CHAPTER 6

Foreign Policy as a Genre of Colonial Power Games: How Right-Wing Think Tanks, through 'Project 2025', Shaped Trump 2.0 Foreign Policy

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Introduction

The election of Donald Trump in 2016 marked a full-circle moment for global racial imaginaries that the twentieth century had begun with. Not only did the fear-mongering rhetoric based on 'different' and unwanted outsiders—immigrants, homosexuals, Muslims, etc.—influence his popularity among conservative voters, the 'Great Replacement' theories that constantly assumed 'a threat on Western civilization *[sic]* by an encroaching racialized *other [sic]*' were also back and foregrounded how he would envision domestic and foreign policy (Barder 2021: 19). This was not an isolated case, however. Trump had joined a long lineage of American presidents who had built their presidencies on themes like 'war on terror', 'containing Arab nationalism', etc.—concepts that subtly connected with the early twentieth-century 'Yellow Peril' fetish that had racialised Asian communities and in turn legitimised all forms of (racial) carnage, from atomic bombs, aerial bombardments and extrajudicial executions (Bush 2001; Yaqub 2005). Further, the Covid-19 pandemic highlighted the polarising lines in more overt and cunning ways when the virus was infamously labelled as a 'Chinese virus', building a rhetoric of *othering* that extended itself to the hoarding

of vaccinations by the global North countries, which ensured low access for poor countries (Zheng and Zompetti 2023). Trump's rise thus laid bare all the signs of a return to the foundational theme of 'ontological difference' as an ordering line of the global imaginary (Mbembe 2019: 64). The 'global color *[sic]* line', as had been pointed out by Du Bois (1903) at the dawn of the twentieth century, was more evident now than ever. This, as Mbembe (2019: 6) would further emphasise, exhibited 'the desire for apartheid and endogamy that harry our epoch and engulf us in the hallucinatory dream of a "community without strangers"'.

This chapter concerns itself with this continuum. It is arranged in three parts. In the first part, we introduce the interlinkages between international theory and foreign policy, and how this legitimises the colonial power games and codifies the global apartheid paradigm. The second part analyses the *Project 2025* document, which was a blueprint document collectively written by far-right think tanks who were intentional about recrafting conservative ideology and federal policy. According to Wendling (2025), this document laid out 'a set of proposals that would expand presidential power and impose an ultra-conservative social vision'. By reflecting on this document, we demonstrate that the Trump 2.0 foreign policy was not the product of a democratic transition per se, but rather a manifestation of discursive codes which collectively encode the modalities and genres of power that advance colonial power relations. For this paper, we distinguish 'Trump 2.0' as the second tenure of Donald Trump's presidency, which began on 20 January 2025 and is ongoing. The third part of this paper explores what we term the apartheid logics of foreign policy, which we posit as an efficient axis of analysis to make sense of the Trump moment and the global racial imaginaries it reconstituted.

The 'Global Color line', IR and Foreign Policy

In *Souls of Black Folk,* Du Bois (1903: 13) argues, 'the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color *[sic]* line, -the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea'. Suggesting that although decolonisation had made attempts in revolutionising the international order, race and racism continued to rearrange inter- and intra-national relations in ways more profound than previously imagined. Anievas, Manchanda and Shilliam (2014: 2) further emphasise that with this statement, 'Du Bois illuminated the crucial significance of race and racism as

fundamental organizing *[sic]* principles of international politics, axes of hierarchy and oppression structuring the logics of world politics as we know it.' Du Bois' observation at the time was apt. It was a response to the tectonic shifts in global imaginaries sparked by the looming 'race wars', 'race suicide', 'Great Replacement', 'Yellow Peril' and 'native problem' as anticipated by politicians and leaders of the time (Vitalis 2016; Barder 2021). The 'global color line' as a research agenda has grown over the years, owing to scholars of international relations from the Global South attempting to make sense of not only race and racism in the international system but also of its centrality in the discipline of International Relations (IR).

Although questions of race and racism are often overlooked in IR, these are issues central to the birth of the discipline (Vitalis 2016; Acharya 2022). Vitalis (2016: 1) reminds us that 'in the first decades of the twentieth century in the United States, international relations meant race relations'. This is because the emergence of the twentieth-century international order was interlinked with the regrouping of colonial powers, still battling with how they could continue to hold on to the colonies despite the 'blowing winds of change' (Macmillan 1960). According to Anievas, Manchanda and Shilliam (2014: 2), 'IR was founded, in large part, as a policy science designed to solve the dilemmas posed by empire-building and colonial administration facing the white Western powers expanding into and occupying the so-called "waste places of the earth", as the Global South was commonly referred to by contemporaries'. While this marks the beginning of IR—even though the official historiography of the discipline places this behind the veil—Acharya (2022: 23) notes that 'as the United States became both the leading world power and the centre of gravity for IR as a field of study after 1945, race was (and continues to be) swept under the carpet, and racism even legitimized *[sic]*, by mainstream scholarship and policy discourses about international affairs and world order'. To think of IR and foreign policy, then, is to grapple with these linkages.

This interconnection affects not only the practice of international relations but also the teaching and theorising within the discipline, as it shapes conceptions of the 'international' by linking it to narrow Eurocentric perspectives that aim to tell 'the Western story; why it is the best, and why the rest should follow it' (Layug and Hobson 2023). Through this entanglement, even though race is central and foundational to the discipline, IR theory focuses on 'anarchy, great power politics, balance of power, interdependence, and the "objective" analysis of war and how to

resolve it" as its main concerns (Layug and Hobson 2023: 6). Dominant theories and understandings of foreign policy develop from this distortion, where they conceal their focus behind the idea of 'national interests', 'maximising national security', etc. The disjuncture, highlighted by leading IR scholar Waltz (1996), who suggests that international politics is not the same as foreign policy, sheds light on one of the oldest debates in the discipline. Within this debate, foreign policy is regarded as a 'governmental product' and thus subject to a theory that 'takes the performance of governments as its object of explanation in order to be called a theory of foreign policy' (Waltz 1996: 55). The Trump 2.0 moment, however, prompts us to reconsider foreign policy not just as a governmental output, as proposed, but as an extension of colonial power relations. In this way, we can observe how Trump's foreign policy defies the traditional logic to American foreign policy, while equally inverting the game to embolden a new colonial power play that highlights the global colour line.

Clarke and Rickets (2017: 370) suggest that the 2016 presidential elections were in many ways 'a contest between liberal internationalism and national isolationism'. This distinction from 2016 has similarly characterised the 2025 Trump 2.0 moment, which was fought on 'America First' rhetoric that sought to undo the multilateral system, in pursuit of a myopic nationalistic approach that projects and dictates terms to smaller countries. Grounded accounts of the impact and symbolism of these shifts in foreign policy have been lagging. Wright (2017) posits that 'Trump is the first post-war president to oppose the liberal order as he seeks the "America First" policy'. This analysis, which has been echoed by many, is part of the 'traditions of American foreign policy', which, according to Mead (2000, cited in Clarke and Rickets [2017: 366]) is divided into four distinct evolutions: 'the Hamiltonian (promotion of an "open door" world), Jeffersonian (maintenance of a democratic system), Jacksonian (populist values, military strength), and the Wilsonian (moral principle)'. These accounts, however, generally fail to provide grounded and persuasive analyses of the Trump turn in foreign policy—particularly in how it frames race and racism as central mechanisms in foreign policy and statecraft—thereby undermining ideals of equality and sovereignty. This also owes to the fact that foreign policy analysis is 'actor specific', and thus locates decision-making in nation-states and their interests (Hudson 2005). In this paper, we argue that the Trump 2.0 foreign policy is a morphology of how the genre recodifies and reconfigures

global modalities of colonial power relations. We go beyond the 'actor-specific' approach to examine the *Project 2025* document, which shows how significant the right-wing think tanks and ideology are in Trump 2.0 foreign policy.

Discursive games in Trump's foreign policy: How *Project 2025* blueprints USAID policy

In this portion of the essay, we will demonstrate how Trump 2.0 foreign policy is blueprinted by the *Mandate for Leadership: Project 2025* document, which was collectively written by 'hundreds of volunteers' under the mandate of The Heritage Foundation. This institution is intentional about recrafting conservative ideology and federal policy through a refurbished discursive blueprint. *Project 2025* is the ninth book in the *Mandate for Leadership* book series, which is compiled and published by The Heritage Foundation. This series of books is categorised in the genre of 'presidential mandates' directed by, and sourced from, non-political actors. Dahl (1990: 356) argues that the genre of the 'presidential mandate' text was created by Andrew Jackson to forward the claim 'not only that the president is uniquely representative of all the people, but that his election confers on him a mandate from the people in support of his policy'. Dahl furthermore asserts that 'Jackson's claim was a fateful step in the democratization *[sic]* of the constitutional system of the United States – or rather what I prefer to call the pseudodemocratization *[sic]* of the presidency" (Dahl 1990: 356). The Heritage Foundation's status as an influential think tank within elite conservative circles is an example of what Dahl means by the pseudo-democratic production of presidential mandates. It is listed as the third most influential think tank in public policy research in the United States by the University of Pennsylvania's Library Guides. The fact that the presidential mandate is produced within the elite think tank industry is an important demonstration that a seemingly democratising text of the *Mandate's* nature is, in fact, privately authored to direct the conservative administration's policy decisions. In this sense, the *Mandate* is meant to serve as a blueprint document for the incumbent conservative administration's public policy documents, including its foreign policies. In the case of Trump's second term as president, *Project 2025* was compiled and published as a precursory or blueprint document for the incoming Trump 2.0 public policy paradigm.

In this chapter, we classify the *Project 2025 Mandate* as a blueprint for the

Trump 2.0 public policy paradigm. This conceptual and ideological blueprint not only serves as the bedrock for the crafting and direction of policy, but it also serves as the sort of discursive game that sets up political relations both within the federal government and the gameplay in foreign relations. The argument is that 'foreign policy' is not only a document that details the strategies of how any given government should position itself in relation to others in the global scene of politics, but it is in fact a text that is constituted by a variety of discursive codes which collectively encode the modalities and genres of power a state must reproduce to retain— and perhaps expand— the internal logics of its existence and power. Thus, when we deconstruct 'foreign policy' as a text, we see that it is, firstly, a discursive document, and secondly, completely constituted by codes that reproduce the power logics produced by the given state to reconstitute the discursive field, or 'gamefield', that undergirds its politics. This is to say that a state is always undergirded by a structure of relations that are in fact constituted and reproduced by means of a game. Since the game is discursive, it is entrenched in both the realms of language and action. For our argument, we will only highlight the political game at play in *Project 2025*, how it redefines modes of relation within the US federal government and how the US, under Trump's second turn, positions itself in the global scene of politics.

In his seminal paper 'Encoding/Decoding', Hall (1980) uncovers the various structures in which a code is produced and transmitted in basic models of any kind of discursive field. He is particularly interested in how this process enfolds in the discursive fields of the media. However, I will demonstrate that his reading of these structures unravels the basic model of all discursive fields qua systems, including the market regime of racial capitalism. Hall argues that the 'code' is a kind of sign as it is imbued with the meaning structure of the system that produces it. However, unlike the conventional linguistic signs which are primarily represented in written and spoken language, the 'code' can be represented and transmitted through objectual reality. Hall asserts that objectual reality is itself a discursive field. Therefore, there is no true bifurcation between objectual reality and the semiological dimension. The former is merely a reified expression of the latter, while the latter is the representational field of the former. Hall asserts that 'Reality exists outside language, but is constantly mediated by and through language: and what we can know and say has to be produced in and through discourse' (Hall 1930: 55). In this sense, language and reality are not only co-constitutive, but

they are also co-producing, such that codes are produced to transmit various particles of the meaning order to these different systems. It is only our positivist theories that bifurcate these two terrains, but when we assess the movement and production of codes, we quickly notice that 'reality' and 'language' are two kinds of correlative discursive systems. Thus, language and political reality converge in foreign policy and its blueprint documents like *Project 2025*.

When we read a text like *Project 2025* as a blueprint document for the policies that are produced by an administration, it becomes clear that the policy— and in our case, the foreign policy document— is constantly referencing and expanding the internal logic that is prescribed by the blueprint. Thus, codes of power games are transferred from the blueprint to the policy document by the various authors and actors involved in the construction of the document. Therefore, we see that foreign policy is not merely constructed in a democratic process. When Trump's entire policy-making infrastructure is designed according to a blueprint like *Project 2025*, every policy produced by this sort of administration draws its codes and rhetorical tools from the blueprint, which, in turn, adopts codes of power and domination from a larger field of 'power production'. This larger field of 'power production' is what Quijano and Ennis (2000) call the 'coloniality of power'. For Quijano and Ennis (2000: 540), the coloniality of power is produced from three degrees of geopolitical and geocultural power extraction that defines our contemporary scene of global politics:

> "The colonizers *[sic]* exercised diverse operations that brought about the configuration of a new universe of intersubjective relations of domination between Europe and the Europeans and the rest of the regions and peoples of the world, to whom new geocultural identities were being attributed in that process. In the first place, they expropriated the cultural discoveries of the colonized *[sic]* peoples most apt for the development of capitalism to the profit of the European centre. Second, they repressed as much as possible the colonized *[sic]* forms of knowledge production, the models of the production of meaning, their symbolic universe, the model of expression and of objectification and subjectivity… Third, in different ways in each case, they forced the colonized *[sic]* to learn the dominant culture in any way that would be useful to the reproduction of domination, whether in the field of technology and material activity or subjectivity."

The codes that are produced from the core of the coloniality of power are pulled and reappropriated to frame and construct blueprint texts like *Project 2025*. These codes form the central logics of these texts, which enable authors and policymakers to reproduce and reify codes of colonial power. Let us assess closely how this process unfolds in a blueprint text like *Project 2025*. In the preamble of the *Mandate for Leadership: Project 2025* document, the authors state that the gamefield of national and international politics has radically 'changed' since the 80s (Dans and Groves 2023: xiv). They state that they have constructed the document as a 'playbook' for the conservative political practitioner who participates in this differently constructed game. For them, the 'game has changed', because a new age in domestic and international politics has dawned, thus the adherents of the playbook must be ahead of their competitors to reconstruct the terms of a new game. The game that has been replaced is 'the long march of cultural Marxism [that has pervaded] our institutions' (Dans and Groves 2023: xiv). The political game outlined in this text resembles the model of game theory in economic structures. McCarthy and Meirowitz (2007: 5) state that 'political game theory is the idea that individuals rationally pursue goals subject to constraints imposed by physical resources as well as the behaviour of other actors' (McCarthy and Meirowitz 2007: 5). According to this theory, actors make and play political games on the basis of two principles of utility or producing outcomes that satisfy their individual and group interests: '1. Confronted with any two options, which we might denote x and y, an individual can determine whether he does not prefer option x to option y or whether he does not prefer y to x, or both. When preferences satisfy this property, we say they are complete; 2. Confronted with three options x, y, and z, if an individual does not prefer y to x and does not prefer z to y, then it must be the case that she does not prefer z to x. Preferences satisfying this property are transitive" (McCarthy and Meirowitz 2007: 5). McCarthy and Meirowitz (2007) assume that the game at play is naturalised in the field on which we construct and reproduce political relations of any kind. However, it is evident in texts like *Project 2025* that the game at play as well as its conditions are constantly being constructed by the social actors within the given gamefield. Thus, the game-maker—like the policymaker— uses discursive items like policies (that is, foreign policy) and blueprints to set up a political and discursive gamefield that directs actors to reconstruct modes of social relations according to the conditions outlined by the text itself. So, the policymaker or

blueprinter who models the logic of their text in accord with game theory does so to get other actors to reproduce certain structural conditions and behavioural patterns that are utility-based. In *Project 2025*, the discursive game that is set up by the authors and blueprinters is one that positions social actors in a field that forces them to reproduce the conditions of possibility that make conservative governance a dominant social and political model.

In the *Project 2025* introduction, Dans and Groves (2023) suggest that a new game must be built to replace the 'dying' game of the old regime of federal thought and action in the United States. This alone discounts the required condition of 'certainty' in classical game theory. McCarthy and Meirowitz (2007: 6) state that classical game theory builds its principles of rationality and utility on the grounds of certainty. For them, certainty means 'that the agent has sufficient information about the choice environment that she can perfectly predict the consequences of each of her actions. Thus, certainty means only that there is no analytic difference between assuming that political actors choose actions based on the desired outcomes which result from those actions, or that they choose those outcomes directly'. Blueprints like *Project 2025* demonstrate that certainty is a fiction constructed by game-makers themselves. The grounds of the coloniality of power produce the sort of dynamics that disables the possibility of constructing even playing-fields where agents can fairly produce individually determined outcomes. If anything, game-makers manipulate fictions like 'certain grounds' to lure other social agents to reproduce the conditions of their game. This is evident in how contributors of *Project 2025* must first insist that there was something defunct in preceding models qua 'dead games'. This 'dead' game, for Dans and Groves (2023: xiv) and contributors of *Project 2025*, had turned the 'federal government [into a] behemoth, [which is] weaponized *[sic]* against American citizens and conservative values, with freedom and liberty under siege as never before'. Thus, to turn a new leaf, and exceed their competitors in reconstructing a new game for the next age of federal politics, the conservative gameplayer bears the 'task' of 'reversing this tide and restoring our Republic to its original moorings'. The authors of the document state that, as this task is too great for one gameplayer to carry out by himself, the task 'requires the collective action of our movement … to prepare and seize the day' (Dans and Groves 2023: xiv). The key axiom qua principle of the document is '"the personnel is policy", and we need a new generation of Americans to answer the call and come to serve'. Thus,

the authors aim to 'assemble an army of aligned, vetted, trained, and prepared conservatives to go to work on Day One to deconstruct the Administrative State' (Dans and Groves 2023: xiv).

The 'deconstruction of the Administrative State' will be achieved through four pivotal pillars. We find 'Pillar I' and 'Pillar IV' to be the most notable for the purposes of this paper. According to Dans and Groves (2023), Pillar I "puts in one place a consensus view of how major federal agencies must be governed and where disagreement exists brackets out these differences for the next President to choose a path." Pillar IV, called 'the Playbook', stipulates how adherents will be "forming agency teams and drafting transition plans to move out upon the President's utterance of 'so help me God'" (Dans and Groves 2023: xiv). As it is clear that the authors of *Project 2025* are setting up a new sort of political gamefield to entrench their order of governance and trap their political opponents to engage in politics through the authors' terms, we need to assess how these 'pillars'— which are first and foremost discursive items— are discursive strategies to cement the new game and naturalise it in the field of politics. Pillar I is clearly a mapping of the political gamefield as it stands, or at least as it is perceived, by the authors of *Project 2025*. The field, to them, is populated by an array of 'major federal agencies'. The strategy of the conservative game-maker is to deconstruct the current order of governing these agencies, so that their own order of governance takes hold. This order of governance will draw out different 'pathways', that is, different processes and mechanisms, for the President (who is the central gameplayer) to imprint the agencies with the new order of governance. Pillar IV will outline how the different segments of the civilian and political 'army' called upon will take the reins of these 'major agencies' in order to institute the new order of governance. The logical steps for the *Project 2025* game-play are:

1. Identify and assess the major agencies of the American federal government;
2. Observe that, from 1980 to the present, these agencies have been governed through a common order;
3. Be aware that this common order, known as Marxism, seeks to champion the interests and wellbeing of the public while also upholding the interests of the private sector;
4. Deconstruct this order of governance in key public agencies, so that

'deconstructing the Administrative State' is achieved;

5. Shift the mandate of governance from a bureaucratic order so that the Administrative State is dissolved into a different kind of state;
6. Institute a reconstruction of the order of governance in key public agencies that replaces the bureaucratic order of the Administrative State;
7. Therefore, set up a new mode of playing the political gamefield, which will:
8. Impel all opposition and adherents to play through the same mode, as this mode will have a coherent set of rules and normative prescriptions;
9. Naturalise the new game to appear as the new age of politics proper;
10. Lock in all gameplayers to reproduce the logics, modes, rules and standards of this new game.

It is now imperative to closely analyse how the logics of Pillar I and Pillar IV—and all the logical steps that follow from these pillars—undergird the document's foreign policy vision. In the ninth chapter of *Project 2025*, titled 'Agency for International Development', Primorac (2023) follows these steps to uncover the governance that is currently entrenched in the operations of the US Agency for International Development (USAID). By merely mentioning USAID as the subject of his chapter, Primorac (2023) succeeds in the first step of constructing a new gamefield. He has identified the USAID as a 'major agency' of the American federal government. He must now complete the second part of step one, which is to assess this 'major agency'. In his assessment, he writes:

> "The U.S. Agency for International Development leads the U.S. government's international development and disaster assistance programs. USAID helps communities to lead their own development journeys by reducing the impact of conflict; preventing hunger and the spread of pandemic disease; and counteracting the drivers of violence, instability, transnational crime, and other threats. In alignment with U.S. national security interests, the agency promotes American prosperity through initiative that markets for U.S. exports; encourage innovation; create a level playing field for U.S. businesses; and support more stable, resilient, and democratic societies that are less likely to act against American interests

> and more likely to respect family, life, and religious liberty (Primorac 2023: 253)."

He continues his assessment as follows:

> "USAID was established during the presidency of John F. Kennedy pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to promote the foreign policy, security, and national interests of the United States. At the height of the Cold War with the Soviet Union, it sought to halt the spread of Communism by assisting peoples in the developing world in their efforts to advance economically, socially, and politically (Primorac 2023: 253)."

Primorac (2023: 253) then follows the sixth reconstruction of the 'Playbook' by insisting that the Biden administration's use of USAID to 'support for the global left' should be discontinued so that:

> "The next conservative Administration should scale back USAID's global footprint by, at a minimum, returning to the agency's 2019 pre-COVID-19 pandemic budget level. It should deradicalize *[sic]* USAID's programs and structures and build on the conservative reforms instituted by the Trump Administration. This will require working closely with the U.S. Congress to make deep cuts in the international affairs '150 Account' while granting USAID greater flexibility in spending its appropriated funds to achieve better development outcomes."

Consequently, the most useful way to think about the sort of political games introduced through, and encoded in, foreign policies are not through political game theory, but the logics of colonial governmentality. Derous and De Roeck (2019: 247) write that:

> "Governmentality firstly understands government as a plurality of activities aimed at shaping, directing, and improving the conduct of others and ultimately capable of inducing self-control. By structuring the field of possible action of the governed, there is no need for coercion or violence to exercise power over the individual. If a government is able to define

the boundaries in which this individual perceives his or her own possible actions or behavior, he/she will very likely behave in ways that fit the overarching mentality (supra). Governmentality is thus about the indirect exercise of power through determining the 'box' within which individuals believe to have the freedom to think and act. Hence, governmentality echoes the Foucauldian conception of power that is diffuse and produces rather than represses. It is diffuse because it is widely shared by different societal actors. It is productive because it is constitutive to truth and to knowledge, which are the basis of our day-to-day functioning. Hence, the Foucauldian notion of power is a departure from the more intuitive, liberal conception of power, stating that power is 'possessed' by an actor and exerted over another, with or without this actor's consent."

Apartheid logics of foreign policy

As stated earlier, the Trump turn in foreign policy is not an isolated moment. It is connected to a longer lineage of American statecraft approaches that projected internal social and political contexts onto the international. This can be understood more clearly through the Du Boisian 'global color *[sic]* line' thesis, which, building from the early twentieth century domestic American experiences with democracy and imperialism, suggested that race was a central schema in structuring modes of governance, both in domestic and global spheres. Hall (1980: 59) points out that 'racism is always historically specific'. Even though it might draw 'from cultural traces deposited by previous historical phases'—as we can see with the present Trump turn—it is always specific and it arises out of present conditions. Hall (1980: 59) further emphasises that racism effects are 'specific to the present organization *[sic]* of society, to the present unfolding of its dynamic political and cultural processes—not simply its repressed past'. Trump's 'America First' policy is an embodiment of this flux. Even though it builds on the Ronald Reagan years (1981—1989) where the original *Project 2025* document can be traced, then named *The Mandate for Leadership*. It has a specific characterisation of the present unfolding societal dynamics and we want to suggest that this can be termed the apartheid logics of foreign policy.

Apartheid has often been theorised from a South African perspective. Rightfully so, since it is in South Africa where we can observe the crude ingenuity

of twentieth-century state-building processes that centralised race as a technology of governance[1]. Wolpe (1972), Legassick (1972) and Arrighi et al. (2010) present conceptualisations of apartheid that depart from British segregation laws, but make a disjuncture that allows us to observe the nexus between race, labour and primitive accumulation and what that means for the continuation of colonial power relations through imperialism. These conceptualisations aptly show the centrality of primitive accumulation in worldmaking, and how it co-opts race to sustain itself. Magubane (1979: 1) emphasises that apartheid in 'the South African social formation itself represents a stage in the evolution of the world capitalist system.' This analysis by Magubane locates apartheid at the centre of the global imperial project and colonial power relations in a similar way to Du Bois' analysis of the American socio-politico-economic process in *Souls of Black Folk* (1903) and later in *Black Reconstruction* (1935). The 'America First', 'Make America Great Again', 'controlling American borders' policies, etc. are all symptoms of a world capitalist system regrouping, and thus haphazardly redrawing the lines and terms of engagement. For example, according to Edwards (2018: 184), 'Trump argued his vision for trade policy would reinvigorate American exceptionalism'. Edwards (2018: 184) further states that this "'exceptionalism' characteristic of American foreign policy is a result of protectionist trade policies of Lincoln and Washington, which helped create the prominence of the United States." The isolationist and nationalist approach of these policies during the Trump years represent specific political and societal dynamics where we are seeing a return to 'apart-hood' and 'separateness', as Mbembe (2019) reminded us earlier. Lastly, this play with geography and distance, or spatialisation, manifesting through the desire to 'empty' America of the immigrant, presented as bad for the American body politic, is what makes us conclude this as a moment of apartheid logics in statecraft. This "hallucinatory dream of a community without strangers", or, in the crudest sense, a community without the unwanted *other,* is what has inspired the isolation of the US, the mass deportation of migrants, the cutting of aid to needy countries, the reversal of 'Diversity, Equality and Inclusion' programmes and the withdrawal from climate deals (Mbembe 2020: 6). Processes that have been the hallmark of the Trump turn in foreign policy.

Conclusion

The Donald Trump 2.0 moment has serious consequences for world re/order and foreign policy. Nevertheless, it is still too early to know its long-term impact. But if history is anything to go by, then 2016, as a benchmark, allows us to conclude that the Trump turn in foreign policy proposes a return to ideas of apartheid and separateness that were internal to colonial power relations. This chapter attempted to unpack the significance of the Trump 2.0 moment in reinforcing the global racial imaginaries with which the previous century had begun. It revisited Du Bois (1903) and the 'global color *[sic]* line' to demonstrate the complex entanglement of the practice of international relations, and the teaching of it with international theories tethered to colonial logics of power and sensemaking. To demonstrate how the Trump foreign policy formulation was encoded with colonial power games, this chapter critically examined the *Project 2025* document, which served as a blueprint for his government's domestic and international ordering. The chapter gave an ideological and practical blueprint for how Trump 2.0 foreign relations will be practised, laying a track for a New World (Re)Order, or rather, new visions of the world that exhibit a desire for isolation, apart-hood and separateness.

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Endnotes

1 We draw from Michel Foucault (1926-1984) who uses the phrase "technologies of power" to refer to methods and procedures for governing human beings (Behrent 2013). We deploy this concept as an attempt to also think of apartheid beyond its 'segregation' ethic, to explore its ability to control, supervise and manipulate populations and individuals.