SECTION IV: THE CHANGING US-AFRICA RELATIONS

CHAPTER 8

MAGA Nationalism and AGOA's Future: Assessing Survival Risks Under a Trump 2.0 Administration

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Background

The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) has been a central pillar of US trade policy with sub-Saharan African countries since its enactment in 2000. It was designed to drive economic development in the region as it provides eligible African countries with duty-free access to the US market for several products. This operates in conjunction with the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which benefits over 5 000 products by lowering trade barriers and encouraging American investment (United States Trade Representative 2020). AGOA has facilitated market access, promoted regional integration and motivated political and economic reforms in Africa. As governments adopted market-oriented policies and poverty-reduction measures, AGOA further supported globalisation and greater economic stability (Britz, Olekseyuk and Vogel 2025).

The Act was in effect from October 2000 to September 2008, and legislative amendments in 2004 extended its duration until 2015 (Liser 2018). It has since been extended to December 2026. There are legislative initiatives in the US House of Representatives that propose further support for AGOA with the

AGOA Extension and Enhancement Act of 2024, introduced by Rep. John James (a Republican member of Congress from Michigan), intended to extend the programme for an additional twelve years to 30 September 2037. This proposal, currently under review by the US House Ways and Means Committee, reflects ongoing debates over the Act's future and underscores its strategic importance, particularly in a context where its non-reciprocal benefits are being critically re-examined.

Theoretical foundation

To effectively analyse AGOA's prospects under a Trump 2.0 administration, it is important to adopt Trade Policy and Power Asymmetry Theory. This perspective emphasises that trade agreements are not merely economic arrangements but also tools for geopolitical influence, especially when asymmetries in bargaining power exist (Sorsa 2023). African nations reliant on external trade preferences encounter structural imbalances that affect their ability to negotiate terms effectively and respond to evolving US policy changes. The theory suggests that shifts towards reciprocal trade demands and unilateralism, which are part of Trump's policies, are likely to increase these imbalances by potentially undermining non-reciprocal programmes like AGOA (Davies 2023). Recognising the interplay between power, sovereignty and economic development helps explain why AGOA's future may hinge on broader geopolitical strategies, domestic political will and the ability to diversify and strengthen intra-continental trade.

Trump's 'America First' doctrine: Core tenets of his economic nationalism

The economic policy of President Trump underwent a significant transformation with the adoption of the 'America First' doctrine. This policy framework places priority on supporting American workers and industries, aiming to address perceived trade imbalances by focusing on reciprocal trade relationships. Additionally, a notable aspect of the Trump administration's strategy is a clear preference for bilateral over multilateral agreements, exemplified by the renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) into the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which sought to secure

concrete advantages for the United States (The White House 2025). The Trump administration sees large and persistent trade deficits as a threat to their national economic interests and responds with aggressive tariff hike measures against key trading partners such as China, Mexico and Canada (Haggard 2020; Williams 2024).

The adopted approach to trade policy is driven by the belief that protecting domestic industries and achieving fairer trade terms requires firstly dismantling traditional multilateral trade frameworks. Such a perspective has had significant implications for non-reciprocal trade programmes like AGOA. The administration's emphasis on bilateral agreements and initiatives to adjust trade balances via direct tariffs illustrates the doctrinal shift towards protectionism and economic nationalism, which are key considerations in this paper's analysis of AGOA's prospects under a second Trump administration. Trump's first term was marked by embracing MAGA nationalism with a series of protectionist and unilateral trade actions that redefined US economic engagements. The administration implemented a range of policies, including the introduction of comprehensive tariffs and the strategic withdrawal from multilateral organisations such as the World Health Organisation (WHO). It also pursued a revised approach to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), reflecting a deliberate scepticism regarding global trade governance (Adu-Quaye and Mavroidis 2026). Furthermore, the Trump administration questioned the structure of non-reciprocal agreements like AGOA, which have traditionally provided duty-free market access without requiring reciprocal commitments from participating countries. However, some critics have argued that these unilateral measures may destabilise existing trade relationships and also risk sacrificing long-term strategic benefits, especially in countering geopolitical challenges such as China's growing influence on the African continent (Eko-Raphaels and Mojekwu 2025).

AGOA's strategic value in US-Africa relations

Since 2001, trade flows between the United States and Africa have exhibited significant volatility. US imports from Africa rose from US$34 billion in 2003 to nearly US$117 billion in 2008. However, after 2011 these imports declined sharply to approximately US$26 billion in 2015, before stabilising below the US$50 billion threshold. In 2022, US imports from Africa were valued at around

US$43 billion (Kassa, Edjigu and Hakobyan 2025). AGOA remains instrumental in this process as it enables the export of value-added goods that generate hundreds of thousands of jobs and encourages the emergence of new sectors across the continent (Gopaldas 2024). The preferential trade framework has allowed African countries to move from relying heavily on primary commodities to a more diversified export base. Notably, some countries have used AGOA particularly efficiently. For example, according to Stender et al. (2025), African countries such as Lesotho, increased their share of duty-free exports to the United States, driven largely by growth in the textile and apparel industry. Furthermore, countries with more diversified economies such as South Africa, Kenya and Ethiopia have benefited from exceptionally high duty-free export rates during recent years.

In the context of China's escalating economic engagement in Africa, AGOA offers an alternative model for trade and development. However, unlike China's approach, which normally involves state-backed large-scale infrastructure investments and resource extraction deals, AGOA provides duty-free access to the large and diverse US market, based on adherence to certain stipulated governance standards or principles. This encourages African states to adopt more transparent economic practices and sustainable policy reforms to reduce their vulnerability to debt patterns and concentrated external influence. Furthermore, by broadening external trade partnerships, AGOA serves as one of the strategically viable tactics to challenge the Chinese economic model, as it allows African countries to diversify their export markets and fortify their economic resilience (Naisho 2025).

In addition to its direct economic advantages, AGOA serves as an important instrument within the broader framework of US geopolitical strategy, particularly in responding to other significant global economic actors (Ayanda, Bonang, Lesedi and Wegayehu 2024). The Act has enabled sustained diplomatic engagement by fostering political and economic reforms that align with democratic values and market-oriented principles. In the context of shifting global power dynamics, such engagement remains essential for preserving US influence in a region of strategic significance. Nonetheless, tensions persist between AGOA's unilateral, non-reciprocal framework and domestic advocacy for bilateral trade agreements that yield immediate, mutual benefits. This divergence highlights an ongoing policy debate within US trade strategy regarding the balance between long-term

goals, such as economic development and the promotion of democracy, and the growing expectation for more balanced trade relationships (Kassa, Edjigu and Hakobyan 2025). Consequently, as US policymakers continue to refine their foreign economic agenda, the trajectory of AGOA will likely be determined by its ability to address both strategic priorities and pressing domestic concerns.

Trump's first-term trade policy record: Precedents for AGOA

Trump's trade policies have represented a major, dramatic departure from the old multilateral and reciprocal trade frameworks by setting robust precedents that may reshape established preferential arrangements like AGOA. In addition, from the beginning of his administration, Trump sought to redefine America's trade policy by transforming longstanding agreements and implementing new aggressive tariff measures. According to Nagy and Navarro (2025), this approach can be seen in the rapid US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the renegotiation of NAFTA into USMCA. Trump's decision to withdraw from TPP was a clear rejection of multilateral trade agreements that are seen as disadvantageous to US interests. According to Nagy and Navarro (2025), Trump called NAFTA 'the worst trade deal ever made' and called for negotiations that included reciprocal gains from US trade partners. Furthermore, throughout the negotiating period, the Trump administration relied heavily on the threat of imposing severe tariff hikes and strict deadlines, which resulted in a trade deal focused on concessions in labour standards, environmental protections, digital trade, intellectual property rights and specific rules of origin, especially in the automotive sector (Nagy and Navarro 2025). The transformation from a broadly based multilateral agreement to a deal forged on bilateral, transactional terms clashes with AGOA's historical structure. Davies (2023) is of the view that if the future US trade policy continues to favour such bilateral arrangements, non-reciprocal programmes like AGOA may come under intense pressure to deliver direct benefits, thereby challenging its original development-oriented objectives.

During the first Trump administration, the United States adopted an assertive tariff policy targeting major trading partners, including China, Mexico and Canada. The application of tariffs on essential manufactured goods such as steel, aluminium and various other products formed a central component of this

protectionist strategy, aimed at addressing perceived unfair trade practices and supporting domestic manufacturing sectors (Christensen 2025). These tariffs functioned both as punitive measures and as strategic tools in negotiations to secure more favourable terms intended to reduce the US trade deficit. While designed to strengthen domestic production and create a more equitable trading environment, these policies also resulted in higher costs for exporters from developing regions. Sub-Saharan African economies that are significantly dependent on exports of commodities like textiles and manufactured goods have thus faced increased production costs and diminished competitiveness within the US market due to such tariff measures (Kohnert 2025). Additionally, as protectionist policies become more entrenched, the historically non-reciprocal duty-free access provided by AGOA faces new challenges. Davies (2023) notes that rising tariffs may prompt US policymakers to reassess the viability of preferential arrangements like AGOA, potentially leading to their restructuring to include reciprocal benefits or gradually replacing them with more balanced bilateral trade agreements.

Moreover, beyond renegotiating trade deals and imposing tariffs, Trump's first term approach displayed hostility towards multilateral institutions, particularly the WTO. The Trump administration's deliberate efforts to undermine the WTO's dispute settlement system included blocking appointments to the Appellate Body, thereby effectively paralysing its capacity to resolve trade disputes (Foster 2025). This reflected a broader scepticism of multilateral trade governance which favours unilateral and bilateral measures. Such actions threaten the stability of non-reciprocal agreements like AGOA which depend heavily on a rules-based international trade order (Brown 2022). Dantata (2025) is of the view that this rejection and withdrawal strategy became a default policy action as Trump's first administration frequently expressed dissatisfaction with multilateral decision-making and instead opted for unilateral and bilateral measures. Moreover, this major shift from multilateral co-operation dismantles the co-operative framework that supports diverse international trade agreements and also poses significant risks to programmes like AGOA, which have thrived within a stable multilateral context. The undermined effectiveness of institutions like the WTO creates an environment of uncertainty in which the long-standing non-reciprocal benefits of AGOA could be perceived as less than advantageous when measured against a rising trend in protectionist reciprocal trade policies (Foster 2025).

Therefore, Trump's first-term trade policy record—marked by the transformation of NAFTA into USMCA, the aggressive imposition of tariffs on major economies and the deliberate undermining of the WTO's dispute settlement system— provides several precedents with direct implications for the future of AGOA. Kim (2025) further highlights that the shift from multilateral to bilateral trade negotiations sets a challenging standard for preferential programmes that have traditionally offered one-way access to the US market. According to Foster (2025) and Brown (2022), the unilateral weakening of multilateral institutions like the WTO signals a broader trend that may undermine the stability required for non-reciprocal arrangements such as AGOA. Therefore, as the global trade landscape continues to change under an 'America First' policy, these precedents cast serious doubt on whether AGOA can sustain its legacy of promoting economic development and integration in Africa without adapting to a more reciprocal model.

MAGA nationalism and 'reciprocal' trade expectations

Since Donald Trump returned to the US presidency, there has been an increased focus on nationalist rhetoric and trade policies that aims to put the United States at the centre of negotiations. The campaign slogan 'Make America Great Again' has been used to convey a commitment to restoring US economic sovereignty (Nagy and Navarro 2025). This approach is linked to a preference for bilateral agreements and reciprocal trade deals, rather than multilateral arrangements such as the TPP. The administration prioritises renegotiating existing agreements individually, advocating for trade arrangements that directly benefit American industry and workers. For example, in the renegotiation of NAFTA into the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement, the administration highlighted enforceable provisions related to labour standards, environmental protection, digital trade, and intellectual property rights (Nagy and Navarro 2025;). Chryssogelos and Brusenbauch Meislová (2025) note that Trump's statements and policies frame free trade deals as instruments that could challenge US sovereignty. He often calls for trade deals involving reciprocal concessions from partners, which marks a departure from previous arrangements, where the United States offered market access without demanding direct returns.

This reciprocity principle therefore raises significant concerns for long-

established preferential programmes such as AGOA. AGOA was created with the objective of improving economic development in sub-Saharan African countries through providing duty-free entry to the US market for a number of products. In addition, as part of a broader trade framework that includes benefits under the GSP, AGOA has helped several African countries to diversify their exports and move away from being reliant on primary commodities to more value-added products (Liser 2018). Statistics show that many African nations, including South Africa, Kenya and Ethiopia have effectively utilised AGOA. In some cases, these countries achieved duty-free rates exceeding 95% for their exports between 2019 and 2021 (Gopaldas 2024; UNCTAD 2023). However, in an environment dominated by an 'America First' trade philosophy of bilateralism, there is growing pressure to reconfigure AGOA into a conditional trade programme. Furthermore, policy proposals and legislative debates suggest that the United States might move towards changing AGOA into a reciprocal agreement that requires African countries trading with the US to provide equivalent market access or undertake additional economic reforms (Kohnert 2025). Dantata (2025) notes that such a transformation could undermine the developmental objectives of the programme as African governments might be forced to adopt policies which are in line with short-term US interests rather than pursuing interests for long-term economic diversification and industrialisation. These changes can dramatically change the non-reciprocal character of AGOA that has supported reform across sub-Saharan Africa for over two decades.

Trump'**s** trade policy also reflects a broader hostility towards one-sided trade benefits that he sees as contributing to persistent US trade deficits. His administration has consistently argued that unbalanced trade deals have severely affected the American manufacturing industry and eroded national prosperity. This conviction has led to the imposition of high tariffs on imports from major trading partners (Christensen 2025). For example, the administration introduced tariffs on steel, aluminium and a range of manufactured goods in an effort to force China, Mexico and Canada into renegotiating deals on more reciprocal grounds. The US Trade Policy Agenda for 2025 clearly states that the United States will pursue bilateral or sector-specific agreements to counter unfair practices and open new markets for US exports (The White House 2025). Mohanty et al (2025) notes that the Trump 2.0 policy agenda support domestic industries by addressing trade imbalances and withdrawing financial support from economies

that do not deliver reciprocal benefits to the US. For example, a sweeping tariff of 25% was imposed on all goods exported by Canada and Mexico, a measure later temporarily postponed when both nations agreed to bolster border security (Mo 2021). Furthermore, the International Trade Union Confederation reported on flat-rate tariffs of up to 25% on key exports from certain African countries such as Lesotho, South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya (ITUC-Africa 2025).

The situation in South Africa highlights the challenges posed by these policies, as prior to these new tariffs, South African manufactured exports—automobiles, refined aluminium and jewellery—entered the U.S. duty-free under AGOA. However, a tariff of 30% was then imposed on South African manufactured goods, a rate six times higher than the weighted average tariff applied to US imports. Moreover, while the tariff exempts raw materials like platinum and titanium, which account for a substantial portion of South Africa's exports (and its trade surplus with the United States), it falls heavily on higher value-added manufactured goods. Analysts at TIPS (2025) argue that such tariff impositions are structured to block industrialisation pathways for countries in the Global South. This antagonistic stance towards one-sided trade deals, as reflected in Trump's aggressive tariff measures, further shows his belief that trade agreements must yield balanced benefits for US industries and workers (Hart 2026; Menezes, Mariano and Contrera 2022).

Trump's approach under the MAGA banner is based on a move away from multilateral trade norms, focusing instead on bilateral, reciprocal agreements (Bhukuth 2026). His administration has revised several major trade deals and implemented tariffs with the aim of securing direct benefits for the United States. These policy shifts have implications for established programmes such as AGOA, which function as non-reciprocal mechanisms designed to support economic development in sub-Saharan Africa. Additionally, as the United States emphasises reciprocal arrangements, there is potential for the modification or discontinuation of preferential programmes that have historically supported long-term growth and diversification of trade in emerging economies. This change prompts important considerations regarding the future direction of US trade policy and its effects on global economic structures (Foster 2025).

Potential scenarios for AGOA under a second Trump administration

AGOA is set to expire at the end of December 2026, a looming deadline that has intensified debates over its future in US-Africa trade relations under a second Trump administration. Its extension in 2015 through the Trade Preferences Extension Act became the longest renewal in AGOA's history. The Act has enabled several sub-Saharan African countries to export multiple products duty-free to the United States, a measure that has contributed significantly to economic reform and diversification in the region. However, rising US economic nationalism and heightened concerns have led to trade imbalances which are exemplified by a US$13.2 billion US trade deficit with AGOA countries in 2023 (Hendrix 2020). Moreover, along with his contentious stance towards non-reciprocal trade benefits, Trump's strategic focus on US-China competition further complicates this trade situation.

The first scenario, then, is the complete cancellation of AGOA. Under this scenario, the act would be terminated when it expires on 31 December 2026, thereby stripping African exporters of the preferential access that has long underpinned their ability to compete in the US market. This could lead to immediate economic disruptions, especially in sectors which heavily rely on US markets for growth (Gopaldas 2024). Fluctuations in US imports from African countries and the heavy reliance of certain sectors on AGOA's benefits suggest a significant vulnerability to abrupt policy shifts (Kassa, Edjigu and Hakobyan 2025). African economies that have integrated AGOA's benefits into their export strategies, especially in sectors like textiles and apparel, would face immediate risk of severe economic disruptions. Therefore, the full cancellation could trigger abrupt revenue losses, job cuts and a retraction from developmental reforms that the act helped facilitate over the past two decades. Such an outcome would damage bilateral trade relations and might also signal a broader retreat from US commitments to development in Africa, potentially eroding investor confidence and deterring longer-term economic engagements (Gopaldas 2024).

A second scenario envisages the conditional renewal of AGOA, with the act being extended beyond 2026, subject to the implementation of reciprocal trade obligations. Under this framework, the United States might prolong AGOA's provisions but require beneficiary African nations to grant market access or implement reforms consistent with US interests. This approach would mark a

significant departure from AGOA's original non-reciprocal model, which could potentially undermine its developmental objectives (Kohnert 2025; Dantata 2025). Such conditions are increasingly being considered within legislative discussions; for example, a bipartisan bill introduced by US Senators James Risch and Chris Coons proposes a sixteen-year extension until 2041, while US Representative John James suggests a twelve-year renewal (Schneidman 2024). Kulu and Bentum-Ennin (2023) assert that African countries may not currently possess the leverage needed to negotiate effectively with the United States, describing the dynamic as similar to engaging with a more powerful partner, which constrains bargaining capacity. Many analysts contend that prevailing power asymmetries significantly limit Africa's negotiating position in trade discussions with the US. Consequently, the imposition of reciprocal obligations could pressure African states into adopting measures primarily advancing US interests, thus diminishing AGOA's intended developmental benefits (Kohnert 2025; Dantata 2025).

A third scenario situates AGOA as a strategic tool against China, albeit within an altered framework. China poses a competitive threat as it achieved bilateral trade volumes with Africa in 2023 that were more than four times higher than those of the United States (Schneidman 2024). Moreover, in recognising China's dominance in Africa, the US could maintain AGOA but with stricter eligibility criteria by linking benefits to governance reforms aimed at reducing Chinese influence on the continent. However, preserving the trade preference primarily to curtail Chinese influence could risk transforming AGOA into a strategic tool rather than a development instrument (Foster 2025). Several African countries such as South Africa, Kenya and Ethiopia have excelled under AGOA, registering high duty-free export rates that exceed 95% in certain sectors, between 2019 and 2021 (Gopaldas 2024). However, while this scenario preserves the act's foundational benefits, it also risks shifting the focus from its original intent by promoting long-term economic modernisation in order to achieve short-term strategic outcomes that cater to US geopolitical interests (Foster 2025). In addition, such a recalibration could temper developmental gains already made if the programme's stringent new standards limit the flexibility and resilience of African export sectors.

The future of AGOA hangs in the balance under a second Trump administration as it approaches its expiration in December 2026. A full cancellation could

lead to immediate economic shocks on African exporters while, on the other hand, a conditional renewal requiring reciprocal concessions might undermine the reformative spirit of the original act, particularly given Africa's limited bargaining power (Gopaldas 2024). Alternatively, a changed framework aimed at countering Chinese influence would preserve AGOA's preferential access, yet risk repurposing its developmental objectives. The final determination will mostly depend on the interplay of domestic political constraints, evolving global economic dynamics and the persistent 'America First' principles that continue to redefine US trade policy.

Policy responses and stakeholder strategies

The uncertainty over AGOA's renewal has provoked diverse responses from key stakeholders, prompting African governments and regional trade blocs to reassess their current strategies. Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa have relied heavily on the duty-free market access provided by AGOA to stimulate export growth and economic reforms. In response to possible changes, national governments may increase their diplomatic engagement with US authorities, seeking assurances or modifications that preserve existing benefits. Furthermore, states are likely to pursue collective action through established regional institutions such as the African Union (AU) and emerging frameworks like the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). These regional economic organisations offer a platform for co-ordinating trade policy and consolidating negotiating power. In recognising that intra-African trade currently remains below twenty per cent of overall trade volume, leaders must intensify efforts to harmonise trade regulations and resolve infrastructural challenges that hinder cross-border trade. Increased regional integration is seen as essential not only to protect existing export sectors but also to reduce the vulnerability produced by over-reliance on external preferential programmes. Governments are anticipated to invest more in domestic industrialisation and supply chain improvements while forging new bilateral and plurilateral partnerships. Such proactive measures will be critical if the nonreciprocal benefits of AGOA undergo a revision that introduces conditionality or if the programme is terminated altogether.

In the US, the legislature is aiming to extend AGOA with proposals now emphasising its strategic importance in countering Chinese influence on

the African continent (Schneidman 2024). Moreover, stakeholders such as business groups and advocacy organisations are lobbying for the preservation of the programme by citing its role in diplomatic engagement and economic development. Lawmakers in the US have historically recognised the strategic value of AGOA in maintaining US-Africa ties and countering China's growing influence on the continent. The recent legislative bipartisan proposals introduced by Representative John James and Senators James Risch and Chris Coons have suggested extending AGOA's tenure while also ensuring it continues to serve broader US strategic interests. Business groups with particular investments in Africa and strong supply chain interests are also actively lobbying for AGOA's preservation. Policy advocates emphasise that beyond mere trade volumes, AGOA represents an important diplomatic tool that underpins US influence in Africa. They stress that any changes to the programme could disrupt economic ties as well as the geopolitical balance in a region increasingly contested by major global powers.

In light of these debates, African countries, regional bodies and US policymakers are already strategising around AGOA's potential cancellation or transformation when it expires in December 2026. African countries are encouraged to improve intra-African trade by diversifying markets and strengthening regional integration through trade frameworks like AfCFTA. These measures reduce over-reliance on the US and also build resilience against global policy volatility (Kansaye 2025). In addition, African countries should actively pursue new trade partnerships with emerging markets in Asia, Latin America and Europe and further promote domestic industrial upgrading. Diversification of trade relations will mitigate vulnerability to shifts in US trade policy and also create long-term economic resilience and greater global competitiveness.

Conclusion

The future of AGOA remains uncertain, largely as a result of recent protectionist policies that prompted a move away from multilateral trade agreements. Certain scenarios suggest the possibility of AGOA's reduction or dissolution, while others propose its continued adaptation as a strategic instrument within an evolving geopolitical environment. To safeguard the developmental progress achieved thus far, it is imperative for African nations to diversify their export portfolios,

foster deeper regional integration and promote policies that align strategic interests with sustainable economic resilience. The coming period will be pivotal in determining whether AGOA persists as a hallmark of partnership and development or transitions into a broader, more reciprocal US trade framework. The trajectory of AGOA will hold significant implications for both intra-African trade and US-Africa commercial relations.

Should AGOA continue, even with potential modifications, African exporters are likely to retain preferential, duty-free access to the US market—an advantage that has facilitated export diversification and industrial growth across the continent over the past two decades. Sustained support through AGOA would help uphold economic progress and reinforce diplomatic ties between the United States and sub-Saharan Africa. Conversely, if AGOA is not renewed after its expiration in December 2026, many African exporters may lose critical market access. Such a development could result in reduced export revenues, employment declines and setbacks in economic diversification efforts, while also potentially signalling diminished US commitment to Africa's economic development and undermining investor confidence in the region.

These outcomes indicate that reliance on a single trade preference programme can increase exposure to external policy changes for African nations. Policymakers in Africa have considered developing a more diversified system of trade that does not depend solely on US market access. Regional trade efforts, such as AfCFTA, are seen as important steps. African countries are also exploring partnerships with markets in Asia, Latin America and Europe. Expanding trade relations and investing in domestic industries may contribute to a more stable economic future. The stability of US-Africa trade relations is likely to be influenced by African responses to changes in AGOA. Diversifying trade through regional integration and broader global partnerships is seen as one way to reduce dependence on any single external preference programme and potentially strengthen long-term economic resilience.

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