SECTION I:
INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1

Reintroducing African Perspectives on Trump 2.0: United States Foreign Policy and the New World (Re)Order[1]

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Welcome to Trump's 2.0 world

Despite his defeat in the 2020 elections and the subsequent controversies that dogged his political prospects, President Donald Trump staged a historic comeback in American political history when he won the November 2024 elections and returned to the White House in January 2025. The second coming of Donald Trump was premised on his populist, right-wing and nationalist agenda. He mobilised popular support around the slogan 'Make America Great Again' (MAGA), which is closely connected to the ideas, proposals, plans and promises of cutting US government spending and debt, increasing government efficiency, reforming law enforcement and judiciary and ensuring freedom of speech. The list also includes reversing LGBTQ+, climate and energy transition policies, enabling tax cuts for local industries, imposing massive tariffs on importation and deporting illegal immigrants. Other campaign promises include ensuring that NATO allies pay for their defences, preventing trading partners from exploiting Americans via aid and trade agreements, resolving the Russian-Ukraine conflict and preventing World War III, ending the Gaza war and securing the hostages, stepping up the competition with China in high-tech and many more (Blackburn et al. 2024/2025; Farley et al. 2025; Jacobson and McKinney 2024). As has been evident in the weeks and months since Trump assumed office as the 47th US President, he has displayed a remarkable commitment to the implementation and realisation of many of these objectives, with an admixture of success, progress, setback and failure recorded so far (for some scorecards,

see Elliott 2025; Esomonu, Lodhi and Woodward 2025; Sonnier and Shannon 2025).

As a result of some of his actions, US foreign policy has taken a dramatic turn under Trump 2.0, with implications for the world order. On many occasions, Trump has announced the intention of the US to acquire Greenland from Denmark, reclaim the Panama Canal from Panama and buy out the associated Chinese stakes, take over the Israeli-occupied Palestinian territory of Gaza to convert it to a real estate development project and make Canada the 51st state of the federation (Davies and Wendling 2025; The Nation 2025; Walsh 2025). Trump justified the expansionist desire for new territory as being in national security interests, especially in the case of Greenland and the Panama Canal. Accordingly, the US under Trump has used diplomatic and economic pressure and has sometimes even threatened military action to advance its objectives. These inclinations and proposed policy moves have led analysts to compare the US President's actions to the aggressive foreign policies of Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping, as evident in their policies in Ukraine and the South China Sea. Trump's efforts to reclaim the Panama Canal, buy the Chinese Panama Canal Ports and Greenland, acquire Gaza and absorb Canada have faced resistance from affected governments and peoples of Panama, China, Denmark, Canada and Palestine, with solidarity from many other states in South America, the Middle East and Europe (Isidore and Liu 2025; Steven 2025; Stone and Boymal 2025). Furthermore, his efforts have challenged the rule-based international order as well as the anti-colonial and anti-expansionist position that the US had championed and sometimes defended for decades.

The US trade and other economic dimensions of foreign policy have been indiscriminately used by Trump against friends, allies and (potential) adversaries alike. The US-Canada relations have shifted from one of historical cordiality to unpredictable animosity since the Trump administration imposed 25% per cent tariffs on Canadians imports, a move he also made against Mexico (Peralta and Northam 2025; Steven 2025). The Trump administration increased tariffs on imports from China by ten per cent on 4 February 2025, and by an additional ten per cent on 4 March 2025 (Feingold and Botwright 2025; Robinson et al. 2025). In addition, Trump threatened to impose tariffs on Europe, and declared tariff reciprocity in its trade relations with India. On 2 April 2025, Trump announced the 'Liberation Day' tariff, which amounted to a global declaration of tariff war,

targeting close to 100 countries across Africa, Asia, the Americas and Europe (Mesa 2025; Panetta 2025). This measure was designed to encourage investors to move production to the US and boost employment locally, address trade imbalances, contain the influx of products from China and its proxy investments globally and compel countries to negotiate trade relations bilaterally, based on Washington's terms. Although Trump subsequently postponed the global trade war, it attracted mixed international reactions and responses (Feingold and Botwright 2025; Peralta and Northam 2025; Zurcher 2025). Many countries were compelled to negotiate with the administration on Washington's terms, while some investors promised to relocate or revive production in the US; others resisted what they referred to as trade unilateralism and bullying. For instance, the European Union (EU) threatened retaliation, and Canada and China gained global attention for their resistance to Trump's tariff war. Most notably, after a tit-for-tat trade war between China and the US, which witnessed no fewer than 125% tariffs on both sides and restrictions on exports of some Chinese rare earth minerals to America, both Beijing and Washington realised the need to negotiate (Feingold and Botwright 2025; Robinson et al. 2025; Momoh and Oyewole 2026). Regardless, Trump's tariffs challenged the enduring international economic order that was based on market globalisation, open borders and a multilateral approach to trade regimes, which the US has previously represented and defended.

In a move towards de-globalisation, Trump has withdrawn the US from international climate commitments, a decision that has threatened global policy frameworks for a just energy transition and environmental sustainability (Global Carbon Fund 2025; Marggraff, Schoeman and Oyewole 2025). The new administration suspended all US foreign aid, except for Israel, and moved to end USAID (The White House 2025a). This development has greatly affected some of the poorest countries and peoples, globally (Democracy Now 2025; *The Lancet* 2025). On trade, climate, aid and many other subjects of interest in international relations, the US has become increasingly distanced from its traditional allies, especially Canada and in Europe. While US Vice President JD Vance questioned the democratic credentials of Europe at the Munich Summit in February 2025, a few days later, US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth reiterated Trump's position at the NATO summit that Europe had to pay for its own defences (Latschan 2025; Lopez 2025; *The Economic Times* 2025). In the absence of Ukraine and Europe,

the US initiated peace talks with Russia in February 2025 at the Saudi Arabian capital, promising to lift sanctions and rationalising the need for Kyiv to concede territory (Pamuk and Magid 2025). Despite Russia's inconsistency in peace talks, Trump has displayed more tolerance for Moscow than for Kyiv. In June 2025, Trump blamed the Ukraine war on the decision of G7 leaders to expel Russia from the group (Verhelst, Taylor-Vaisey and Cancryn 2025). Furthermore, Saudi Arabia has moved from a pariah state status to the new darling of US diplomacy, as Riyadh hosted the first foreign state visit by the 47th President and promised hundreds of billions of dollars in foreign investment to America (Schwartz and England 2024; The White House 2025b). These reflect Trump's transactional and personalised approach to foreign policy and his favourable disposition towards autocratic leaders at the expense of a US record of promoting multilateralism, democracy, human rights and its rule-based order globally.

African perspectives

The field of international relations has been dominated by Euro-American perspectives, often to the detriment of other viewpoints, especially from developing countries and regions of the world, such as Africa (Acharya 2014; Bischoff, Aning and Acharya 2015; Odoom and Andrews 2017; Smith 2009). Given their shared strength, influence and leadership role in technological development, international politics, economy, culture, law and order, the collective West (Europe, North America and Australia[2]) has used its unique position to assume the centre stage of global affairs and attendant knowledge production. Accordingly, most understandings of the new- or old-world order, disorder and reorder have been conceived, shaped and marketed around developments in the West, while others are mostly peripheral and supporting stories (Acharya 2014, 2025; Faleye 2014). Alas, African experiences and perspectives have mostly received limited attention in world affairs. In fact, many of the prevailing African narratives are actually Western or broadly foreign perspectives of the continent's experiences (Abrahamsen 2017; Mazrui 1977; Ogunnubi and Oyewole 2020; Oyewole 2025; Taylor 2010). This has been exacerbated by decades of resources dedicated to African studies being concentrated in Europe and North America, without commensurate academic efforts to study how the African continent navigates world affairs.

Despite some efforts, research and development (R&D) commitment to

understanding African experiences and the continent's relation to global events and the major global players, is limited. This has limited the recognition of African contributions to the conception and understanding of major subjects within international relations.

Notably, Trump 2.0 has become a major disruptive force in international affairs, given its influence on US domestic and foreign policies and the consequences for world order, disorder and reordering (Brands 2025; Cooley and Nexon 2025; Goddard 2025; Kimmage 2025). Therefore, the subject of Trump 2.0 has generated media and policy debates and growing academic interest globally (Oxford Economics 2024; Transatlantic Task Force 2025). Amidst these, there are vastly different media and policymaker perspectives regarding the political, economic and cultural impacts on Africa under Trump 2.0 (Gopaldas 2024; Isike and Oyewole 2024a; Munga 2025). However, beyond policy briefs, media articles and oral presentations, a need remains for more research efforts to produce a concise and coherent body of knowledge from Africa that reflects the diversity of African experiences and their multidimensional perspectives on Trump 2.0, along with its influence on US foreign policy regarding the continent and the entire world.

As evident from the first six months of the new administration, the effects of US foreign policy under Trump 2.0 have outpaced academic responses and knowledge production, especially from Africa and other developing regions of the world. Beyond what is often identified in international debates, Africa has already felt the impacts of Trump 2.0, its influence on US foreign policy and world order. Despite the popularity of and admiration for Trump among the African populations, some of his word choices about the continent have been considered derogatory and dehumanising. In March 2025, for example, Trump remarked that 'nobody has heard of the country' (Ngcobo and Jones 2025), when referring to Lesotho. Trump has also condemned South Africa's Expropriation Act as racist against the white minority, alleging genocide against them, and controversially offered refugee status and relocation to the US (*Fordsburg Independent Community Newspaper* 2025; Friedman 2025; US Mission South Africa 2025). Equally, Trump described the security situation in Nigeria as a religious genocide against Christian and deployed the US military to support the country. Furthermore, Trump's administration has largely stopped aid to the continent, which includes the withdrawal of funding support for the war against HIV/Aids. Moreover, Trump and his team have been less than supportive of South Africa's hosting of

the G20 (Majadibodu 2025). Due to these developments, some critical areas of US-South Africa relations, as well as US relations with the rest of Africa, have suffered.

Thousands of illegal immigrants from across the world are now facing deportation from the US, and many African nationals, notably Nigerians, Ghanaians, Kenyans, Zambians and Zimbabweans, are affected (Ekanem 2025a; Ekpo et al. 2026). In March 2025, many African countries appeared on Trump's visa ban watchlist, including Libya, Somalia and Sudan on the red list (consisting of eleven countries whose citizens are completely banned), Eritrea, Sierra Leone and South Sudan on the orange list (consisting of ten countries whose citizens face additional restrictions) as well as Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, São Tomé and Príncipe and Zimbabwe on the yellow list (consisting of 22 countries that have 60 days to address concerns and risks) (Cole 2025; Ferragamo 2025). Moreover, Trump's global trade war has extended tariffs to no fewer than 50 African countries (Mesa 2025; Panetta 2025). Although the tariffs were later postponed, they threatened to override the benefits of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which was barely extended till 2026. Again, the impacts of US aid cuts and suspensions have been significantly felt in Africa (Cilliers 2025). As earlier suspected, Trump has displayed little or no interest in developing a coherent US-African strategy or in supporting democracy and climate resilience on the continent. Neither has he supported the required reform of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) that would secure permanent seats for the region (Isike and Oyewole 2024a).

Against this background, there is a growing concern about whether Trump 2.0 will improve or undermine US-Africa relations. Despite its numerous inadequacies, Joe Biden's administration developed a US-African strategy, made high-level visits to the continent and supported democracy, climate resilience and socioeconomic development in Africa through trade, aid and investments, as well as UNSC reform for African permanent seats (Isike and Oyewole 2024b, 2024c). While the Trump administration has yet to display sufficient commitment towards these directions, some of its policies have their own considerable merits. Unlike Biden, Trump's foreign policy is culturally indiscriminate on the system of government, thereby offering African democracies and autocratic states similar

opportunities to conduct their relations with the US in a transactional manner (Isike and Oyewole 2024a). Moreover, Trump notably brokered the DRC-Rwanda Peace deal, where many earlier initiatives had failed, thereby contributing to peacebuilding on the continent (Ekanem 2025b; Lawal 2025). However, the DRC-US minerals for peace deal that underscored the Trump-brokered DRC-Rwanda deal revealed the transactional approach of the new administration to US foreign policy, which is a subject of concern to many on the continent and beyond (Carter 2025; Zungu 2025). Nevertheless, many observers, including some contributors to this volume, believe that Trump 2.0 and its associated foreign policies offer rare opportunities for Africans to reduce aid dependency and better manage their resources to cater for human development. They feel that it is the opportune time to boost intra-African trade and local capacity in value-added production to raise the continent's strategic importance in the global value chain and to develop food and economic sovereignty, along with suitable political systems that are efficient, indigenous and popular among the peoples. Some admirers of MAGA believe that Africa needs a Trump-like leader to make the continent great. Consequently, the world is changing fast with the second coming of Trump, and this calls for intellectual interrogations from different perspectives and regions, including in Africa.

About the book

Africans are not blind, deaf or dumb to the world. The continent has always been involved in observing, reacting, reflecting and responding to world affairs. However, the impact and visibility of African contributions to the knowledge, practices and realities of international relations remain open to debate. In response to this challenge, the African Centre for the Study of the United States at the University of Pretoria (ACSUS-UP) initiated this project three weeks after the inauguration of Trump as the 47th President of the US, after observing some of the rapid changes to America's foreign policy positions and its (potential) impact on global order, disorder and reorder from an African point of view. The objective was to offer a concise and timely scholarly reflection that blends conciseness with the diversity of African experiences, to inspire intellectual deliberations, and to inform and impact policy engagements on the continent with US foreign policy in a rapidly changing world order, disorder and reorder.

This book is the outcome of a hybrid workshop organised by ACSUS-UP on the subject of 19 May 2025. As the second volume of this project, the book is divided into eighteen chapters. The last contribution to the two volumes was received in September 2025, while this concluding chapter was completed in November, with some revision thereafter. As an early prognosis of Trump 2.0 and its consequences for US foreign policy and world order, contributors contend with several pros and cons of such early intellectual engagement with evolving issues. Data inadequacy, shortage of materials, time constraint, trend uncertainty and event trajectory unpredictability make a conclusive analysis of increasingly dynamic themes and fast-moving events challenging. Contributors draw from historical data, Trump 1.0 records and early indicators of US foreign policy under the new administration, along with the resultant international reactions and responses, to illuminate paths to understanding the evolving world order and Africa's position in this context.

Beyond this introductory section and the first chapter that reintroduces the book, there are seventeen chapters divided into seven sections. Section II, comprising Chapters 2 to 4, covers the changing US role in world affairs. In Chapter 2, Mariah Faridah Muli examines how the 'America First' doctrine of Trump's 2.0 is reflected in US foreign policy and discusses the implications for global power dynamics in a multipolar world. With the US disengaging from multilateral institutions, suspending foreign aid, withdrawing from climate agreements and participating in a tariff war that is exacerbating global trade tensions, Washington's influence is being challenged by great-power competitors, such as China and Russia. Meanwhile, Trump's pivot to bilateral diplomacy, such as initiating U.S.-Russia peace talks while sidelining NATO, further weakens traditional Western alliances. For Africa, these policies present both risks and opportunities. Trump's tariffs and other pressures on China, India and other countries, and the reduction in US aid and investment across Africa, could push these countries closer. This chapter examines how Trump's foreign policy is accelerating a multipolar world and how it is affecting Africa's geopolitical strategy, economic positioning, and diplomatic alignments.

In Chapter 3, Sky Lukas Mkuti explores the strategic uncertainties created by the US MAGA foreign policy and the implications for Global North-Global South relations. Using alliance and multilateralism from the end of World War II to the post-9/11 era, the US emerged and maintained its position as a

superpower, recognising the perils of isolationism in an increasingly anarchic global landscape. In contrast, the first Trump administration reshaped the dynamics of global diplomacy by disrupting the traditional Liberal International Order (LIO), while his second coming amplifies uncertainties in US global relations, threatening foes and long-standing allies alike across the globe. The chapter argues that Trump's MAGA foreign policy opposes interdependence and global co-operation, as it interrogates the implications for global peace, strategic alliances and the sustainable development aspirations of the Global South.

In Chapter 4, Tony Onazi Oche and Christopher Isike examine the implications of Trump 2.0 for the US global role in AI safety governance. Amid the growing scholarly debate on the actual and potential impacts of Trump 2.0, there is inadequate attention from policy scientists on how the changes in the US will influence AI governance. One of the earliest executive orders by President Trump was to discontinue the AI safety policy, to maintain America's edge in the development of advanced AI models through less regulation. The chapter reviews and compares the AI safety policies under the two Trump administrations with those of the Biden administration. Although Trump is perceived to prefer less regulation of advanced AI development and deployment, this chapter argues that he has not really changed the AI safety governance landscape in comparison to Biden's administration. It contends that 'AI safety governance' is a more useful conceptual tool for studying different approaches to AI concerns instead of the broader AI governance. It also analyses how changes in the US government will impact global AI safety and governance.

Covering Chapters 5 and 7, Section III of this book focuses on the internal-external dynamics in US foreign policy. In Chapter 5, Peterson Waweru reflects on internal-external dynamics in foreign policy analysis, focusing on the decline of the liberal world order and the rise of great men and hero worship. The liberal international order, popularised after World War II and renewed after the Cold War, has increasingly come under pressure from economic crises, democratic backsliding and rising nationalism. As trust in democratic institutions and governance wanes, many countries are turning to authoritarianism with leaders who promise political stability, sovereignty and national revitalisation. This shift has profound consequences for foreign policy, as leader-driven decision making challenges the bureaucratic and institutional frameworks that have long governed international relations. This chapter contrasts the European Union's structured

and bureaucratic foreign policy approach with the emerging transactional and personality-driven strategies of leaders such as Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping. It categorises strongmen based on their distinct geopolitical approaches, such as economic dominance, territorial revisionism and ideological nationalism. Drawing theoretical insights from Francis Fukuyama and Karl Mannheim, the chapter analyses the emerging trend of great foreign policy, how it is (re)shaping the evolving global order, and its implications for international diplomacy, particularly in Africa.

In Chapter 6, Samukelo Ndlovu and Ayabulela Mhlahlo examine foreign policy as a genre of colonial power games, as they reflect on the influence of right-wing think tanks, their agenda, such as the 'Project 2025', and their impacts on Trump 2.0 foreign policy. The chapter is premised on the convergence of critical race perspectives in International Relations and Philosophy, as it uses discourse analysis to deconstruct foreign policy as a textual genre of colonial power. Although foreign policy is often discussed in the context of states as sovereign and insulated powers, the chapter also examines how the concept is manipulated by Western imperial powers, such as the United States of America, as a means of asserting colonial power. In Chapter 7, Samukelo Ndlovu examines how the US-based Christian fundamentalist NGOs are transforming sexual politics in Africa and re-configuring the nation-state, as the growing number of African countries passing bills with stringent penalties for homosexuality illustrates. This chapter examines the roles of co-ordinated global campaigns led by US faith-based NGOs, such as Family Watch International (FWI), in the politics of anti-LGBTQIA+ legislation in Africa. It shows how such messaging finds a home in Africa through the open revolving door of ideological influence between the Global North and the Global South.

Section IV of this book covers the changing US-Africa relations in Trump 2.0 from Chapters 8 to 10. In Chapter 8, Levious Chiukira, Tanatsiwa Dambuza, and Ray Masuku focus on MAGA nationalism and the prospect of AGOA renewal after its expiration under Trump 2.0 in 2025. The chapter shows scepticism about the future of 'non-reciprocal' trade frameworks like AGOA, which grants African countries duty-free access to the US market. This scepticism is based on Trump's 'America First' doctrine and MAGA rhetoric, withdrawal from the WHO, negative disposition towards the WTO and NAFTA and preference for transactionalism, nationalism, protectionism, bilateral deals and reciprocity, as

well as his imposition of tariffs against China, Mexico, Canada and many other countries. However, geopolitical competition with China raises the prospect of continuous Washington support for the AGOA under Trump 2.0.

In Chapter 9, Mary Magdalene Sackflame, Ibrahim Akinola Salawu, and Kumi Ansah-Koi examine the critical roles of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in managing displaced persons in the Lake Chad Region, and the implications of the Trump 2.0 aid cuts in this conflict zone. In line with its 'America First' agenda, one of the earliest policy moves of the Trump 2.0 administration was to suspend almost all US foreign aid, including humanitarian aid across Africa. Based on the experience of the Lake Chad Region, this chapter shows that sudden USAID funding cuts without adherence to the prescribed exit plan in conflict zones exacerbated vulnerabilities among displaced persons, disrupted local economies and increased reliance on underfunded regional initiatives. The authors recommend diversified funding mechanisms, enhanced regional co-operation and sustainable policy frameworks to ensure the long-term resilience of displaced persons in conflict zones. In Chapter 10, Anton M. Pillay unpacks the diplomatic dispute between South Africa and the United States under Trump 2.0. The disagreements between these regional and global hegemons reflect ideational conflict over who controls the global narrative on race, an extremely important discourse in International Relations.

Section V, Chapters 11 to 13, examines climate change, health diplomacy and global governance. In Chapter 11, Gugulethu Lethu Ngwenya assesses the ripple effect of Trump's Paris Agreement withdrawal on climate adaptation funding for women-led initiatives in Sub-Saharan Africa. Trump 2.0 has sparked global controversy, uncertainty and a seismic change in US foreign policy and global frameworks, as US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord threatens global environmental aspirations as contained in Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 13. The effects of the US withdrawal are globally concerning and particularly devastating in Africa, a continent of developing nations struggling to industrialise and achieve economic growth for poverty reduction, while also contending with climate change. Trump's move raises questions about the future of climate financing, particularly for women-led climate change initiatives in Sub-Saharan Africa, such as Kenya's Green Belt Movement and the Green Climate Fund, as the US had been a dominant contributor to these initiatives. This chapter examines the ripple effect of climate change and the withdrawal of funding

on women and how it will exacerbate socioeconomic inequalities through the uneven distribution of resources that hinder gender equality objectives. It proposes a policy that integrates indigenous knowledge systems and scientific knowledge to combat climate change in Africa.

In Chapter 12, Bamidele Olajide and Victor Ojakorotu analyse the impacts of Trump 2.0 on climate governance in Africa and consider the relevance of climate bandwagoning. With the antecedents of his controversial first term and the sceptical start of his second term, climate governance globally as well as in Africa is unlikely to be prioritised under Trump 2.0. Given the disproportionate effects of climate change and the acute resilience deficit of developing countries, the re-withdrawal of the US from multilateral climate commitments, such as the Paris Agreement, will increase the vulnerability of the continent, highlighting the unconscionability of African countries' climate bandwagoning. Climate bandwagoning refers to the alignment of the development quest of developing countries with international climate protocols and processes, a strategy aimed at leveraging climate finance and technical assistance. However, Trump's 2.0 withdrawal of US leadership from global climate governance is a major source of concern in climate financing. The chapter recommends that African countries should reconfigure their climate change-development nexus by adopting alternative models and resilience building, which can foster regional innovation and minimise the effects of volatility caused by Trump 2.0 and future climate-sceptic developments.

In Chapter 13, Chané Nel discusses how the US is disengaging from global health governance with Trump's withdrawal from the World Health Organisation (WHO) and its effects. In line with Trump's campaign to cut foreign aid and his negative opinion about multilateralism and global health governance, one of his earliest executive orders was to withdraw the US from the WHO and defund USAID. Trump's position on the WHO can be traced to his troubled relations with the world body during the COVID-19 pandemic. Considering the US position as one of the leading funders of the WHO and medical aid globally, Trump's disposition towards health diplomacy is bound to have negative consequences for many African and other developing countries that rely heavily on medical aid from Washington.

Section VII, which covers Chapters 14 and 15, focuses on Trump's tariffs and emerging economic questions. In Chapter 14, Opeyemi Aromolaran, Samuel

Oyewole, and Nicholas Ngepah examine Trump's 2.0 tariff policy and its effect on the US domestic economy. The announced and enforced US tariffs on Canada, Mexico and China, as well as on many other countries globally, have generated a series of economic questions. The immediate effects of these policy actions have disrupted both the domestic and international economies, with notable effects on inflation and supply chains in the US and other countries, some of which have retaliated. Using historical data, this chapter examines the costs and benefits of the US tariff policy under Trump, and recommends a cautious and strategic approach to this measure.

Chapter 15, by Abdulrasheed Abdulyakeen, further examines emerging economies and the 2025 US tariff escalation, paying attention to retaliation, supply chains and strategic diplomacy. Beyond its dominant attention on the US-China trade dispute, this chapter also showcases how emerging economies such as South Africa, Brazil and India navigate the competing imperatives of maintaining access to global markets while protecting domestic industries. Using a comparative case study approach with strategic trade theory and neorealism, the chapter analyses retaliatory and adaptive measures, including reciprocal tariffs, trade diversification and supply chain realignment and their broader implications for global trade governance. The chapter provides a Global South perspective on strengthening resilience, preserving market access and enhancing the coherence of global trade governance, through a hybrid strategy that combines deeper regional integration with sustained engagement in multilateral institutions.

In Section VIII, Chapters 16 and 17 explore some strategic options for Africa and responses to Trump 2.0 and the emerging world order. In Chapter 16, Babatunde Oyateru calls for reshaping Africa's international relations in an America First world. The international system has been changing and is evolving rapidly since Trump's re-election. This is evident in the current illiberal trade policy of the US, economic transactionalism, an anti-aid disposition, shifting peace and conflict engagements and declining priority for Africa. Amid these, the chapter advocates for African states to take bold steps by deploying African agency to shape US-Africa and the continent's international relations. Likewise, Chapter 17, written by Nkanyezi Msimango and Neo R. Mofokeng, revisits the debated China-Africa relationship within the context of South Africa's international relations under Trump 2.0. It explores the nature and benefits of South Africa's relations with China, the implications for SA-US relations, and

the consequences of the evolving US-China relations for Pretoria in the broader context of Africa's relations with these superpowers. It is against this background that Chapter 18 provides a concluding reflection on Africa and its repositioning in relation to the US under Trump 2.0 and the emerging world order.

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Endnotes

1 This chapter is a revised version of the Chapter 1 of the first volume of this book project with significant difference in the last section.

2 It is noted that Australia struggles to position itself between its location in the South and its ontological and epistemological orientations towards the North (see Suleiman, Isike and Mickler 2023: 3).