CHAPTER 12

An Analysis of the Impacts of Trump 2.0 on Climate Governance in Africa: Is Climate Bandwagoning Still Relevant?

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Introduction

The emergence of Donald Trump in 2016 and his re-emergence in 2024 have caused tremendous disruptions to international politics and norms. During these two terms, Trump has demonstrated an inward-looking approach to governance, which has affected US foreign policy. His ultra-pro-American stance and rhetoric have redefined America's foreign policy, favouring isolationism and retreating from multilateralism, a principle it has championed since World War II (Harper 2025). Of particular importance is Trump's aversion to international norms and culture, pulling the US out of many established memberships and active participation in multilateral and bilateral relations. He, at will, chooses to dishonour international values and practices, withdrawing the US from alliances, agreements and international treaties, thereby disavowing the respected international law dictum *pacta sunt servanda,* which means all agreements must be respected and fulfilled in international relations (Kelsen [1952] 2003).

A particularly significant example is the withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement; an internationally binding instrument entered into in 2015 to save the world from the impending catastrophe of global warming and climate change (Bodansky 2021). Before the emergence of Trump in 2016 and after his loss in 2020, the US offered climate governance leadership and was a major funder of climate change response in the world (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 2025). Thus, the period between his two terms can be seen as a respite,

with his re-emergence placing US foreign policy back in the spotlight. This is because his second-term rhetoric and actions on climate and environment show no departure from the Trump Way. Hence, with the commencement of Trump 2.0, he re-withdraws the US from the Paris Agreement and is undermining national climate and energy laws and regulations in an apparent disregard for climate change, the science that undergirds it and its international governance (De Pryck and Gemenne 2017).

Climate change has emerged as the world's most consequential problem in recent decades, with Africa bearing the brunt of the phenomenon's disproportionate impacts. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), in its Sixth Annual Review, notes with high confidence that climate change is already having serious multi-sectoral impacts across Africa (Pörtner et al. 2023). There is an observed worsening of climate change effects such as high temperatures and heat waves, droughts, floods, land degradation, food security pressures, melting glaciers, climate change-related health challenges, forced migration and disruption of economies and livelihoods (Pörtner et al. 2023). With these staggering climate challenges, it is not out of place for African countries to be eager to negotiate climate change mitigation, adaptation and financial support to address the root cause(s) of the crisis. However, the global process is under strain because of the Trump 2.0 withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the key mechanism for addressing climate change causes and impacts. This also hampers African countries' climate bandwagoning, namely, to strategically integrate their development exigencies and imperatives into the climate process.

The aim of this paper is to analyse and interrogate the impact of Trump 2.0 on Africa's climate governance and to raise the critical question of whether climate bandwagoning is still relevant after the re-withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, as well as the unsavoury domestic anti-climate actions of the Trump administration. This discussion is critical because the global climate process will suffer from withdrawal. Furthermore, this exit will negatively impact the effectiveness of Africa's climate change response. African countries have linked their development goals to the global climate process (Olajide 2022a); however, the volatility of the international system seriously challenges the logic of bandwagoning as a means to secure financial support, capacity enhancement and technological assistance.

Climate governance and bandwagoning: Conceptual and theoretical overview

Climate change has emerged as the world's most existential and pressing issue as the twenty-first century unfolds. Such is the threat that it poses that world leaders and other climate stakeholders have realised that a business-as-usual outlook is insufficient to avert irreversible catastrophe in the coming decades (Radunsky and Cadman 2021). For this reason, global climate governance was brought into being, starting with the commissioning of the Brundtland Commission Report in 1987, followed by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), otherwise known as the Earth Conference, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992 (Olajide 2022a). The World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) and the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) formed the IPCC in 1998 to anchor the scientific evidence for climate change (IPCC 2019). This further led to the development of the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1995, which has been the organising body of the annual Conference of the Parties (COPs), the main multilateral forum for climate governance in the world.

Climate governance is a multi-stakeholder affair (Olajide 2022b). This is because many multilevel actors, including national and subnational governments, international organisations, civil society and the private sector, among others, play important roles in climate negotiations (Olajide 2022b). As a result, important diplomatic breakthroughs have ensued from climate governance over the years. This includes the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 and the Paris Agreement of 2015. The Paris Agreement is the most binding of climate diplomatic efforts since its inception. It sets up protocols to monitor climate change responses, the most important of these being the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), by which state parties are expected to detail their intended contributions in terms of mitigation, adaptation and climate financing (Thidzumba, Olajide and Ojakorotu 2020).

African countries have been a part of the climate governance process since its inception. They have shown commitment to the process by being signatories to it and by ratifying many climate agreements over the years. Olajide (2022a) argues that the commitment of African countries to international climate governance is akin to climate bandwagoning. This means that they have attached

their potential for development to this process and are looking to maximally leverage the opportunities inherent in it. Nicholson and Chong (2011: 122) hold that 'bandwagoning is a process whereby a weaker social movement borrows resources, activities, and discourses from a stronger movement to gain advantages from it'. Thus, climate bandwagoning is the strategic linkage of nations' development imperatives to the climate change governance process. Jinnah (2011: 3) agrees with the definition by asserting that climate bandwagoning is a 'recent phenomenon of political actors strategically linking their issues to climate change politics for a variety of reasons'. This is a type of formative bandwagoning, in those African countries, along with other developing nations, strategically link their development goals to the climate change crisis.

African countries, among which are some of the world's poorest nations, view climate change as inherently full of development opportunities. The continent entered the twenty-first century with a serious development deficit, partly motivating the international community to adopt development frameworks, such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Sustainable Development Goals (McArthur 2014). Hence, African climate governance structures arising from the African Ministerial Conference on Environment in 1985, such as the African Group of Negotiators (AGN), Common African Position and the Conference of African Heads of State on Climate Change (CAHOSCC) have all worked in unison in promoting climate bandwagoning on the continent (Olajide 2022a). This is why Jinnah notes that climate bandwagoning is a 'purposive, agent-based linkage of political actors to affect the whole essence of the climate change regime as a result of their agenda' (Olajide 2022a: 608).

Consequently, African countries have shown an uncommon commitment to climate governance through the AGN and other actors and have been a part of the most momentous developments of the process, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, and paying their NDCs to the UNFCCC in the process (Thidzumba, Olajide and Ojakorotu 2019; Olajide 2022a). This explains the AGN's strong support for the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR), a key principle of global climate governance that apportions responsibilities based on historical culpability in greenhouse gas emissions. CBDR contains protocols including the distribution of climate financial support, technological transfers and technical know-how accordingly.

It also demonstrates why every negotiation is important to the African group, the operationalisation of the Loss and Damage Fund at COP 28, with US$400 billion in pledges, being a case in point (Olajide 2023).

Theoretical framework

This paper is theoretically grounded in contrasting the assumptions of realism and constructivism as theories of international politics. Realism is the premier theory of international politics, speaking to the primacy of the state as the main actor in the international system. Realists view the international political system as anarchical because it is the platform for egoistic and self-serving states to interact in the advancement of their national interests, security and self-preservation without an overarching authority to mediate these interactions. Thus, realism takes international relations to be a competition and struggle among states, a situation that inevitably leads to conflict among states. Korab-Karpowicz (2023) notes that while national politics goes on with the purview of well-defined laws, supervised and often enforced by a nationally recognised authority, international politics does not enjoy such affordances because inter-state politics is bound by no law or morality. It also lacks recognised authority capable of mediating intra-state relations. Hence, because of the anarchic nature of the international system, states take seriously the need to improve their national power.

The foregoing is the reason why realists believe that strife, conflicts and competition between and among states in the international system cannot be avoided, and that the struggle for dominance and survival is a strong driving force for global politics. In his work *Politics among Nations*, Morgenthau (1948) stated that realism in international relations focuses on the actions of states in pursuit of their self-interest. He believed that states would do almost anything to protect their territory and advance their self-interest. For Morgenthau, realism entails examining the motives and intentions of states to be able to understand and predict their actions in the international system. Realism claims to explain the truth about world politics and views the nature of state relations from the perspective of human selfishness—fighting for their own survival. The idea of power is fundamental to realism. Realistic thinking inevitably acknowledges the existence of conflicts resulting from rivalry for resources, power and safety. Self-serving states maneuver strategically and occasionally come into confrontation with one another.

Constructivism in international relations is a departure from the mainstream theories. It holds that the dynamics of the international system are socially constructed through shared meanings, rather than being determined solely by the material power and fixed interests of state actors. According to Finnemore and Sikkink (2001), social constructivism holds that '(a) human interaction is not shaped by material factors, but primarily by ideational; (b) the most significant ideational factors in this context are "inter-subjective" beliefs as shared collective understanding; and (c) these beliefs construct the actors' identities and interests' (Jung 2019: 2). The theory attempts to analyse the effects of ideas and beliefs on international politics. Social constructs are products of human consciousness, and they actively shape the international system (Ruggie 1998). This entails that the international environment and its dynamics are products of actors negotiating shared ideas that shape the system.

The social constructivist theory is in contrast to the realist theory of international relations. Realist theory is based on the material power or endowment of the state. Due to the relativity of state power calculated in material terms, states compete for scarce resources or even go to war against one another (Barkin 2009). On the other hand, constructivism is based on ideas that speak to the social basis of state behaviour and interaction in the international system. It is a reaction to the failure of realist theory to account for the ideational, social and cultural determinants of state behaviour in international politics (Wendt 1999). The social constructivist theory contends that the structure of the international system cannot be explained in material terms alone; rather, the interpretations and constructions of states as to their identity, interests and norms provide necessary details for understanding.

These theories speak to the reality of Trump 2.0 and its impacts on climate governance in Africa. While realism speaks to the assertion of pro-American rhetoric by Trump and his government, constructivism speaks to the reconceptualisation of American national interest through a narrower, inward-looking lens. For Africa, realism speaks to the need for countries to reassess their national interests during the Trump 2.0 period, with the possibility of engendering new alignments to achieve their climate goals. Similarly, constructivism speaks to African countries' need for normative and ideational shifts in their climate diplomacy to engender innovative alignments and creative frameworks to achieve their climate goals, through bandwagoning or otherwise.

Climate change and its impacts in Africa

As the 21st century unfolds, climate change can clearly be seen as one of Africa's most debilitating challenges. As one of the least developed regions of the world, climate change impacts are disproportionally felt on the continent, relative to other regions of the world. This fact was first noted by the Africa Progress Panel in 2015 when it asserted that, although the continent is arguably complicit in terms of historical emissions that cause climate change, it is also more affected by its impacts than other regions of the world (Africa Progress Panel 2015). Olajide (2022a) notes that climate change means more than an environmental problem for Africa. This is because it has complex secondary social, economic and political impacts that affect how people live and earn a livelihood. Furthermore, climate change, as a threat multiplier, makes existing social, economic and political issues and challenges more serious in incidence and therefore more difficult to address.

Despite Africa being the lowest greenhouse gas emitter globally, it faces serious climate change effects. The IPCC notes that the continent is experiencing observed impacts of the phenomenon (Pörtner et al. 2023). This corroborates the African Development Bank report that climate change has serious effects on Africa despite it being the region with the least greenhouse gas contribution in the world (African Development Bank 2019). The African Union Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan 2022-2032 notes that the continent is already being affected by observed impacts such as rising temperature, high precipitation, increased West African Monsoon, increased wind and storms and increased coastal and ocean-related hazards (African Union 2023). It is instructive to note that these impacts are expected to become more intense as climate scenarios unfold.

These impacts, while framed in environmental terms, have deeper roots on the continent. This reality coincides with the position of Okereke and Massaqoui (2017) that climate change has development implications for the world and the developing nations in particular. Thus, climate change causes or worsens problems such as food insecurity, drought, floods and erosion, water scarcity, health crises, extreme weather events, migration (forced migration has now become common), resource conflicts and ecosystem and biodiversity loss (Fonjong, Matose and Sonnenfeld 2024). The impacts have now become common in incidence and greater in magnitude, and are already reversing and stifling development on the

continent. This is demonstrated by the high number of climate events and the consequent staggering human and material costs.

Since 2023, Africa has experienced grave climate change impacts. For example, the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) notes that the year was the warmest in the past 124 years. It reports that 2023 was 0.61°C higher than the 1991—2020 averages and 1.28°C higher than the 1961—1990 averages (World Meteorological Organisation 2024a). The organisation's Secretary-General, Celeste Saulo, laments that 'Over the past 60 years, Africa has observed a warming trend that has become more rapid than the global average. In 2023, the continent experienced deadly heatwaves, heavy rains, floods, tropical cyclones, and prolonged droughts' (World Meteorological Organisation 2024b). This illustrates that climate change impacts Africa disproportionately relative to other regions in the world. There is now a rising incidence of sudden-onset climate events causing heavy loss and damage across the continent. In September 2023, Storm Daniel caused massive damage in Libya while Cyclone Freddy made landfall on the African side of the Indian Ocean, affecting countries such as Madagascar, Mauritius and Reunion (World Meteorological Organisation 2024a).

The worsening impacts of climate change on the continent have serious social and economic consequences. Socially, climate change is a significant contributor to the rise of Africa's disease burden. For example, the 2022 provincial floods in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, caused widespread waterborne and vector-borne diseases in the province (Presidential Climate Committee 2022). Economically, climate change causes serious costs for African countries as they are losing two to five per cent of their GDP as a result, and many of these countries spend up to nine per cent of their budgets in responding to extreme climate events. The development impact of climate change lies in the resultant widespread poverty. By 2030, this will be a crisis on the continent if climate change is not addressed and adaptation is not ramped up, since up to 118 million people will be exposed to droughts, floods and extreme heat (World Meteorological Organisation 2024b).

Trump 2.0 and climate governance

The re-emergence of Donald Trump following his electoral victory in 2024 brought a whole new dynamic to global climate governance. With his anti-

climate change stance, his emergence at the polls sent tensions through the climate diplomacy structure. In his first term as President, Trump demonstrated his aversion to the concept of climate change, its science and diplomacy. His inward-looking, America-first rhetoric and stance influenced his first-term climate change policy. While the goal of climate governance nationally and internationally before his emergence was to reduce carbon emissions towards ensuring that global warming is capped at 1.5°C above pre-industrial times, Trump sought energy independence for America (The Protect Arctic 2025). Through his America First energy plan, he rolled back 98 environmental laws in the US, and about fourteen were being processed for repeal at the end of his first term (Popovich, Albeck-Ripka and Pierre-Louis 2020). This demonstrated Trump's climate science scepticism. His administration, taking a climate-denying stance, maintained that American energy sufficiency should be ensured by developing new hydrocarbon projects in the country.

Trump withdrew America from the Paris Agreement in his first term as part of his Administration's climate policy. Before this, America had provided leadership in global climate governance by supplying the political, technical and financial means for the UNFCCC structure to operate efficiently. This is especially true of the preceding Obama Administration, which led America to rejoin the Kyoto Protocol and played a key role in shaping the Paris Agreement of 2015. America was also an active member of the global climate negotiation process (Sussman 2015). Domestically, the Obama Administration invested heavily in renewable energy to ensure that America took the lead in the global energy transition. American investment of approximately US$40 billion in renewable energy between 2014 and 2015 demonstrates the seriousness with which the administration took climate change. Trump, however, undermined America's local and international climate involvement, investing in earth-harming hydrocarbon projects and withdrawing the country from international climate commitments.

The foregoing serves as background on the nexus between Trump 2.0 and climate governance. There was no major change in his rhetoric on climate change and the environment during his second presidential campaign. Thus, the apprehension among climate governance stakeholders about his emergence as American President was not misplaced. Following his inauguration, Trump again withdrew the US from the Paris Agreement on 20 January 2025 by an Executive

Order titled Putting America First in International Environmental Agreements (The White House 2025). With this withdrawal, Trump has again abdicated American leadership and agency in global climate governance. This move holds serious implications for the local and international climate advances that have been made. Though it takes a year for withdrawal from the Paris Agreement to be effective, Trump's action means there will be no more commitment from America to the Agreement and its processes.

While Trump has not repealed the Biden Administration's climate law (The Inflation Reduction Act of 2022), he has undermined it significantly by suppressing facilitatory regulations for the effective implementation of the Act. This happens through executive orders, budgetary and regulatory stringency, regulatory rollbacks and legislative efforts. Thus, Trump 2.0 has weakened the most important and celebrated American climate policy, thereby hampering its local and international utility. Hanawalt and Fitch 2025), in an analysis of the first 100 days of Trump 2.0, notes that the US is weakening regulations that are meant to protect America from the financial risks of climate change. This is because the government is weakening institutions developed to ensure that America is financially resilient to climate change, and since Trump has an aversion to climate change and its dynamics, there are co-ordinated efforts to undermine its processes in America. The Corporate Climate Risk Disclosure is also being undermined as government agencies and companies are no longer under pressure to observe environmental codes. For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council (FAR Council) have stalled climate risk disclosure, while the White House has issued executive orders that vastly undermine the climate and climate-related regulations of federal and state governments (Hanawalt and Fitch 2025).

Impacts of Trump 2.0 on climate change in Africa

Trump 2.0 has serious implications for climate governance in Africa, as the continent is disproportionately affected by climate change impacts. Africa faces an uncertain future regarding the effects of Trump 2.0 on climate governance on the continent. In the first place, the Trump 2.0 withdrawal from the Paris Agreement is a leadership loss for global climate governance. America's withdrawal from the Paris Agreement denies the world its leadership at a time when co-operation to

reduce emissions is urgently needed. According to Gibson (2025), America's withdrawal from the Paris Agreement does not suggest the failure of the Agreement, but rather, it is an abdication of leadership from America on climate governance. As the world's most powerful and influential nation, its presence in the Paris Agreement helps to galvanise other countries to ensure an effective climate change response, but its withdrawal could discourage other nations from getting involved in mitigation and adaptation because of weak governance or delays in climate commitments (Swain et al. 2025). Thus, America's leadership withdrawal could discourage African countries from developing an effective climate change response.

America has always been an important climate change partner. This is especially true of the Obama Administration. Thus, Trump 2.0 and its anti-climate action connote the loss of a strategic partner for the region in climate governance. While the Trump 2.0 stance on climate change is not directly aimed at Africa, its impact affects the continent because it is one of the main beneficiaries of climate diplomacy. An example of the African-American climate partnership was the 2014 US-African Leaders' Summit in 2014 where climate change was the central discourse (Podesta 2014). While the Biden Administration was criticised for not showing enough commitment to Africa on climate and energy (McPherson-Smith 2022), the impact was not as grave as the Trump 2.0 re-withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. As an African climate and energy partner, the US had many avenues by which it supported the continent. For instance, the US pledged to work with African entrepreneurs to develop clean energy projects and assist farmers to enhance their sustainability in the analysis of climate change as an aspect of US national security (Kodak 2021).

America has been a leading funder of global climate governance. Given the primacy of climate finance as an aspect of climate change response, America's withdrawal and other anti-climate actions constitute a serious threat to Africa's climate governance. The continent is presently in the throes of climate change impacts and most urgently needs all the climate finance it can get to bolster its climate change mitigation, adaptation and resilience building. However, America's withdrawal from the Paris Agreement constitutes a major loss of a climate finance source. The US Department of State, in its progress report on President Biden's Climate Finance Pledge, notes that the US international climate finance for 2022 stood at US$5.8 billion, surpassing the previous year by 286%

(US Department of State 2023). The country's international climate finance was projected to reach US$11 billion by 2024. The implication of this is that Trump 2.0 constitutes a serious financial problem for African and other developing countries. Similarly, the US made the largest expansion of the adaptation fund in 2022, to US$2.3 billion, and projected it to reach US$3 billion by 2024 (US Department of State 2023). Thus, Trump 2.0 has effectively aborted America's climate finance resurgence just as the country was showing greater commitment to international climate finance.

The foregoing, in general, has the potential to abort Africa's climate bandwagoning, thereby possibly stifling the continent's development. As the continent has a serious development deficit—requiring that every possible opportunity for development is explored—global climate governance has always been a viable route to pursue (Olajide 2022a). The vast economic potential in climate change response can trigger African development through the massive investment opportunities in mitigation and adaptation, investment in climate-smart and resilient infrastructure, low-carbon and inclusive growth, clean energy technology transfer and other sundry socioeconomic dividends for the continent (Ndung'u and Azomahou 2023; Were n.d.; UNEP n.d.). Leveraging climate bandwagoning can help to ensure an effective climate change response, so that it mitigates the high cost of addressing climate change impacts that many countries are facing. While climate bandwagoning has always brought maximum climate governance utility to Africa, it currently has to operate within an inconsistent and volatile international environment, as demonstrated by the emergence of Trump 2.0.

Interrogating climate bandwagoning in an inconsistent world

Climate bandwagoning is a relatively new effort in international politics, given the relative recency of global climate governance itself. Its main objective is that actors in the international climate governance process can strategically link their issues to the global climate process. Jinnah (2011) extols the importance and potential of climate bandwagoning by actors in global climate governance. Actors link their issues to the climate process either at inception (formative stage) or during the pendency (operational stage) of the process (Jinnah 2011). Thus, climate bandwagoning offers a whole spectrum of possibilities for actors in strategically

linking their objectives to the climate process. For African countries, the potential of advancing their development by means of the global climate process is the main driver for bandwagoning. Given their unimpressive development trajectory, African climate actors consider the global climate process viable for meeting their development exigencies. To this extent, African countries have always explored the development imperatives through the instrumentalities of multilateral climate negotiations.

African countries have benefited from climate bandwagoning over the years in many areas. The continent has been able to leverage climate finance from the various climate negotiations. For instance, the continent received US$43.7 billion in climate finance in 2021/2022 through climate finance sources, such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF), Global Environment Facility (GEF) and bilateral and multilateral aid (Climate Policy Initiative 2024). The continent has also benefited from the capacity-building and knowledge-sharing portfolio of global climate governance. Given its well-known capacity deficit, Africa has been able to leverage important capacity-building and knowledge-sharing efforts in climate change response in important areas such as renewable energy, food security, rural electrification, subnational climate change response and so on. Thirdly, the continent has become an important bloc in global climate negotiations, speaking with one voice through the African Common Position and the AGN. African countries have outgrown their timid start in global climate governance (Tsega 2016). Last, the continent has benefited from the economic affordances of global climate governance, such as job creation and energy and food security improvement.

While the foregoing sounds impressive for the African continent, it raises critical questions about the challenge of maximising the potential of bandwagoning. It suffices to point out that the so-called affordances of climate bandwagoning are but a weak reflection of what the continent should and could have leveraged from global governance. This is because the global climate process appears to be hesitant to speed up effective climate change responses to the level that can maximally benefit Africa. In terms of climate finance, for example, there is a wide gap between what the continent gets and what it requires for climate bandwagoning to be effective. African countries require about US$3 trillion to achieve their NDCs by 2030, which translates to US$242.4 billion per annum. The paltry US$43.7 billion received in 2022 shows that the climate funders

are not necessarily showing a determined commitment to Africa (African Development Bank 2024). More evidence of climate finance hesitancy is the fact that the US$100 billion commitment made by developed countries in 2009 was only met by 2022. Meanwhile, the continent has suffered costs comparable to that amount and more in the intervening years.

Nothing underscores the unsustainability of climate bandwagoning more than the volatility and inconsistency of the international system within which it is currently operating. The international system is anarchical, despite the rise of normative commitment to the multilateral diplomatic system. The emergence of Trump 2.0 and its anti-climate actions show that it is unwise to base development exigencies on climate bandwagoning. Trump has redefined America's national interests to the exclusion of many of its traditional allies and also Africa. This creates a serious development hiccup for the continent as climate change impacts are worsening and exerting serious human and material costs on society. To this extent, basing development exigencies on climate bandwagoning is a dangerous game that can backfire because of inconsistencies in the international context within which it operates, as shown over the past few years. While the Trump 2.0 stance on climate and the withdrawal from the Paris Agreement are not targeted directly at Africa, their impacts on the continent are serious. This is because America is a major climate finance player and a viable leader, if committed to the ideals of global climate governance. Hence, climate bandwagoning is not necessarily safe for African countries despite its potential to engender development.

The foregoing challenges the relevance of climate bandwagoning, as the world recedes into uncertainty in the wake of Trump 2.0 and other similar developments in the international system. While bandwagoning offers advantages, the fact that it can be eroded by the volatility of the international system shows that African countries need to rethink the climate governance-development nexus. This is because bandwagoning reeks of dependency, which means that development ideation and funding are externally sourced. Thus, it is anti-development to base development goals on a slow and volatile platform, as the general hesitant behaviour of climate financiers and Trump 2.0 has proved.

Conclusion

Africa's climate bandwagoning is in dire straits because of the Trump 2.0 change in climate dynamics. With the US having a rethink of its national interest under the new Administration and challenging extant norms of international politics by jettisoning alliances, chiefly the withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the logic and relevance of climate bandwagoning by African states becomes questionable. As an international climate bloc that has grown in influence over the years, Africa has used its one voice to push for negotiations that could trigger its development within the UNFCCC and other multilateral climate structures. However, the volatility of the international system is likely to affect its climate governance adversely. With all the countries on the continent depositing their NDCs with the UNFCCC and looking to leverage international support, which is mostly conditional, Trump 2.0 is a direct attack on the continent, even though the withdrawal was not aimed at the continent.

This brings the continent to a whole new juncture where it needs to reassess its climate bandwagoning and chart a new course going forward. As the Trump 2.0 realism asserts the America First rhetoric in climate governance, causing an inward-looking, anti-climate change stance, there is a need for African countries to reconfigure their climate change-development nexus by adopting alternative models to resilience building, which can foster regional innovation and development from within. This will help to attenuate the effects of the volatility caused by Trump 2.0 and future climate-sceptical developments in the international climate process.

While climate bandwagoning is not bad in itself, African countries do not have control over how other countries behave in the international system. Hence, it is always at risk of being affected by the anarchical and volatile nature of the international system. To this extent, the relevance of climate bandwagoning is questionable, not only because of international system volatility, but also because it is slow and does not yield quick wins for the bandwagoning nations. Given that climate change impacts are on a worsening trajectory, the slow pace of climate negotiations vis-à-vis the rising costs of the business-as-usual climate stance shows a critical and unhealthy mismatch. Hence, African countries must consider alternative models of the climate governance-development nexus. Given the flux in social construction in the international system, Africa needs to

consider new partners and to bolster regional climate diplomacy and governance tools for better development performance. While this position allows African countries to continue pursuing the climate agenda based on extant norms such as the CBDR, reframing its utility will help advance the continent's development. Most importantly, it will also shield the continent from the international volatility demonstrated by Trump 2.0.

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