa” as one large case study which hides several key trends (Cheeseman 2019). Some attempt has been made to divide the continent into geographic regions to trace the effects of democratic initiatives but even these can obscure possible findings. And while many have blamed colonialism for the continent’s experience, few have grouped countries according to their specific colonial power to assess the effect this has had on their political systems’ trajectory.

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For this very reason this book compares ten countries geographically located across the continent and that share a similar colonial experience – at one time each was colonised by Britain. The purpose is to explore whether their political systems, despite their varying political contexts, share some commonalities. If they do have common ground, do these trends help us better understand the democratic potential within these states. The chosen case studies include Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. To provide a broad indication of each country’s demographic spread, leadership rotation, and representative system, here is a very brief political history.

## Political Historical Overview

With the exception of Liberia and Ethiopia, the early twentieth century saw the African continent carved up and placed under the control of various Western European governments (Hunt 2017). These externally imposed boundaries were artificial and largely ignored key cultural, ethnic, linguistic or geographic realities (Graham 2019: 3). To quote Ali Mazrui's (2005: 70) description, 'it took European conceptualization and cartography to turn Africa into a continent' and these early efforts continue to shape the continent's identity and its politics. As a result, African countries developed at a pace dictated by their colonial administrators and in a style that reflected the economic and political needs of these same governors. African soldiers were, for instance, conscripted into the imperial military forces during each of the world wars and through their service discovered other political realities that sparked a greater expectation for self-determination (Ferguson and Adu Boahen 1990: 334). The spark became a call that a small group of European educated African leaders were happy to champion (Gocking 2005).

Perhaps aware of these murmurings and certainly keen to reshape the post-war world, US President Franklin Roosevelt pushed for the autonomy of all colonies during the 1941 Atlantic Conference with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. With discernible reluctance, Churchill responded to the meeting's *Atlantic Charter* (1941) by introducing a degree of democratic government within Britain's colonies but only at the local level, rejecting universal self-determination (Karski 2014: 330). This move was enough to fuel a generation of African nationalists now tired of being exploited for their labour and their country's natural resources (Ferguson and Adu Boahen 1990). The 1945 Pan-African Congress became a key platform for Western educated leaders such as Jomo Kenyatta (Kenya), Kwame Nkrumah (Gold Coast, now Ghana), Julius Nyerere (Tanganyika, now Tanzania), and Nnamdi Azikiwe (Nigeria) to push for an end to colonial rule (Allman, 2013). In the conference's declaration, Nkrumah (1945) wrote 'We believe in the rights of all peoples to govern themselves. We affirm the right of all colonial peoples to control their own destiny. All colonies must be free from foreign imperialist control, whether political or economic'.

Ghana was the first to be granted self-determination and, keen to avoid another conflict similar to the one France was fighting in Algeria, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan ushered in a decade during which Britain formally withdrew from its colonies. Macmillan (1960) acknowledged 'the wind of change blowing through this continent', and by 1968, all colonies, with the exception of Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), were granted independence (Hemming 1996; Cooper 2002).

This decolonising initiative coincided with an intensifying Cold War between the US and Soviet Union and their competition to secure precious geopolitical footholds across the world. American diplomats were dispatched with orders to help establish or reform democracies, particularly across the resource rich African continent. Selling the promise that democracy would deliver peace and prosperity – and eventually trust – to nations struggling to manage an expectant people and internal rivalries, the Americans peddled their political system and vast ‘development’ packages to help them win friends and influence trade flows. To some extent these political and economic resources helped countries develop democratic models that differed from the American standard but the models they adopted also reflected each country’s unique context. These diplomats also worked to help countries retool their constitutions and political institutions to ensure the integrity of the political systems and dissuade civil unrest. In essence, these political missionaries did everything in their power to make the idea of democracy seem achievable.

In the Anglophone African case studies compared in this book these models include versions of parliamentary democracies chosen along simple-majoritarian prescripts with a few proportional representation ballots thrown into the mix. And, although some did not start out this way, most now look to encourage multi-party systems instead of the much-debated American two-party arrangement. Nevertheless, the colonial construction of these states has skewed electoral dynamics and these imbalances have certainly favoured one party governance, and sometimes for prolonged periods. Unfortunately the inequities of these representative structures and, in countries with simple-majoritarian systems, the spirit of zero-sum competition has done little to nurture peace and prosperity and have, in fact, intensified partisan distrust (Cheeseman 2019).

## Case Studies

### *Botswana*

Between 1885 and 1966 Bechuanaland was a British protectorate. The country changed its name to Botswana upon independence in 1966 when the people elected Seretse Khama as their president. Khama would occupy the presidency for three consecutive five-year terms. A leader of the independence movement and a member of the influential Ngwato royal family, Khama founded the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) and used his stature to drive a vigorous market-friendly economic programme to bring social prosperity to his country. Khama upheld several of the fundamental principles of liberal democracy and instituted strict measures to guard against

corruption, to promote non-racism and to embrace the rule of law (Mungazi 2004; Tlou et al. 1995; Rotberg 2013). The country's mineral resources and progressive policies, particularly in combatting HIV/Aids, served to attract key foreign investment and kept its economic and social arenas relatively stable (Acemoglu et al. 2003: 85-106; Good 1992).

Widely considered to be one of the most politically stable countries on the African continent, Botswana has enjoyed some 54 years of uninterrupted civilian leadership. Under its parliamentary republic system the president is indirectly elected by the National Assembly for a five-year term and once elected, s/he appoints the vice-president and cabinet. The current president, Mokgweetsi Eric Masisi, succeeded Ian Khama (son of the founding president) who retired in 2018 obeying the constitutionally mandated ten-year term limit (Tlou and Campbell 1997).

There are 65 seats in the National Assembly where 57 members are directly elected from single-seat constituencies by a simple majority vote. Six are nominated by the president and then confirmed by simple majority vote by the rest of the National Assembly, where the president and attorney general sit as ex-officio members. In addition to the National Assembly, and acting as an advisory body, is the 35-member House of Chiefs (Ntlo ya Dikgosi). This body comments on issues such as the powers granted to chiefs, how customary law should be enforced, how tribal property should be governed and proposed constitutional amendments (Freedom House 2020).

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## *Ghana*

In 1957, Ghana became the first Sub-Saharan country in colonial Africa to gain its independence. Unlike Botswana the country's political experience has been a rocky one. The charismatic Kwame Nkrumah, founder of the Convention People's Party (CPP) and a leader of the Pan-African movement for self-determination, assumed the role of president in 1960 but four years later the promise of his tenure morphed into a controversially amended constitution that made Ghana a one-party state with Nkrumah as president for life of both his party and the nation (Gocking 2005; Apter 1972, Iliffe 2007).

Nkrumah was deposed in 1966 by Joseph Arthur Ankrah and the National Liberation Council which was a combination of national military and police forces. A subsequent series of coups finally ended in 1981 when Lt Jerry Rawlings took control and banned political parties (Tordoff 2002). Over the next decade Rawlings crafted and passed a new constitution that restored multi-party politics before winning the presidential vote in 1992 and again in 1996 (Cooper 2002). In 2000, and of particular importance for our study, he obeyed the constitutional term limit mandate

and stepped down ahead of the scheduled election. His tenure has been followed by a series of peaceful transitions of power with the New Patriotic Party (NPP) candidate John Kufuor winning in 2000 and 2004 before John Atta Mills' National Democratic Congress (NDC) took office in 2008. Upon his untimely death in 2012, Mills' Vice President John Dramani Mahama assumed office and won the scheduled election later that year. However, Mahama's re-election bid was halted by the NPP's Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo marking the third peaceful transition of power since the country's return to democracy.

Ghana has improved its health care, nutrition and hygiene services and by addressing its poverty levels has increased its proportion of elderly persons to a level that is amongst the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 2020). A severe drought and an economic downturn has seen many Ghanaians leave for Cote d'Ivoire or Nigeria to work in the agricultural and extractive industries and many of the country's doctors and teachers took up opportunities in the UK and US.

The country is a presidential republic with both the president and vice president directly elected on the same ballot by an absolute majority vote. Both are elected for four-year terms and are limited to two terms in office. Interestingly, the Council of Ministers is nominated by the president but must be approved by Parliament. There is one legislative chamber with 275 seats to which members are elected from single-seat constituencies by a simple majority vote every four years (Freedom House 2020).

## *Kenya*

Kenya's struggle for liberation ended when it was granted independence in 1963. The country elected Jomo Kenyatta, a leading figure of the struggle and the Kenyan African National Union (KANU) party, as its president in 1964, a position he held until his death in 1978. Kenyatta was succeeded, according to a constitutional mandate, by his vice president Daniel arap Moi, who continued KANU's reign and subsequently altered the constitution to recognise KANU as Kenya's sole political party in 1982 (Cooper 2002; Iliffe 2007). Internal and external calls for political liberation eventually pressured Moi to allow multi-party elections in 1992, but an opposition that was ethnically divided and a flawed election process characterised by violence and fraud kept Moi in office until 2002 (Burbidge and Cheeseman 2017).

After a peaceful and fair election in 2002, Mwai Kibaki, the standard bearer for a multi-ethnic National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), assumed the presidency defeating KANU's candidate Uhuru Kenyatta, the son of the country's founding president. Kibaki's campaign touted an anti-corruption

platform which it also used in its bid for re-election in 2007. However, Raila Odinga and his Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) cited widespread electoral fraud sparking two months of violence during which around 1100 people died. With no end in sight, the African Union asked former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to intervene, which resulted in a power sharing agreement that saw Odinga accepting the restored post of prime minister. Kibaki and Odinga also agreed to reform the constitution to include additional checks on the executive branch, empower 47 new counties, and eliminate the restored prime minister position. The new constitution was accepted through a national referendum in 2010 and Uhuru Kenyatta won the first election under the new legal standard in 2013. The 2017 round of elections saw Kenyatta controversially re-elected after the initial poll was nullified by the country's Supreme Court citing substantive irregularities. When the vote was held again later that year, Odinga and his opposition party boycotted the process, handing Kenyatta's Jubilee Party a victory with 98.27 per cent of the vote (The Carter Centre 2018).

Under the new constitution the president and deputy president are elected by a qualified majority vote where the candidate must win an absolute majority of the popular vote and must receive a minimum of 25 per cent of the ballots cast in 24 of the 47 counties. If this threshold is not met it triggers a runoff election. Candidates for both positions are limited to two terms of five years each and the president is able to appoint his cabinet after the National Assembly confirms his proposed candidates. Kenya has a bicameral parliamentary system that is elected every five years in a process that goes to great lengths to ensure fairness and inclusivity. A mixed electoral system elects a 67-seat Senate, of which 47 members are elected from single-seat constituencies by a simple majority vote and twenty are elected using a proportional representation system ensuring that certain sectors are represented – that is, sixteen female representatives, two representing the youth and two members from the disabled community. The second chamber is the 349-seat National Assembly where 290 members contest single-seat constituencies determined by a simple majority vote, 47 seats are reserved for women members who are elected via simple majority and the remaining twelve members are nominated by the National Assembly to represent the youth and the disabled (Freedom House 2020).

Despite incidents of intense internal violence Kenya has been relatively stable since its independence and has been home to refugees escaping violence in their own countries. The country sheltered some 300 000 Somali refugees in 2017. This stance has prompted reprisals from extremist groups and terrorist attacks on key elite and tourist sectors within the capital Nairobi, a factor that fed the narrative of political instability for political parties and wary economic investors.

## *Malawi*

The country grew from the prosperous Kingdom of Maravi in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries with territory that stretched into Zambia and Mozambique. In 1889 it became the British Central African Protectorate after Britain increased its missionary and trading activity around Lake Malawi and was subsequently renamed Nyasaland in 1907 and then Malawi after gaining independence in 1964 (Tordoff 2002). During the colonial period economic prospects were limited and Malawians went to work as domestic servants, farm labourers and miners in neighbouring southern African countries. But by the mid-1970s the Malawian government, under President Hastings Kamuzu Banda, looked to develop its estate agricultural sector enticing some 300 000 migrant Malawians to return to assist the effort. Since then, the country has seen its population grow exponentially, effectively increasing pressure on the agricultural sector. Like many of its African compatriots, Malawi's population continues to demand that its government does more to promote economic growth and contain corruption and the spread of HIV/AIDS (Iliffe 2007).

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These demands manifested most recently in the 2019 countrywide protests that erupted after President Peter Mutharika was re-elected in a disputed election. Since its independence, Malawi has had a total of six presidents – Hastings Banda (1964-1994) who presided over 30 years of one-party rule; Bakili Muluzi (1994-2004) who became the first freely elected and re-elected president under a multi-party system and who failed to amend the constitution to extend his tenure; Bingu wa Mutharika (2004-2012) who was re-elected despite allegations of economic mismanagement and poor governance but died in office; Mutharika was succeeded by his vice-president Joyce Banda (2012-2014) who, after Elizabeth II, was the country's second female head of state; Peter Mutharika won his 2014 election bid but his re-election was questioned after the Malawi Constitutional Court nullified the 2019 poll. In a fresh election in 2020, Lazarus Chakwera took office for the first of two possible five-year terms.

Malawi's electoral system is an elementary one that relies on a simple majority to elect the president and its 275-member National Assembly. National Assembly members represent single-seat constituencies and serve five-year terms. The President has the sole authority to name his own cabinet (Freedom House 2020).



## *Nigeria*

The country, which has always been home to a range of ethnic groups with their own distinct languages and traditions, has seen a spike in religious and ethnic violence over the years. It houses the largest population of any country on the continent and, like so many other countries, is battling to improve economic productivity and reduce unemployment and poverty (World Bank 2020).

After World War II, Nigeria was granted greater autonomy and by 1960, it was granted independence. Given its disparate population, the country has been plagued by longstanding divisiveness that was controlled by a series of coups and military rule (Ilfie 2007; Tordoff 2002). In 1999 a new constitution was adopted, and the military allowed a civilian administration to assume control. This transition fought to institutionalise democratic principles and curb the rampant corruption and mismanagement that saw millions expropriated from the country's petroleum-based economy. Corruption has since featured prominently in election campaigns after 2003. But despite allegations of irregularities, intimidation and violence, Nigeria has remained under civilian control with the first peaceful transfer of power between civilian administrations taking place after the 2007 general elections. The 2015 election is another key marker for the country's democracy – it was the first time since 1999 that the People's Democratic Party (PDP) was defeated, and another party was able to peacefully assume office.

Under the Nigerian electoral system a presidential candidate is directly elected by a qualified majority vote and at least 25 per cent of the votes cast in 24 of the country's 36 states. The successful candidate can serve a maximum of two, 5-year terms and can appoint the Federal Executive Council, but the body must include a least one member from each state. The legislative body serves a four-year term and consists of two houses: a 109-seat Senate, with one member elected to represent the Abuja-Federal Capital Territory and three members from each state (108) elected by a simple majority from single-seat constituencies; and a 360-member House of Representatives that are also elected by a simple majority from single-seat constituencies (Freedom House 2020).

## *South Africa*

The British seized the Cape of Good Hope from Dutch colonists in 1806 and clashed with other indigenous people as they sought to expand their territory. An increase in European immigrants seeking their fortunes started after diamonds (1867) and gold (1886) were discovered in the colony

and spurred the British Empire to expand its colonial claim. A series of brutal wars ensued against the Zulu kingdom (1879) and the Afrikaner settlers (1899-1902). By 1910, the British and Afrikaners reached a detente of sorts and together formed the Union of South Africa, which morphed into a republic in 1961 after a whites-only referendum (Cooper 2002; Iliffe 2007).

The National Party's (NP) 1948 policy of apartheid or 'separate development' is a legacy the country continues to battle. Often brutally enforced, the policy favoured the white minority population (both English and Afrikaners) over other 'non-white' groups and ignited a decades long struggle for liberation spearheaded by the African National Congress (ANC) (Cooper 2002). Mounting internal protests and a campaign of insurgent attacks led to lengthy prison sentences for the movement's leadership – Nelson Mandela and his detention on Robben Island being the most prominent example (Iliffe 2007). Eventually these tactics, combined with a widespread international boycott, forced the NP to negotiate a peaceful transition to majority rule. The country's first multi-racial elections in 1994 saw Mandela take office as the country's first truly democratically elected leader, a position that has rotated amongst the party's various leaders from Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki (1999-2008) to Kgalema Petrus Motlanthe (2008-2009) to Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma (2009-2018) to Matamela Cyril Ramaphosa (since 2018).

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Like many of the other countries under study in this book, the successive ANC administrations have had to manage allegations of corruption and address the wealth, housing, education and health care imbalances that they inherited from previous colonists. After nearly three decades, a lack of essential infrastructure and the inability to enforce accountability on those in office have stoked national frustrations and pose perhaps the most significant threat to the country's stability (Thuynsma 2017).

Fortunately, allegations of mismanagement have not influenced the country's electoral process. South Africa's national elections use a proportional representation system to elect the 400-seat National Assembly, one of two legislative bodies. Here, members are elected from multi-seat constituencies to serve a five-year term. This body also elects the president for a similar term with both Mbeki and Zuma having been re-elected for a second and final term, although both were removed by their party before finishing their full ten-year tenures. The second legislative body is the 90-seat National Council of Provinces to which each of the nine provincial legislatures appoint ten members. This Council's purpose is to protect the regional interests of their constituencies including safeguarding the linguistic and cultural traditions of ethnic minorities (Freedom House 2019).

## *Tanzania*

This is the only country in this study, although not the only one on the continent, to have been transferred from German to British rule after World War I. Britain initially ruled Tanganyika and the Zanzibar Archipelago separately, but after each earned their independence the two territories merged to form the United Republic of Tanzania in 1964 with Julius Nyerere as the leader of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) elected as president. After unification, Tanzania had the largest population in East Africa and became one of the most diverse countries on the continent with over 130 languages spoken (Ilfie 1979, 2007). Nyerere recognised the need to reconstruct the nation's identity and, to harness potential friction, implemented a policy of ethnic repression and identity transformation which continue to make the country one of the most politically stable in the region. This is one reason Tanzania has become a major transit country for migrants from the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region who head south to escape violence or pursue economic opportunities. But perhaps the country's biggest challenge is managing the political and economic expectations of its youthful population – about two-thirds of the population is younger than 25 (*East African Regional Analysis of Youth Demographics* 2018 :8).

Tanzania has been a one-party dominant state – Nyerere's TANU party merged with the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) to form Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) in 1977 which has remained in power despite claims of voting irregularities and the 1992 constitutional amendment allowing multiple political parties to contest elections.

According to the constitution, presidents and vice-presidents are allowed to serve a maximum of two five-year terms provided they successfully win the popular vote by a simple majority. The president appoints his cabinet from among the members of the 393 Bunge or National Assembly. Tanzania uses a complex electoral system in an attempt to maintain political inclusiveness and representation – a simple-majority election system elects 264 members of the Bunge from single-seat constituencies and five members from the Zanzibar House of Representatives. 113 women are indirectly elected through a proportional representation ballot, and the president appoints a further ten and the attorney general occupies the remaining seat. All representatives are elected for five-year terms, but the president may only serve for a maximum of ten years. The Bunge enacts laws for the entire republic as well as specific laws for the mainland. Zanzibar is semi-autonomous and elects a president to manage internal matters and 82 members of its own House of Representatives – 50 members directly elected by simple-majority from single-seat constituencies, twenty women directly elected by a proportional representation vote, ten appointed by the Zanzibar president

and the House speaker and attorney general (as an ex-officio) occupy the last two seats (Freedom House 2020).

## *Uganda*

British explorers seeking the source of the Nile River began prospecting in Uganda in the 1860s and after concluding several trade agreements, established the Uganda Protectorate in 1894. During this period, the colonial power sought to build the Uganda Railway and imported some 32 000 people from British India as indentured labourers to complete the task (Iliffe 2007). At the end of their contractual period almost 7 000 labourers elected to stay in East Africa and eventually became the country's new breed of entrepreneurs managing, among other things, cotton ginning and the sartorial retail sector.

Besides these Indian immigrants the colonial boundaries of the era incorporated a range of ethnic groups, each with their own political system and culture. Managing these differences has been a complicated process and one that challenged the political system after the country's independence in 1962 (Iliffe 2007).

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Uganda has been ruled by its share of imperious leaders. The first post-independence election was relatively peaceful after a loosely formed political alliance between the Uganda People's Congress (UPC) and Kabaka Yekka (KY) won enough seats to place a quiet-spoken Milton Obote in the role of executive prime minister. Obote was accused of benefitting from the illegal trade of ivory and gold from the neighbouring Congo, a trade managed by his then army chief of staff Colonel Idi Amin. Once Parliament voted to censure Amin and investigate Obote, the cultural and political fault lines became more inflamed. In 1966, the Obote-led government suspended the constitution, removed the dual positions of president and vice president and in 1967, Obote declared himself president. He was eventually deposed in 1971 when Idi Amin executed a military coup. Amin's brutal dictatorial regime lasted until 1979 during which he expelled the Indian businessmen and traders and killed some 300 000 opponents. Obote returned to office 1980 in a disputed election that spurred a prolonged guerrilla war led by Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA) and a few other military forces. It is estimated that between 100 000 and 500 000 people lost their lives in that conflict (Bercovitch and Jackson 1997).

Current president Yoweri Museveni assumed office in 1986 and has developed the country's economy despite having one of the youngest and fastest growing populations in the world and with limited infrastructure and natural resources (*East African Regional Analysis of Youth Demographics*

2018: 8). He has also brought relative stability, although inter-communal violence persists in some areas of the country, and his administration has been dogged with allegations of corruption. Uganda's public service was ranked as one of the most corrupt in the world by Transparency International (2015:14).

In 2017, the parliament removed the constitutionally imposed age limit effectively allowing Museveni to run for further five-year terms. To win he would need to garner an absolute majority of the popular vote (in two rounds, if needed). As president he would then again be allowed to appoint his cabinet from among the elected members of the National Assembly, the country's only legislative body. The 426-member National Assembly is comprised of 289 members and an additional 112 women who are all elected by a simple-majority vote in single-seat constituencies; 25 representatives from special interest groups such as the army (ten), disabled (five) youth (five) and labour (50), and a maximum of eighteen ex officio members are appointed by the president (Freedom House 2020).

## *Zambia*

The British secured mineral and other economic concessions from local leaders in the region and in 1911 incorporated the territory into the British Protectorate, called Northern Rhodesia. The colonial power helped to develop the country's mining sector into the 1930s, promoting the sector as the destination for business developers and anyone seeking employment.

Upon independence in 1964 Zambia continued to develop its mines and effectively capitalising on its natural copper reserves. Under Prime Minister Kenneth Kaunda (1964-1991) and his socialist United National Independence Party (UNIP), which between 1972-1991 was the sole legal party, Zambia played an important role in regional politics helping to resolve conflicts in Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia), Angola and Namibia. But the decline in the copper price in the 1980s and a prolonged drought hurt the economy and exposed the extent of the government's mismanagement (Ilfie 2007). A peaceful transfer of power saw Frederick Chiluba's social-democratic Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) assume power in 1991 intent on revitalising the country's social-economic growth. The MMD continued its rule despite claims of electoral misconduct during the 1996, 2001 and 2006 election cycles with its leaders Levy Mwanawasa and then Rupiah Banda remaining in office until 2011. Michael Sata's Patriotic Front (PF) won control in 2011, but his tenure was characterised by allegations of economic malfeasance and an attempt to silence the opposition. Sata died in office in 2014 and was eventually succeeded by Edgar Lungu who was re-

elected in 2016.

The president is elected by an absolute majority popular vote, in two rounds if necessary, for a five-year term and is eligible for a second term. S/he appoints a cabinet from among members of the National Assembly. Of the 165 seats, 156 members of the National Assembly are directly elected from single-seat constituencies by a simple majority vote (in two rounds if needed) and up to eight members are appointed by the president (Freedom House 2020).

## *Zimbabwe*

Southern Rhodesia became a self-governing territory in 1923. In 1965 the essentially white government repudiated Britain's policy of 'no independence before majority rule' and issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (Iliffe 2007). Britain rejected the pronouncement and demanded more inclusive voting rights for the country's black majority. After an intense guerrilla war and a series of UN sanctions, free elections were eventually held in 1979 and Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) became Zimbabwe's first prime minister in 1980. Mugabe ruled until his resignation in 2017 after allegedly rigging elections in his favour.

30 During his 37-year reign, Mugabe enacted several controversial policies including a land redistribution campaign that forced white farmers, who were fixtures of the agricultural sector, from the country. The policy crippled the economy and decimated the local currency. Despite international condemnation Mugabe's tenure continued and in 2005 he launched Operation Restore Order that, under the guise of urban renewal, destroyed over 700 000 homes and businesses belonging to opposition supporters. The disputed 2008 election, which the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led by Morgan Tsvangirai was generally acknowledged to have won, provoked an intense backlash both internally and from international fora which saw more sanctions imposed and socio-economic conditions reach crisis proportions. Mugabe and Tsvangirai eventually reached a power-sharing agreement which produced a revised constitution.

Despite this, Mugabe won the 2013 election and promptly re-instituted one-party rule perpetuating what *The Economist* called 'misrule and dazzling corruption'. By November 2017, after a military intervention that forced Mugabe to resign, Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa took control. He retained office in 2018 and has, in Mugabe-esque fashion, continued to violently disrupt protests and opposition rallies.

Under the law a candidate for president must have a nomination form signed by at least ten registered voters (at least one candidate from each province) and be elected by an absolute

majority popular vote in two rounds if necessary. The successful candidate is then appointed for a five-year term (there are no limits to the number of times a person can be elected to the office), and the co-vice presidents are drawn from within the winning party's leadership. The president is able to appoint his own cabinet, but the body is responsible to the National Assembly. The National Assembly has 270 seats with 210 members directly elected from single-seat constituencies by a simple-majority vote and the remaining 60 seats are reserved for women who are elected via proportional representation vote. The upper chamber, the 80 seat Senate, consists of 60 members who are proportionally elected from multi-seat constituencies – six seats in each of the 10 provinces, sixteen members are elected by the regional governing councils, two are reserved for the National Council Chiefs and two are reserved for members with disabilities (Freedom House 2020).

## Assessing their Democracy

Elections on their own do not secure trust, peace, or a prosperous democracy. Previous publications have assessed individual case study countries and/or looked at specific aspects of these democracies such as their political history, the electoral system, the machinations of political parties, the veracity of key institutions such as the judiciary or the rise of authoritarianism. Many of these studies feature African case studies in isolation, and trace development trajectories using economic data.

Assessing the electoral processes of democratic systems is a key and sometimes sole or 'thin', to use Coppedge's (2005) terminology, focus for international agencies, such as Freedom House, and political scholars (Le Duc et al 1996, 2002, 2010, 2014; Kabemba and Eiseman 2004; Lindberg 2008). Indeed, such research typically studies aspects such as how inclusive a particular electoral system is and whether it, for instance, accommodates universal adult suffrage in a manner that facilitates easy registration and voting options (Dahl 1970). Also important for these authors is the frequency of elections, the independence and integrity of the voting process and the candidate and issue options that effect the range of choice voters have at their disposal. The question of access is another key concern with some assessing the impact of the geographic location of voting booths, and others looking to measure the level of access all candidates and parties have to the media (Thuynsma 2002 and 2017) and their ability to campaign in their various constituencies. The often-cited *Comparing Politics* series examines democracies across the globe studying whether all parties accept election results (Le Duc et al 1996, 2002, 2010, 2014). A question they explore is: in the event that a ruling party has to transfer power to another political party, is this process done

peacefully and does it include interventions from other powerful and vested interests such as the military, business and or ethnic interest group (Kpundeh 1992)?

The authors contributing to this volume have, however, chosen to compare the broader democratic presence and performance of these case studies in the hope that they can discern key trends and challenges. They do so by using questions inspired by Bruce Baker's (1999) democratic audit that assesses the more characteristic measurements of a democratic system: the transparency and oversight ability of the public and political institutions, the level of political participation within each society, the presence and influence of civil and human rights on the political system, and the influence the colonial legacy has had on each country's specific political context.

In both her chapters, for instance, Yolanda Sadie looks at the respective electoral processes and pays particular attention to the systems' ability to promote inclusive representation and engage issues that matter to women in each of the case study countries. What is also of great importance is the impact voters have on the electoral result and system. While it does indeed seem as if the democracies across the continent are moving towards political extremes (Cheeseman 2019), a key concern is how these trends have affected the participation of voters and, in particular, younger political candidates and constituents. After all, population profiles across the chosen case studies show that the voting pool is dominated by those who are between 18-35 years old. This younger demographic is also raising concerns that their interests are not represented and, therefore, casting doubt on the importance of their ballot. These arguments, as Victoria Graham explores, have affected the levels of voter participation and have also caused commentators to routinely question electoral results.

Measuring the health of a country's electoral system only reflects one aspect of a country's political performance. A feature that should not be ignored is the degree of transparency and accountability of a country's government, which in turn calls a number of different features into question. Studies have tried to correlate what a government does while it is in office with what they promise voters on the campaign trail. They have, for instance, looked to understand the extent ruling parties consult public opinion and take into account relevant interests, such as those voiced by civil society, as they develop policies and enact legislation. This is something that Andrea du Toit is particularly keen to understand as she unpacks the vibrancy and relevance of civil societies across the sample countries.

Good governance, or rather the lack thereof, is largely responsible for the growing turn towards 'autocratization' (Luhmann and Lindberg 2019). A country's inability to entertain oversight, they point out, effects the government's ability to reach consensus, curb corruption and use available



resources. To be accountable requires that representatives consult and present their constituent's interests, appoint qualified people to serve within public institutions, and account for the spending priorities of the legislature as a whole. It also requires that these representatives declare potential conflicts of interest and allow public and independent bodies to measure the effects of particular policies and legislation. Key among these priorities is the need for the executive and public officials to respect judicial authority and uphold the relative autonomy of local government structures. These are questions that Michael Bongani Reinders explores in his study of lawfare. He also looks at how civil and political rights are sustained and enforced, paying particular attention to how informed citizens are of their rights and responsibilities and to what extent independent monitors are allowed to assess such compliances and provisions.

Authors also address pivotal influences such as Olugbemiga Samuel Afolabi and Michael Reinders's study of the role and impact leaders have in each of these specific post-colonial contexts and, together with Francois Gilles de Pelichy, Afolabi also studies the rising effect issues such as land and identity have on each case's politics. In her chapter, Suzanne Graham highlights the need to encourage economic sustainability – the essential conduit for democracy's much-promised economic prosperity. Her study looks at past and possible trade avenues for Anglophone Africa by dissecting Britain's decision to leave the European Union and the likely effect this will have on the sample. BREXIT is a strategic issue that will affect – and perhaps define – democratic politics in each of these countries given their Commonwealth membership.

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